Don't slam the Powell Doctrine yet ....
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Originally Posted by
MattC86
In regards to Steve and Tom, I wonder if the different geopolitical realities of now vs., say, 1975 may make a difference. My hope, I guess, is that since the Army (and the Marine Corps, but the Army in particular) can't just refocus on "the right war" that suits their doctrinal preference, they will continue to focus on small wars and COIN. I think that with the specter of future insurgencies, regime changes, and nation-building on the horizon, we can't just say "we don't do this kind of stuff," which was essentially what the Powell Doctrine was all about.
Matt
Good point. We don't have a Soviet Union to run back to, and China is hardly a conventional peer competitor in the next 20 years. COIN and IW will make up a large part of what we must contend with. Unless we go back to 1920's/30's isolationism .....
However, I would say that part of our troubles in Iraq stemmed from not following the Powell doctrine - that a) We didn't have a strategic plan b) we didn't send overwhelming force. Those two decisions are the primary reasons Iraq went into chaos - we never filled the order/security vacuum early, and nature abhors a vacuum. Add in all the root causes of insurgencies were present and Voila! Iraq 2003-2007. Even if we had had good COIN operational concepts, tactics, and education in 2003, it wouldn't have compensated for a lack of a workable strategy.
Devil, details and all that...
Rob:
Agree with you on the GP forces, the talent is there and our repeated failure to use that talent has bothered me for many years. The kids (E1-O5) are capable of doing so very much more than we allow them to do. My belief is that failure is due partly to mindset -- we still have a lot of WW II / draftee Army hangups I believe -- partly due to the fact that training money is hard to justify to the parochial communities and to Congress and partly due to the fact that the conversion to a centralized personnel system / human resources regimen led to too many efficiencies for the personnel 'managers' and none for the broader institution.
I think there positively must be better coordination and relationships between the 'conventional' Army and SOF / SOCOM. both communities are at fault here and I have long believed that creation of the SF Officer branch was a very bad move (so was Aviation branch but that's another thread another day). The movement between a basic branch and SF kept folks in a total Army mindset; that has been lost. It also allowed senior people with SF experience to command or serve on the staff of conventional forces and enhanced cooperation between the two communities.
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"I think that is probably the place to start - ask the question, "what would it take to succeed at a long term (5-10 years) major campaign where the CFSOCC was the supported CMD for the largest chunks in a place where the benefits do not fit the OEF model because the conditions are very different?"
Let me toss that back at you with a counter question. Do you think that this polarized US society with its sound bite attention span will accept long term campaigns of 5-10 years?
Lastly, thoughts on " what would it take, what is the Delta, and how long would it take?" First; a comprehensive sort out of the world as we see it and of potential conflicts that might require our engagement (which must not lose sight of the absolute fact that we must be a total spectrum force). The QDR nominally does this but it is actually a bureaucratic shuffling of the deck chairs (I know a lot of people but in a lot of hard hours on it but it is still what it is and no more) so I'm talking a comprehensive review entailing (shudder!!) getting the HASC and SASC involved (God, I hated to write that... :rolleyes:).
That should lead to a roles and missions adjustment which should concentrate on removing the branch and community parochialism (good luck with that... :wry:) by DoD initially and then by the Army in it allotted share of those things. Then a plan must be developed to get us there.
The Delta, I believe is a recognition of the sheer raw capability of units to do many diverse jobs and that the enablement of this power is simply training (and doctrine as a base).
We're likely to look at a series of small operations where a far better trained and equipped SOF element will be required; one that can operate (and / or will be allowed to operate) without a massive support and backup structure. Yes, there will be risk -- but that's war in the fast lane, risk is endemic.
There'll be other, somewhat larger operations where either light infantry (mostly) or Stryker / FCS folks are required with or without SOF accompaniment. There may be a few cases where Armor is also required in small quantities.
Lastly, full scale war where all that plus a lot of Armor is needed. My gut feel is that the percentage ratio of SOF : Light : Medium : Heavy employment over the next 10-20 years will be on the order of 60 : 30 : 10 with full acknowledgment that the world situation can change rapidly due to unforeseen events. Still, I think a major restructure of the AC and RC are necessary with potentially a smaller more lethal AC and a larger RC. The allocation of GP maneuver combat Brigade sized elements should be about [ AC / RC] 20 / 8 Light + 8 / 0 Pcht; 8 / 4 Medium; 12 / 24 Heavy. My bet is we'll have adequate warning of a need for a lot of Heavy Brigades.
Time is always an element but it shouldn't take more than two years to get a role and mission sort out and promulgate a long term plan; say another two to reorient doctrine and training and two to three to get that training embedded, get the equipment in place. So, say seven years plus a fudge factor due to the slowness of our overlarge bureaucracy, the operations that may intrude and the parochial food fights that will have to be quelled; say 10 years in total. Long in some senses, in others, not long at all -- takes far longer than that to develop and field major hardware.
Just one old guys thoughts...
Ken
A very concise description of our very broad problem
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we still have a lot of WW II / draftee Army hangups I believe -- partly due to the fact that training money is hard to justify to the parochial communities and to Congress and partly due to the fact that the conversion to a centralized personnel system / human resources regimen led to too many efficiencies for the personnel 'managers' and none for the broader institution.
I have been trying to articulate that in my mind. This is why I think we have a hard time holding on to some of the best talent - we don't put round pegs in round holes (in more then one way) at this level - its just not efficient. This may be the thing that bothers me most and typifies why adaptation and change is so hard - we have made it so - maybe we even like it that way:(