America’s Morale and the “In Between” Wars

15 June post at the Westhawk Blog - America’s Morale and the “In Between” Wars.

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Mr. Robert Kaplan, author of the brilliant Imperial Grunts among other books and articles, has a new article out in The American Interest. Entitled On Forgetting the Obvious, (h/t RCP) Mr. Kaplan makes three assertions:

1) Much of the “Establishment” class in America, along with the urban and suburban populations in the United States that this class wishes to influence, lacks the morale and will to face the national security challenges of the future.

2) With a relatively small and professional military, the vast majority of American society, especially its most “elite” civil institutions, have no contact with military culture (nor is there much of any contact the other way). A society cannot sustain a long duration armed struggle in this manner.

3) American society can perform well at only two kinds of wars, either very large ones that mobilize all of society, or small ones that employ largely covert professionals out of society’s sight. The U.S. will flounder at “in between” wars like Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq which are large enough to be costly and visible but not large enough to require the full mobilization of society...

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Originally Posted by SWJED

15 June post at the Westhawk Blog - America’s Morale and the “In Between” Wars.

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Good find! I make a similar argument (although in grossly inferior style to Bob) in a new article on asymmetric strategies in National Strategy Forum.

Seems to me that we need a President that understands Sun-Tzu and thinks like Rocky Balboa.

:)

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

Good find! I make a similar argument (although in grossly inferior style to Bob) in a new article on asymmetric strategies in National Strategy Forum.

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Not at all inferior, different thrust.

Kaplan's article aims at a future problem; the increasing "progressivisation" (if I can invent a word) of the US, the west in general and the potential for that to impact strategies and operations. Though that movement contributed to the problems you cite as did the governmental milieu and the bureaucracy mentioned.

While we can and should certainly decry the excessive intrusion of domestic politics into international geostrategic efforts, it is a fact that the civilian and military leadership through five administrations has failed to grasp the old nettle. In the case of the former, intrusion in odd places for less than pragmatic reasons and then vacillation in the face of resistance has been, uh-h, unhelpful.

In the case of the latter, desire to fight a land war across the north German plain ably supported by the Joint players -- and obtaining the concomitant hardware -- sort of obscured the reality that appeared in Munich in 1972 and that with which we got smacked in the face in 1979 and 1982; and that got put firmly to bed in 1989. There were people in low places who mentioned those things but they became unpopular...

My desire to remain civil and refrain from bad words precludes me from commenting on Congress...

The same restraint applies to subject of the emasculation of much of the Intel community...

But I digress -- I think you're correct. Actually, my only fear is that the Islamists will do something really stupid and unleash a whole lot more than they expect; not only from us but I suspect an aroused Europe could quickly show why the continent was a charnel house for several centuries