"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

Moderator's Note

This thread was in the Operation Iraqi Freedom arena and on a quick review is a far more general topic so moved here (ends).


People enjoy comparing Afghanistan to Vietnam. Some comparisons fit, many do not. I believe it is high time to explore some other comparisons in a manner that may help us to better understand a family of conflicts, past and present. That family is Resistance.

The two case studies that most of the Small Wars Council community are very versed in for this thread are WWII and the ongoing US War on Terrorism. The core (rooted in human nature) dynamic that I would like to explore is the natural tendency for a foreign, and therefore illegitimate, occupation to trigger a resistance response in the populations affected by the same.

A resistance insurgency is very different than a revolutionary insurgency. The first is a continuation of war - where one system of governance seeks to coerce its will over another, where the government and army have been defeated, and only the population remain in the fight. Resistance is war.

A revolutionary insurgency, however, is internal to a single system of governance. Like the division of a cell, revolutionary insurgency occurs when some segment of the population comes to feel compelled to coerce through illegal (and often very violent) ways political change on the domestic system of governance over them. Such conflict is best thought of as civil emergency, rather than war, as it is largely an act of illegal democracy where legal democracy either does not exist or is inadequate to the task. If such a "cell" ultimately divides and new governance and army forms around the dissident population, such a civil emergency then, and only then, becomes civil war.

Below is a response I posted this earlier today on a thread on the Small Wars Journal:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/how...s-of-tora-bora

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In a court of law this entire thread is what might be called "relevant, but immaterial" (in that the information, while interesting and applicable to the case at hand, in no way helps resolve said case).

At a tactical level AQ is a pain in the ass. Tactically they are "a threat." They came to our country, they murdered our citizens, and while they did so in a war-like way, it was plain old, garden variety mass murder and we need to bring justice to those who perpetrated the act, and peace to those who suffered a tragic loss from that same act. Acting like a proverbial elephant with an irrational fear of mice, tromping all over any place where we think mice might hide with little regard to the impression that is creating in the minds of those innocently affected by our tromping is not making us safer. Quite the opposite, in fact.

At a strategic level AQ is a symptom. Just as the Treaty of Versailles made a future war with Germany inevitable, so too did the US decision to let the programs, policies and relationships nurtured during 45 years of Cold War manipulations in the Middle East to simply ride into the future make conflict with the people of that region inevitable as well. The explosion of information technology was an accelerant. Like the collision of a cold (war) front and a warm front over a sea of the people - it brewed a perfect storm.

In the first case, if not Hitler and the Nazi ideology it would have been someone else with some other rallying message. In the second case, if not AQ and their Islamist ideology it would have been someone else with some similar message (Islam-based ideology seems to be the only flavor that works in the Middle East for rallying people to illegal political action).

Resistance insurgency is a natural human response. While it is easy to appreciate why Hitler triggered this human response in every single country he invaded during WWII (and to some degree we even concede why we triggered resistance in Iraq and Afghanistan), we have a harder time appreciating that not every inappropriate, illegitimate "occupation" need be physical. I think we understand the rise of AQ and the resonance their message has had across the greater Middle East in the post-Cold War era best if we consider the possibility that one can trigger this human response through an "occupy by policy" as well as by the more traditional physical occupations we normally associate with resistance movements.

Why is this important? Because if we want to reduce the likelihood of terrorism against the US we must address the source of energy fueling the problem in the first place. Widespread CT operations and invasions of nations we see as supporting or facilitating the UW operations AQ has been conducting to leverage this resistance energy have served primarily to make that energy stronger. Symptoms must be mitigated, not defeated. To attempt to defeat symptoms ignores the problem and allows it to grow unchecked at best - at worst, and we have been bad, such efforts make the problem worse and accelerate its growth.

In many ways, much of what President Obama has been doing in regards to turning his back on Mubarak, tempering the use of drones, looking for diplomatic solutions to Syria, acting in ways that tend to piss off Cold War partners such as the Israelis and the Saudis in general - all have done far more to reduce the energy of this occupation by policy than all of our military efforts over the past 12 years combined. The boss has good instincts, but we have no strategy to provide the framework or narrative necessary to guide and communicate the logic of those actions.

If we want to get to better results, we need to redefine the problem and then devise new strategies. Working harder and faster to execute flawed perspectives focused on symptoms, or rehashing 12-year old battles, is not going to help us finally turn the corner on this problem.

RCJ

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Did the victors of WWI provoke an inevitable WWII by their occupation by policy of Germany through the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles?

Did the victors of the Cold War provoke an inevitable War on Terrorism and associated Arab Spring by their decision to largely leave in place in the Middle East the policies, practices and relationships nurtured during and in support of activities designed to contain the Soviet Union?

Do men like Osama bin Laden and Adolf Hitler "cause" these types of conflicts, or are they simply opportunists who, like Mao so eloquently said about his role in China, "saw a parade and leapt in front"?

Do ideologies - be it Nazism, Communism, Islamism, or any other "ism" radicalize otherwise content populations to rise in illegal conflict, or are these simply effective tunes tailored to help a particular "parade" march in step?

I believe we need to refocus the debate. We have debated the branches of these types of conflicts to death. The roots, however, we tend to gloss over. After all, it is uncomfortable to confront the very real possibility that these are roots we planted ourselves.

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Originally Posted by Bob

Did the victors of WWI provoke an inevitable WWII by their occupation by policy of Germany through the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles?

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"Inevitable" is too deterministic. I think it's generally accepted that the termination conditions of WWI did not resolve all of the outstanding issues in Europe, and also created new conditions for conflict. The Great Depression had an equally (or more?) important impact on the political and economic conditions that facilitated the success of Nazism. Germany survived World War I, unlike Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. But this question is also one with an implied structural theoretical base: did the individuals in politics and business matter at all to the outcome? And lastly, the agenda of the Nazi Party was not only the reversal of the Versailles Treaty, but also the establishment of a new German Empire in Europe itself. What about the end of WW1 prompted an imperial/colonial focus in Europe instead of Africa or Asia? Did those same conditions make it easier for the Nazis to succeed than other right-wing and left wing factions (particularly the socialists)? The Nazis were adeptly organized and by 1933 they had forged a number of key political and business alliances that propelled them to power. The other question is: was Nazi policy deliberate from start to finish, or did it evolve as the party gained power and became entangled in another world war? I forget which one, but one of the Werhmacht field marshals after the war basically started that none of them anticipated the invasion of Poland to start a global war.

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Originally Posted by Bob

Did the victors of the Cold War provoke an inevitable War on Terrorism and associated Arab Spring by their decision to largely leave in place in the Middle East the policies, practices and relationships nurtured during and in support of activities designed to contain the Soviet Union?

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Same thoughts as above, although Islamism was already on the ascent since the final failure of the Arab nationalists in 1973. I think the end of Arab nationalism as a credible political force had more to do with the emergence of Islamism than anything else. I think globalization (proliferation of weapons, technologies, communication, etc) contributed more significantly to Islamism's successes since then.

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Originally Posted by Bob

Do ideologies - be it Nazism, Communism, Islamism, or any other "ism" radicalize otherwise content populations to rise in illegal conflict, or are these simply effective tunes tailored to help a particular "parade" march in step?

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I think this is an important and deep question. First, ideologies don't emerge in a vacuum and it's difficult to predict which ideas will catch fire or how they will evolve over time. It's been argued that the ideological origins of Nazism can be traced to the mid 19th century. Of course, communism can be traced back to the writings of Marx in the same time period -- all before the emergence of a unified Germany, the rise of the US, and the two World Wars. How could anyone predict that these ideologies would more or less shape the second half of the 20th century? But it's also important to note that Marx himself argues that ideological reproduction is function of a system's political economy; in other words, the material system exists first and from it emerges an ideology to sustain it. In my view, this is probably the most accurate; people willingly believe what they wish to explain the world around them. The more desperate they are, the more radical the ideas will be. When times were good in the Weimar Republic, the Nazi party struggled to find support among the electorate. That changed with the Great Depression.

Certainly no particular set of facts or outcomes involving people are "inevitable," after all, we have free will to make decisions and the specific facts and cultural factors will always be unique. Versailles and the lesser known companion treaties, however, created an effect at the human nature level making some form of conflict inevitable.

But these are perceptions that can only be assessed through the lens of those on the receiving end of such an "occupation by policy."

Many on the winning side thought these treaties reasonable and necessary to prevent the very war they ultimately provoked. Likewise most Americans and Middle Eastern leaders either swept up in, or scrambling to ward off, Arab Spring, found the idea of sustaining the status quo emerging from the Cold War reasonable as well.

Common to both examples is that no one asked or gave serious consideration to how the people affected by these decisions felt.

Robert-what is interesting is the failure of Arab nationalism in the 70s and 80s vs say the rise of Sunni and Shia fundamentalism development since then-- especially Iran since 1979.

We often tend to focus on the AQ salafist side of the Sunni house and we speak of the Wahhabi Saudi influence with say FFs but I would say the last 12 years we tended to ignore the real differences between Sunni and Shia Islam.

During the last 12 years Saudi fundamentalism has in fact become the defacto Sunni standard across all Sunni Muslim populations especially in the political arena. While at the same time Shia fundamentalism is really a copy of what the Sunni's were doing as Khomeini attempted to become the overall leader of the Islamic world by using Sunni fundamentalism messaging-which he failed in because he could not bridge the gap of being a Shia and an Iranian in the eyes of the Sunni.

So what we now have in the ME is IMO a true clash between Sunni fundamentalism and Shia fundamentalism which is occurring in Syria as Syria is the key in the view of the Sunni fundamentalists in stopping the Shia expansion started by Khomeini and which is still is being continued by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards who view themselves the defenders of the Shia faith worldwide.

What concerns me is that we the US seem to want to sidestep this Islamic development as it is messy, complicated, has cost us a large amount of cash and lives on both sides and it does not lend itself to easy solutions that fit in a 30 second TV message. And it is equally difficult to explain to the US public who has been paying for it for the last 12 years.

It is now hard to say we screwed up and now we have to change directions---with our current divided political camps what politician is going to venture out with that messaging?

Also look at our think tanks and all of their messaging---who wants to lose one's funding stream by saying --just maybe we went the wrong direction.

Overall the ME population is working it out at the cost of thousands of killed and injured and we the US simply stand by---in some aspects our actions even recent actions are reinforcing the message that it is also not only the Shia fundamentalism that is problem for the Sunni --it is also our actions that are reinforcing the image that the US is actually siding with the Shia---if one really does take the time to read the recent AQ General Guidance for Jihad (Sept 2013) we could in fact be declared the "near enemy" and right now AQ is having success against the "near enemy".

What also concerns me is the side lining of the secular Sunni which is really a large part of the international Sunni population especially among the young and elites---we see this playing out now in Turkey.

We also see it playing our in Germany and France which have rather large Muslim populations--in Berlin there are districts under control of one or two Arabic clans/families/tribes using Sharia law to settle disputes---meaning in those districts the German judicial system which is the linchpin of Germany democracy is being undermined by Islam---already leading to increased neo Nazi backlash-which by the way is growing-and as well a growing concern for German politicians (from both major parties) who are also voicing the same concerns.

In France it is causing a large growth in the right wing as well.

In order to understand the ME it is time to fully understand Islamic fundamentalism (Sunni and Shia), why it occurs, how it is occurring and our role in driving that development---it is no longer just about AQ nor has it really been about AQ.

Islam is not going away any time soon.

In short, it isn't all about us. Yet when our policy is deemed as excessively inappropriate we generate a resistance effect that focuses negative energy in our direction.

Just as the information age created by the printing press opened an era of political and religious (religion being a tool of government) evolution; so too is the modern info age affecting the ME.


When our policy is a fusion of status quo of governance and promotion of Western values in an era of massive upheaval and political/religious evolution, how can there not be conflict?

Bob,

I think we also have to be careful in categorizing all opposition ideologies or factions as passive. Granted, in many cases, US actions and policies generate resistance, but Western democratic capitalism is not the only ideological force driving for change. With the complexity of ideology and it's evolution over many decades (in some cases, centuries, like Christianity), it's hard to predict which will catch fire and which won't. Nobody expected a communist state in Russia, not even Marx, who predicted revolution would come in the most advanced capitalist economies first. But that never happened, not even in Germany's defeat in WWI. So I think we should be careful in comparing the global momentum of ideologies with the specific opportunities that emerge in conflict itself. There's always going to be an out-group, whether by design or by choice, and there will be some ideological tool kit lying around for them to pick up and use. Some have been successful with terrible results. Others, like the Unabomber, barely make a bump in history.

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Originally Posted by Bob

Versailles and the lesser known companion treaties, however, created an effect at the human nature level making some form of conflict inevitable.

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Again, I take issue with the word "inevitable" since you are implying there is a direct and causative relationship between the treaty and the rise and policies of the Nazi Party. But between 1918 and 1933, the Nazis were only one of dozens of radical factions on both right and left. Did any the conditions created by the treaty make it any more likely that the Nazis would be successful not some other political faction instead?

Versailles created conflict on issues directly bearing on its issues; i.e. the Rhineland. But I don't think a direct connection can be drawn between the treaty, the specific components of the Nazi program, and the start of World War II. It wasn't the Rhineland or German demilitarization that led to World War II - it was the invasion of Poland, which was formerly Russian territory. The Nazis imposed a hard colonial regime in Eastern Europe not unlike imperialism in Africa in some regards; was that policy caused by Versailles?

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Originally Posted by Bob

Common to both examples is that no one asked or gave serious consideration to how the people affected by these decisions felt.

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Yes, but to what extent did alienation drive political radicalization? And how is radicalization predictable? In other words, did decision-makers at those times have a reason to believe that their actions would lead to the historical outcomes that occurred?

Let us be clear, I said that bad policy made conflict inevitable due to the impact those polices had upon the people they affected.

I never said that Versailles gave rise to Hitler or Nazism.

That is simply the guy who answered the bell and the ideology he applied. It could have been communism just as easily (though liberals and socialists were largely blamed for selling Germany out to the allies, so it would most likely have been some form of conservative, nationalist doctrine).

Robert---you are on to something that has gone under the last 12 or so years---what really causes a resistance insurgency and why does the population react the way it does---yes Mao and Co. help but with religion and ideologies---both have to be looked at intensively.

Kilcullen stated out with his ecosystem approach but then shifted gears when the blogs, think tanks, and others had no idea on how to use it. It is still a point to start with when discussing the development of a resistance insurgency

What I find amazing about the ME especially the Sunni/Shia divide is how the "isms" have played a major role in their fundamentalist developments and how both fed off of each other the last 20 years or so.

We talk about Arab nationalism being a factor but what we do not talk about is the deep impression made by Communism/Marxism on the various Sunni and Shia thinkers in the 60/70s and early 80s---if one does not think there was any influence---check what Khomeini ordered when the communists/leftists were removed first from the universities and then out of government---they were either killed, imprisoned and then killed or driven out of the country. We played a role as well in the killing of thousands of Iranian communists when the CIA was alleged to have passed lists containing their names knowing what the Revolutionary guards would do with the information---and we wonder why the US embassy was bombed by as was rumored shortly after the attack that it was a pay back from the KGB. This attack often does not get discussed as does the Marine bombing.

We have had our internal politics so colored by the Cold War "fight" against Communism that we forgot and or cannot now discuss in a honest fashion just what the role of the various ME Communist parties was in the development of the ME---virtually every modern Sunni/Shia thinker of the 60/70s who was fighting for self determination ie nationalism ended up in prison where they met sometimes for the first time Arab communists---and during their prison exchanges learned things like organization, living underground and population messaging at the same time learning of the similarities between the "religion of Islam" and the "ideology" of Communism/Marxism. In fact a number of ME leading communists were being jailed/killed for their political activities long before Sunnis/Shia got into the self determination fight.

Even some of Khomeini's early writings and speeches reflected communist thinking wrapped in Shiaism.

Why is it that still today we in the US have an extremely hard time discussing Communism in an open dialogue without people taking sides and threatening each other with bodily harm politically speaking of course.

To understand the ME is to understand the role of Communism in the development of Sunni/Shia fundamentalism.

I don't know how relevant they are but I would like to offer two observations. First, I think you ought to consider "war" as a human activity first and a political activity second. Another way to look at it is that there are natural wars and political wars. Natural wars occur spontaneously from the heat of passion. Political wars are initiated for a specific political end. At its simplest, war is a blood feud between two groups. The motivation in this type of feud is revenge - revenge for an actual or perceived wrong (a murder of a member of your tribe) of such importance as to require retribution in kind on someone of the offending tribe. War is a blood feud on steroids. But the basic requirements are the same. You need two groups, one of whom has committed an offense against the other so grave that it requires retribution in blood. If you think of war this way an American does not need to be the person pulling the trigger and murdering a member of your tribe for you to seek retribution against America. They just have to be the proponent of the policy that results in the trigger being pulled. You have exactly what you describe, war by policy.

Second, I agree that the “isms” don’t matter. What does matter is the reason one “ism” or another is preferred by the population at any one time. In a political war the “ism” is either clear or largely irrelevant. In a natural war the “ism” chosen will reveal a great deal about the nature of the group. The discussions of Arab nationalist and communism is a great example. Communism as a political theory works to unite the general population who share a common burden against the elite who do not share in that burden. It is a perfect match for the idea needed to unite a traditionally disparate group (the Arab people) into a single nation against its oppressor (the "West"). Understanding that message might be helpful in crafting a response intended to co-opt the message.

Robert---the press comments from today indicated that the national decision makers attempted to talk to notice I mentioned talk to-- not talk with the Islamic Front.

But as usual---did not understand a thing of what is going on in Syria---deciding to send a third ranking individual instead of signaling a true intent by sending a high level rep---seems the DoS was against it.

It also signals to me they do not understand the players, their reasons and the Sunni/Shai fundamentalists on the ground. Sometimes "dancing with the devil" is actually a sign of respect within the fighting groups---it really is all about perceptions. But how can we gain creditability in the eyes of the Sunni fundamentalist fighting groups when we are dealing now with Iran and supplying weapons/drones to a Shia Iraq?

Sometimes just supplying weapons to the "bad side" is in effect supporting our long term goals---but supplying them without any constraints or conditions and then sometimes it takes a lot of courage to sit back and see where the dust settles---but at least from the support one does have a voice in the afterwards however small that voice is. It does though take a leap of faith---that we seem to not have.

“Alienating the Islamic Front puts the U.S. at risk of losing any leverage or influence within the armed opposition,” he said. “It’s not about whether they are good guys or bad guys. The Islamic Front is the only counterbalance to extremists in Syria. The U.S. must recognize that.”

What is with this current decision making group in DC---has 12 years of war dulled the thinking capability to see the "trees" from the forest?

Robert---you and I have often repeated here that the Sunni/Shia divide is one of Shia containment by the Saudi's---and I say it is in fact a natural Saudi fundamentalist drive that the US has not recognized or is unwilling to recognize just how deep this goes in the Saudi psyche.

If one does not think the Saudi's have not now made an inherent decision to make a stand against Iran/Shaiism---fails to see history looking them directly in the face. Just how it is that we get it so wrong-repeatedly?

Taken from a news release today and coupled with our inherent inability to talk with the Islamic Front also reported today --we are in the future just going to react to events.

"Saudi Arabia Pledges $3 Billion to Lebanon's Army
Saudi Arabia pledged $3 billion to bolster Lebanon's armed forces, in a challenge to the Iranian-allied Hezbollah militia's decades long status as Lebanon's main power broker and security force."

Hold on tight--- this development will take a lot of courage from our side to ride through--as we have elected for some reason to just be spectators.

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Originally Posted by Bob

Let us be clear, I said that bad policy made conflict inevitable due to the impact those polices had upon the people they affected.

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I think that claim is too broad because the next obvious question is: did the "bad policy" determine the scope or intensity of the "inevitable conflict"? Why would WW2 be preordained and not a smaller, local conflict or a political conflict? And, relatedly, if the disarmanent and "occupation by policy" of Versailles made "conflict inevitable", why wasn't there a similar or more intense German reaction to the peace of WW2, which divided Germany in half, expelled millions of Germans from their homes, annexed historically German territory, disarmed the offensive capabilities of the country, and more or less ended Germany's independence as a great power? That peace was far more destructive to German power than the Versailles Treaty.

So, conflict in a broad, abstract sense is "inevitable" if there's no definitive time frame; but I think the real substance of the question is whether there's a relationship to the scope and intensity of conflict and the imposed policies.

There are so many powerful forces in DC it is amazing we ever get anything right.

Perhaps the most powerful force is inertia. DC is still full of good Cold Warriors on both sides of the aisle who see our strategies, policies and activities of that era as what "right" looks like. What was a good idea in 1950 is hardly likely to be still a good idea in 2014 without some serious refinement applied.

There is also inertia of CT/"war"-think from the past 12 years.

Look at the budget/service battles in the Pentagon today and one sees these two forces of inertia locked in close battle, while very few speculate as to what type of military we actually need for the world we live in today and the missions, capabilities and capacities necessary to extend our messy peace into the future.

Their has also over the past 70 years been a gradual, but tremendous, shift in the relative balance of power between the Congress and the Presidency. It is no wonder all Congress seems to be able to do is quibble over which party wins the Oval Office next. Sustaining a warfighting military in peace necessay to implementing a containment strategy has enabled so many wars of presidential choice. I believe this more than any other factor has contributed to this shift of power. The Founders warned of this very effect and crafted language in the Constitution to prevent this from happening, but now we tend to think of that language as quaint or even obsolete.

Our post-Cold War National strategies have also contributed to our inability to see other people's "forests" because we have become so lost in our own. The twin pillars of sustaining the status quo under US leadership, coupled with a heavy promotion of US values at a time when virtually everyone else is seeking their own best future and turning inward to their own value systems is not a good match. The world is a come as you are party, and we need to embrace that reality. Certainly self-determination was central to our pre-Cold War strategic model.

But as I stated in the opening post:

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"The boss has good instincts, but we have no strategy to provide the framework or narrative necessary to guide and communicate the logic of those actions."

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We need to reframe how we think about the problems that vex us, and then we need to develop a new stategy to guide and communicate efforts in line with that understanding. We probably also are at the point where we need a national strategic plan and a HQ and staff under the Executive branch tasked to coordinate and synchronize efforts across government in the execution of that plan. Every Agency for themselves is no longer a degree of chaos we can get away with.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

I think that claim is too broad because the next obvious question is: did the "bad policy" determine the scope or intensity of the "inevitable conflict"? Why would WW2 be preordained and not a smaller, local conflict or a political conflict? And, relatedly, if the disarmanent and "occupation by policy" of Versailles made "conflict inevitable", why wasn't there a similar or more intense German reaction to the peace of WW2, which divided Germany in half, expelled millions of Germans from their homes, annexed historically German territory, disarmed the offensive capabilities of the country, and more or less ended Germany's independence as a great power? That peace was far more destructive to German power than the Versailles Treaty.

So, conflict in a broad, abstract sense is "inevitable" if there's no definitive time frame; but I think the real substance of the question is whether there's a relationship to the scope and intensity of conflict and the imposed policies.

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Strategy by nature is broad. Strategy does not tell you who will lead the next war, what ideology they will employ, or what their ultimate battle plans or goals will be. But strategy can tell you when you are creating conditions that make future conflict inevitable. Human Nature is very predictable. Human Behavior is a wild card.

As to WWI and WWII the answer is simple and widely accepted. The German people perceived themselves to have been betrayed by their own government in WWI, and certainly not defeated by the Allies. In WWII the German people knew they were defeated. Also, because the West were so clearly the lesser of two evils, West Germans readily submitted to occupation by the West as it was so clearly the better alternative to submission to occupation by the Soviets.

We think people like us for who we are; more aptly they tolerate us for who we are not. We need to stop deluding ourselves to that reality.

We're like the little kid buying his mom some jewelry in a commercial running this holiday season. He dumps a handful of change on the counter, while behind him his dad shows the clerk his credit card. We think it is all about the coins we drop on the counter, and don't appreciate their are other forces at work that shape people's decisions.

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Originally Posted by Bob

As to WWI and WWII the answer is simple and widely accepted. The German people perceived themselves to have been betrayed by their own government in WWI, and certainly not defeated by the Allies. In WWII the German people knew they were defeated. Also, because the West were so clearly the lesser of two evils, West Germans readily submitted to occupation by the West as it was so clearly the better alternative to submission to occupation by the Soviets.

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So then it appears the answer to your question is that the Versailles Treaty did not make conflict inevitable because, in your words, the "German people perceived themselves to have been betrayed by their own government and certainly not defeated by the Allies." What made conflict inevitable was this German perception.

In their defense, the Allies were aware of this problem, which is one reason why they pushed for the disarmanent of Germany after the war. So it seems that the perceived inevitably of conflict, at least in the European experience, is what created the Versailles Treaty, not the other way around.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

So then it appears the answer to your question is that the Versailles Treaty did not make conflict inevitable because, in your words, the "German people perceived themselves to have been betrayed by their own government and certainly not defeated by the Allies." What made conflict inevitable was this German perception.

In their defense, the Allies were aware of this problem, which is one reason why they pushed for the disarmanent of Germany after the war. So it seems that the perceived inevitably of conflict, at least in the European experience, is what created the Versailles Treaty, not the other way around.

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You're like my dog playing tug of way with a knotted rope on this...

Why did the Germans feel betrayed? Because of the bait and switch that occurred between the armistice agreed to on 11/11/18 and the terms of the actual treaty that came several months later. Wilson's points were tossed aside and Britain, and primarily France, wanted revenge. The terms of the actual treaty were so onerous as to crush the German economy long before the Great Depression, and the German people did indeed feel betrayed by their national leaders who conceded to such terms.

If the ruling voice for crafting the treaty had been the US rather than France I suspect a far less provocative document would have emerged. For France, what went forward was perceived as reasonable, for Germany it was perceived as intollerable. The US had the lead following WWII, with very different approach with very different results based on our lessons learned from WWI

The military fights wars, but it is politicians and policy that both end and starts wars. Too often the policies designed to end one conflict become the seeds of the next.


But back to the purpose of this thread to explore the "resistance effect" within a population that is occupied, and to consider that one need not physically occupy to spark this effect, but that policy alone can be enough if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution.

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Originally Posted by Bob

But back to the purpose of this thread to explore the "resistance effect" within a population that is occupied, and to consider that one need not physically occupy to spark this effect, but that policy alone can be enough if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution.

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My problem isn't with your claim in principle, it's with the abstractness of your claim; and so it's worth exploring the specific horizons of how bad policy (defined as "excessively inappropriate and illegimate") sparks "resistance insurgency" leading to "inevitable conflict". I think the World Wars are too complex to use to support your argument. I'm sure you could find plenty of examples in the history of imperialism in Africa that more effectively isolate the casual relationship you are claiming exists.

In your initial post, you asked: "Did the victors of WWI provoke an inevitable WWII by their occupation by policy of Germany through the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles?"

Here's the problem: "inevitable" is too deterministic. "WWII" is very specific in scope and intensity. Your question asks if the policy of Versailles directly caused the Second World War notwithstanding what occurred between 1918 and 1939. You could credibly argue that the Treaty contributed to a new conflict, but I don't think you can make the specific claim that it led to World War II as it occurred in scope and intensity (you did so at least once: "Just as the Treaty of Versailles made a future war with Germany inevitable").

In another post, when you address the differences in German resistance at the end of both World Wars, you make it clear that the Germans overcame their "natural human response" for resistance through a deliberate decision to focus on a greater enemy; in this case, the Soviet Union ("because the West were so clearly the lesser of two evils"). How do you reconcile the contradiction between a "natural human response" and the deliberate decision to ignore that natural human response? It would seem that policy makers have options other than abandoning the policy - they could create a new enemy, for example.

That said, back to the substance of your position: "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution."

You also claim that "resistance insurgency is a natural human response". If "resistance" is a "natural human response" (implying its inevitability), then to what extent should policy makers modify their policies to accomodate it? Resistance to a thing is not a sufficient indicator of the invalidty of that thing. Or is it?

So to really excavate your idea from the surrounding intellectual fodder, I think it can be more accurately described in this way:

"Policies perceived to be illegitimate may fuel armed resistance if the policies are sufficiently inappropriate. It is not necessary for direct military occupation to incite armed resistance."

Robert---went back over your comments and these items stand out--can it be so simple?

Have we at the national decision making level actually failed to see or maybe not wanted to see and understand the ME population even in the face of the points below? Answer is yes.

Have we at the national level in effect focused all our attention on AQ and not on the population? Answer is yes.

Yes the conversation has to be refocused as it is getting worse in the ME, AQ has grown well in the ME, Saudi is striking out on it's own and surprisingly is in synch with the Israeli view of Iran, Lebanon is set to explode again, Egypt will have MB problems for the coming years, Syria is the final fight for the Shia/Sunni fundamentalists, and the Arab Spring has shown us that the population is looking intently for their path forward-whatever that path will be.

The over 9K KIA and over 100K WIA in two wars demand that we find answers that explain what is happening as this area will be with us for a long while---virtually every current AQ battleground outside of the ME is religious in nature and is tied to the "isms".

1. "Did the victors of the Cold War provoke an inevitable War on Terrorism and associated Arab Spring by their decision to largely leave in place in the Middle East the policies, practices and relationships nurtured during and in support of activities designed to contain the Soviet Union?"

Part of the current problem with the national decision makers is that to refocus demands that one openly admit that we are part of the problem---that will never happen.

To accept the above comment requires one to accept the premise as it is stated-which is hard--it is hard to say we actually created UBL and AQ---it is easier to accuse them of being terrorists or religious nuts.

2. Do men like Osama bin Laden and Adolf Hitler "cause" these types of conflicts, or are they simply opportunists who, like Mao so eloquently said about his role in China, "saw a parade and leapt in front"?

UBL was an astute observer of the ME and American interactions in the ME--his beef with us went back to our be stationed in DS in Saudi Arabia.

3. [B]]Do ideologies - be it Nazism, Communism, Islamism, or any other "ism" radicalize otherwise content populations to rise in illegal conflict, or are these simply effective tunes tailored to help a particular "parade" march in step?[B]B]

The "isms" give the population something they can understand and drive towards especially if everything else has failed in their drive towards self determination---in some aspects that self determination is tied to jobs, ability to raise families, national respect etc and how they fit into their society as a whole.

I believe we need to refocus the debate. We have debated the branches of these types of conflicts to death. The roots, however, we tend to gloss over. After all, it is uncomfortable to confront the very real possibility that these are roots we planted ourselves.

You are right---we have in effect caused our own wars by the roots that we planted in the 1950/60/70s.

Would make a great Doctoral thesis.

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"Robert---went back over your comments and these items stand out--can it be so simple?" Outlaw

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"All great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope." Winston Churchill

Robert---your comments are actually very appropriate if one applies the same comments you made to the current situation in Mexico.

I would argue that actually the current problems seen in Mexico are the direct results of an unfinished revolution that did not include the population.

I would also argue that in fact the roots that caused the revolution to go unfinished were caused by our US Army military intervention which did not end until after we had declared war on the Germans during the 1st World War.

We never seem to see analysis of that particular event ie military intervention and it's impact on the population and the revolution.

Thank you...Thank you....Thank you. I have said many times that there is No difference between Communism and Radical Islamism as far as a methodology for conducting Special Warfare. They are the same... but we cannot or we will not see that...so we get beat up alot!


PS. I Highlighted certain critical parts of Outlaw 09 comments below.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09

We have had our internal politics so colored by the Cold War "fight" against Communism that we forgot and or cannot now discuss in a honest fashion just what the role of the various ME Communist parties was in the development of the ME---virtually every modern Sunni/Shia thinker of the 60/70s who was fighting for self determination ie nationalism ended up in prison where they met sometimes for the first time Arab communists---and during their prison exchanges learned things like organization, living underground and population messaging at the same time learning of the similarities between the "religion of Islam" and the "ideology" of Communism/Marxism. In fact a number of ME leading communists were being jailed/killed for their political activities long before Sunnis/Shia got into the self determination fight.

Even some of Khomeini's early writings and speeches reflected communist thinking wrapped in Shiaism.

Why is it that still today we in the US have an extremely hard time discussing Communism in an open dialogue without people taking sides and threatening each other with bodily harm politically speaking of course.

To understand the ME is to understand the role of Communism in the development of Sunni/Shia fundamentalism.

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I have read the posts to date and wondered about the reverse effect of a 'no occupation policy' in the context of Western Europe, in particular the Iberian pleninsula - where in 1945 Franco ruled Spain, had been an Axis ally and next door Portugal had the Salazar dictatorship, which had eventually allied itself with the Allies.

Yes in the Cold War context both were seen as allies, providing bases notably, but politically until 1974 kept at a distance politically. Both successfully became and remain democracies - without major bloodshed.

It is a curious fact that the USSR shared occupation in Austria till 1954 IIRC; withdrew from northern Norway promptly and negoitated a semi-submissive realtionship with Finland. "Finlandisation" was a theme during the 'Cold War' about what could happen if the USSR was successful.
Yugoslavia partly freed itself, but the USSR withdrew swiftly.

Not to overlook all the countries of Eastern Europe it did occupy, each evolved a communist regime that the USSR could normally accept.

Anyway just a thought.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09

Robert---your comments are actually very appropriate if one applies the same comments you made to the current situation in Mexico.

I would argue that actually the current problems seen in Mexico are the direct results of an unfinished revolution that did not include the population.

I would also argue that in fact the roots that caused the revolution to go unfinished were caused by our US Army military intervention which did not end until after we had declared war on the Germans during the 1st World War.

We never seem to see analysis of that particular event ie military intervention and it's impact on the population and the revolution.

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A better case for the 'no occupation policy' thank you.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

I have read the posts to date and wondered about the reverse effect of a 'no occupation policy' in the context of Western Europe, in particular the Iberian pleninsula - where in 1945 Franco ruled Spain, had been an Axis ally and next door Portugal had the Salazar dictatorship, which had eventually allied itself with the Allies.

Yes in the Cold War context both were seen as allies, providing bases notably, but politically until 1974 kept at a distance politically. Both successfully became and remain democracies - without major bloodshed.

It is a curious fact that the USSR shared occupation in Austria till 1954 IIRC; withdrew from northern Norway promptly and negoitated a semi-submissive realtionship with Finland. "Finlandisation" was a theme during the 'Cold War' about what could happen if the USSR was successful.
Yugoslavia partly freed itself, but the USSR withdrew swiftly.

Not to overlook all the countries of Eastern Europe it did occupy, each evolved a communist regime that the USSR could normally accept.

Anyway just a thought.

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The Air Force has been saying this since the end WW2 as part of the Air Power/Project Control Theory.

David and Slap,

Bob's thesis is that "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution." He cited World War II and the Arab Spring as examples where policies without occupation incited armed resistance as a "natural human response". As stated in my previous posts, I think the example of World War II is problematic, though I think an argument can probably be made about the Arab Spring.

So, in the examples of Mexico, Finland, Spain, and Portugal, what about the policies pressed upon them by the US or USSR were not "excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution"? In his comments about WWI and WWII, Bob stated that rational decision-making was fundamental ("the Allies were the lesser of two evils") in the German response, even though Germany survived WWI and was virtually dismantled after the second. If perception of policy is the determinant of armed resistance, what options to policy-makers have in shaping perception to co-opt resistance or must they abandon their policies?

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

David and Slap,

Bob's thesis is that "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution." He cited World War II and the Arab Spring as examples where policies without occupation incited armed resistance as a "natural human response". As stated in my previous posts, I think the example of World War II is problematic, though I think an argument can probably be made about the Arab Spring.

So, in the examples of Mexico, Finland, Spain, and Portugal, what about the policies pressed upon them by the US or USSR were not "excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution"? In his comments about WWI and WWII, Bob stated that rational decision-making was fundamental ("the Allies were the lesser of two evils") in the German response, even though Germany survived WWI and was virtually dismantled after the second. If perception of policy is the determinant of armed resistance, what options to policy-makers have in shaping perception to co-opt resistance or must they abandon their policies?

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AmericanPride,

You can make a case that post-1945 US and Western European policies towards Spain especially reinforced the Franco regime. Spain took a long time to ditch its anti-US stance as a result. If anything neither country had 'policies pressed upon them by the US'. Look how long Portugal clung on to its African colonies, without US & Western European support.

I am no expert on Finnish history, but expect the Soviet oversight developed over time, e.g. leaving the naval bases on the Gulf of Finland. Plus the Finnish Communist Party was only able to get a small popular vote.

Occupation after military defeat is different from occupation when the nation-state remains viable in the perception of its citizens. Eastern Europe and Finalnd were devasted by WW2, followed by a sometimes, even often, brutal Soviet military presence e.g. Hungary 1956. 'Excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution policies' followed by the USSR and its communist partners I would contend diminished over the decades.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

David and Slap,

Bob's thesis is that "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution." He cited World War II and the Arab Spring as examples where policies without occupation incited armed resistance as a "natural human response". As stated in my previous posts, I think the example of World War II is problematic, though I think an argument can probably be made about the Arab Spring.

So, in the examples of Mexico, Finland, Spain, and Portugal, what about the policies pressed upon them by the US or USSR were not "excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution"? In his comments about WWI and WWII, Bob stated that rational decision-making was fundamental ("the Allies were the lesser of two evils") in the German response, even though Germany survived WWI and was virtually dismantled after the second. If perception of policy is the determinant of armed resistance, what options to policy-makers have in shaping perception to co-opt resistance or must they abandon their policies?

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. I believe Ike had the proper 3 part policy. Massive retaliation at a time and place of our choosing. Which included three parts. First a strong economy at home. Second strong nuclear forces. Third strong covert action capabilites based upon plausable deniabilty.

Slap,

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Originally Posted by Slapout

Third strong covert action capabilites based upon plausable deniabilty.

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Aren't the consequences of that policy (i.e. blowback) one of the major problems highlighted by Bob's argument against "occupation by policy"? In particular, wouldn't it be "illegitimate in nature and execution" to conduct "strong covert action"?

Certainly covert actions would be viewed as illegitimate by those they are employed against. This is a risky business, but Slap raises a good point, and added the qualifier of "plausible deniability." Of course these things can blow up in one's face. Take our actions to put the Shah in power in Iran. The Iranian people will not soon forget or forgive that bit of Cold War manipulation.

What we seem to discount, however, is that legal, totally overt actions can be equally or even more damaging to our security. Again, with Iran as an example, how do we think the Iranian people perceive the US in our hard, overt sanctions against Iran intended to deter them from developing a nuclear weapon? Even Iranians who do not believe their nation needs such weapons tend to believe even more fervently that the US has no right to curtail Iranian sovereignty to be something less than the sovereignty of those nations currently in possession of nukes.

We, being a nation of laws, tend to put too much faith in actions being ok so long as they are legal. Nothing could be further from the truth. The primary test must be one of perceived appropriateness, not legality. Often this is primarily a constraint on "how" rather than "what" one believes they need to do. The vast majority of our actions in response to the attacks of 9/11 have been legal. But the majority of our actions have also been perceived as inappropriate by those they affect and by many who watch from afar. It is the inappropriateness of our responses that is, IMO, the primary reason that for all of our tactical successes we are failing at the strategic level.

Too often we are unwilling to compromise tactical gains (that are objective, measured and reported to measure our success) in the name of attaining greater strategic gains (that are subjective, nearly impossible to measure, and therefore largely discounted in importance). How many times has President Karzai asked for reasonable constraints on tactical operations in his own country to be told "no" by the same American government that professes to be there as a guest of a sovereign nation with the mission of enhancing the legitimacy of their government? We say one thing, but then our actions have the opposite effect. We even publicly chastise President Karzai as being ungrateful when he dares to stand up for extremely reasonable sovereign rights that we would certainly demand if roles were reversed.

So our occupation of Afghanistan is both physical and by policy. And the resistance insurgency there is very strong as a result. This resistance insurgency will wane rapidly once we back off on both of those lines of provocation. (However the revolutionary insurgency against the government we elevated into power will continue regardless of what we do, we need to accept that fact as well).

Quote:

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

Slap,



Aren't the consequences of that policy (i.e. blow back) one of the major problems highlighted by Bob's argument against "occupation by policy"? In particular, wouldn't it be "illegitimate in nature and execution" to conduct "strong covert action"?

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The world is a tough place and it is going to get tougher IMO. We need covert options and operations and let somebody else take the credit and or the blame for them. Most of the world works that way anyway which is why we get beat up so much. It is the nature of Big Power Nation Politics. We need to be able to do things quietly.

Sure there will be mistakes and blow back but it is a far more realistic option than just saying we will send in the Marines and beat you up on world wide television because we are going to make the world safe for puppies, kittens and bunny rabbits. In a since the USA needs to grow up and act like an adult and not some spoiled child with a lot of money,weapons and Polly Anna beliefs.

What did that dead Chinese guy say....All war is based on deception!! sometimes he is better than that dead German guy.;)

The problem with this discussion/debate is the extreme arrogance that underpins it. America this and America that, as though we're sole power that influenced good and evil in the world. Our policies certainly contributed to rebellion in some situations, but wherever we played others also played whether they were Soviets, French, Chinese, Israel, India etc. All nations pursue their interests using their own strategies and ways to achieve their ends. Seldom do populations in developing nations within our concept of a State determine their destiny without considerable interference from multiple third parties. A proxy war is just that, an extension of war between two states in another state using proxies. Both sides are being manipulated by the powers that support them, and powers are being manipulated by the proxies. The world has always been this way, this isn't unique to the Cold War and the so called inappropriate policies that we allegedly still follow (which is a very questionable assertion).

I'm not arguing against Bob's ideas, they are old and sound ideas that have been around at least since the beginning the Cold War. Nothing written here that Ed Lansdale and others didn't write over 60 years ago about the necessity of avoiding attempt to force our ways upon foreign populations with our aggressive policies. Not surprising, that line of thought didn't garner a lot of traction back then either. Conventional minded leaders will remain conventional minded leaders.

As to the conversation on covert operations, of course they should be in our toolbox, but that is ultimately nothing more than a way/tool. What objective are we pursuing? Then determine which way to achieve it is best. It does all start with policy, and since 9/11 we have been suffering from terrible ones.

Robert---back to your comment on it is simple---that is in fact the whole crux of the matter meaning yes we see the actions being made by say us and we see the results of those actions coming back as feedback from the population we are dealing with BUT then we the US do not want to believe that the feedback is what it is.

Being simple means from the beginning one looks at the perception of what and how the US action is going to be received on the other end---meaning just how in the heck will the targeted population "receive" or "perceive" our actions in their own minds.

This is where our policy and policy leaders always go astray and I mean astray.

Will give you an example on Iran---in the 60s through the late 70s the Shah sent a number of Iranian students to study in Berlin at the cost of the Iranian government---the students who were initially shy became in a short time "radicalized" by the German student movement which was by the way in 67/68 taking on the dictatorship of the Shah went most US students had never even heard of the Shah or his SAVAK. The first German student shot by the Berlin Riot Police in 67 was demoing against the Shah during his visit to Berlin

For those that now nothing about SAVAK it was the internal security police trained by our CIA and brutally put down anything that resembled resistance insurgency against the Shah.

Those Iranians who were not radicalized out of fear still in their personal beliefs and in private comments hated the Shah.

As an American it was an experience trying to catch up on the history of our coup in 53 that the Iranians you are right still resent to this day---never mentioned in any US history book of the 60s in a high school or university.

Now this is where the fundamentalism kicks in---those students- many left and communists in the mean time raced back to Iran to help in what they viewed to be a final overthrown of US involvement in Iranian politics only to end up either killed, imprisoned or fleeing back to Berlin totally disillusioned.

Never once during the Shah events did we the US admit to the CIA involvement in SAVAK which was truly hated in Iran.

I happened to be flying out of Houston back to Berlin the day that the US literally kicked out the Iranian pilots who had been training in Lackland AFB as "our response" to events in Iran---GUESS WHAT everyone of those pilots were executed when they returned to Iran.

As a former SF vet and someone who had understood what was going on inside Iran my heart broke for them---you could see in their eyes the resignation of their deaths--but they never said anything as they waited for their flight to NYC which was mine as well.

What were the policy makers thinking---did they not understand the population, did they not truly think through their actions and how their actions would be perceived on the other end---no we just reacted out of "anger and wanted to punish Iran" for the embassy event.

If it were so simple the world might not be where we are currently.

To ask national policy makers to think through their actions especially on how it will be received or perceived by the target population is really hard as most Americans never have been on the ground in those countries.

I go back to a former SF PhD Det A vet who is still working and living in Jordan who had the courage to stand in front of over 80 US MI/interrogators in Abu Ghraib in 2005 and say it takes three things to be a good interrogator;

1. speak well any foreign language
2. have physically lived and resided in any foreign culture for a period of time
3. have a natural curiosity of the world around you

I would say that they are also the requirements for a national policy maker and or his advisors---how many Presidents had we had that speak anything other than English?

Again fundamentalism and perception in the ME are the key drivers---without them there would have never been a OBL and AQ.

But then with them we have had the Arab Spring--we should just sit back and let it flow---populations will in the end work through their problems. That is the inherent lesson we fail to understand. We should have learned long ago to accept the results of what the population does-not fight it if it does not match our "values"---sometimes being a good friend/listener gets one further.

I had a Kurdish interpreter in Iraq who during the ethnic cleansing that said you all need to let the Arabs literally kill each other until both are on the ground exhausted then and only then will they negotiate and settle their issues---it has always been the Arab way.

To Bill's comment about arrogance, this is not a concept about America, we are simply the party de jour and the nation I am a citizen of that is currently caught up in this problem.

It is America that is leading a global campaign to defeat a tactic and an ideology, and it is America that is not recognizing the causal role of our obsolete and controlling policies lingering in the Middle East that serve to validate much of AQ's dogma regarding "the far enemy."

Policies that are often reasonable and necessary when initiated grow stale and inappropriate over time if not updated for the times. This is true of relationships as well, to include relationships defined in the legal terms of a treaty. In fact, the very nature of a treaty and its fixed terms leads to a relationship most likely to become outdated and inappropriate for the times we live in today. As Bill well knows, we have many treaty allies in the Pacific, treaties crafted during and for the Cold War. It is little wonder much of our pivot looks a lot like Cold War containment when so much of the policy is still crafted in Cold War terms. I would strongly urge our government and the governments of the region to make updating those treaties the policy lead to any sort of military pivot.

This does not mean don't have treaties, but they must be living documents. This does not mean don't have partners, but partnerships must be flexible, both in their terms, and also in what we apply them to. For example, the US cannot expect NATO nations to follow us on every adventure we see as being in OUR national interests and assume that it must be in THEIR national interests as well. Often it isn't. We can wear out our friends and their populations just as fast as we wear out our opponents and their populations. Perhaps we actually have an adverse affect on the populations of friendly nations even faster than we do on those we bump heads with at the governmental level.

Look at Iran. The people there are not too pleased with their government, but they don't blame the US for that government, so we suffer little from populace-based Iranian or Shia terrorism. Our polices to constrain Iranian sovereignty in support of our Saudi and Israeli allies, however is beginning to create a resistance effect in what is otherwise a largely pro-American Iranian population. That is unfortunate, unnecessary, and avoidable. I applaud the President's efforts to work toward normalizing US relations with what is arguably the most important nation in the Middle East.

Being the most powerful nation on earth is an onerous task. We will have to act in ways that are hard on governments and populations at time. No question. But we always have choices as to how we pursue our interests. Currently we are too caught up in the goodness of our own narrative and therefore ascribe excessive badness to narratives that run counter to our own. This is a problem with becoming excessively ideological in one's strategy, and the US NSS is extremely ideological in tone and nature. We need to become more pragmatic and more aware of how others perceive us and our actions. This will help guide us to developing approaches that are more effective than those of the past dozen years, and that are perceived as more appropriate by the global audience who watch or are impacted by our every move.

Resistance is as old as government and war. We did not invent resistance, nor are we the first nation to spark a resistance effect through occupation by policy. But we are the current nation caught up in this cycle, and recognizing the problem for what it is is the first step to backing away from stomping about the planet in an effort to crush the symptoms.

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Not to overlook all the countries of Eastern Europe it did occupy, each evolved a communist regime that the USSR could normally accept.

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They didn't develop regimes acceptable to the USSR on their own. They were guided every step of the way by the gentle hand of the Red Army and the NKVD and often the people who eventually ran those govs were selected and trained by the Russians. It is important to remember that the Red Army was always there to do what needed to be done if the USSR was displeased. They did what needed to be done on several occasions.

Anne Applebaum wrote an extremely good book about how the USSR occupied and thoroughly pacified the countries of Eastern Europe.

http://www.amazon.com/Iron-Curtain-C.../dp/140009593X

It is very much worthy of study from a small war standpoint. What the Russians accomplished was quite remarkable as those countries weren't exactly pre-war hotbeds of communism and the Russians weren't well liked. Remember one of those countries was Poland. But they did it and were able to keep that boot on the faces of those countries until their relative economic power declined. Then they left, they weren't ejected. What the occupied peoples thought about it never really mattered.

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

'Excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution policies' followed by the USSR and its communist partners I would contend diminished over the decades.

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It did, but that was only because thoroughly entrenched, powerful police states don't need to use the rough stuff so often. The hard part is forcing the guy into the cell. Once he's in there there isn't much need to get physical.

Occupation by policy is a very clever phrase but what it really means is your country is doing something that another country or group of people have a beef with. Nothing new there. The clever part is in the use of the word 'occupation'. That gives the objection of the other party a sort of noble sounding cachet redolent of plucky freedom fighter resisting the colonial power, a throwback to the Che days of the Cold War if you will. So the other party isn't just ticked off that this or that country is doing something they don't like, they are resisting 'occupation'.

The problem I have with it is this. If you are to base your policy primarily upon the need to avoid ticking other people off, you are making other countries or parties the final arbiter of your actions. That is a formula for appeasement. That will not result in a pleasant world to live in seeing as how that world has in it takfiri killers who are real honest to goodness 'Convert or die!' guys; not to mention the more sophisticated and more deadly hard eyed killers in the Chinese Communist Party. I don't like the phrase 'occupation by policy' because using it immediately puts us on the defensive thereby making it harder to recognize the bad things coming at us.

Since we are using WWII lets go to the other side of the world for an example of what I mean. We imposed some very hard economic sanctions on Japan prior to WWII. They were throwing their weight around and killing Chinamen by the millions. So we tried to restrain them some and we viewed it as trying to keep the beast in check. Now, let us say they said you are occupying us by policy and we are only resisting nobly as a great people should. That is a little more persuasive than 'we have a right to kill Chinese with no interference'. It is a matter of semantics I grant you but it could have an effect, but only if you accept the notion of 'occupation by policy'. American leaders back then would have laughed at the notion but the feckless crew we have now might latch onto it as just one more reason to back off or do nothing at all.

Carl,

Save your spin, brother. You don't have to agree, but this is about being smart, not clever.

And this is the farthest thing from appeasement ( a word right up their with "isolationist" and the phrase "abandon your allies" for rationalizing a continuation of policies il-suited for the current era). This is about recognizing the reality of the fact that the US is not particularly vulnerable to any other state, but that we are very vulnerable to every other population. In days over a century in the rearview mirror, governments did not need to worry much about how their foreign policy affected the average person. A deal between governments was good enough. No more.

Now we must actually give pause and consider how the people perceive our actions. This applies to our allies when we drag them off to places like Afghanistan equally to our opponents when we leverage hard sanctions against the people of Iraq under Saddam or the people of Iran currently. This does not mean we do not enforce or pursue our interests at all. It simply means we need to add as a critical and weighted factor in our COA development and comparison how appropriate our actions will be perceived by the people affected directly, and indirectly as well.

We must evolve. You seem to advocate that we double down on the past. I simply try to understand the present and determine ways to succeed into the future.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

This does not mean don't have treaties, but they must be living documents. This does not mean don't have partners, but partnerships must be flexible, both in their terms, and also in what we apply them to.

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That is a formula for chaos and chaos gets violent. You want to renegotiate treaties often, fine. But to have a treaty, a contract sort of, that is 'flexible' in terms and what we apply them to, to have a 'living document' is to have nothing at all. What you say ain't what you mean...except sometimes. That is international relations by what I feel like at the time, no predictability, anything may happen at any time. Good luck maintaining the peace that way.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by carl

That is a formula for chaos and chaos gets violent. You want to renegotiate treaties often, fine. But to have a treaty, a contract sort of, that is 'flexible' in terms and what we apply them to, to have a 'living document' is to have nothing at all. What you say ain't what you mean...except sometimes. That is international relations by what I feel like at the time, no predictability, anything may happen at any time. Good luck maintaining the peace that way.

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Inflexible treaties turned an assassination of a single national leader into the senseless horror of WWI.

Today we are similarly poised where bad treaties could lead to senseless war. When war is necessary wage it to win, but when war is unnecessary avoid it like the plague that it is.

Relationships become dysfunctional over time. We must ensure that in an era of rapid change we are not caught like the powers of Europe were not so long ago into events they did not want, but could not see their way clear to escape.

Our current defense strategy calls for "permanent allies" and "building partner capacity" as a major LOO for advancing our interests into the future. I respectfully disagree.

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We have no permanent allies,
we have no permanent enemies,
we only have permanent interests.

–attributed to Henry John Temple Viscount Lord Palmerston 1784-1865, Foreign Secretary and two-time Prime Minister under Queen Victoria.

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What he actually said was [concerning apparent British apathy regarding Polish struggles against Russian hegemony, which Palmerston did not
believe that it met the threshold of justifiable war] “He concluded with the famous peroration that Britain had no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only interest that were eternal and perpetual . . .”--quoted in David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy,
1846-1855 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 82-83.

https://politicalscience.byu.edu/Syl...on_170_F08.pdf

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Carl,

Save your spin, brother. You don't have to agree, but this is about being smart, not clever.

And this is the farthest thing from appeasement ( a word right up their with "isolationist" and the phrase "abandon your allies" for rationalizing a continuation of policies il-suited for the current era). This is about recognizing the reality of the fact that the US is not particularly vulnerable to any other state, but that we are very vulnerable to every other population. In days over a century in the rearview mirror, governments did not need to worry much about how their foreign policy affected the average person. A deal between governments was good enough. No more.

Now we must actually give pause and consider how the people perceive our actions. This applies to our allies when we drag them off to places like Afghanistan equally to our opponents when we leverage hard sanctions against the people of Iraq under Saddam or the people of Iran currently. This does not mean we do not enforce or pursue our interests at all. It simply means we need to add as a critical and weighted factor in our COA development and comparison how appropriate our actions will be perceived by the people affected directly, and indirectly as well.

We must evolve. You seem to advocate that we double down on the past. I simply try to understand the present and determine ways to succeed into the future.

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Spin can be useful. It allows a projectile to fly truer, fly farther and hit harder when it arrives. Very useful.

Don't like the word appeasement because it's passe? Well it still exists regardless. Same with "abandon your allies". That is related to standing by your buddies which is one of the things that allows men to stick it out in battle, or so I've read. These things are forever and powerful motivators of humans which is why they keep coming up. We just can't seem to evolve beyond them.

There is nothing new either in having to consider how the populations of countries are affected by and feel about various foreign policies. Just look at all those allies various powers have had or thought they had. The people of the countries weren't too enthusiastic about regardless of what the gov thought. The various allies of the Germans in both WWI and WWII come to mind. I recall reading too how Chiang Kai-Shek was driven into action against Japan at a militarily unpropitious time because the Chinese were so upset. Shoot, look at the problem Spain faced with us in 1898. So there is nothing new there.

Nothing new at all really. The wise course has always been to do what you can and recognize when what you want to do ain't worth the candle. At the same time you must recognize that sometimes you have to take a stand. That's why I don't like the concept of 'occupation by policy' at all. It seems to me that it will lessen our ability to see when a stand must be made, especially given the widespread lack of moral character in our leadership class.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Inflexible treaties turned an assassination of a single national leader into the senseless horror of WWI.

Today we are similarly poised where bad treaties could lead to senseless war. When war is necessary wage it to win, but when war is unnecessary avoid it like the plague that it is.

Relationships become dysfunctional over time. We must ensure that in an era of rapid change we are not caught like the powers of Europe were not so long ago into events they did not want, but could not see their way clear to escape.

Our current defense strategy calls for "permanent allies" and "building partner capacity" as a major LOO for advancing our interests into the future. I respectfully disagree.



What he actually said was [concerning apparent British apathy regarding Polish struggles against Russian hegemony, which Palmerston did not
believe that it met the threshold of justifiable war] “He concluded with the famous peroration that Britain had no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only interest that were eternal and perpetual . . .”--quoted in David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy,
1846-1855 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), pp. 82-83.

https://politicalscience.byu.edu/Syl...on_170_F08.pdf

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Maybe those treaties started WWI. Maybe it was German high commanders allowing the importuning of staff logistical officers to override good judgment.

In any event, how many wars have been prevented by people being certain that countries will fulfill their formal treaty obligations? It's hard to prove a negative but probably a lot I'll wager. Countries keep making them so they have been judged for thousands of years to have much utility.

Again, that does not mean don't renegotiate treaties frequently or even renounce them. Fine, but be up front about it. Give the other guy something to plan around. A treaty that is a 'living document' isn't a treaty at all and leaves everybody guessing. That leads to trouble.

What does LOO mean? I know what it means in England but I don't know what it means here.

I suppose it is true that there are no permanent allies in the long run, hundreds of years, but in the short run, scores of years, I am not so sure. This is especially true if you include the influence of popular opinion, populations as you say, upon government policy. Our support of Israel is a case in point. I suppose in the realpolitik sense we should have tossed those guys long ago, but that ain't gonna happen. And it ain't gonna happen because popular American opinion won't let it. Same thing with the other English speaking countries. Let's say the Red Chinese called up and said we want Australia or there will be war. Our response would be 'Ok, if its war you want, its war you will have.' I can't see the Americans cutting the Aussies loose. That is a good reason perhaps to make a sort of permanent ally treaty with the Aussies. The Red Chinese can avoid trying to colonize Australia and thereby avoid trouble. Good for everybody.

LOO=Line of Operation

Bob, I understand your response to my comments. Fair enough.

Posted by Outlaw 09

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Will give you an example on Iran---in the 60s through the late 70s the Shah sent a number of Iranian students to study in Berlin at the cost of the Iranian government---the students who were initially shy became in a short time "radicalized" by the German student movement which was by the way in 67/68 taking on the dictatorship of the Shah went most US students had never even heard of the Shah or his SAVAK. The first German student shot by the Berlin Riot Police in 67 was demoing against the Shah during his visit to Berlin

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Besides being incredibly interesting, I think this comment points to the importance of ideology and transference of ideas. It is ideology, religion, and other ideas that shake the world more than anything else, so we can't dismis them. I also think we have the best intentions when we try to establish democratic governments in the midst of chaos, but with few exceptions (e.g. the country has an educated population and history of democracy) it will fail for reasons that seem obvious in hindsight, and possibly in foresight. Why were the communists and jihadists able to establish functional (good enough) government structures rather quickly? Say what you want about Kilkullen, but a point I think he got right in his new book is that people desire order, they want to know what the rules are so they can establish a new norm that is somewhat predictable. Sharia law and communism provides that structure in my opinion (I'm not talking legitimacy) fairly quickly because the laws/expectations are pretty clear. What do we do? We attempt to impose democracy in a chaotic situation where people are seeking order more than a voice, so we throw more disorder on top of disorder.

While not politically correct, occupation powers (not arguing the morality of being an occupying power) should establish fairly strict population control measures, and facilitate a strong government that can continue to impose this order. Then over time after order is established gradually encourage and assist that government transition to something that more effectively addresses the demands of its people.

We can't fix our policy makers, I wish we could, but we can execute in ways that are more effective at the operational and strategic level.

I agree with carl about living documents.....that is nothing but a drug deal about to go very bad.

Let's look at a specific and current example.

I have long contended that the Center of Gravity for the War on Terrorism (or whatever we call it this week) has been, and remains, the nature of the relationship between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the United States.

There are many clues pointing to this as the COG:
1. The vast majority of AQ's Core and the 9/11 attackers are Saudi.
2. The primary target of AQ being taking down the Saudi family's rule of Arabia.
3. The Saudi-US relationship dating back to 1944 when FDR committed to Ibn Saud that the US would be the protector of the Saudi Kingdom and retain his family in power.
4. The role of the Saudi Kingdom as the protector of Islam and the holy mosques at Mecca and Medina.
5. My understanding of Insurgency. Revolutionary Insurgency conditions between Saudi members of AQ and the KSA; and Resistance Insurgency conditions between Saudi Members of AQ (and their many sympathizers) and the US due to the widely held belief that the Saudi family has been far less willing to listen to the reasonable grievances of the people due to their commitment of protection from the US than they would be if there were no such external source of protection.

Now fast forward to today. What relationship is evolving faster than any other relationship the US has in the ME? Not out of design; not out of us sitting down face to face and discussing new terms; but rather out of reaction to decisions the US is making elsewhere in the ME. Our relationship with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis clearly no longer trust the certainty of this 1944 promise of protection and are increasingly taking matters into their own hands to secure their future. Ironically, even to the extent of working with their sworn enemy, AQ, in Syria.

What have we done that has soured this Cold War relationship?
1. We invaded Iraq and took out Saddam, thereby destroying that strong buffer between Shia Iran and Sunni Arabia. Net result, we delivered Iraq into the Iranian Sphere of Influence and allowed them to flank the Arabian Pen. on the north.
2. We turned our back on Mubarak. Who might we turn on next? The Saudi's and the Gulf State leaders reasonably believe it could be them, as they know they are willing to be even more ruthless than Mubarak toward their own people if need be to stay in power.
3. We waffled on Syria. Saudis and the Gulf States launched their own UW campaigns to support the revolution, working hand in glove with AQ who was already there.

So, while we may well be defusing the COG a bit by accident, that is no way to wage policy. We essentially "occupied by policy" the KSA, not by controlling the Saudi family, but rather by protecting them and enabling them to ignore their people's evolving needs and concerns. We created conditions of resistance insurgency that have been a powerful recruiting tool for AQ and others to enlist members willing to conduct acts of transnational terrorism, to include, of course, the 9/11 attackers.

My recommendation is that we sit down with the Saudis, President to King, and let them know what the new terms are in no uncertain way. Letting them guess is leading to them guessing the worst. That isn't good.

Bob:

I am in full agreement that the relationship between the US and Saudi gov has made for a world of trouble and may continue to do so. Some of the things you cite and conclusions you make I disagree with. I still think the whole 'resistance insurgency' and 'occupation by policy' bits are too strained and tenuous to be useful but you're right about Saudi Arabia being trouble as things stand as they are. We should rejigger the whole thing.

What should we tell them the new terms are?

http://warontherocks.com/2013/12/reb...ref_map=%5b%5d

A quote from an article posted to the blog today that is very relevant to the topic.

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Every foreign force that comes crashing in thinks it’s intervening in ‘a country,’ but it’s actually taking sides in an ongoing contest among Afghans about what this country is. . .The foreign power essentially tries to swing the pot by grasping its handle, but the pot shatters, and the foreign power is left holding only a handle.

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Originally Posted by carl

Bob:

I am in full agreement that the relationship between the US and Saudi gov has made for a world of trouble and may continue to do so. Some of the things you cite and conclusions you make I disagree with. I still think the whole 'resistance insurgency' and 'occupation by policy' bits are too strained and tenuous to be useful but you're right about Saudi Arabia being trouble as things stand as they are. We should rejigger the whole thing.

What should we tell them the new terms are?

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Carl,

In broadest terms, I think we need to evolve in our approach to being less of an arbitrator of outcomes we believe will be best for us, to being more of a mediator of terms that the people believe will be best for them.

That means assuming a degree of risk we have up to now been unwilling to assume (after all, we have the means in our war fighting military on hand to force the outcomes we want, why allow things to go to chance?).

Control is over-rated. Certainly Containment was a very controlling strategy, so we developed some bad habits over several generations. Many now see this as normal and proper. It isn't. Certainly not in the emerging strategic environment where people are increasingly empowered and informed.

Influence needs to be our goal, and that demands we be far more pragmatic about who some particular people want (e.g., MB in Egypt), and much more plugged into what the people are thinking and feeling about their governance and about us.

For US SOF, (OK, this is my opinion, and not anything official) this means the main effort shifts from JSOC and CT over to the more diverse aspects of SOF that are primarily part of USASOC and the other service SOFs and under the C2 of our various theater SOCs. Primary mission would not be to build partner capacity, but rather simply (and critically) to develop the informal and formal understanding, relationships and influence necessary to appreciate how the people feel, to know who they blame, and to be postured to shape in the right direction in appropriate ways when necessary. Typically that will be through some partner with shared interests and direct relationships with said populations. CT will fall into the shadows as a minor, but vital, capacity to mitigate the rough edges when necessary - but again, in ways that are far less caustic than our approaches over the past several years.

Bob's World cited in part and with my emphasis:

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For US SOF, (OK, this is my opinion, and not anything official) this means the main effort shifts from JSOC and CT over to the more diverse aspects of SOF that are primarily part of USASOC and the other service SOFs and under the C2 of our various theater SOCs. Primary mission would not be to build partner capacity, but rather simply (and critically) to develop the informal and formal understanding, relationships and influence necessary to appreciate how the people feel, to know who they blame, and to be postured to shape in the right direction in appropriate ways when necessary. Typically that will be through some partner with shared interests and direct relationships with said populations. CT will fall into the shadows as a minor, but vital, capacity to mitigate the rough edges when necessary - but again, in ways that are far less caustic than our approaches over the past several years.

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Robert,

That is a very grand objective. I am not persauded that SOF are the best body to undertake such a task alone, nor that diplomats and spooks are too. Maybe it would work in parts of the developing world, where non-military agencies find it too hard to operate.

Can you indicate if US SOF have achieved such an objective before?

Before 1979 in Iran the USA had well developed official relationships within Iranian officialdom, but almost none beyond that (shared with many other nations, who feared upsetting the Shah and his regime if they did). IIRC the USA sent a senior army general to Teheran, who had served there, to talk with the army commanders - to not use force against the rising protests.

I do wonder if the Allied WW2 experience, by no means not all good, of political warfare has been forgotten. Yes there was a strong element of "cloak & dagger" and 'black' psyops hence OSS & SOE are well known names, few have heard of PWE (Political Warfare Executive).

Put yourself in the role of the potential host, a nation-state regime, which is aware that the USA wishes to deploy SOF tasked to such a mission; why on earth would they accept them?

Since you earlier referred to KSA, it would be interesting to see if the advocated SOF mission led to the ending of US & UK missions within the KSA military.

Bob:

This is what I understand you to mean. Put people in the country, long term, decades even, so that they may gain a true understanding of the place and the people in it. I say long term because it would not be possible in my view to gain the understanding of the place needed unless our people spent a long, long time there.

The first object of this is simple intel, but truly deep intel. Another objective would be to influence events and this influence would be effected by the people who have been there a long time. This is all to the good but it sort of breaks down for me at this point.

First, can American military people do this or will personnel policies prevent it? It seems that guys are moved around very frequently and that won't do if truly deep knowledge is to be gained.

Stan and his experience would seem to be the kind of thing you are looking for. That brings up another problem. Stan knew what he was about and he knew what Zaire was about. But he was a Sgt. Would a man of such relatively low rank be able to exert any influence? I wonder. It seems to me there would be a lot of 'Oh he's only an enlisted man.' that would get in his way. And that would not only be with the locals, that would be with our own people. Would they listen to an enlisted guy, or any military guy who wasn't a high officer.

The part that really trips me up is the influencing part. How would that be done? Would it be moral suasion, force of personality or would it be something more substantial like the money inflow. It seems to me that we could have guy who was best friends in the world with a big shot in one of these countries and it would be for nothing unless our guy had something to give or take away.

As far as Saudi Arabia goes I'm not sure such an arrangement as you propose could really do us measurable good, like doing something to stop the private Saudi funds financing AQ, unless we could pressure them. We are coming into a very strong position, North American continental energy independence, so we can influence them, but I think it would take more than talk.

Another situation that is getting worse is the persecution of Christians in some of the countries of the Muslim world. That is one of those situations where the energetic people of the country; it might be that is what they really want. How would we change that short of something stronger than talk, if it can be changed at all?

I seek your opinion on the question of persecution of Christians in the Muslim world. Do people talk about that? Is it even seen as a problem and if it is, can or should anything be done about it?

So I can see merit in the general idea, but I question its practicability even given that the perceived ability to 'get things' is inherently less.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

5. My understanding of Insurgency. Revolutionary Insurgency conditions between Saudi members of AQ and the KSA; and Resistance Insurgency conditions between Saudi Members of AQ (and their many sympathizers) and the US due to the widely held belief that the Saudi family has been far less willing to listen to the reasonable grievances of the people due to their commitment of protection from the US than they would be if there were no such external source of protection.

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I think there's a great deal assumed here that is not supported by evidence or reasoning.

The idea that AQ is a reactive organization conjured up in response to American policy is widespread - the word "backlash" comes up rather often - but repeating something doesn't make it so. It is a peculiarly American conceit to assume that others have no capacity for agency, and can only be either manipulated by American policy or lash back against it. In reality many of those others have their own proactive goals, usually associated with power, and are perfectly capable of pursuing them on their own, without lashing back against anything. AQ wants power. They want to rule. Certainly they tap into a deep reserve of Arab and Muslim discontent, but I've seen few coherent arguments to suggest this is a backlash against US policy, or that any possible permutation of past American policy would have had the capacity to alter that.

Certainly AQ seeks to overturn and replace Arab governments, most particularly that of Saudi Arabia, but it's important to note that this element of their platform receives very little support among the populaces of these countries. Saudis are more than willing to cheer on AQ and to contribute money and fighters, when AQ fights foreign intruders in Muslim lands, or counts coup against anything associated with "the west". When AQ tried to bring the fight home and generate a rebellion against the Saudi monarchy, the effort fell completely flat: they never generated anything remotely approaching the critical mass needed to muster a credible insurgency or seriously threaten the government. People simply didn't buy the message: Saudis are quite willing to support and celebrate AQ as long as they fight somewhere else, but they have zero interest in being ruled by AQ. That doesn't mean they love the monarchy, of course, it just means that they don't see AQ as a viable alternative. It also doesn't help that the most consistently aggrieved section of the Saudi populace is the Shi'a, who of course are not about to jump on the AQ bandwagon.

There are certainly many Saudis who have grievances with their government, nut AQ is in no way a manifestation of popular anti-government sentiment. They tried to cast themselves in that role, but were categorically rejected.

Perhaps the weakest contention in your argument is the claim that US support has somehow enabled the Saudis to ignore popular grievance. Again, I see no evidence or reasoning to support that claim. The US has certainly supported the Saudis against foreign threats, and will continue to do so: that's not about supporting the royal family, it's about ensuring that Saudi oil reserves don't fall into hostile hands. The Saudis need no US help or advice to maintain internal security, and they could (and would) do it their way no matter what the US said or did. They don't need US help to oppress the populace, nor do they need or seek US permission.

Perhaps the most dangerous part of this argument is that it seems to point toward urging the US to try to impose itself as an unwanted mediator between the Saudi government and populace. That of course is an appalling idea. The US has zero standing to take on such a role, and any such effort would be resisted by all parties involved. The relationship between the Saudi government and their populace is complex, but it is none of our business and neither government nor populace wants us messing in it. Any advice we give their government is going to be rejected out of hand: for a suggestion of how that would go, look what happened when the US tried to council accommodation and negotiation when the Arab Spring hit Bahrain. The Saudis simply ignored us. Why would we think they'd do anything different if we tried to tell them how to manage their own populace?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

My recommendation is that we sit down with the Saudis, President to King, and let them know what the new terms are in no uncertain way. Letting them guess is leading to them guessing the worst. That isn't good.

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I don't see how the terms have changed.

The US will not bomb Iran or remove Assad just because the Saudis want us to. That's nothing new. The Saudis have tried to push in that direction, the US has not obliged (wisely, IMO), and the Saudis have gone about their own way. That doesn't represent any great change in the US-Saudi position.

The US will, of course, defend Saudi Arabia against any (rather hypothetical) attack from Iran (with Saddam gone there's no other reasonable candidate). Again, that's not support for the royal family, it's keeping the oil in congenial hands, something the Saudi government and people know quite well. The US will not withdraw that protection no matter what the Saudis do to their own people, and any threat to withdraw it is hollow... we know that, and so do they. No matter how awful the royals are, we will not accept Iranian control of the Saudi oil fields.

The US will not protect the Saudis in the event of internal uprising, but I don't think the Saudi royals ever expected that, or cared: they are quite confident in their own ability to manage that situation. That confidence may prove misplaced, but no matter what we do or say, they will do it their way. They don't care what we think, and they don't have to care. We have neither control nor meaningful influence over their actions.

/rant

At the end of the day, since the argument clearly focuses on Saudi Arabia, can we have some actual suggestions for policies and/or actions that you think would improve this situation?