The National Defense Strategy is Not

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201...rategy/156068/

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The National Defense Strategy (NDS) Is No Strategy

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The author starts by attacking the National Security Strategy (NSS). Overall I agree, both the NSS and the NDS are hyper conventional based on outdated Clausewitzian influence that both McMasters and Mattis embraced to a fault.

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Let us first dispense with the notion that there exists a White House National Security Strategy that describes an overall national-security approach in which the NDS plays a part. The 2017 NSS document, a modest, carefully navigated bow to conventional thinking perpetrated by National Security Council staffers under then-National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, was largely irrelevant from the start.

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He points out that the NSA Bolton has dismissed the NSS.

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Listening to the NSC staffers who produced the NSS leaves one with an impression of freshly minted international relations graduates whose grasp of statecraft is limited to buzzwords like ends, ways, and means; DIME; soft power; and such.

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True, but unfortunately a lot of the authors were relatively senior.

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Most importantly, it is the enduring, intellectually stultifying legacy of James Mattis’s reign as defense secretary, perpetuated and institutionalized (to a degree perhaps not seen since NSC-68) by true-believing disciples and acolytes.

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We know where he stands on Mattis, who perhaps like any other person held in high esteem is a good person, but still overrated.

The following point I agree with. The strategy dismisses anything beyond the 2+3 threats (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and VEOs). Yet wishing these threats away doesn't make them disappear. On the other hand, our hyper focus and ineffective approach to counter VEOs did largely blind us the rise of both China and Russia as significant threats to our interests, and to compete and deter against these actors requires investing resources and time into different capabilities. Yet, not at the expense of other threats.

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All else – e.g., failing states, climate change and environmental degradation, arms proliferation, sundry forms of illicit trafficking, pandemic disease – is ancillary and peripheral, unworthy of more than passing attention because such things don’t warrant legitimate military response.

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Finally, many of us wrestle the with the tactical focus on increasing lethality, which sadly still the preferred way of war for America. Move a heavy force to the battle area to engage in direct force on force combat and devastate the adversary with our advanced weapons. The focus on lethality limits the focus on innovation to weapons systems, despite claims to the contrary. Great for the weapons industry, not so great for the nation seeking to advance its interests in the 21st Century.

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Trumpeting lethality – deadliness, killing power; a term used some 13 times – is pure Mattis: tough-guy rhetoric one might expect from a Chesty Puller or a George Patton, good perhaps for motivating the troops and being “colorful,” but to others nothing short of arrogant, hyperbolic, inflammatory, and strategically counterproductive.

To suggest that lethality will sustain influence is less persuasive than the argument that it could diminish influence through disaffection with our bellicosity and militarism. To suggest that it will ensure favorable balances of power is to ignore the likelihood of provocation, insecurity, and reciprocal escalation.

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We're unlikely to see a redo any time soon.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201...rategy/156068/


The following point I agree with. The strategy dismisses anything beyond the 2+3 threats (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and VEOs). Yet wishing these threats away doesn't make them disappear. On the other hand, our hyper focus and ineffective approach to counter VEOs did largely blind us the rise of both China and Russia as significant threats to our interests, and to compete and deter against these actors requires investing resources and time into different capabilities. Yet, not at the expense of other threats.



Finally, many of us wrestle the with the tactical focus on increasing lethality, which sadly still the preferred way of war for America. Move a heavy force to the battle area to engage in direct force on force combat and devastate the adversary with our advanced weapons. The focus on lethality limits the focus on innovation to weapons systems, despite claims to the contrary.

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I’m just a Reserve NCO, but in recent months I’ve been stuck on the following thought:

Innovative Strategy > Innovative Technology

And I get the feeling that the US led 5 Eyes/Coalition have this backwards.

Having had some solid exposure to US and 5 Eyes defence innovation, I’ve seen some really impressive strides.

Necessary strides that have saved lives on combat operations(Pete Newell’s slide on IED incidence/casualties/launch of Rapid Equipping Force should be printed and framed).

But that tactical/tool level innovation at the coalface doesn’t seem to be matched with any real innovation in the overarching strategy.

As a Reserve NCO, military strategy is clearly “not my job” by trade or training.

But I have a growing interest in it, as well as experience with strategy in the commercial sector(early stage Amazon.com, Stanford GSB, startup mentoring, and angel investing).

In my personal anecdotal engagements with US and Australian Defence, I think they really “get” Moore’s Law and it’s implications for Defence.

But I’m beginning to wonder if Metcalfe’s Law of Network Effect, most readily seen in FAANG+(Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google, Microsoft, Cisco, Juniper) and BATH(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei) international digital platforms, will shift to more of a core consideration in our hybrid digital future.

Geodigital =/> Geopolitical

However, I get the feeling the US led west may need 3 distinct strategies to counter 3 distinct, but overlapping, competitors/adversaries

1) vs China: competition between “global geodigital operating systems”
2) vs Russia/Iran/North Korea: long term adversaries that are evolving as globally disruptive threats
3) vs Islam: ideological competition between fundamentalism and consumerism, one sided ideological fight

Thoughts?

Am I way off the mark?

Feel free to chop it to pieces Bill.

The younger folks who are fighting the current fight are not concerned with dogma and Clausewitz, they have real problems they need to solve and they're tested almost daily in combat. Tactical innovation as you pointed out is not strategic innovation. I was going to make the excuse that we haven't been forced by reality to force innovation in strategy, but frankly, that isn't accurate. Whatever we call the war on terror now, it has been a tragic failure at the strategic level. There has been limited innovation at the strategic level, we clung to a failed strategy for way too long. Instead of innovating we're more likely to quit. Furthermore, China and Russia have made impressive gains with their gray zone strategies, and our response is to develop a more lethal force? A more "effective" force is certainly required to deter an adversary from pursuing nuclear and conventional options that threaten our interests, but it does nothing to reverse the setbacks in the gray zone. Since I'm on a roll, our innovation has largely been innovated to technology, seeking that third off-set technical advantage, but little innovation in the realm of strategic and operational approaches.

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However, I get the feeling the US-led west may need 3 distinct strategies to counter 3 distinct, but overlapping, competitors/adversaries

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1) vs China: competition between “global geodigital operating systems”
2) vs Russia/Iran/North Korea: long term adversaries that are evolving as globally disruptive threats
3) vs Islam: ideological competition between fundamentalism and consumerism, one-sided ideological fight

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First, we need an overall strategy that describes where we want to be in the future as a nation, and that includes some internal issues such as our education system, infrastructure, economically, environmentally, internationally, and so forth. Once we have an idea of where we are steering, the threats and opportunities become clearer and more rational.

China, Russia, and Violent Extremism are critical threats to our interests, but as you pointed out each requires a deep understanding of all the strategic factors including the culture of each country (and its subcultures), political, economic, military, paramilitary and other factors to determine how to gain advantage. We have a habit of driving blind and focus on so called decisive combat operations as the answer to everything when more often than not the decisive work is done before the fight if there is even a need to fight. Increasing lethality as the author of the article above notes is not a strategy. The reason we haven't seen innovation to challenge these threats short of conventional armed conflict is largely due to our bureaucratic structure which has shaped our strategic culture. It's the hammer-nail thing. While we have other tools, each tool is in a separate toolbox with it owns authorities and associated funding, and that tool will seek to protect its turf. The hammer can only envision a conventional war paradigm, even against VEOs.

China seeks to change the international order that we and many other countries depend upon for our security and prosperity. They have a multiprong sophisticated strategy for achieving this. Help me connect your idea to protecting the international order? You'll need to explain the global geodigital operating systems to me because I think we already have those in spades.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

The younger folks who are fighting the current fight are not concerned with dogma and Clausewitz, they have real problems they need to solve and they're tested almost daily in combat. Tactical innovation as you pointed out is not strategic innovation. I was going to make the excuse that we haven't been forced by reality to force innovation in strategy, but frankly, that isn't accurate. Whatever we call the war on terror now, it has been a tragic failure at the strategic level. There has been limited innovation at the strategic level, we clung to a failed strategy for way too long. Instead of innovating we're more likely to quit. Furthermore, China and Russia have made impressive gains with their gray zone strategies, and our response is to develop a more lethal force? A more "effective" force is certainly required to deter an adversary from pursuing nuclear and conventional options that threaten our interests, but it does nothing to reverse the setbacks in the gray zone. Since I'm on a roll, our innovation has largely been innovated to technology, seeking that third off-set technical advantage, but little innovation in the realm of strategic and operational approaches.





First, we need an overall strategy that describes where we want to be in the future as a nation, and that includes some internal issues such as our education system, infrastructure, economically, environmentally, internationally, and so forth. Once we have an idea of where we are steering, the threats and opportunities become clearer and more rational.

China, Russia, and Violent Extremism are critical threats to our interests, but as you pointed out each requires a deep understanding of all the strategic factors including the culture of each country (and its subcultures), political, economic, military, paramilitary and other factors to determine how to gain advantage. We have a habit of driving blind and focus on so called decisive combat operations as the answer to everything when more often than not the decisive work is done before the fight if there is even a need to fight. Increasing lethality as the author of the article above notes is not a strategy. The reason we haven't seen innovation to challenge these threats short of conventional armed conflict is largely due to our bureaucratic structure which has shaped our strategic culture. It's the hammer-nail thing. While we have other tools, each tool is in a separate toolbox with it owns authorities and associated funding, and that tool will seek to protect its turf. The hammer can only envision a conventional war paradigm, even against VEOs.

China seeks to change the international order that we and many other countries depend upon for our security and prosperity. They have a multiprong sophisticated strategy for achieving this. Help me connect your idea to protecting the international order? You'll need to explain the global geodigital operating systems to me because I think we already have those in spades.

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Thanks for the response Bill.

Last week I submitted an article for the US Army Mad Scientist 2030 writing competition that covers “geodigital strategy” in a fictional scenario against “Donovia” used as a proxy for China.

I’m happy to send thru a copy(although about 4500 words) if you’re interested.

But in short:

GeoDigital Strategy: A fictional subfield of geopolitics. Foreign policy guided by factors that are unique or significantly magnified in the digital environment. The geopolitical application of Metcalfe’s, Moore’s and Zipf’s Laws.

Superplatform: A digital platform of global geodigital significance.

One Platform, One Network(OP/ON): One Belt One Road applied to geodigital networks. A fictional development strategy extension of OB/OR to expand the integrated China/BATH superplatform into the ubiquitous global operating system.

FAANG+(Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google, Microsoft, Cisco/Juniper)

BATH(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei)

The entire fictional exercise actually rose from a post I made here in response to one of yours where I mentioned the disturbing rise and total dominance of WeChat in China.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...l=1#post212826

I view China/BATH as an integrated “operating system” akin to government developing and directing strategy executed in combined arms operations by an interoperable Army, Navy, and Air Force.

I view the US/FAANG+ “operating system” as the “geodigital” equivalent of a government in open conflict with each and every one of its superplatform “armed services” who are also concurrently in open conflict with each other.

Having grown up during the 90’s gen1 Internet boom and the silly valuations put on scaling user bases(first common use of Metcalfe’s Law in tech media lexicon). Then again in the last decade long boom.

It has me thinking Metcalfe’s Law and Zipf’s Law may apply to government/commercial hybrid networks that are globally and geopolitically significant.

Hope that helps clarify it?

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Originally Posted by flagg

Thanks for the response Bill.

Last week I submitted an article for the US Army Mad Scientist 2030 writing competition that covers “geodigital strategy” in a fictional scenario against “Donovia” used as a proxy for China.

I’m happy to send thru a copy(although about 4500 words) if you’re interested.

But in short:

GeoDigital Strategy: A fictional subfield of geopolitics. Foreign policy guided by factors that are unique or significantly magnified in the digital environment. The geopolitical application of Metcalfe’s, Moore’s and Zipf’s Laws.

Superplatform: A digital platform of global geodigital significance.

One Platform, One Network(OP/ON): One Belt One Road applied to geodigital networks. A fictional development strategy extension of OB/OR to expand the integrated China/BATH superplatform into the ubiquitous global operating system.

FAANG+(Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google, Microsoft, Cisco/Juniper)

BATH(Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei)

The entire fictional exercise actually rose from a post I made here in response to one of yours where I mentioned the disturbing rise and total dominance of WeChat in China.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...l=1#post212826

I view China/BATH as an integrated “operating system” akin to government developing and directing strategy executed in combined arms operations by an interoperable Army, Navy, and Air Force.

I view the US/FAANG+ “operating system” as the “geodigital” equivalent of a government in open conflict with each and every one of its superplatform “armed services” who are also concurrently in open conflict with each other.

Having grown up during the 90’s gen1 Internet boom and the silly valuations put on scaling user bases(first common use of Metcalfe’s Law in tech media lexicon). Then again in the last decade long boom.

It has me thinking Metcalfe’s Law and Zipf’s Law may apply to government/commercial hybrid networks that are globally and geopolitically significant.

Hope that helps clarify it?

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Great thoughts, and we're potentially already seeing the One Platform, One Network with Huawei. Perhaps digital hegemony enables economic and political hegemony?

Regarding Zipf’s Law, I add to look up the definition and just reading the definition wasn't helpful. I'll attempt to study it a little more over the weekend to understand its relevance in your argument. Copy on Metcalfe's law, and maybe a passing thought, can we reverse engineer it from a value proposition to a destructive proposition. Rough thought, but turn all the connected nodes against a particular actor. Not sure where I'm going with this, sounds like something your generation could explore more effectively than mine. Keep the ideas coming.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Great thoughts, and we're potentially already seeing the One Platform, One Network with Huawei. Perhaps digital hegemony enables economic and political hegemony?

Regarding Zipf’s Law, I add to look up the definition and just reading the definition wasn't helpful. I'll attempt to study it a little more over the weekend to understand its relevance in your argument. Copy on Metcalfe's law, and maybe a passing thought, can we reverse engineer it from a value proposition to a destructive proposition. Rough thought, but turn all the connected nodes against a particular actor. Not sure where I'm going with this, sounds like something your generation could explore more effectively than mine. Keep the ideas coming.

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Agreed on digital hegemony perhaps allowing economic/political hegemony.

If given a choice of digital, economic, or political monopoly, I’m increaisngly leaning towards digital as my vote for most valuable.

Zipf’s Law applies to frequency of word useage, regardless of language.

With the most frequently used word being used at roughy twice the rate of the 2nd most frequently used words, etcetera.

I think it can be roughly applied to operating systems such as:

Cloud computing:
Amazon #1
Microsoft #2(half of #1)
Google #3(half again of #2)

Mobile OS:
Android #1
iOS #2 (well less than half of #1)

Desktop OS:
Windows #1
macOS #2(well less than half of #1)
Linux #3(half of #2)

Where I think it may apply here in a geodigital Cold War between opposing superplatform operating systems is that in commercial cases there seems to be far more in the way of dominance than equilibrium.

My thoughts are that Zipf’s Law, if it applies, may be something akin to Thucydides Trap for geodigital networks.

In my fictional scenario, I refer to an “OD-X” partnering with OGA combined under Title 50v2 focused on counter network effects operations.

I find out by the end of the month if US Army Mad Scientist will publish it or not.

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GeoDigital Strategy: A fictional subfield of geopolitics. Foreign policy guided by factors that are unique or significantly magnified in the digital environment. The geopolitical application of Metcalfe’s, Moore’s and Zipf’s Laws.

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The evolution of globalization and information technology facilitates the ability to share information instantaneously around the globe in multiple forms. These messages frequently become memes that individuals identify with (note the recent criminal act in New Zealand). The power of information to shape the geopolitical space is profound. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states “the rapidly accelerating spread of information is challenging the ability of some governments to control their populations and maintain civil order, while at the same time changing how wars are fought and aiding groups in mobilizing and organizing. It is this globalization of information that blurs the distinction between local and global affairs in the social, political, and economic spheres. Metcalfe’s Law indicates this geodigital space will increase in significance exponentially.

I think we have a fair understanding of how violent extremists leverage the digital environment to pursue their ends, which includes expanding their operational reach globally, or at least to the connected the portions of the world. We have only recently begun to appreciate how state actors compete in the geodigital domain. It is Net warfare in the 21st Century, but in traditional parlance, it is political warfare with new means (weaponizing the digital space).

The digital domain enables more than information/influence dominance, it will enable economic dominance, and perhaps security dominance. Collectively this unfortunate, because it has so much promise to change the world for the better. Norming the use of the digital domain globally is desirable, but I question if it is possible?

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

The evolution of globalization and information technology facilitates the ability to share information instantaneously around the globe in multiple forms. These messages frequently become memes that individuals identify with (note the recent criminal act in New Zealand). The power of information to shape the geopolitical space is profound. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states “the rapidly accelerating spread of information is challenging the ability of some governments to control their populations and maintain civil order, while at the same time changing how wars are fought and aiding groups in mobilizing and organizing. It is this globalization of information that blurs the distinction between local and global affairs in the social, political, and economic spheres. Metcalfe’s Law indicates this geodigital space will increase in significance exponentially.

I think we have a fair understanding of how violent extremists leverage the digital environment to pursue their ends, which includes expanding their operational reach globally, or at least to the connected the portions of the world. We have only recently begun to appreciate how state actors compete in the geodigital domain. It is Net warfare in the 21st Century, but in traditional parlance, it is political warfare with new means (weaponizing the digital space).

The digital domain enables more than information/influence dominance, it will enable economic dominance, and perhaps security dominance. Collectively this unfortunate, because it has so much promise to change the world for the better. Norming the use of the digital domain globally is desirable, but I question if it is possible?

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I believe the voluntary reach of commercial network platforms, if working in granular partnership with government, could be easily pushed beyond just majority and towards ubiquity with preferential treatment towards specific commercial networks and diplomatic/political/legislative nudging behaviours.

Expanding hybrid digital network influence across international borders may be achieved using the same political, economic, and diplomatic TTPs as One Belt, One Road.

However, I very much believe coercive debt trap diplomacy only gets a network so far.

A competitive value proposition is still required.

For both “citizen users” to enhance their opportunity as well as “sovereign government users” to enhance their continuity.

Just in the last two weeks, Italy became the first Group of Seven or NATO country to sign up to China’s One Belt, One Road initiative along with Germany’s decision to NOT ban Huawei 5G from Germany’s next gen network are both related to my argument of a possible One Platform, One Network future.

I’m left thinking that the US is currently facing a much more dangerous digital analog to the Trans-Siberian Pipeline Crisis where President Reagan placed considerable political pressure on some of the US’s closest allies to disrupt Soviet economic opportunity and political leverage.

Creating, capturing, distributing, and monetising economic value.

But I see it working as a velvet gloved, iron fist.

An economic hand up, combined with a political punch in the face if you oppose it.

Global economic, political, and social “networkism” with Chinese characteristics.

I don’t view the possibility as a singular dominant network/platform, but I do see it as having potential to be the world’s largest.

But my concern is that instead of seeing some form of Cold War-esque balance, equilibrium, or homeostasis we may see Zipf’s Law apply with vastly uneven distribution between the most commonly used network and the 2nd most commonly used network.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

The digital domain enables more than information/influence dominance, it will enable economic dominance, and perhaps security dominance. Collectively this unfortunate, because it has so much promise to change the world for the better. Norming the use of the digital domain globally is desirable, but I question if it is possible?

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Further to my last Bill:

The Xuexi Qiangguo “Study the Great Nation” app is now the most downloaded item on Apple’s App Store in China(More than WeChat and TikTok):

https://www.scmp.com/tech/apps-socia...inping-thought

https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...to-your-pocket

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-a8859511.html

Seems like Mao’s Little Red Book(published by PLA General Political Department) mashed up with behavioural economics “nudging”, likely observed by tireless evolving AI/ML Google Analytics-like tools of State Security.

Probably more George Orwell’s “1984” than Shoshana Zuboff’s “Age of Surveillance Capitalism”.

I tend to think our potential digital future is a blend of the two, with the spoils going to the network/platform that iterates the best value proposition for both citizen “users” and government “enterprise/admins”

Xi is using Mao's methodology to brainwash his citizens. The similarity between Xi and Mao is both embrace oppressive governance; the difference is Xi comes closer to embracing Confucius thought (as Xi calls it, socialism with Chinese characteristics) than foolishly embracing communism as Mao did. The results economically are night and day, but increasingly similar when it comes to oppressive governance. Like Mao in the 60s and 70s, Xi is now exporting this model of governance, and the means (IT, AI, etc.) for other nations to implement it. Xi infiltrates economically, then gains control of the various media outlets to the point of controlling country's media may publish, etc. With Huawei, artificial intelligence, facial recognition technology increasingly available, I think it is possible that Xi will gradually assert control over social media in other nations. If you control the information, then you can control the populace.

This thread started with the claim that our NDS is not a strategy. In the traditional sense it is a strategy, but one that clings to outdated Clausewitzian views of power. I'll refer back to a post I made a couple of years ago that is relevant here.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...l=1#post202760

Connectography: Mapping the Future o...y Parag Khanna

I'm quoting reviewer on Amazon below:

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The author of this book has done something no one else has done – I say this as the reviewer of over 2,000 non-fiction books at Amazon across 98 categories. For the first time, in one book, we have a very clear map of what is happening where in the way of economic and social development; a startlingly diplomatic but no less crushing indictment of nation-state and militaries; and a truly inspiring game plan for what we should all be demanding from countries, cities, commonwealths, communities, and companies, in the way of future investments guided by a strategy for creating a prosperous world at peace.

This is a nuanced deeply stimulating book that makes it clear that China’s grand strategy of building infrastructure has beaten the US strategy of threatening everyone with a dysfunctional military that crushes hope and destroys wealth everywhere it goes; that connectivity (cell phones, the Internet, roads, high-speed rail, tunnels, bridges, and ferries) is the accelerator for wealth creation by the five billion poor that most Western states and corporations ignore;

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Parag makes the following arguments:
- Infrastructure is destiny
- Connectography proves why past is no longer prologue
- Why China’s “One Belt, One Road” project is a winning strategy that outflanks the U.S. rebalance (Go) by integrating all of Eurasia’s economies under China’s auspices.

For those that think proxy wars are the way to compete, he offers a counterview. I am reading more and more thought pieces that propose we revert to Cold War proxy wars to compete, but to what end? It is hard to break from the past when our doctrine clings to it.

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a tour of the new geopolitical marketspace in which military superpowers competed for influence in regions strife with instability and divisions. Colonies were once conquered; today countries are bought. Smart states practice a shrewd multi-alignment strategy, friendly with all great powers to extract max benefit without committing to deep alliances.

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I think our national leadership has awakened to this fact (there are exceptions of course), but too late and we don't have a strategy to compete effectively for connectivity. We also have a White House that messages it is opposed to connectivity, creating opportunities for China to exploit.

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Geopolitical competition is evolving from war over territory to war over connectivity. A tug of war over global supply chains, energy markets, industrial production, and flows of finance, technology, knowledge, and talent. Shifts from a war between systems (communist versus capitalist) to war within one collective supply chain system. Military war is a real threat, while tug of war is a perpetual reality. Won thru master economic planning

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If the overarching of our national strategy is to advance an international order that facilitates achieving our security and economic objectives, then the following should be considered.

Mega-infrastructure overcame hurdles of pol-physical geography. How we divide the world legally (geo-pol) is giving way to how we organize its functionality versus political space. The lines that connect us supersede the borders that divide us.
Systems only want one thing, connectivity, doesn’t care which power is most connected. Is PRC building the new system?

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Supporting links to Xi's use of technology to oppress and export the same.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ce-prison.html

https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/asia/...tl/index.html?

https://www.cfr.org/blog/exporting-r...ce-push-africa

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Xi is using Mao's methodology to brainwash his citizens. The similarity between Xi and Mao is both embrace oppressive governance; the difference is Xi comes closer to embracing Confucius thought (as Xi calls it, socialism with Chinese characteristics) than foolishly embracing communism as Mao did. The results economically are night and day, but increasingly similar when it comes to oppressive governance. Like Mao in the 60s and 70s, Xi is now exporting this model of governance, and the means (IT, AI, etc.) for other nations to implement it. Xi infiltrates economically, then gains control of the various media outlets to the point of controlling country's media may publish, etc. With Huawei, artificial intelligence, facial recognition technology increasingly available, I think it is possible that Xi will gradually assert control over social media in other nations. If you control the information, then you can control the populace.

This thread started with the claim that our NDS is not a strategy. In the traditional sense it is a strategy, but one that clings to outdated Clausewitzian views of power. I'll refer back to a post I made a couple of years ago that is relevant here.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...l=1#post202760

Connectography: Mapping the Future o...y Parag Khanna

I'm quoting reviewer on Amazon below:



Parag makes the following arguments:
- Infrastructure is destiny
- Connectography proves why past is no longer prologue
- Why China’s “One Belt, One Road” project is a winning strategy that outflanks the U.S. rebalance (Go) by integrating all of Eurasia’s economies under China’s auspices.

For those that think proxy wars are the way to compete, he offers a counterview. I am reading more and more thought pieces that propose we revert to Cold War proxy wars to compete, but to what end? It is hard to break from the past when our doctrine clings to it.



I think our national leadership has awakened to this fact (there are exceptions of course), but too late and we don't have a strategy to compete effectively for connectivity. We also have a White House that messages it is opposed to connectivity, creating opportunities for China to exploit.

.

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Hi Bill,

Connectography looks interesting and is now in my Kindle queue.

At a glance, it aligns quite nicely with my recent Mad Scientist submission.

Which network operating system(China or US) will offer individual users(consumers) and sovereigns(enterprise) the best respective value proposition?

I’ve been grounded in Metcalfe and learning how to apply Clausewitz.

I’m hoping those that are grounded in Clausewitz start applying Metcalfe.

I’ve been looking at two very sobering comparisons:

1) (E-commerce/mobile payments), Chinese > USA .....by 50x

2) (Relative spend in 2018 dollars), One Belt One Road > Marshall Plan .....by 50-90x

Advancements in disrupting & destroying insurgent networks is a useful capability(McChrystal et al), but how are we at amplifying friendly/coalition commercial network effects and deterring/disrupting adversary commercial networks via non kinetic means?

The GWOT expression “we can’t kill our way to victory” can also be recycled and repurposed for peer threats to “lethality doesn’t create positive geodigital network effects”.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Supporting links to Xi's use of technology to oppress and export the same.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ce-prison.html

https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/asia/...tl/index.html?

https://www.cfr.org/blog/exporting-r...ce-push-africa

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Unlike the “surveillance capitalism”-like WeChat, Xi’s App feels far more “littleredbook.com” forced.

But if we look at them both thru a geodigital export “product” lens:

WeChat is for citizen users (consumers) who desire opportunity
Xi’s App is for sovereign users(enterprise) who desire continuity

Flagg

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Which network operating system(China or US) will offer individual users(consumers) and sovereigns(enterprise) the best respective value proposition?

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The network operating system is part of a greater competition that ultimately focuses on who will be primary in shaping the international order. I think your description of Geo-digital strategy will likely be one of the most crucial areas in this overall competition. The winner as you state will be determined by who provides the best value proposition. We must offer more than saying don't buy into Huawei. I have yet to see our value proposition?

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IÂ’ve been grounded in Metcalfe and learning how to apply Clausewitz.

IÂ’m hoping those that are grounded in Clausewitz start applying Metcalfe.

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Don't get over-enamored with Clausewitz on strategy, too many people shut their mind down to new ideas by focusing on one strategist. Obvious to most people, the world has changed significantly since the early 19th Century. I still recommend reading "On War," but study it with a critical eye.

If you haven't read it yet, I highly recommend reading NSC-68. It is close to 70 years old, but some relevant strategic themes can be modified and brought forward into the 21st Century.

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl...s/pdf/10-1.pdf

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IÂ’ve been looking at two very sobering comparisons:

1) (E-commerce/mobile payments), Chinese > USA .....by 50x

2) (Relative spend in 2018 dollars), One Belt One Road > Marshall Plan .....by 50-90x

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Please explain bullets 1) and 2) above.

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Advancements in disrupting & destroying insurgent networks is a useful capability(McChrystal et al), but how are we at amplifying friendly/coalition commercial network effects and deterring/disrupting adversary commercial networks via non kinetic means?

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Disrupting adversary commercial networks is potentially a dangerous path to go down. We already over leverage trade as a weapon, which in my opinion sets a bad precedent for an international order that should focus on promoting prosperity. We risk pushing allies and partners away from us with this approach, and perhaps into China's camp if we're not careful. There are already increasing calls to replace the dollar as the global currency. If that happens, then we may have to live with the norm we imposed being imposed upon us. American strategists have never been particularly good at thinking about effects over time.

The best way to disrupt adversary commercial networks is to offer a better product/service. If the commercial networks are illicit, then that is another matter.

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The GWOT expression “we can’t kill our way to victory” can also be recycled and repurposed for peer threats to “lethality doesn’t create positive geodigital network effects.”

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This war, or hyper-competition, over the international order is being waged non-lethally currently. Having the world's most powerful military accomplishes little in addressing the competitive space below armed conflict. At best it denies an adversary an overt military option (deterrence), but if our adversaries are achieving war-like objectives without overt military aggression how do we achieve our aims? That is the strategic question our nation and allies must wrestle with now.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Flagg



The network operating system is part of a greater competition that ultimately focuses on who will be primary in shaping the international order. I think your description of Geo-digital strategy will likely be one of the most crucial areas in this overall competition. The winner as you state will be determined by who provides the best value proposition. We must offer more than saying don't buy into Huawei. I have yet to see our value proposition?

Agreed.

Pressuring our coalition allies to ban Huawei is not a strategy.

Creating an alternative that our coalition allies and their respective citizens want, is.

Don't get over-enamored with Clausewitz on strategy, too many people shut their mind down to new ideas by focusing on one strategist. Obvious to most people, the world has changed significantly since the early 19th Century. I still recommend reading "On War," but study it with a critical eye.

Agreed. I needed to understand Clausewitz for when it is the default reference.

However, I have found an adaptation of friction to be relevant.

If you haven't read it yet, I highly recommend reading NSC-68. It is close to 70 years old, but some relevant strategic themes can be modified and brought forward into the 21st Century.

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistl...s/pdf/10-1.pdf

Thanks for that. On first pass I’m finding the most relevant part in applying it to today being a bit of role reversal.

We are currently a very rough analog to the Soviet Union’s excessively heavy military economy, China is a very rough analog to the US economy with considerable scope for economic warfare.

Please explain bullets 1) and 2) above.

1)

Alibaba’s Singles Day generated more revenue that Amazon Prime Day(China’s and US’s respective artificial e-commerce holidays).........in just 10 minutes

China’s mobile payments in 2018 were $12.8 trillion, US equivalent was $50 billion so a comparative 256x differential

2)

US Marshall Plan, as well as being the last industrial/financial power standing post WWII, is widely regarded as a significant success worthy of a Nobel Prize for it’s architect/proponent beyond the influence and economic/financial integration that could be monetised thru US Dollar exorbitant privilege.

At an estimated price in 2018 dollars of $100 billion

One Belt One Road looks to have an estimated price tag of $5-9 Trillion over a decade+( 50-90x differential)

Even if the former is the greatest ROI of all time, and the latter is the worst, we have a significant problem in terms of economic competition for relative global influence.

Throw in the digital domain with Zipf’s Law and we are increasingly seeing the likelihood of a decisive winner and an increasingly distant second place network competitor.

3) Huawei has double the combined revenue of Cisco/Juniper, and far more than double R&D spend(hence 5G superiority).


Disrupting adversary commercial networks is potentially a dangerous path to go down.

Completely agree.

And it could become the next mutually assured destruction(MAD) option.

We already over leverage trade as a weapon, which in my opinion sets a bad precedent for an international order that should focus on promoting prosperity. We risk pushing allies and partners away from us with this approach, and perhaps into China's camp if we're not careful.

Exactly, hence competitive value proposition perspective.

There are already increasing calls to replace the dollar as the global currency. If that happens, then we may have to live with the norm we imposed being imposed upon us. American strategists have never been particularly good at thinking about effects over time.

Do we run the risk of reacting too late, and being viewed as the ruling Alawites, then as Tutsis?

The best way to disrupt adversary commercial networks is to offer a better product/service.

Absolutely. Build something citizens and sovereigns want..

If the commercial networks are illicit, then that is another matter.


This war, or hyper-competition, over the international order is being waged non-lethally currently. Having the world's most powerful military accomplishes little in addressing the competitive space below armed conflict. At best it denies an adversary an overt military option (deterrence), but if our adversaries are achieving war-like objectives without overt military aggression how do we achieve our aims? That is the strategic question our nation and allies must wrestle with now.

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I think the threshold of detectability matters.

Do citizens and governments detect the non kinetic jockeying for strategic position? But do they care beyond immediate needs and the next election cycle?

Are we able to shift away from “deter, disrupt, and destroy” and incorporate “attract, build, create”?

Citing one line by Kevin23:

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China’s mobile payments in 2018 were $12.8 trillion, US equivalent was $50 billion so a comparative 256x differential

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Whilst China may not have a street crime problem like many Western nations have, it does have a problem with dishonesty - which is seen in everyday theft of property e.g. electric motorcycle batteries. Let alone the widespread corruption within officialdom; one spin-off is the neglect of industrial health & safety procedures, which can be lethal.

The Chinese economy as Kevin23 pointed out uses mobile payments on a scale not seen in the USA and I expect elsewhere too. Quietly in international crime-fighting forums acknowledges that fraud poses a big problem. Even only for example 0.5% is stolen, that is a lot of money.

Posted by Flagg

Quote:

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I think the threshold of detectability matters.

Do citizens and governments detect the non kinetic jockeying for strategic position? But do they care beyond immediate needs and the next election cycle?

Are we able to shift away from “deter, disrupt, and destroy” and incorporate “attract, build, create”?

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It is the job of the government to educate its citizens. The problem we must overcome is the engrained naïve view since the Bush senior administration that China will conform to international norms and become a valuable partner. It wasn't until recently that the West woke to up to the fact that China and the West are ideologically non-compatible, yet economically entangled. It wouldn't matter at all, or at least matter much less, if China displaced the U.S. as a global leader if they were generally ideologically aligned. That is the conclusion the UK came to when the U.S. surpassed them a world power. There was no need to undermine us, or worse go to to war, because we shared mutual interests.

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Are we able to shift away from “deter, disrupt, and destroy” and incorporate “attract, build, create”?

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'

The leadership to promote this change will not come from the military or the current administration. It will take a leader of the likes of JFK or Reagan to pull the country in this direction.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Citing one line by Kevin23:

Whilst China may not have a street crime problem like many Western nations have, it does have a problem with dishonesty - which is seen in everyday theft of property e.g. electric motorcycle batteries. Let alone the widespread corruption within officialdom; one spin-off is the neglect of industrial health & safety procedures, which can be lethal.

The Chinese economy as Kevin23 pointed out uses mobile payments on a scale not seen in the USA and I expect elsewhere too. Quietly in international crime-fighting forums acknowledges that fraud poses a big problem. Even only for example 0.5% is stolen, that is a lot of money.

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Great post David.

I'm constantly torn between the contradictions of digital authoritarianism combined with market access totalitarianism mixed with the Wild West cowboy entrepreneurialism from both legit entrepreneurs and illicit networks.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Posted by Flagg



It is the job of the government to educate its citizens. The problem we must overcome is the engrained naïve view since the Bush senior administration that China will conform to international norms and become a valuable partner. It wasn't until recently that the West woke to up to the fact that China and the West are ideologically non-compatible, yet economically entangled. It wouldn't matter at all, or at least matter much less, if China displaced the U.S. as a global leader if they were generally ideologically aligned. That is the conclusion the UK came to when the U.S. surpassed them a world power. There was no need to undermine us, or worse go to to war, because we shared mutual interests.

'

The leadership to promote this change will not come from the military or the current administration. It will take a leader of the likes of JFK or Reagan to pull the country in this direction.

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Agreed on the leadership required.

However, if an effective alternative array is to be built to counter China's it is going to have to require a dramatic increase in trust.

Trust in government, trust in government institutions, trust in private superplatform partners, and trust in coalition/array/network partners.

The last polls I viewed displayed dangerously low levels of trust in government and the narrative on both the wealth divide and data privacy are decidedly anti superplatform in the west.

I'm a pretty optimistic guy, but I don't see us at square 1, I see it as more like square negative 4.

Extremely pessimistic at the macro level.

But at the micro level, a key indicator remains the consistent flow of people moving.

The wealthiest are still flowing consistently from China to US led 5 Eyes.

Further to the superplatform and geodigital strategy narrative I’ve been trying to build, attempts to ban Huawei have made it into the news cycle recently, but my old employer Amazon abandoning China is receiving little attention:

https://pandaily.com/amazon-quits-ch...ling-in-china/

It would appear to be an example of Amazon simply not keeping pace with Chinese competitors’ value proposition as well as user expectations.

What role do multi trillion dollar superplatforms play in national geodigital strategy over the next decade?

Open conflict between superplatform and sovereigns? (US)

Laissez-faire?

Public-private Partnership?

Complete integration? (China)

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Great thoughts, and we're potentially already seeing the One Platform, One Network with Huawei. Perhaps digital hegemony enables economic and political hegemony?

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Last month Germany resisted heavy US pressure to ban Huawei, greenlighting its 5G buildout.

Now add the UK to the list:

https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/...ectid=12224897

Quote:

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Originally Posted by flagg

Unlike the “surveillance capitalism”-like WeChat, Xi’s App feels far more “littleredbook.com” forced.

But if we look at them both thru a geodigital export “product” lens:

WeChat is for citizen users (consumers) who desire opportunity
Xi’s App is for sovereign users(enterprise) who desire continuity

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Another timely article, this time on Chinese geodigital exports for “enterprise” customers.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/t...overnment.html

The hits keep coming, now in 5 Eyes partner NZ:

One Belt One Road sales pitch by China’s Ambassador to NZ Wu Xi, in our biggest national news source:
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/...ectid=12225605

NZ Trade Minister firmly committed to One Belt, One Road:
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/...ectid=12225644

Huawei/5G issue sidestepped, but increasingly likely to mirror UK accessibility to Huawei/5G

The following article discusses the cybersecurity threat that 5G will present regardless of who provides the hardware infrastructure. The software presents the most significant cybersecurity threat. It goes on to argue that Trump administration's race to win the 5G race has resulted in security shortcuts. The former FCC director explains 5G designs need to address security as a forethought, not an afterthought. Makes me wonder if 5G could empower individuals to create mass chaos and disruption if they can hack into the system? Super empowered actors?

The article points out that many 5G capability claims are hyperbole based on the limitations of the 5G wavelength to penetrate buildings and the limited range of the wavelength; thus it would require 5G antennas on almost every building in a city to make the IOT effective. I'll watch the experts debate it over the next few months and years.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/annal...the-5g-network

Quote:

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Originally Posted by flagg

Another timely article, this time on Chinese geodigital exports for “enterprise” customers.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/t...overnment.html

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The video in this article was interesting, but not convincing in my view. Xi uses surveillance technology, not just cameras, but comprehensive monitoring of its citizens, to maintain party control. Xi is exporting this technology to other autocrats who hope to do the same. It will assist in creating a new world order where Arab Springs are less of a threat to autocratic rulers. However, the Ecuador example wasn't convincing. Not a great comparison, but I liken it to a police officer using an automatic rifle to protect citizens to a criminal using an automatic rifle to terrorize or murder citizens. Surveillance technology can be used to protect citizens or oppress them, and in high crime areas it may protect them. We should have enough data by now to see if the UK's use of surveillance technology has reduced crime or at least enabled law enforcement to capture the culprits.

Reference the articles on New Zealand, I can understand the desire to reject protectionism, but I think they're buying into Xi's web of deceit, no country promotes protectionism of its businesses more than China. They can put lipstick on a pig, but it is still a pig. Reference the articles on Germany and UK ignoring U.S. pressure not to purchase Huawei; I think the U.S. is coming to terms that it has reduced power to influence in a multipower world order. Diplomacy and economic incentives are more important than having the preponderance of military power.

Replying to Bill:

Quote:

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We should have enough data by now to see if the UK's use of surveillance technology has reduced crime or at least enabled law enforcement to capture the culprits.

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Bill,

The impact of the often pervasive use of CCTV, whether by public agencies or private operators and now increasingly private individual's homes, is very moot. It did have an effect on some crimes, such as vehicle crime in car parks and street robbery in city centres. The police have almost come to the point "no CCTV, no investigation" IMHO and for serious "high end" crime, such as murder or terrorism, it is essential part of the investigative picture that can be assembled.

For multiple reasons, with reduced budgets to the fore, crime is now growing - particularly vehicle crime and violent street crime. Property crime and in particular fraud (some assess it as a third of all crime) even if CCTV exists is not being investigated. One big urban force admitted 40% of all reported crime is filed upon submission.

Crime is not static, those committing it change and the victims do too. Hence the widespread use of CCTV inside and outside private homes. So the burglar(s) simply wear masks and hats, let alone gloves to ensure no prints are left behind.

I would argue that CCTV is no longer a deterrent to most crimes, even more so when there is little prospect of an investigation. All the other technological options for "high end" crime, such as financial data and movement data stumble when there is no useful imagery.

It is difficult to find public examples of the value of LPR (ANPR in UK parlance) and a huge amount of data is collected every day. Here is one, a long running series of non-violent house burglaries in London and eventually a Manchester unknown suspect was identified. "Reading between the lines" he was finally caught in a surveillance operation. The national detection rate for house burglary is 3% and has been static for thirty plus years.
Link:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/24/wimbledon-prowler-finally-admits-raids-decade-burglaries/

Citing BIll again (without going back):

Quote:

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Xi uses surveillance technology, not just cameras, but comprehensive monitoring of its citizens, to maintain party control.

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My limited understanding of China suggests there is a strong tradition of conformity by the population to their rulers, provided there is food to eat, stability, no bandits and an element of justice. With the dramatic increase in urbanisation, where individuals can become anonymous, China has focused on technology to reinforce existing controls, e.g. the "internal" passport. Controlling movement is another, potent as most traffic is the state-provided bus and train networks. Just a few thoughts.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Replying to Bill:

Bill,

The impact of the often pervasive use of CCTV, whether by public agencies or private operators and now increasingly private individual's homes, is very moot. It did have an effect on some crimes, such as vehicle crime in car parks and street robbery in city centres. The police have almost come to the point "no CCTV, no investigation" IMHO and for serious "high end" crime, such as murder or terrorism, it is essential part of the investigative picture that can be assembled.

For multiple reasons, with reduced budgets to the fore, crime is now growing - particularly vehicle crime and violent street crime. Property crime and in particular fraud (some assess it as a third of all crime) even if CCTV exists is not being investigated. One big urban force admitted 40% of all reported crime is filed upon submission.

Crime is not static, those committing it change and the victims do too. Hence the widespread use of CCTV inside and outside private homes. So the burglar(s) simply wear masks and hats, let alone gloves to ensure no prints are left behind.

I would argue that CCTV is no longer a deterrent to most crimes, even more so when there is little prospect of an investigation. All the other technological options for "high end" crime, such as financial data and movement data stumble when there is no useful imagery.

It is difficult to find public examples of the value of LPR (ANPR in UK parlance) and a huge amount of data is collected every day. Here is one, a long running series of non-violent house burglaries in London and eventually a Manchester unknown suspect was identified. "Reading between the lines" he was finally caught in a surveillance operation. The national detection rate for house burglary is 3% and has been static for thirty plus years.
Link:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/04/24/wimbledon-prowler-finally-admits-raids-decade-burglaries/

---

Thanks, David, I was hoping you would provide some expert commentary on this issue. I agree with your point that crime is not a statistic, but most governments use data, arguably incorrectly, to inform their decisions. Assuming the data you provided would come to the same conclusions in other countries, then the data would undermine China's argument that the surveillance technology improves public security. Hard to argue it doesn't improve party control. I think there is a general perception that pervasive surveillance will reduce crime, but as you pointed out a few simple tricks hat and mask tricks can defeat it. Furthermore, if there isn't a credible response or post-event investigation then it serves little purpose.

Maybe when AI compliments surveillance technology the story will change, but for now, it seems the more we try to replace the beat cop with so-called modern approaches to law enforcement crime increases. Not unlike COIN, we had many small unit leaders in the U.S. who don't believe in presence patrols (beat cop). Yet it is a known fact that presence patrols deter insurgent activity, connect and increase trust between security forces with the local population, and increases situational awareness/intelligence. Simple common sense tactics almost always trump high-end sexy tactics (find, fix, finish) to achieve enduring stability.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Thanks, David, I was hoping you would provide some expert commentary on this issue. I agree with your point that crime is not a statistic, but most governments use data, arguably incorrectly, to inform their decisions. Assuming the data you provided would come to the same conclusions in other countries, then the data would undermine China's argument that the surveillance technology improves public security. Hard to argue it doesn't improve party control. I think there is a general perception that pervasive surveillance will reduce crime, but as you pointed out a few simple tricks hat and mask tricks can defeat it. Furthermore, if there isn't a credible response or post-event investigation then it serves little purpose.

Maybe when AI compliments surveillance technology the story will change, but for now, it seems the more we try to replace the beat cop with so-called modern approaches to law enforcement crime increases. Not unlike COIN, we had many small unit leaders in the U.S. who don't believe in presence patrols (beat cop). Yet it is a known fact that presence patrols deter insurgent activity, connect and increase trust between security forces with the local population, and increases situational awareness/intelligence. Simple common sense tactics almost always trump high-end sexy tactics (find, fix, finish) to achieve enduring stability.

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As I understand it in China, the social scoring model to “nudge” positive behaviour incorporates local block wardens/informants.

Party “beat cops” as human observation sensors and behaviour “nudgers”?

Stasi informants mashed up with smart phones.

Agreed on the NYTimes article on Ecuador not being very convincing as it represents an earlier generation of surveillance technology.

CCTV combined with improving facial recognition, combined with gait analysis, combined with smartphone tracking, combined with e-commerce and media consumption, combined with social scoring, equals individualised/personalised analytics.

THX1138 with Chinese characteristics?

I know there are a few reports claiming A.I./ML based surveillance in China is overblown(comically in some case).

But if history is a teacher, we have consistently seen how linear human thinking over estimates the short term and way, way under estimates the long term application of new technology.

Flagg,

The point is China claims it will reduce crime, so far little evidence that is true. It is a propaganda statement to conceal its real purpose. It clearly supports population control if the focus is protecting the party. Especially the comprehensive surveillance you point out.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Flagg,

The point is China claims it will reduce crime, so far little evidence that is true. It is a propaganda statement to conceal its real purpose. It clearly supports population control if the focus is protecting the party. Especially the comprehensive surveillance you point out.

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Hi Bill,

Here’s that article/story I was referring to that developed with this thread:

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...gital-strategy

Has Bill M. been busy? I ask as the linked article has:

Quote:

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Moore’s Law: An observation that the speed and capability of computers can be expected to double every two years, as a result of increases in the number and density of transistors a microchip can contain.

(Later) The price performance of Moore’s Law enabled the emergence of a sustainable technology enabled authoritarian state.

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Quote:

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Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Has Bill M. been busy? I ask as the linked article has:

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Moore’s Law was originated/coined in 1965 by Gordon Moore(co-founder of Intel).