Ah so, as the Japaneses say...
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
The immediate topic was an example using relevance and materiality - which is what I understood your question to be. To me, relevance and materiality are different. If fact A affects fact B in some way, then the two facts are mutually relevant. The next step is to determine materiality - how much does fact A affect fact B (is the relationship important - how much weight should be given).
I understood that, what was not understood was to what the relevance and materiality were to pertain.
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Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories...My question is whether categories 2-4 also have to be taken into account and whether they are material factors in determining an appropriate force structure for counter-insurgency, on one hand, and conventional, on the other.
My answer is yes, they do have to be taken into account. If for no other reason the mobility of HIC versus the static locations usual in COIN but there are many other factors -- and all are or will be very much situation dependent. I'll also point out that one could provide alternative categorization to those four -- Combat and combat support would perhaps the simplest example.
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Perhaps, one force structure can be appropriate for both. I don't know, which is why I raised the question.
Military force structure is always a compromise effort -- and like any compromise, it is rarely as effective as a purpose designed structure. In the case of the US Army, it strongly biased toward HIC which means in a COIN effort, ad hoc arrangements are necessary. Due to the stasis, that's easily done (if annoying to have to do...). OTOH, a force designed for COIN could not adjust to HIC without considerable changes -- there would be few Tanks, for example.
The down side from a realistic perspective is that a force optimized (to an extent if not fully) for HIC will have a predilection for HIC-like action regardless of the scenario. That can be deterred by strong leadership and good training.
The flip side is that a force optimized for COIN will not have an inclination toward aggressive and rapid forward movement in spite of casualties. Units used to holding Memorial Services for every man killed will have to shift to seeing dozens killed and no time for services; Investigators of every death will no longer have a job...
Shifting gears upward can be done -- it just isn't as easy as down shifting.
This is not really correct
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Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas.
The incident happened because the necessary combat skills; known as a requirement since Korea ADDED:{When the Chinese routinely infiltrated our lines and attacked CSS element in the Corps Zones -- and occasionally far deeper.}, reinforced in Viet Nam and needed by all soldiers, were not adequately covered in training for Lynch, her leaders or her Commanders -- all of whom erred mostly because they were poorly trained -- over an obvious period of many years. That includes the 1990-2001 period when the Army knew it was likely to be deployed to stability ops but did nothing to prepare for it. The situation has improved, slightly, today but we still are turning out only partly trained Soldiers.
That incident happened partly because the Army wanted to save money and 'not train anyone for skills they may not require' ADDED: {and the practice of deferring f/ CSS MOS Tng in the Svc Schools most or all the the combat skills as 'Tasks to be trained in unit' -- which don't or did not bother.} Perhaps the money saved went to to buy a SP Artillery system and a new ScoutHelicopter... Oops, that didn't work out. Either time on the chopper...:mad:
I'll also say -- as I have before, that anyone since Korea who thinks life is going to be totally linear in the combat zone is not thinking clearly. ADDED:{While our training did head that way, our doctrine has not said that.} Too much flexibility is afforded all our potential opponents. They can buy NVG and laser pointers just as well -- cheaper, even, then we can. They're also likely to be more innovative and flexible than we can be...