Well said and I'd suggest that your
point 2. is where, in either Policing or COIN, the difficult to change crux of the problem lies.
This:
Quote:
"...Much of crime, let alone terrorism, is hidden from the public's view."
is all too true...
We're missing the point, or IO is a bogus concept
Quote:
the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own
Taking your hat and sunglasses off when talking to people on the beat (whether a cop or Soldier) is simply a TTP for building relationships, it is not the integrated use of EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC. It may in some "small" way influence the individual(s) you're talking to.
Ken you noted earlier that my call for a better definition was too restrictive, but without some sort of guideline, we end up grasping at straws, and now we have Officers who think talking to the locals is IO. If that is true, zero'ing your M4 must be offensive operations.
Maybe IO was never intended for the tactical level. At the tactical level we practice EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC (and influence events) as separate disciplines? At the operational and strategic level where different disciplines can be integrated we practice IO (one would hope). This IO integration turns into tasks and guidance for subordinate units and requests for support from other agencies.
Let's say we want to influence an insurgent group from attacking oil production infrastructure (you name the location, Middle East, West Africa, S. America, etc.), but we prefer not to get involved in the conflict, so are primary line of effort is IO to influence the adversial group to quit attacking oil infrastructure. Some sample activities include:
EW/CNO: disrupt their computer metwork communications to create a sense of uncertainty and vulnerability
PSYOP: Leak articles about potential western/NATO forces intervening on behalf of the government (most groups would prefer not to fight western forces if they can avoid it), use other methods to convince the insurgents that attacking the oil infrastructure is not in the their best interest.
Diplomatic initiative where our diplomats speak to the insurgents, and strongly suggest they quit attacking oil infrastructure, etc.
Deception: Conduct military exercises in the vicinity of the insurgents, include show of force demonstrations (Fleet off the coast, fast movers flying over, etc.), several articles showing western and HN forces training together and pledging their friendship, etc.
OPSEC: Protecting the information that could reveal our true intentions.
The point isn't whether any of these will work, but to quasi-illustrate how IO could support small supports. IO by definition is a much bigger concept than we're discussing here, and it isn't simple. At the tactical level we support IO, we don't necessarily plan and conduct the full breath of IO.
Sorry, Bill. I wasn't clear...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
...Ken you noted earlier that my call for a better definition was too restrictive, but without some sort of guideline, we end up grasping at straws, and now we have Officers who think talking to the locals is IO. If that is true, zero'ing your M4 must be offensive operations.
I wasn't aiming at you nor was I trying to say a definition wasn't important; it is important.
However, I'm a firm believer in the Halsey dictum: "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Been my observation that less than half the people in the Armed forces subscribe to that view. Unfortunately, that means over half cling to what's written as the gospel, no deviations accepted. Therefor, what is written is important. Put too much in and it'll get overdone, leave something out -- as I did -- and it'll get misconstrued. :D
For example, I agree with all you say in the rest of the post from which that quote above derives -- but I also understood that "talking to the locals" was IO as simply a metaphor for a whole gamut of things; I didn't take that comment as being the answer to the whole IO gambit, yet you did or seem to. I don't mean that in the pejorative sense, merely pointing out that different people can read the or see the same thing and arrive at quite different conclusions.
As you go on to say:
Quote:
"...IO by definition is a much bigger concept than we're discussing here, and it isn't simple. At the tactical level we support IO, we don't necessarily plan and conduct the full breath of IO.
I totally agree -- but at the tactical level what Joe does, what that Officer who stops to grab a coke does, all contribute and those things are important; doctrine can't get that far down in the weeds (or should not) but it's got to address the concept; all, hopefully, without getting too prescriptive. Failure to zero your M4, for example, can conceivably sort of ruin your day when you get into offensive operations...
On the macro level of IO, strategic, operational and tactical (and even those three levels may be too confining for IO...), the definition is important, no question. It is also equally or perhaps even more important that it be not too prescriptive nor too loose -- and that is not an easy task. It will take time and effort to get it right. While some aspects of IO are older than thee and me, in a lot of factors, we're in uncharted territory and feeling our way. I think that's both understandable and acceptable and I'm willing to accept that it does not have to be my way to be right. Long way of saying it'll take a bit longer to get a good solid working description of the facets of IO published.
We pay lip service to teaching people how to think and not what to think; we're even trying to do that and that's a good thing. Regrettably, there are too many out there who do not want to think, they want to be told what to do in excruciating detail. Since it's difficult if not impossible to cover all contingencies, the doctrine writers have to -- and hopefully will -- walk a fine line lest some of their words get adhered to rigidly by such people. Those types are dangerous but there are too many of them and they aren't going away so we have to be careful what we write. That's what I was trying to say...
Well, I'll buy the old part...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Ken you are an old school Team Sgt
I dunno, I'm slow, took me too long to discover it was way better to seek forgiveness (even that's rarely necessary) than to ask permission (never a good idea and to be avoided at all costs). :D
Quote:
...I don't know if (his) mind ever expanded, but if it didn't wasn't because we were trying to help to him along.
Heh. Been there, done that -- it's one of the paybacks for putting up with mind numbing stupidity from high places. :D
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I would like to see doctrine provide a framework to work in (and it does in most cases), but I'm not happy yet with the IO doctrine, I think it does more harm than good in its current state. I do agree we're in new territory, important territory, so we need to evolve it into an effective framework. To do that you need a few naysayers out there throwing stones at the glass IO house, so we can rebuild it. I'm in that naysayer camp.
Agreed on all counts; my cautionary was directed at those who want too precise doctrine as opposed to sensible doctrine which leaves room for some flexibility, that and an acknowledgment that (a) it ain't easy and (b) it takes time when things change almost daily.
Is IO "integrated marketing"?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Taking your hat and sunglasses off when talking to people on the beat (whether a cop or Soldier) is simply a TTP for building relationships, it is not the integrated use of EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC. It may in some "small" way influence the individual(s) you're talking to.
Agreed--taking your hat off and having a conversation is not IO. But creating a system of thought and a strategy in which many "agents" (bad word with its own baggage, but the most appropriate) collectively take their hats off and have conversations is IO. And it's not just talking points and scripts, else it would be "merely" Public Affairs or PSYOPS. It's something bigger. ("Something ... wonderful.") And it's strategic in orientation--even if it occurs at the tactical level.
I'm beginning to dust off my communications theory brain-cells, and wondering whether "IO" is just "integrated marketing" in disguise. If so, there are some similar intellectual battles waged in business and communications schools: The former sees "integrated marketing" as abstract and the extension of a larger business plan (strategic?); the latter sees it as practical and methods-centered (tactical?). Either way, the question should be: What's your desired information end-state, and what are the tools to get you there.
I'm intrigued enough to start looking into how concepts such as viral marketing, buzz marketing, stealth marketing and the like play into the IO concept. And, again, my premise would be that such strategies are not just PSYOPS TTP, but something more in keeping with the IO definitions being discussed here. (Note to self: how to implement "buy me a drink girls" IO strategy downrange.)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Ken you noted earlier that my call for a better definition was too restrictive, but without some sort of guideline, we end up grasping at straws, and now we have Officers who think talking to the locals is IO. If that is true, zero'ing your M4 must be offensive operations.
A parallel analogy, in hopes of clarifying my "is / is not IO" distiction, attempted above: Zeroing your M4 is not "offensive operations." But I would argue that having a system in which soldiers are systematically trained in dime-drills, then mechanical zero, then battle-sight zero, then on the paper-target range, then on the pop-up, then stress-shooting, etc. is a basic part of a well-balanced and offensive breakfast. And, it seems, elements of that training communicate notable and perhaps surprising messages to troops. (Note comments of COL Robert Radcliffe, chief of combat developments at Fort Benning, at end of linked Associated Press article.)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Maybe IO was never intended for the tactical level. At the tactical level we practice EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC and OPSEC (and influence events) as separate disciplines? At the operational and strategic level where different disciplines can be integrated we practice IO (one would hope). This IO integration turns into tasks and guidance for subordinate units and requests for support from other agencies.
...
IO by definition is a much bigger concept than we're discussing here, and it isn't simple. At the tactical level we support IO, we don't necessarily plan and conduct the full breath of IO.
At the same time, despite my ramblings above, there needs to be identification of what is and is not working, ideas on what could work (both in terms of messages and modes). In short, IO tactics should not only support IO objectives, but inform them. (Perhaps that's why someone in this thread speculated regarding lumping intelligence collection under IO as well?)
I assume all of this leads to why we work in "IO working groups" at a brigade level--even though all these working groups begins to feel like "military operations by committtee"--it's both the largest- and smallest-scale at which the various IO-component SME staffs and soldiers are all invited to the same table?
The Non-Lethal Effects Cell
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
That is not to imply that having a non-kinetic effects cell in the staff makes any sense. I don’t think it does. I think it makes more sense to have a cell that handles all the stuff flying around in the air; air support, fire support, attack aviation, ADA, EW – largely to handle the coordination and deconfliction – and coordinates closely with CNO and intelligence collection assets to prevent non-kinetic fratricide. Unfortunately some of our staffs are using the doctrinal definition of IO as the guiding principle for how the staff is structured, and this simply makes no sense. Why is the EW guy working next to the PSYOP guy and CA guy? The overlap and need for coordination is minimal to zero.
I agree with your points regarding doctrine and pain, the occasional utility of the kinetic/non-kinetic construct, and the requirement for 18-year-olds and pointy-sticks to deliver on any effort to make friends and/or kill people.
I differ, however, in that I do see the potential need for the de-confliction of non-lethal factors in mission planning and execution. Meeting with the IO working group, for example, the brigade S2's "non-lethal effects electronic warfare officer" might weigh in on a given mission's use of MI company assets that could (either intentionally or unintentionally) affect civilian cellular telephone, television and/or radio infrastructure, any of which would seem to also offer obvious Civil Affairs, PSYOP, and Public Affairs implications.
Caveat: Seen it in theory and war-gaming. Haven't seen it in real-life.