1 Attachment(s)
The BCT CDR's Role in Security Force Assistance
I did this report up to inform on SFA activities from a BCT perspective. Over the course of a couple of weeks we interviewed three BCTs from the same DIV HQs. I wanted to get the observations out to the broader audience reached here through the SWC. The first page of the down loadable word.doc clarifies JCISFA's role, and why interviewing the BCTs supports that role. On the back end is a document used by one of the BN CDRs within a BCT that illustrates how he visualized the lines of effort and framed the conditions. Some of these observations will feed the SFA Mosul Case Study I'm working on which incorporates interviews with the BCT, MiTTs at different levels (DIV,BDE,BN), some of the key personnel from the Ninewa PRT, and others in order to capture the frictions and challenges of conducting SFA and related activities while also conducting offensive, defensive and stability operations. I hope to have that done and releasable as an UNCLASS study within a couple of months.
This is the lead in to the meat of this report.
QUOTE]The BCT and Below CDR’s role in SFA
In comparison to how much has been written about “Advisory Duty”, or the various impacts of Advisory duty with regards to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), the role of the BCT and below commanders (I include the regiment – both Army Marine and MN, or anyone who is assigned like responsibilities and authorities), and the organizations they lead has been lacking. The exception to this might be the discussions that have evolved about the inconsistencies, command relationships, degrees of support, or shortfalls that advisors and their teams have encountered while conducting their mission. This is a deficiency in our understanding of the broader mission in Iraq and Afghanistan, the operational environment, the goals of our counter-insurgency efforts in those two countries and impacts on future DOTMLPF issues for the JIIM community. We divide our focus by making this an either / or argument, and we self-induce friction that is unwanted, unnecessary and constrain what we are able to accomplish with regard to the mission.
To better understand that role JCISFA is interviewing senior leaders and key players (staff, etc.) to consider the various attitudes, frictions, solutions, perceptions etc. within the BCTs and how they relate to other players and organizations they interact with. Currently I’m writing a SFA Case Study on Mosul that examines these relationships, however in the interim we thought it of benefit to share what we’ve learned so far with regards to BCT side. What follows is some of the forthcoming analysis that may benefit leaders at varying levels as they consider how to conduct SFA within their mission, how to task organize and train for it, and what it means to the future of SFA activities for the broader JIIM community.
While these issues are being discussed at high levels, the BCTs are involved to varying degrees. In some cases BCTs are fielding whole teams out of their organizations, in others they are filling holes on existing teams with individual augmentees, and in some they are in supporting role. It all depends on the conditions of METT-TC. In all three of the cases below, the CDRs took conceptually different approaches to the conditions as they were perceived in relation to their mission. However, certain themes and threads were consistent in all three approaches. The BCTs were all in Iraq at the same time and in garrison shared the same patch, but each inherited different conditions that range from the status of friendly forces, the enemy, their ranking in priority with regards to “the Surge” in Baghdad, and the higher HQs they worked for.
These are among just the most distinguishable differences, there are many more subjective and subliminal ones that deal with the personalities of the leaders within those formations, the personalities of the various TTs and PRTs within their respective AORs, the personalities, maturity and ambitions of the ISF, ethnic groups, and competing interests, etc.. In each case the BCTs had to contend with conducting SFA activities and other developmental lines (economic, political, etc.) while conducting offensive and defensive pieces as part of COIN operations. The enemy was always present, always creating tough choices, always tough, adaptive and determined – CDRs had to make continual assessments as to where to place effort, emphasis and resources – it was heavy on the art of command, and the professional experience they had accumulated was resident in their judgment.
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Best, Rob
