Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?
4 Jun 09 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?
RADM Garry E. Hall, Commandant The Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Maj Gen Robert P. Steel, Commandant The National War College
RADM James P. Wisecup, President The Naval War College
MG Robert M. Williams, Commandant The Army War College
Maj Gen Maurice Forsyth, Commander of the Spaatz Center and Commandant The Air War College
Col Michael Belcher, Director The Marine Corps War College
But the more relevant question
Are the politicians competent to interpret the answers?
A gentleman who was on the Republican Party primary ballot in all fifty states in 2008 and I were having a beer in 2007. He was passionate about the need for military action against Iran. When I mentioned something about the other instruments of national power, I got the "bunny in the headlights" look. When I started questioning second and third order effects of military action against Iran, I got the "bunny in the headlights" look.
Nice guy, I'd trust him to watch my kids, but I wouldn't trust him with national strategy, to differentiate between geo-political strategy and military strategy, or to assess the testimony of the officers that briefed the subcommittee.
Grand Strategy is not a paper doc
Quote:
Grand strategy for the US is made (or the responsibility of) the President with the advice of his NSC. It is published as the National Security Strategy of the US supposedly annually according to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Because it is unclassified, it is inherently a partisan political document - some more so, some less. (The best of these was the final one published by the Budh 41 Adminsitration.) The NSC includes the CJCS as a statutory advisor; therefore, the military has appropriately input to US grand strategy. Note that the NSS is, in reality, a bureaucratic product so the Joint Staff and OSD are players. Key players from both as well as the NSC staff often wear military uniforms.
All true but that may or may not really become a grand strategy, which to be operational, has to exist as a shared set of assumptions among the broad elite, not just among a few members of agovernment bureaucracy during a particular administration. Cranking out policy docs will not cut it. The grand strategy has to be accepted deeply by the American people, or at least their broad leadership, or it rests on sand.
Containment was a grand strategy. So was the Atlantic Charter. So was the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine. They were grand strategies because their core transcended normal partisanship and, in practice, became a frame of reference with which partisans and officials understood, framed and debated policy options and strategic goals. The grand strategy represented a vital consensus.
America lacks a real grand strategy right now because it is deeply divided between Left and Right and between elite and masses and few politicians care to do the hard work of building such a consensus or have the longitudinal perspective to see the need to do so. Short term thinking prevails.
A lot of folks keep telling me that Containment was Grand Strategy.
Living through the period and being a borderline adult when it began and assisting in small ways with its implementation for 45 years, I can only say that:
- Steve is right, there were divides between policy elites and the mass of the nation; rich and poor, the various armed forces, Congress and the WH, members of the punditocracy and political ideologies that were just as deep as they seem today -- the difference today is simply that we are less restrained in our speech to the point of egregious incivility and significantly improved and easier mass communication lets everyone know that.
We also seem to have not learned much history...
- Containment was not a strategy, it like the Monroe doctrine was a Policy that was generally followed when it suited (and was ignored when it did not) and a series of Strategies -- and stratagems -- were developed by all the eight Presidents who served while the policy was in being. Each mostly different; most, in hindsight, not as useful as many thought. ADDED: After some thought, I'd even say that some if not most of those strategies were really counterproductive.
Agree with you, Ken, on the first part
but disagree on the latter.
But first, a digression. There is not much agreement on what constitutes Grand Strategy. Steve Metz uses Barry Posen's definition which is not really different from a definition of foreign and security policy. Of course, Steve modifies the definition he has chosen to use toward the end of his book to bring in the "Ways and Means" - especially the latter. Some Grand Strategies are effective, some are not - just like military strategies and theater strategies. I see GS as how a state chooses to organize its resources (both tangible and intangible) and employ them to achieve its objectives in face of the objectives of others (which may or may not be threats). Usually, these are written as documents - the NSS is an attempt, imposed by Congress, to force the Executive to produce and puiblish a GS.
Containment was, indeed, a policy. Kennan's Long Telegram - later published as the X Article - was less than a strategy. It stated a goal in line with an assessment of the threat and argued that if the USSR's expansion were "contained" (a shorthand description of a "way"), the goal would be achieved. NSC 68 turned the policy into strategy and GS at that. It spelled out the ways and the means (resources) and served us well throughout the Cold War with some tweaking. Did it have to be written? Not in theory but in practice writing it out was necessary and functionally so to achieve an effective GS.
Cheers
JohnT
I think what you wrote was that Containment was a policy
and NSC 68 was one (or an -- or the -- I'm easy :D) ) implementing strategy. No quarrel with that. I'll also point out that, per your comment yesterday, the document contained no resource considerations...
However, it did constitute a strategy. BTW, remind me -- who authored that document? ;)
I further agree that it largely guided all elements of the USG from implementation in 1951 for about 20 years -- and that its principles were broadly followed for another 20.
However, I also suggest that a look at History will dispel any notion of great continuity within that 'strategy'. From the 'New Look' (NEC 162/2) to 'Flexible Response' (host of NSC Docs and AR 100-McNamara) to 'Sufficiency' to "Mikhail, I'll outspend you..." That latter policy (again with no resource considerations...) endorsed by my Wife... :rolleyes:
Thus my contention that Containment was not a strategy but a policy implemented by numerous strategies. Many of which did as much harm as good... :wry:
Our political system is inimical to 'Grand Strategy.' I submit that's why there is argument over whether there is such a thing. Some nations have them and use them; most democracies cannot due to changes of government.
Okay. However, I see I'll have to answer my own question.
State.
NSC 68 was written by the Policy Planning staff at State -- from whence internationally aimed strategies should appear.
It also short circuited the NSC, BoB and DoD, all of whom had different ideas. I think there's a very strong and good message in that...
The fact that Louis Johnson, far and away the worst and dumbest SecDef (worse than McNamara, Clifford, Aspin and the other two bad ones, Charlie Wilson and Tom Gates combined), was in the Pent-agony probably helped get it by the building...
As an aside of no relevance, I believe if you'll check, NSC 68 did not contain any real resource requirements but only broad estimates -- one reason Truman initially rejected it. Only after North Korea attacked the South did Truman decide to implement the directive -- and his spending on defense future programs immediately exceeded the NSC 68 estimates. That brings up two points -- other players can cause major strategy modifications and resource estimates will generally be low due to that fact.
Yeah. Same guy also decided to go to Viet Nam
No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...
At the time.
Of course,Ken, you are right
the Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, wrote the thing. (Sorry I missed the essence of your question:o) Agree about Louis Johnson. But, in the 1948 - 50 period there was no NSC staff to speak of and the concept was that State was the lead agency. The PPS was an innovation of SECSTATE George C. Marshall that, IMO, he created to replicate a planning component of a military staff. Today, that is the J5 staff section at the JS and all GCCs. And the PPS has significantly atrophied.
DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.
You are right that Truman intially rejected - rather did not approve - NSC 68 because it was weak on resourcing. But as the document evloved over the course of 1950 the resource components were added - and before the N Kor attack (for the most part). The question of whether Congress would have approved w/o the push from the N Kor is problematic at best.
NDU press has published NSC 68 (in all its interations to include Pres Tuman's public EO) with discussion and commentary icluding an intro by Nitze. It's available online.
Cheers
JohnT
I do seem to recall that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.
Yep, sure do. Remember it well, didn't read about it. Still, they were a 400 to 500 pound Gorilla even then, resource allocation wise. Scattered all over DC and the suburbs, too. Even in the old Temps on the Mall.
Though I would have said four services trying every way they could to avoid becoming a unified Department. Pity they didn't win. Not only am I not a Goldwater-Nichols believer, I'm not a fan of DoD. The Service bureaucracies were bad enough without adding an upper layer. See DHS and the DNI for current versions... :D
This, OTOH:
Quote:
...and before the N Kor attack (for the most part).
Is not as I recall but it's really immaterial, I suppose... ;)
Since you're even older than I am
perhaps, i should defer to your memory.:wry:
Oh, I'm well aware of those backgrounds -- and far more on both
than is contained in the quotes or the Wiki articles. I'm also aware of the the fact that Washington elected to fight the British on their own terms and thus Von Steuben was beneficial -- and that Thayendanega was an Indian and they had difficulties with group discipline (but not, more importantly, with self discipline once they were pointed in the right direction). He sided with the British but that was as much due to American intransigence as his earlier relationships.
In any event, that allegory was not really aimed at the persons but at the fact that we adopted European models for many things we do and those were possibly not the best approach for a very independent people.
Way off thread here, to get back on, one could make the case that Indian Strategy was not good, as they sort of lost -- but when one considers the time period involved and the raw numbers on both sides, they really did quite well. My reason for mentioning the Von Steuben / Thayendanega contrast was to make the VonS / CvC link and the point that a lot of German ideas permeated the early US and not all were beneficial. OTOH, Thayendanega was as American as one could possibly be, he took care of his people and he was a smart and principled guy. I believe a happy medium between those two poles -- Europe / Indian -- would have better served us. However, we didn't go that route...
We for years have adopted European strategic concepts and patterns as well as a Eurocentric strategy and I agree with Bob's World that these patterns have not done us any favors.
And JMM has a good dissection of one reason this is possibly so.
Wilf, we are in the same triangle ...
not the Bermuda Triangle (which captured my initial try at this post when at home - and sent it into the ether); but this one:
Quote:
from Wilf
He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.
which is exactly the "remarkable trinity" quoted in MCDP 1-1 Strategy, and in any number of US doctrinal publications on strategy.
In that "remarkable trinity", the characteristics (using your terms) are primarily associated as follows: "passion" (people), "reason" (government) and "chance" (armies). Or, in CvC's own terms (Howard & Paret translation, which I quoted in my prior post and here numbered for absolute clarity):
Quote:
... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.
The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.
I suggest the foregoing rather clearly establishes that reason ("rational thought" in your words; "rationality" in mine) was associated by CvC with governments - in his theoretical construct, reason cannot be associated with the people who are moved by "blind natural force" - "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity". Nor can "reason" be relied on in the case of commanders and armies because of the element of chance (query: why chaos and complexity theory would not be applicable to peoples and governments as well, but that is a subject matter for another thread).
No doubt that CvC's view of governments was informed by the European governments in place when he wrote (a product of Metternich and Vienna, so quite conservative in tidy boxes) - and those which had shaped Europe since Westphalia. In that construct, the Sovereign was co-terminous with Sovereignty - then, in a very real sense, the ruler was the state. Not that many years before, Louis XIV had stated exactly that.
The salient point of all that is that the government (the ruler and his cabinet) was necessarily composed of statesmen because their objectives and courses of action were the state's objectives and courses of action. The government was the state and defined the national interests. A very simple construct, justified by the realities ca. 1831 Europe.
CvC was also informed (perhaps a better word is "uninformed") as you say:
Quote:
CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.
as to which, the first point is simply that the Athenian and Spartan systems of governance were not informative when it came to the system of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism then developing in the US; or to the parliamentary system of democracy developed in the UK after George III lost his grip. The Greek systems are even less informative when it comes to the evolved systems of governance in either the US or UK. In short, CvC was no SME when it came to the interplay between the people, government and the military in modern democracies like the US and UK.
The second point deals with the Thucydidean construct of "fear, honour and/or interest" as factors leading to wars. In CvC's time, whose "fear, honour and/or interests" were critical to the decisions to make war ? The only answer is the ""fears, honour and/or interests" of the statesmen, since they (not the people) decided on the national interests that include those factors.
Now, use of the term "statesmen" has everything to do with those folks being the "deciders" when it came to what they believed was in the national interest. It has nothing to do with whether those statesmen (by the Grace of God, etc.) were competent or not in making those decisions. Since CvC had the decisions of Louis XIV, XV and XVI in front of him, we can fairly infer that he did not believe that all statesmen and their governments were competent.
Moving this up to the present, and back to my initial point, is that there have been substantive changes in US politics since the era of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism (which CvC would have viewed with some distain is a good probability). Crudely stated, we are much more likely to find politicians, rather than statesmen, making national policy decisions.
To introduce some rigor in my terms, by "politicians" I mean persons who practice "politics", the art of getting elected to and remaining in office - often by log rolling legislation and policies which enhance the latter objective. While this has always been true to some extent in US politics, the present practicalities of the election cycles and fund-raising efforts require politicians to be just that - leaving little room for consideration (much less implementation) of the national interests. The vastly quickened media cycle has also added up to politicians being more and more politicians.
Even beyond that, we have seen more and more "professional politicians" in office. That is, the guy or gal who perhaps went to law school (let's say with very high grades, etc.), but then got into politics at the grassroots (say, in community organizing) or by marrying into the governor's mansion. Those folks are indeed SMEs in politics - that is a serious comment; they are good at it and know their profession as well as any professional. But, that does not make them "statespersons".
They, at the highest level, do end up with that mission - to be statespersons faithfully representing the national interests (the "peoples' business" as they are so fond of saying) - until the next election cycle, etc. Perhaps, I am naive, but I believe that Pres. Bush then, and Pres. Obama now, felt and feel that they represented and represent the national interests - as they saw and see them. That situation is, however, qualitatively different from the situation that CvC wrote about.
My suggestion is that the People, collectively and over a longer timeframe, are more likely to get the national interests right, than transitory politicians.
Entirely too long, and somewhat political; but the subject matter of the discussion seemed to require some political sidebars.
---------------------------
Wilf, this ...
Quote:
I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.
looks like an argument heading in a brief. Please feel free to complete the brief; but tell me what CvC observation you are suggesting (he must have made 100s or 1000s of observations); and the facts tying that observation into post-9/11 US foreign policy.
Cheers :)
Mike
If your perception is this ...
Quote:
from Wilf
My reading of CvC is that Passion is associated with the people, because people as a collective are not rational. Rule of the mob? ... Now these are not direct relationships, they are merely cited as dominant influences. I see them as largely correct and useful.
you are, in classical US political terms, a Hamiltonian[*]. It is very much a matter of perception - and a product of one's entire life experience. So, I end up a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian. You don't see it that way.
Evidence of the people collectively acting over time ? As one example, I'd look to the Civil Rights story from Reconstruction to the present, where the pendulum swung back and forth until something of a consensus was reached by a majority of the people.
All this having been said, you haven't addressed the key issue of transitory politicians setting national policy. If CvC addressed that issue in one of his "observations", please supply the quote - thereby giving me a chance to recant and renounce heresy. :)
-------------------------
[*] Watch out for Aaron Burrs. ;) Now there was a rabble rousing politician who tried to lead a charge. Good pistol shot, though.
Agree with Wilf. I have great difficulty finding
many times in our history when we we did what was morally right. OTOH, there are few cases of totally amoral conduct including those Wilf mentioned.
The few times we did what was morally right, we generally screwed it up. Viet Nam was an example. We signed a treaty to assist. Morally correct, I think. We then urged and paid the Viet Namese to ask us to assist. Morally wrong, I think. We then proceeded to assist. Morally questionable. We screwed it up -- morality not relevant.
Same with WW II. We were on the side of 'right.' We did what was needed to win regardless of human cost (ours or others). We cheated, lied, stole and bullied other nations to get into the war that may not have ever significantly affected us. What of all that was 'right' and what was 'wrong?'
There's a lot of gray out there...
That said, we and the British have generally acted in our own interests as have all nations. Across the board, both of us have done more good than harm on a practical (pragmatic) and realistic basis. I think the 'moral' aspect in the conduct of nations is sort of a misnomer. Nations are not people; they may have some social characteristics and national trends in the psyche arena but they aren't people.
It has been said that morals are what others think you should be doing -- but they may not necessarily feel constrained to act the same way. Lot of truth in that.
