Contractors Doing Combat Service Support is a Bad, Bad Idea

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

As a historian, I would think you would know better than to compare a 21st century infantryman to a Roman Legionaiire. The number and complexity of skills a modern combat soldier is required to master far outstrips any relevant historical example. It isn't marching in formation and swordplay or even musketry - there's a ton of highly technical, highly perishible skills that must be maintained. You hire an infantryman today to be a highly trained infantryman, not a generalist slave. There's barely time to keep guys proficient in all the core skills required.

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I didn't compare anything. I simply offered an example of an alternate model where infantrymen were expected to do more than just the infantry tasks.

However, I do agree with Selil and think you're giving short shrift to what was expected of the Roman Legions as compared to what they had.

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Here we disagree. There is a difference between "luxury" and "decent system". We had a decent system in both my tours. Our guys received 1-2quality hot meals, laundry service, mail, and other services daily in the COP. No one was deprived. All it took was a little effort on the part of the chain of command. If someone's not getting that, it's not a logistics/fairness issue, but a leadership issue. We got everything except for the shellfish that the guys on the FOB did.

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Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

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Depends on excessive. Yes, there was some amount of overboard. That said, why live badly if you don't have to? I will also say the "bounty" is greatly appreciated by guys rotating off the line.

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And it should be there for the folks rotating off the line. But nobody has touched the subject of the folks for whom this is the daily experience.

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Separate argument. One can argue the main argument FOR the FCS system is that it will reduce the supply tail requirements immensely - common parts, smaller crews, better engines, and more reliability all will significantly reduce logistics tail if they work as advertised (different thread).

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Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

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One can argue no one (organizationally) thought Iraq would last this long, and recruiting extra CSS to support what were envisioned as short term demands would carry higher cost than contracting someone to do it.

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It doesn't make me feel any better to know that military planning starts from the premise that everything will work out just as we want it to. I'm sorry, I just don't have a lot of sympathy or patience for that argument. It suggests that there is a large deficit in professional competence in those running things. So, why should I feel particularly good about the ancillary decisions they've made?

On the other hand, it seems that there was always an intention to maintain a significant military presence in Iraq. So I'm not sure that I buy the argument that this was "just how it worked out when it had to be settled on the fly."

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Units do eat together at the team/squad level often. Especially in a COP. You also seem to assume that there's a lack of bonding going on - trust me, the main thing soldiers desire is often a little privacy from their unit for awhile. However, operations are ongoing 24/7, so an imagined BN mess all happily passing the gravy is a little dream-worldish.

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I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

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Food is certainly not a minor issue - I could argue it's one of the most key components of morale. That's why I don't agree with your assessment of the problem or the solution - ensuring the guys get the best quaility of food possible in adquate amounts immensely contributes to morale. Nothing saps a deployment worse than constantly eating bad food. I never (organizationally) ate better than I ate while deployed to Kosovo in 2000-2001. Better than most all inclusive resorts. I know it significantly impacted my perceptions of the deployment, and made it much more bearable (back when I thought six months was a long deployment). Having high quality food is a morale multiplier. I wouldn't want to go to Army A's.

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1. Yes, food (and dining) are important to morale -- that's the whole point of my dissertation. How it works is where it gets very interesting. I've got my President Bush Thanksgiving 2003 action figure to remind me of that.

2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

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I'm confused why you don't think we have the same ethos today - assigning a combat general to oversee a problem area just happened - look at Walter Reed. They took BG Tucker (a tanker) and made him DCO of WR to clean up the mess, which he did. Now he's headed back to the force that the WTU's and other reforms are underway. Shifting a general to oversee what were really leadership (not supply) issues is far different than taking an infantryman and making him pump gas.

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It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

Regards,
Jill

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Originally Posted by Sargent

This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations?

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That could be a question not only about food, but just about anything in this war...
- Inflated awards (Bronze Stars for everyone!)
- Cushy accomodations (air conditioned huts with actual beds and mattresses)
- Outlandish amenities (PX, restaurants, movie theaters, KBR DFAC with Baskin Robbins sundaes made to order, etc)
- Misusing the supply system to order "nice to haves" rather than necessities (take a look at what you can order in a GSA catalog; it's insane, but many units order the stuff)
- Misappropriation (building bus stops, party patios, and saloons have become the standard uses for lumber in Iraq - lumber that we purchase and ship there at a heavy premium)
- Umpteen gazillion other examples

I just figured I'd toss that out there, in case you're looking for more research material. There is a vast, fruitful plain of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement deserving attention.

Back to the original thread, I still say that the solution is not to revamp the logistics system that delivers food. The solution is to reinvent MREs, or MRE-like meals, that are designed for long-term consumption. The delivery of MREs is highly efficient for the logistician and makes life very simple for the company level folks.

I was one of those few Combat Arms officers lucky enough to become a Support Platoon Leader in an Armor Battalion. It was one of the most difficult - and rewarding- jobs I;ve had in uniform. I learnt how logistics works at the BN and BDE level, and have become a much better officer because of it.

Now - getting to the issue at hand - there are too many contractors in the military today. I agree with those that use the post-Cold War declining endstrength as a factor. The Army leadership wanted to keep the same culture associated with a large standing Army in place, so the easiest way was to hire contractors to perform certain services. Whether that was wise or not is a discussion for another time.

Where my beef comes in is that we have contractors in all theaters performing duties that should be allocated to the uniformed services. Case in point - there was a retired 06 working in the Future Ops cell in the command I was in Afghanistan - at the strategic level. Was he competent? Certainly. Would it have been better for an Army or Marine Officer to be in his position and gain the knowledge and experience required for professional development? IMO, yes indeed.

I was stunned when I deployed to Afghanistan - lobster and steak on Friday's? Jesus Christ, I ate better there than I do in CONUS. I do not expect that kind of treatment, nor do I want it. I enjoy the Spartan experience associated with military service, and the chow halls in theater were so over the top and disassociated with reality it blew my mind. Did it help morale? I suppose so at an individual level. But it became a very sore point to me travelling through certain sections of Afghanistan, and seeing people who could barely scratch out an existance, and there we were getting effing steak, crab legs and lobster every Friday. It made me ashamed to be quite frank.

'Dueling Opinons'

Because that's what it's degenerated to. On the one hand we have the Spartans, on the other the sybaritic Persians... :D

I guess I'm a Persian, I got Steak every now and then in a couple of wars; I thought it was a good idea even as I ached for the kids who later scuffled through our garbage for something edible.

For Jill: If you believe that the original intent was to remain in Iraq long term, you may want to delve into that in more depth.

For Ski: You enjoy the Spartan existence -- does every other soldier you know believe in the same standard? How would our enlistment rate look were your view to prevail?

Seems to me to be a lot of "If I were God..." and that valid points made by folks who were there are sort of overlooked. The most egregious overlooking being in the area of how (to include methods and times), even if you dispense with contractors and the troops do the CSS jobs, you are going to feed the guys outside the wire in the COPs the same meals you are able to feed in the base camps. That doesn't even get into how you're going to retain, in a volunteer force, those Fobbits and / or REMFs if you forced them to eat like the line guys.

No one has yet come up with a viable alternative that will meet the needs and goals of the nation, the army -- or of today's troops who are very emphatically not Spartans, Roman Legionaires, Revolutionary Continentals or even post Civil War troopies. I'll wait for that.

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Originally Posted by Schmedlap

That could be a question not only about food, but just about anything in this war...
- Inflated awards (Bronze Stars for everyone!)
- Cushy accomodations (air conditioned huts with actual beds and mattresses)
- Outlandish amenities (PX, restaurants, movie theaters, KBR DFAC with Baskin Robbins sundaes made to order, etc)
- Misusing the supply system to order "nice to haves" rather than necessities (take a look at what you can order in a GSA catalog; it's insane, but many units order the stuff)

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It isn't just this war I'm afraid. In 1974, I worked in the Makiminato Service Area (MSA) on Oki, a major transhipment point for "stuff" being retrograded from Viet Nam. All the warehouses were crammed full; so, a lot of the "stuff" was stored outside. During breaks, I used to walk around and see what was in the MSA. My favorite find was a 10x10X10 (1000 cubic feet) crate from Transportation Officer, Cam Ranh Bay that was labelled "Skis, Arctic." The amount of crates full of high end office furniture (couch, leather for example), steam tables, refrigerators, ice cream makers, etc was amazing to me.

I think we recognize that being out there is tough . We try to palliate the suffering as and where we can. We probably do as much Class VI kind of stuff as we think we can afford to do for those that we can get to. Of course opinions will vary about that. But I think we need to remember what opinions are like. :wry:

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Originally Posted by Sargent

Sometimes it's a systemic problem, as in, there is not a system in place to deal with the folks outside the wire.

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Can't disagree more. It's called LOGPAC. It is simply not possible (or wise) to supply a guy on the line to the same level that is possible in the rear. You can arbitrairly reduce what is available in the rear to the same level, but to what end? Also, rear areas are for refit. If you're talking about Transition Teams, they are a special case, and may be embedded far away from coalition largesse. Comes with the territory.

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Same argument. You create a set of requirements and you incur a set of costs. Even if the system works as well as it can, should we be spending resources to run generators to maintain significant ice cream stores?

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I agree that some of the level is a bit much, and could be reduced. But I disagree that it's an argument against using contractors or that soldiers should go back to pulling KP. All that requires is a re-write of the contract as to what food is provided. There are valid arguments against contractors, but in the end they provide the food requirement that is contracted for. That's not their fault, it's DoD's.

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I understand that both needs - for together time and for privacy -- must be managed. My original response was to an example where only one side of the equation was potentially being addressed. Elsewhere, I've pointed out that one can use MREs and hot chow alternately, to give space when needed, and bring the group together when needed.

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I still fail to see where you think cohesion has been impacted in the current environment by food issues. Where is the basis behind the assertion that there is a cohesion issue in the force due to either KBR chow or MRE's? Some examples so I understand where your position comes from?

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As I've never said anything approaching what you describe in the last sentence, it seems rather unfair to characterize my position in that way. That being said, while it might not be the norm for the BN to get together for a meal, there is certainly a value to doing just that on occasion. Call it a Warrior Mess Night.

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Which is done regularly by units, at the end of field exercises and our formal occasions.

I guess I am primairly confounded as to what is driving your problem assessment and some of the assertions that have been made, along Old Eagle's comment. It seems you have an opinion and are looking for evidence that fits it.

For example:

1) MRE's and KBR hurt unit cohesion because of lack of shared meals
2) There is no "system" for supplying the line with hot chow.
3) That it is reasonably possible, in the security environment, to provide equal access to services/chow for all soldiers, wherever stationed.
4) There is a leadership problem in the Army specifically regarding this
5) That using combat arms troopers in CSS roles provides benefits that outweigh the opportunity costs, and would preform at a level equal to or above those with the specific MOS
6) That our supply system leadership is wanting and requires combat arms guys to run it.
7) That having unequal access to service/chow measurably impacts combat force morale, and decreases performance of CSS types who do have access to it.

Each point can be argued, but you argue with enough vigor that I am curious to the data backing your arguments. My data comes from my experiences at varying levels in the army for 11 years.

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2. Based on that, the gaps in the system concern me. You can shrug them off, and maybe it is personal to me, but I doubt that it was a one-off occurrence, and based on WHY it happened, it's liable to happen more in the future, and certainly in any future where we can't rely on getting most of our folks onto large bases.

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We have plenty of MRE and UGR-A support, especially heat and serve. So there isn't a "gap", the army has solutions. I also want to know why MRE's are sustainable long term. We ate MMM and MMA for the first five months of OIF without health or nutrition issues. When it became possible, the larger DFACS were set up. Contracting is usually cheaper than the long term costs of carrying the infrastructure. However, I haven't seen a cost/benefit data from a reliable source comparing the cost to the Army (short and long) of reestablishing its food service corps to do what contractors are doing now. I'm prepared to be persuaded on the economic cost.

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3. Given the COIN objectives in Iraq, and given what my research has suggested insofar as disparity between groups is concerned, we are doing ourselves a strategic disservice with some of these quality of life systems. I may be a fan of gastronomy for morale, but I know that the biggest morale boost comes from being mission effective.

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Show me how having steak and lobster on large FOB's affects mission effectiveness? Again, I'm looking for evidence (not anecdote) that combat performance or service support has been affected because of having an abundance of food. Or that having Baskin Robbins in the DFAC with the CSS creates a decrease on the performance or morale of line troops. Some complaining about REMF's, maybe, but I'm talking measurable impact. You can make an entirely reasonable argument that large FOB's are not helpful in COIN from an attitude standpoint, but that is not what is being argued.

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4. This is the least important, but I do wonder how it will play out -- what becomes of a treat, of a morale booster, if it becomes the norm? I AM NOT MAKING A COMPARISON, but this is the problem with spoiled children. Can we afford hyper-inflation of expectations? I also think there is a difference between feeding the troops well -- good, wholesome, healthy foods -- and giving them special treats. In that way both needs are met without blunting the edge of the gastronomy for morale tool.

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No real disagreement here - but soldiers adapt. In 2003, we ate crappy food over and over for months. We got over it. We liked it when KBR became available. Yay. Combat effect as long as bellies were full = zero.

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It was not that there was a problem of leadership in the supply and logistics system during the Revolutionary War. It was that it was being handled by the private sector, it wasn't working, and General Washington realized that the only way to make sure it did was to make it a military responsibility -- and as such, he wanted his best man in the job.

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And that is different from my WR example how? Mostly contractors were failing their job, the military assigned to support was also failing, and the SecDef/Chief of Staff appointed a high quality combat leader to fix the issue. Also, we were creating an army from scratch then, so I think the comparison may be weak when infering the performance of KBR to the performance of the private revolutionary contractors. What I resented was the implication that our leaders are somehow not measuring up, and the constant barbs on the "quality of our leadership" as if it's some monolith. We have good and bad leaders, and I wouldn't say any of the above is representative of anything culturally relevant to the force. We have much bigger fish to fry than food sevice, IMO.

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1) MRE's and KBR hurt unit cohesion because of lack of shared meals

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No, my point regarding MRE vs. hot chow is that the two can have very different effects the unit. Commanders should be aware of this so that they can use the two effectively to deal with the cohesion need at the moment.

As for the FOB dining system, there has historically been morale issues between the line and the rear elements, in terms of what each gets vs. what each does. Be aware of that.

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2) There is no "system" for supplying the line with hot chow.

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In certain circumstances, yes, that is the case. See my response to 1 to why this can become a problem.

Furthermore, to the extent that contractors take care of the food, you will always have a problem supporting those who are in dangerous locations. Getting food to the guys on the front line is always going to be perilous. Who is more likely to take on that responsibility -- contractors or other soldiers/Marines?

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3) That it is reasonably possible, in the security environment, to provide equal access to services/chow for all soldiers, wherever stationed.

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No, that's not what I have said. I have argued that the priority should start with the line folks, with those outside the wire and work backwards. If you can only manage to get the guys in peril one hot meal a day, don't go overboard with those behind the lines.

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4) There is a leadership problem in the Army specifically regarding this

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I've never said that. There's a -- I don't know, is it adoctrinal, strategic, budgetary, personnel, philosophical, etc. -- problem, probably within DoD as a whole, with how CS/CSS is viewed. I worry that a system that served well for two centuries was discarded not for effectiveness reasons but for fiscal reasons. But I don't think we're spending much less. And if money is the problem, I think it might be better to figure out how to reduce the demand rather than changing the system of delivery.

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5) That using combat arms troopers in CSS roles provides benefits that outweigh the opportunity costs, and would preform at a level equal to or above those with the specific MOS

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I think it bears considering whether troops might not be better suited to the tasks, particularly as you get closer to the fight. How you want to fill those billets creates another set of questions.

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6) That our supply system leadership is wanting and requires combat arms guys to run it.

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I suggested the use of CA personnel in response to the argument that supply/log soldiers didn't care about the front line guys any more than contractors did. So, I thought about a comparative situation -- how Marines feel about their own aviators, that they trust them because the latter have gone through TBS and know soomething about what the guys on the ground are doing -- and that's why I floated the idea about using combat arms personnel in CS/CSS functions, especially those functions at the front lines.

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7) That having unequal access to service/chow measurably impacts combat force morale, and decreases performance of CSS types who do have access to it.

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Response to part one -- all historical evidence suggests that such a situation will breed discontent. It also breeds a bit of a swagger and a degree cohesion amongst the "downtrodden." Paradoxical, but the guys who do the fighting are really an interesting bunch. Which becomes more influential depends on a variety of factors, probably paramount among them is the extent to which they feel they are successful and effective in the mission.

Response to part two -- do you really want to run the risk of creating a set of expectations that you may not be able to meet in the future? I don't know what will happen to the rear troops if you spoil them too much -- I don't know enough about that particular niche. But I do know that, generally speaking, too much of a good thing reduces the enjoyment of the good thing.


Regards,
Jill

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Originally Posted by Sargent

As for the FOB dining system, there has historically been morale issues between the line and the rear elements, in terms of what each gets vs. what each does. Be aware of that.

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Bitching about the REMFs is a cherished, time honored CA tradition. It has been going on as long as there have been REMFs. The guys who do the fighting are always going to complain about the guys who do the supporting, no matter what. It is not going to go away. I can remember being in the field as a young soldier and complaining because we thought that the REMFs were keeping the "good" t-rats and giving us the bad ones (in retrospect I have no idea what the difference between a good and a bad t-rat is:)). There is an old saying in the Army, "If joe ain't bitchin', joe ain't happy."

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Originally Posted by Sargent

Furthermore, to the extent that contractors take care of the food, you will always have a problem supporting those who are in dangerous locations. Getting food to the guys on the front line is always going to be perilous. Who is more likely to take on that responsibility -- contractors or other soldiers/Marines?

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Can you point to any circumstance when a front line guys didn't eat because of contractors? I don't know about the Marines but there are plenty of Army log convoys traveling all over Iraq. If there is a place where the contractors won't go because it is too dangerous then we have military log guys to carry supply to those areas. Just because we have contractors carrying a lot of the stuff does not mean that our log don't carry any. Presumably it is the same with the Marines.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

No, that's not what I have said. I have argued that the priority should start with the line folks, with those outside the wire and work backwards. If you can only manage to get the guys in peril one hot meal a day, don't go overboard with those behind the lines.

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As Cav pointed out we are generally supporting the frontline guys as well as circumstances and a facilities allow. Some of the COPs I have been on don't have enough room for a decent sized latrine, never mind an MKT and a mess section.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

I think it bears considering whether troops might not be better suited to the tasks, particularly as you get closer to the fight. How you want to fill those billets creates another set of questions.

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As I stated above, troops are still doing this. Contractors have augmented but not replaced troops, with some exceptions.


As per SOP Ken cuts to the heart of the whole argument.

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Seems to me to be a lot of "If I were God..." and that valid points made by folks who were there are sort of overlooked. The most egregious overlooking being in the area of how (to include methods and times), even if you dispense with contractors and the troops do the CSS jobs, you are going to feed the guys outside the wire in the COPs the same meals you are able to feed in the base camps. That doesn't even get into how you're going to retain, in a volunteer force, those Fobbits and / or REMFs if you forced them to eat like the line guys.

No one has yet come up with a viable alternative that will meet the needs and goals of the nation, the army -- or of today's troops who are very emphatically not Spartans, Roman Legionaires, Revolutionary Continentals or even post Civil War troopies. I'll wait for that.

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SFC W

Ken - my biggest gripe with the chow halls is that the food we were given was beyond the pale in comparison with what the locals ate. They probably had no idea what we were eating - and the seafood was off limits to most of the Afghans anyway- but there was a serious disconnect in my reality box when I was sitting in a mess hall in Afghanistan getting better food than what I would get at home.

Understand the spartan way is not for all and that the meals were intended to boost morale. Just seems like a case of cognitive dissonance to me.

Uboat wrote:

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Can you point to any circumstance when a front line guys didn't eat because of contractors? I don't know about the Marines but there are plenty of Army log convoys traveling all over Iraq. If there is a place where the contractors won't go because it is too dangerous then we have military log guys to carry supply to those areas. Just because we have contractors carrying a lot of the stuff does not mean that our log don't carry any. Presumably it is the same with the Marines.

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I can send you specific details in a private message, but I don't want to get into it on the open list.

But generally, I understand full well that, in combat, front line logistics are a bear. I know that at times supply and support can be severely constrained, and troops must make do with very little. I also know how powerful the urge to give the troops as much as possible can be -- so much so that commanders have at times unnecessarily risked the lives of their troops to do so. I do not, however, have much tolerance for a system that can leave some out in the cold when but a few miles away guys are eating ice cream -- all the while, the contractor is still paid. That's just ridiculous.

Now it's your turn. Explain for me and Ski how the sort of quality of life efforts being made on behalf of the vast majority of Americans deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is not harming our COIN effort. Can you justify generators being run non-stop to keep the lobsters and ice cream on ice while most Iraqis are still without a reliable electrical system? How do you propose for the Iraqi Army to learn how to DIY their own logistics at the battalion level when they have no model from which to learn?

Regards,
Jill

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Originally Posted by Sargent

...I do not, however, have much tolerance for a system that can leave some out in the cold when but a few miles away guys are eating ice cream -- all the while, the contractor is still paid. That's just ridiculous.

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The guys out in the heat in OTOH may well want Ice Cream -- unlike you, they understand why they can't have it (as has been repeatedly explained by several others above) and they don't get too wrapped around the axle about luck of the draw REMFs eating better (as has also been repeatedly stated).

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Now it's your turn. Explain for me and Ski how the sort of quality of life efforts being made on behalf of the vast majority of Americans deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is not harming our COIN effort...

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Good try. Hard to prove a negative. :D

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...Can you justify generators being run non-stop to keep the lobsters and ice cream on ice while most Iraqis are still without a reliable electrical system?

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Sure. Those generators are running lights, computers, defensive systems and hospitals -- and the vaccines, serum and blood the treatment facilities need. The lobsters and ice cream are only a microscopically small part of the mass of food it takes to feed the troops. Most of that food is cheap stringy contract beef, pork and chicken plus vegetables. Most of it also doesn't taste that great, the steak and lobster can be tough and stringy too but at least they make up for Chili Mac and Roasted Chicken.

The Iraqis have more electricity now than they had in 2002 and they know it. They are unlikely to ever have the relative luxury the US does and takes with it where ever it goes.That may offend some but it's a fact of life and has been true in every war we've been in during my lifetime. I doubt it will change. Even if we get a Spartan for CJCS... ;)

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How do you propose for the Iraqi Army to learn how to DIY their own logistics at the battalion level when they have no model from which to learn?

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One should expect them to resurrect the previous logistic system they had, copied from the British and that worked for them through a pretty big war in the 1980-88. That's a fact of history. They'll take on a few US modifications but it will basically be an Iraqi log system as it should be.

We do BTW, have log systems at Bn level to include cooks. It's cheaper and easier to use the contract mess to cook huge quantities and the Bn picks up and distributes it to the Outposts (not the contractor, the Bn and the units in that Bn).

Doesn't have to be your way, Ski's way or my way to work...

And I'm still waiting for this:

"No one has yet come up with a viable alternative that will meet the needs and goals of the nation, the army -- or of today's troops who are very emphatically not Spartans, Roman Legionaires, Revolutionary Continentals or even post Civil War troopies. I'll wait for that."

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Originally Posted by Uboat509

Can you point to any circumstance when a front line guys didn't eat because of contractors?

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There is no such case for one very simple fact: contractors do not fill out the LOGSTAT. The Company XO does. Had my company run out of food when I was an XO, assuming that I were not relieved or that I did not get throttled by my CO and BN XO, then I doubt that anybody would have taken me seriously if I attempted to blame it on a contractor. Even if "front line" folks were getting food cooked, delivered, and served by contractors, there would still be no excuse. MRE's have an NSN and they're abundant. There are pallets of them all over Iraq. Jot down MRE x 96 BX on your LOGSTAT and even a support platoon that is half asleep and has 8 deadlined vehicles can get you 2 pallets of MREs by tomorrow. I'll trade you my orange poundcake for your raspberry applesauce.

Ken White wrote:

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One should expect them to resurrect the previous logistic system they had, copied from the British and that worked for them through a pretty big war in the 1980-88. That's a fact of history. They'll take on a few US modifications but it will basically be an Iraqi log system as it should be.

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This is a most bizarre comment given the number of threads and comments on strengthening our advisory capability. According to your logic, there is no need for the advisors, because the Iraqis had an army that could fight -- all they need to do is resurrect the previous operational capability they had, copied from [and often educated by] the British and that had worked for them through a pretty big war in 1980-88. That's a fact of history as well.

Otherwise, if it is believed that the Iraqis need help with the trigger pulling, then it must be accepted that they will need help with the other stuff, because we ought to realize it's much easier to build up a good fighting capability than a good logistics capability.

Jill

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Originally Posted by Sargent

...According to your logic, there is no need for the advisors, because the Iraqis had an army that could fight -- all they need to do is resurrect the previous operational capability they had, copied from [and often educated by] the British and that had worked for them through a pretty big war in 1980-88. That's a fact of history as well.

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I'll just repeat this part:"...They'll take on a few US modifications but it will basically be an Iraqi log system as it should be."

Don't agree that building up a good fighting capability is all that much easier than building the Log capability -- but I certainly acknowledge that the Log piece is not easy. All of which has little to do with US practice and capabilities...

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Originally Posted by Schmedlap

I just figured I'd toss that out there, in case you're looking for more research material. There is a vast, fruitful plain of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement deserving attention.

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In other words: There's a war.

It's always been like that since the invention of the state as far as I know.

the Italian Army fascinated me when I was a young soldier; red wine, real pasta, and naps for lunch out in the brush of the Po River Valley and cappuccino and pasticcini's for afternoon breaks in hills and mountains of the Veneto region (apparently there are mobile versions of the cappuccino machine). I would always mentally compare and contrast what I had read about the history of the Romans with what I observed in modern times.

In general my take on things is that 'lighter is righter'. That outlook helps to keep me mentally and physically sharper out in the field and it helps with building rapport with the local populace; they are in fact very aware of how we fight and live.

As an 'Economics' data-point the 2008 Pocket World in Figures published by the Economist notes that 49.1% of the US population is employed, 29.3% of the Syrian population is employed, and 33.5% of the Turkish population is employed. The percentages for Afghanistan, Jordan, Iraq & Iran are not given and the Cayman Islands is listed as number one with 68.9% of the populace employed. 'Global Competitiveness' rankings were built on 259 different criteria, with the US being listed as number one.

Tooth to tail ratios over the years and over various campaigns for different armies would be interesting. Does anybody have any insights?

Just started in on this Rand study on US Forces (OP 23 The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations)...

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McGrath’s study finds that the tooth-to-tail ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have both increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

In other words: There's a war.

It's always been like that since the invention of the state as far as I know.

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Very true. But until very recently in history, suffering significant losses from disease, poor sanitation, and poor medical care could also be characterized as "it's always been like that." But instead of just dismissing the problem, we fixed it. Now death due to disease is rare, sanitation is adequate, and our wounded have incredibly high survival rates. One would think that we could have made similar headway in the fraud, waste, and abuse department, what with all the new IT capabilities, intense media oversight, and our newfound focus upon Army Values.

The "it's always been that way" attitude that many have towards the issue is generally borne of a belief that the problem is too complex to solve (not saying that is necessarily your view). The real problem is that such issues are often incredibly simple to solve, but it is leadership and labor intensive. It requires leaders - usually the 2IC's of an organization - to get off of their butts and maintain a heavy presence and significant supervision of their subordinates and, dare I say it, hold people accountable for their actions. Some do it. Some don't. The ones who don't seem to make up for those who do. How tough is it to prevent your unit from using lumber to build a party patio on the FOB, when an infantry company is begging for lumber to build overhead cover at their PB/COP? How long does it take to periodically check your DCR to make sure your supply sergeant is actually ordering the stuff that you need and not ordering televisions and mailing them home?

Waste in wartime is no technological challenge, but a motivation & sanction problem.

Extreme forms of motivation are employed to mobilize the necessary national resources for war. This does not allow to care for the finer points, like wasteful bureaucrats and war profiteers, as long as these don't oppose the general idea (often, they even claim to be an essential part of the effort).

Many social scientists see warfare as a social phenomenon first, and they are right.
It's easy to ignore that because the social aspects seem so self-evident and reliable, but an attempt to fight corruption and waste equals an assault on the foundation for warfare, the motivation.
Most people would find it extremely difficult to be united against a foe while in the same matter being against some of themselves, although these claim to contribute to the common effort against the external opponent. It's simply too complicated and confusing.

And wartime puts more stress on institutions than peacetime anyway, so there are few resources to fight that minor problem in addition to all those other problems.

Fraud and waste has always associated warfare, it's not as simple to defeat as pox.

and the steaks were usually too overdone.

While the grunt/line doggie will always bitch and moan about the REMF, it is after all a prerogative of the position ;) , they also almost universally understand that without those folks in the rear with the gear and the beer there wouldn’t be somewhere to rotate back to for some decent hot chow, real showers, etc.

It isn’t that you cannot live on Cs/MREs for quite a long period of time; it is they just get a bit mundane. The REMFs just get to enjoy the American largess daily because they happen to work there, but if they are not there then no one gets any perks. As has been noted here, and elsewhere, if you do not have to live in misery then why do it?

Having quality small unit time during chow is important and in my experience that time is mostly when you are eating field rats in a remote area. Everyone huddles up to horse trade items and often we just combined all the meats into a hash so all could enjoy the repast (especially relevant when the early MREs had the nutritious and delicious dehydrated beef patty, mmmmm). Seems to me that chow halls, rather than bringing folks together, tend to facilitate folks splitting up.

As to Surferbeetle’s experience with the Italians I would also say the French Foreign Legion is not lacking in the mastery of field epicureanism. The 2 REP seemed to have some marvelous scroungers and the cook (not his MOS just an additional duty) was always in fine form when “la soupe” was served in the western reaches of Djibouti. :D

The Canadians sure could have used the culinary talents of that ad hoc "soup" chef when they were next door in Somalia in '93. Instead, they got to subsist on hard rats (1980's MRE's left over from Germany, you know, the ones whose only luxuries were the chocolate bars that had gone pure white from age, and those even luckier fellows who got that tiny bottle of Tabasco sauce in their MRE) for six straight months. Not even hay boxes n' mystery meat:eek: to break up the monotony. No wonder some of the lads were feeling a little hostile.

Meanwhile the Task Force Headquarters was aboard ship in the Red Sea, and in between occasional ports of call, at least one of the most senior officers was able to get by on the creations of his personal (and real) chef - no kidding.:wry:

Edited to Add: All that said, if there had been resources to provide a true and full contingent of third-line log types, then perhaps some of the suffering that had to be endured could have been better alleviated from time to time.