Counter Insurgency On The Cheap
Interesting way to do COIN with the idea of establishing Economic Advantage.
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/alex-de...y-on-the-cheap
What are the Napoleonic vestiges ?
Quote:
from ML
....the broad consensus is that the first vestiges of operational warfare "emerged" during the Napoleonic era.
As I think has been obvious, my interest in this topic is historical and in the 19th century texts (CvC, Jomini, Mahan, Halleck, Bigelow, as examples). I don't have the professional competence to judge what "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" are or are not in the present-day; or whether the present-day usage of those terms (obviously replete in US manuals) is good, bad or indifferent.
What I do see in the 19th century is replete with references to the planning and execution of operations and campaigns - and a very rich vocabulary (of what I would call "terms of art") dealing with operations and campaigns; as well as something of a hierarchy of divisions (e.g., theatre of war, theatre(s) of operations, zone(s) of operations).
What are the "vestiges" of "operational warfare" in the Napoleonic era as you see those "vestiges" ? If those "vestiges" exist, they are not readily apparent to me. I see a very well developed "operational art" in what I've read (cited above); but I do not see "operational warfare" and the "operational level of war" until into the 20th century - e.g., Fuller as cited by the Brit LTG in his article.
Regards
Mike
LTC Melton - Cavguy comments
LTC Melton was the teacher; Cavguy was the student. Some brief (subdued) comments by the latter are here (Wilf Bait: The Clausewitz Delusion; post starting thread), here, and here.
Here is not the place for me to comment on LTC Melton's article, Conceptualizing Victory Anew (2011), which is subtitled "Revisiting U.S. Law, Doctrine, and Policy for War and Its Aftermath" - thus, entering my ballpark.
Basically, Melton mixes military strategy with "grand strategy" (a term he uses; also expressed inter alia as: Policy/Politik; the National Security Strategy; or Beaufre's "total strategy"). I'd argue that the results in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan (whether one calls them victories, half-victories or defeats) were primariily set by Policy/Politik. All four cases involved "first halves" and "second halves" (the latter still being played out in the continuations of OEF and OIF). Tell truth, Melton's article has little content re: either "Law" or "Policy" - and the "Doctrine" discussed is military. The military does not establish Policy/Politik except in the early 1990s science fiction of Charlie Dunlap (one of our great military lawyers, who should visit here), where the military makes a real hash of it.
Like the poltergeist, I'll be back :D - with discussion of agreement with LTG Kiszely re: Jomini and Fuller; and, taking off from that, my summary of what Jomini included in "Strategy", "Grand Tactics" and "Logistics".
Regards
Mike