dissertation help please! US military culture and small wars.
To the valued members of the small wars journal community.
i am currently in my third year studying war in Swansea, Wales, and am writing my dissertation. the title that i have chosen is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'
I was wondering if anyone would care to help me with ideas / book proposals/ suggestions. anything would help! i need particular help in relation to how the american military is changing to deal with the increasing prevalence of small wars - i have read ALOT about everything else, but can find very little about the current policies (force modularity?).
here is my basic outline:
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so. The dissertation will show how this preference is a result of cultural biases and will extrapolate the various themes that feed these biases.
The essay will centre upon how the American military’s preferred paradigm of conventional war is incompatible with the context of a small war and begin with a summary of why this is so. It will also look at the history of the American Army, and so will comment on the traditional division between the civilian sector and the military. It will outline this split and will look at how it came to exist, with particular reference to Upton’s ‘reforms’ of the Army in the wake of the civil war. It will also look at the Jominian basis for the army over a Clausewitzian ‘politics by other means’ stance, and discuss how this influences the United States’ ‘Big War’ paradigm, although this description and analysis will be kept to a minimum for reasons of brevity.
Of major importance to this work will be the concept and ramifications of the so called ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. In itself the syndrome is incredibly significant in regard to the Big War paradigm, however the changes in doctrine that followed it, namely the ‘Never Again’ school, the Weinberger and Powell doctrines and the more recent ‘Decisive Force’ concept have damaged the U.S. Army’s small war fighting capability by codifying the idea that the expenditure of huge amounts of firepower can create a quick resolution to a conflict. This discussion will feature an analysis of the real impact of the Vietnam Syndrome, which Cassidy believes to effect the military’s willingness to fight wars far more than it effects the populations support of them: a paradoxical issue which may prove useful in discussing how cultural issues within the military may actually reinforce each other. The essay will widen this subject to include the ‘CNN’ and ‘bodybag’ effects in order to give a true account of the Vietnam Syndromes causes and strength as a concept, while referencing instances such as the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans to illustrate its impact. The war in Vietnam itself will be looked at of course, both to partially explain the Syndrome but also as a useful case study of how conventional warfare is inapplicable in a small war context. The war is again useful because the extensive amount of material regarding it has thrown up a number of cultural analyses which have exposed the Army’s cultural dedication to ‘Big War’ at the time.
As part of the essays investigation into the American Army’s devotion to conventional warfare the issue of doctrinal forgetfulness will be reviewed, with particular reference to the small wars that the U.S. has fought, such as the Indian wars, the war of independence and obviously Vietnam itself. It will draw the conclusion that because of this cultural devotion to a big war paradigm, small wars are not accepted as pertinent, and so the lessons that are learned while fighting them are forgotten as soon as the war ends. One of the instances linked to this is that even during the irregularity of the Indian wars, the American Army was developing itself as a reflection of the Prussian (conventional) model of organisation. This section may also include reference to the power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars.
As with any work regarding unconventional warfare, the essay will give an overview of what is required of a military to win a small war, such as force limitation, the use of native forces, the importance of legitimacy (Kaldor’s book: New and Old Wars is particularly useful in this regard) and the relevancy of the political campaign. It will also talk about the currently changing nature of small wars, with reference to Al Qaeda and in particular its religious motivation. The essay will talk about these changes only where they effect the chances of American success, such as how the increasingly religious nature of such conflicts is making the political aspect of the campaign harder to win. It will also talk about the paradox of a large power fighting a small one, and so will discuss the relevancy of support, means and aims in relation to each side of the conflict. The main area of this will be a discussion of the asymmetry of will which is inherent in every small war engaged in by a large power and its relevancy in regard to the Vietnam Syndrome and conventional warfighting in general. This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades to complete and that a conventional war stance is unprepared for such a time frame. It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect.
In explaining how American small war fighting methods can be improved, the essay shall feature an analysis of British examples of success in this field and why the British model is so effective. This will include an assessment of historical reasons for this effectiveness which will centre on the regimental system. The conclusion that will be drawn will be that the close nit nature of the regimental system serves as a home-away-from-home and as the support that American forces usually get from the public. It will also show how the colonial history of the British Army means that the public is more accepting of unclear missions and of casualties that occur in faraway places. An analysis of successful British unconventional missions will echo the tenets of the previous paragraph regarding what is required to win small wars, and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns. It will also look at how the British have traditionally taken a Fabian approach to warfare, with the Napoleonic wars and, again the colonial campaigns as the main instances of this. This approach, while lessening the Army’s effectiveness in conventional wars has made it more affective in unconventional confrontations.
An investigation into the problems that big powers face while fighting small wars shall be carried out by looking into the Soviet and Russian experiences of unconventional warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya. This section shall serve as a summary of many of the points that have already been made in the essay, but shall serve to show the similarities between the American problems and those of other large powers, and so shall support the asymmetry of will and paradoxes inherent within such confrontations. This section will be useful again because it will compare the cultures of each military and extrapolate relevant information from it, with particular relevance regarding the problems of big war when instigated in the wrong context.
rest to be added in a second....
the stuff that didnt fit...
As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating. It will concentrate upon several distinct areas; technology, denial and self validation. In regard to technology the section will look at how such developments do not help the fighting of small wars. To do this it will look at a number of different authors arguments on the subject as well as drawing conclusions from previously successful irregular wars. Part of this will also look at the arguments for and against the relevancy of the current (disputed) revolution in military affairs (RMA), many critiques of which will prove useful not only for this section, but for the dissertation as a whole. The idea of self validation will look at how the first Gulf War ‘proved’ the relevancy of conventional warfare to the military leadership and is related to the previous assessment because the first Gulf War was enabled by technological superiority and is given by many as the evidence for the existence of the current RMA. This section will illustrate how the success of the Gulf War paradoxically weakened American military power and also how it relates to the military’s forgetfulness in regard to irregular war: President George H.W. Bush’s speech in which he claimed that America had finally got over the Vietnam Syndrome is the centrepiece for this argument and is a grand instance of denial.
The final section of my dissertation will be a discussion of the changes that are taking place within the American military, such as the ‘Modular Force’ concept, and their, and its, relevancy. This section will, like so many others, be intentionally brief so as to not dominate the piece, but must be included if my essay is to be an accurate account. It will feature a summary of the proposed changes and their foreseen effects, with particular reference to the culture of individual units of the Army and how this culture will be altered with the implementation of these changes. The marine corps shall serve as the personification of this change because of their developed unit culture and individual lexicon.
particular focus is upon the vietnam syndrome and the conventional warfighting stance of the U.S.
for those that have spent the time reading this and helping me out, i thank you from the bottom of my heart.
Xander
Perhaps another title for your dissertation
might be "Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?" I suggest that because I'm unsure that what you've posted here justifies your thesis. In any event, some thoughts for you:
Is the British model superior and if so what recent proof exists of that?
You might wish to be careful with "the withdrawal from Somalia and non-involvement in the Balkans..." The former was an aberration and a political miscalculation due to another political miscalculation; the latter was due to the misplaced belief that Europe could and would take care of a European problem of little concern to the US. I.e. both events were due to political -- not military -- errors and thus have little bearing on your thesis.
While this is true and deserves mention "...power of the military industrial complex and interest groups in rejecting the change required to fight small wars." you should also consider that the US Congress has as much or more say in that seeming and nominal 'complex' than do the military and the industrialists.
Caution is needed with this as well: "This will conclude, in short, that small wars are long term affairs which often take decades..." while that may historically be marginally correct; need it be that way? I'd say no.
Same here: "It will also state that the unprofessional and inexperienced U.S. Army is unable to fight such protracted campaigns because of issues with public backing, a statement which will obviously refer back to both the American preferred paradigm of big war and the Vietnam Syndrome / bodybag effect." Unprofessional or just undertrained and poorly focused (for counterinsurgency small wars; one presumes you did not mean to apply that to large wars as well -- else you'll have a dichotomy... ;) ) -- the two are not at all synonymous. I do not disagree at all with your preferred paradigm statement but I do think the Viet Nam syndrome and bodybag effect can be and are overdone. The One Third Rule applies. I also believe that if you talk to the British Army today, they will not concur that the US army today (as opposed to five years ago) is either unprofessional or inexperienced with regard to small wars.
This statement: "and will emphasise the minimal force emphasis of the Northern Ireland and Malaya campaigns." is subject to serious question on many levels. For example if X force for Y years is minimal, then is X force for (Yx4) years still minimal? Far more importantly, be very sure you consider the fact that in both those operations, Britain WAS the government; a situation the US has not been involved with since the Indian wars of the 19th Century and the Philippine involvement in the early 20th. It makes a difference. A big difference. I think you need to be rather careful in the assumptions on this one...
When you complete your dissertation, I look forward to reading your treatment of this: "As a continuation of the Weinberger and Powell doctrines renewal of the conventional war dedication, one section of the essay will deal with how the belief in Decisive Force is self defeating."
My overall perception is that your effort is based on common wisdom (Heh) and perceptions. They're not totally incorrect but they do bear a great deal more thought than they seem to have been given thus far. Good luck.
I suspect you might attract a few more responses after the US Thanksgiving holiday -- which essentially lasts until next Monday. Gian may stop by...:D
If you were writing a dissertation (thesis/paper)
for me, I would be telling you to NARROW YOUR FOCUS! :D A common fallacy among new thesis writiers is to try to do too much. The second thing I would tell you is that you clearly believe that you know what the answer is so you should be developing this as a hypothesis to be tested. By testing I mean that you must state your tentative conclusion in a form such that you can collect and analyze data so that it could prove your hypothesis false or wrong. If you can't disprove your hypothesis then it will stand as a firmer conclusion.
In the case of your topic, the evidence is all over the map. There are cases which support your thesis and other cases which tend to disprove it. All the caveats theat Ken mentioned apply. Here are a few sources you could look at: the 4 colonels report on El Salvador, Schwartz's Rand study of the same, Chapter 7 of Max Manwaring and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited which refutes both studies of El Sal, my 1995 article in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Also see John Nagl's Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife and Richard Downie, Learning From Conflict.
Good luck
Cheers
JohnT
I agree with Wilf on all that and as for
reinventing the wheel -- that's due to massive egos and arrogance "I don't need help, I have all the answers" is as American as the proverbial apple pie. We're arrogant twits at times... :eek:
On the fads, that's our short attention span and constant search for quicker and better ways to do things (never cheaper...). :D
War is a very human endeavor; the attitudes and proclivities of people permeate it and will influence the way they go about it. While people are people the world over, Americans are rather different from Europeans in many aspects of collective psyche. :wry:
Wilf gives good advice ...
and for Sam, I believe that Taylor & Francis (who bought out Frank Cass) the publisher of LIC&LE and Small Wars & Insurgencies would reproduce all the articles in these journals (and their others) for a price. :rolleyes: I do suspect that the UK libraries will have the journals. In the US, I am sure that the libraries of the military graduate schools have these journals - CARL at CGSC (Leavenworth), the AWC, the NDU library. All work with interlibrary loan. Indeed, that is probably the best way to go (but you may have to tell your librarians where to look.
Cheers
JohnT
Serious flawed logic in my opinion
xander day wrote,
Quote:
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so.
xander, like the others I applaud your efforts, but find your thesis statement flawed.
First, when you state that the American military has difficulty fighting small wars, that implies that other nations don't and are actually good at it. I would argue that most modern countries (especially democracies) have major difficulties waging small wars, especially small wars that endure over a long period. I'm sure you can list many failed European attempts to hold onto their colonies.
Furthermore, the recent trend to compare Malaysia to Vietnam is shamefully deceptive and unproductive. Put the Malysian Emergency in perspective, it was a British colony, and the Brits defined the rules, which gave them considerable freedom of movement. And while the emergency was serious, it paled in comparison to the problem set in Vietnam. As Owen stated the Vietnam War was not just a small war, combat with NVA regulars was as conventional as it got, and it was the conventional fight in the end that was decisive when NVA regulars rolled into Saigon.
Concurrently there was an insurgency, and some criticism directed against the U.S.'s early COIN efforts in Vietnam is deserved (although it frequently over hyped in my opinion). However, what seems to be overlooked is our many successes in Vietnam against both the NVA and the insurgency. GEN Abrams developed an appropriate COIN strategy, so we did learn, and we did concurrently while waging a conventional fight, and in a country where we didn't write all the rules. When we pulled out the VC were largely contained, at least to the point that they were not a vital threat to S. Vietnam, and the NVA was back in their box.
There are some new historical books coming out without the political agendas of the past, that shine a new light on our conflict in Vietnam. By all means criticize our shortfalls, but please keep it in perspective. If you want to compare America's performance to Europe's colonial wars, then I recommend you look at our conflict in the Philippines. We adapted rather quickly and in most respects did better than other modern countries.
Second, since your thesis is focused on the American Military's shortfalls, which there are many, but I think Ken put in perspective well when he explained the political and social factors on our homefront that shape our military policy and strategy.
I have to thank William Owen for this statement,
Quote:
When left to their own devices, the US are actually pretty/very good. ...and they do learn fast, and there is ample material to support this, but what they learn the do seem to forget. Why they do, may be worthy of some study.
We do have the doctrine for small wars, and we had it long before the new COIN manual came out a couple of years ago. Why we failed to adapt to the situations we were in sooner still confounds me, but we do adapt.
My final point is that some small wars are not winnable for America or anyone else because the objectives are too lofty, too expensive and take too much time, which means the social and political factors that Ken addressed will preclude success. That is not a problem unique to America.
Slapout has done you a favor, Xander.
You'll note that the linked article he provides mirrors your beliefs to a great extent. I believe that reflects the common wisdom of academia, the political classes and the media -- however I and others disagree with that on several counts.
I'll use Record's words and give my counterpoint. I say 'my' because these words are mine however I've found a large number of people all over the country -- not members of the academy or media -- who essentially agree.
Quoth the abstract of Record's essay:
Quote:
"Americans are averse to risking American lives when vital national interests are not at stake. Expecting that America's conventional military superiority can deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success, Americans are surprised and politically demoralized when confronted by Vietnam- and Iraq-like quagmires."
I strongly agree with his first point and more strongly disagree with his second. SOME Americans feel that way and they tend to move in the social circles in which Jeffrey moves; more Americans, I think are disappointed (not demoralized) that the armed forces have not succeeded and they are generally not surprised. The 'wisdom of crowds' syndrome applies; most are less surprised at failure or tedium than are the political and chattering classes.
Quote:
"...Since the early 1940s, the Army has trained, equipped, and organized for large-scale conventional operations against like adversaries, and it has traditionally employed conventional military operations even against irregular enemies.
He's showing his ignorance -- that's been true since 1787; that Prussian influence...It has been particularly true since 1900-17.
Having said all that, he's correct in his inference:
Quote:
"Barring profound change in America's political and military culture, the United States runs a significant risk of failure when it enters small wars of choice, and great power intervention in small wars is almost always a matter of choice. Most such wars, moreover, do not engage core U.S. security interests other than placing the limits of American military power on embarrassing display. Indeed, the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation.
but wrong, IMO, on three counts in the way he arrived at that inference; (1) his attribution of the risk aversion of the public is wrong as I stated above; (2) he does not understand or state all the drivers for the Army's predilection for avoiding small wars -- quite simply, they're very messy, very tedious and hard on the troops. That simple. Congress aids in this because of their misperception that the public is vehemently opposed (they are not, the 1/3 and two year rules apply) and their, Congress', desire to fund the big ticket procurement items as opposed to necessary training as vote buyers; (3) the statement that "the very act of intervention in small wars risks gratuitous damage to America's military reputation." is a left leaning ideological statement that is highly arguable if not downright ludicrous.
He ends with:
Quote:
"The United States should abstain from intervention in such wars, except in those rare cases when military intervention is essential to protecting or advancing U.S. national security."
I agree with that and again say he got the correct result but for the wrong reasons. :rolleyes:
The real reason to avoid such wars aside from the fact that they're messy and tedious (the Army position) is that we Americans are too impatient to prosecute them properly (the two year rule), too politically diverse and / or divided to develop unity of purpose in most cases (the 1/3 rule) and that most of them are, indeed, not necessary to secure US interests (Record's first and only accurate point...). IMO, of course. ;)
Thanks, John. My laziness again gets caught...
The 1/3 and two year rules are of course nothing but very simplistic rules of thumb, shorthand for American diversity / divisiveness and impatience. I know the psych-folks say there's no such thing as a national trait. Perhaps, but those two things come close to disproving that idea...
The 'rules' are a convenient and concise way to express two phenomena for which as you say there is evidence -- and there's certainly some practical accuracy there, subject as always to the exceptions. My general observation has been that a majority of Americans will support the effort for far longer if they perceive it is being prosecuted as well as can be expected and see a real American interest in the outcome. :cool:
I'm also convinced that most Americans are little affected by bodybags -- provided they see a return or prospect of one for the loss. ADDED, for Xander -- that's the great unwashed, the American public. Politicians and Academia are affected by them; the former for unreasoning fear of voter turnoff, the latter due to ideological persuasion. The media here in the US will affect sadness and dismay while they revel behind the scenes at the thought of greater sales; "if it bleeds, it leads" being their watchwords.
The thing that has always bothered me is not the fickleness of that 1/3 of the public in the center who vacillate depending on how well things seem to be going (though they're mildly annoying; either the effort is worthwhile or it is not) but the large ideological component of either Yea or Nay sayers. :confused:
I am unable to understand people or politicians (not the same thing, I think...) who put party loyalty or personal ideology above the needs of the nation. I understand that 'good' is a relative and viewpoint dependent judgment but it seems to me that a large number of good and bad determinations pertaining to a particular war or military operation are based mostly upon political affiliation or leaning...
Allowing ideology to affect ones choices I can understand -- if one is inclined to dislike war, then non-support of most or all wars is understandable and even correct IMO -- to like this or that war dependent upon which party started it is particularly pathetic and borderline indefensible IMO. :mad:
You could largely be correct.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
Regarding the people, I think they see wars as a part of the political power struggle within the country and truly believe that the political power struggle is more important to the fate of the nation than the outcome of the war.
I'm sure this is true but still question the rationale for such a belief.
Quote:
Presidents get good approval ratings when the war kicks off (See 41 and 43).
That's the 1/3 rule kicking in. One could make the same comment about Clinton and the Balkans or Kennedy and Viet Nam. Initial support about 60% ±; then when things didn't go well, support declines to about 30% ± as the fickle, 'how well is it going' middle third abandon ship (then come back as things improve -- or not...). In all those cases, the bulk of the less than hard core Anti-war types in the 30% ± opposition to the war were supporters of the out of power political party of the time. Same thing has been true in most of our wars. That makes political sense but is still, to me, illogical and perverse.
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There is a political interest in the opposition party to remove public support so as to erode the political clout gained by the executive and his party. I think that many in the party truly think that this is in the country's long-term best interests.
I'm sure you're correct, I think pretty much the same thing but submit in the first case that is totally venal IMO and in the latter case, that's just dumb because both parties have done enough wrong along the same line that no one should have much faith in either of them to do much that's good for the nation. :rolleyes:
Quote:
Regarding the politicians, I think they (most) are just power-hungry sociopaths. The rest are probably motivated by sentiments similar to the people.
We can totally agree on that... ;)
As I said, you're probably, almost certainly, right -- but I'm still at a loss to really understand it. Maybe that's because I own more than one firearm??? :wry:
Probably true. However, the problem is that
Quote:
Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
I think most people believe, knowingly or not, that what's "good" for them is also "good" for the country as a whole.
what is good for Person no. 1 is slightly different for Person no. 2 which is slightly different fer Person no. 3 -- and so on to no.301,214,726. IOW, the sliding scale of what's perceived as 'good' is infinite -- and changes almost daily as the age, circumstances, locations and situation of people change in multitudinous ways. Ergo, there is no real thread of continuity or logic so I still question the rationale. Sorry. ;)
Quote:
Political factions are always busy rewriting history and reality to illustrate the significance and necessity of their own existence.
True. That's bad enough; they also tend when in power to write dippy laws based on those skewed perspectives and including some that they hope will cement their hold on that power -- thus I strongly question the need for their existence even if they don't. :mad:
Federal office holders, including elected politicians all seem to forget their oath of office:
"I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God."
I see no mention of party -- or, indeed, of District or State in there (nor, for the Armed Forces, of Branch or Service... :D ).
The admission oath at SCOTUS
is even simpler:
Quote:
I, __, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that as an attorney and counselor of this Court I will conduct myself uprightly and according to law, and that I will support the Constitution of the United States.
Interestingly enough, under Rule 8 (attorney discipline), a majority of the Court decides without an adversarial merits hearing whether "conduct unbecoming" (the standard for disbarment) has occured - the burden is then on the attorney to prove innocence. So it has been from the gitgo.
A couple of points that may be of interest.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
xander day
To the valued members of the small wars journal community.
i am currently in my third year studying war in Swansea, Wales, and am writing my dissertation. the title that i have chosen is: 'How Does the Culture of the American Military Prevent Them From Waging Small Wars Effectively?'
I was wondering if anyone would care to help me with ideas / book proposals/ suggestions. anything would help! i need particular help in relation to how the american military is changing to deal with the increasing prevalence of small wars - i have read ALOT about everything else, but can find very little about the current policies (force modularity?).
It is unclear to me in what field you're writing your dissertation. That piece of information is crucial in regards how one assess your thesis statement.
Regardless of the field, two recently published works that may be of interest to you are Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (ISBN-13: 978-0700615780) and Henry Cole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (ISBN-13: 978-0813125008). Dr. Trauschweizer addresses convincingly some of your points and may provide a good point of departure for additional discussion (this is, if you're looking for a historiographical framework).
Quote:
The thesis of my dissertation is that the culture of the American military prevents it from fighting small wars effectively. The overarching focus of the essay will be upon how the U.S. Army’s preference for conventional warfare weakens significantly both their capacity to fight small wars, and their willingness to do so. The dissertation will show how this preference is a result of cultural biases and will extrapolate the various themes that feed these biases.
Although the dust is starting to settle, "culture" remains a highly contested term and basis for analysis in historical studies as well as other fields. I don't think one has to master this literature to write about culture intelligently. Still, it may be worth your while to develop your definition of "culture" and place it within the broader debate over the term. This suggestion is aimed at positioning your work so it can reach a broader audience.
Quote:
The essay will centre upon how the American military’s preferred paradigm of conventional war is incompatible with the context of a small war and begin with a summary of why this is so. It will also look at the history of the American Army, and so will comment on the traditional division between the civilian sector and the military. It will outline this split and will look at how it came to exist, with particular reference to Upton’s ‘reforms’ of the Army in the wake of the civil war.
In regards to Upton, his reforms, and the "traditional division" in civil-military relations, I advise the utmost caution. The late Russell Weigley offered some observations on Upton and his reforms which were expanded by the late Stephen Ambrose in his biography of that troubled man. In tandem, the two raised questions about the efficacy of Upton's proposed reforms. I have explored some of those questions in my own research (as well as adding one or two of my own). The short version of my findings is that I do not believe that the U.S. Army's official account of Upton's reforms or of civil-military relations during the Gilded Age are supported by the documentary evidence.
If my interpretation is correct (I have evidence and a hunch that may lead me to a 'smoking gun'), many modern basic assumptions about civil military relations as well as the professionalism of the Army's officer corps may have to be re-examined.
As this project is well over the horizon, I think you will do well enough if you consult carefully Weigley's works on the U.S. Army and be wary of works that reference works by Upton, his biographer and friend Peter Michie, and, especially, Samuel Huntington. (I advise using Ambrose's biography of Upton guardedly. Regrettably--because he inspired me to study military history--Ambrose was exposed as a plagiarist towards the end of his life. As his lapses of judgment spanned his career, it is difficult to know which paragraphs of which of his books are reliable. Until that gets sorted out, why take unnecessary risks?)
In regards to your 'big war' versus 'small war' comparison, have you considered the preference you attribute to the U.S. Army (a conclusion with which I'm inclined to disagree) as a side effect of the quest for decisive battle?
HTH
Boom. Boom. Boom. Whazzat? Sounds like the
Dinosaurs have been attracted to fresh meat...:D
Ditto what John T. said. Schmedlap missed only one small thing with respect to Viet Nam -- repeat tours. The Officers and NCOs who learned good lessons the bad way were only able to impart them to a few others before they left for another tour in the land of opportunity. The casualty and KIA rates for NCOs and Co Grade officers meant that the lesson diffusion was not great. Still, basic point that lesson impartation during that war was poor is generally correct.
Lessons learned today indeed are proliferated rapidly and the Army has adapted far more rapidly and effectively than it did in Viet Nam. Organizations like the Asymmetric Warfare Group have been instrumental in pushing new techniques (and, equally or more importantly, reviving old ones) so that's correct.
Two points for consideration though.
While lessons learned do get rapidly disseminated and the system adapts more rapidly, everyone has to realize that the personnel system has NOT adapted and that personnel turbulence has a significant adverse impact on units, lessons learned and embedding those lessons in the units.
We were unprepared for this bout of Small Wars due to a POLICY, not doctrine, that decreed they should be ignored. Numerous people in the Army during the 1975-2002 period tried to reverse that policy to no avail. So there is a culture issue because the culture drove that policy and most within the culture subscribed to it. Culture is largely molded in organizations by personnel selection and promotion policies as well as by organizational education and training processes. If you do not fix those things, you will not change the culture. Point is that all the effective networks in being do not translate to effective training (ask the Troops...) and that they have not thus far affected the culture.
One can only hope they will...
Boom, boom, boom, ...., ...
P.S.
Sigaba is on to something with Upton. The US Army adopted all the bad aspects of the German General Staff and training systems and none of their good ones. We should have developed as US specific system and we did not; we pulled our usual trick with many things -- copied someone else's idea, engineered it until it didn't work as well, tacked on a few minor embellishments and called it our brilliant solution to the problem.
We are slow to learn...