Is It Time to Get Out of Afghanistan?
by John Hinderaker @ Power Line
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archive.../04/028748.php
Who in the American domestic target audience still believes that Afghanistan and Afghans are worth it?
Who is supposed to be strategically communicating to the American voter what we're trying to do there, how well we're doing it, and why?
In 2005 Newsweak invented a story about Koran desecration at Gitmo. Seventeen Afghans died rioting. It is painfully obvious that we learned nothing from that. Why did we learn nothing?
Many questions. The only answer I have is that is indeed time to drastically reduce our headcount while at the same time dramatically increasing the Taliban's bodycount.
And for God's sake do not evacuate the Kabul Embassy via helicopters on the roof.
1 Attachment(s)
Here is my reasoning for being in Astan ...
30 Aug 2009 - AQ means ...
Quote:
"The Base" - and as such, is supporting to efforts by other groups on a global basis to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on its analysis of each group and its plans. It also was (and probably still is, to a lesser extent) capable of its own direct action operations.
By analogy, AQ can be viewed as waging unconventional warfare in the classic sense of our FMs. A SFOB hinges on its personnel and functions, not on its location (or locations, which can be multiple - though obviously network-linked). So also AQ. That is COL Robert Jones' concept, which makes sense to me.
As to the 2001 invasion of Astan, two reasons were (1) retribution and reprobation; and (2) specific deterrence[*]. Both reasons would have been satisfied by a complete destruction of the AQ leadership in Astan as we then knew it. That goal was not realized (Tora Bora et al).
The direct action effort against the AQ leadership still persists (separate US command); but has been submerged by the much larger efforts of UN-NATO ("nation-building" and peace enforcement in favor of the Karzai government) and the US FID-SA effort with major combat support (as noted by Bill Moore).
Since AQ (as a "base" of personnel and functions) is a moving target, the linkage between the effort against it, and the much larger Astan efforts, is not very clear to me. I expect I shall be enlightened.
The Taliban, very intentionally on their part, simply got in the way of our direct action efforts against AQ.
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[*] Specific deterrence deters the individual wrongdoer (you execute the serial killer). That may have no general deterrence effect on serial killers to be.
30 Aug 2009 - Two kinds of deterrence
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We've done a decent job on specific deterrence of AQ on three fronts: (1) intelligence + direct action (military); (2) intelligence + detention (law enforcement); and (3) disruption of network nodes, especially financing support (intelligence + counterintelligence).
As to general deterrence, not a real clue because I see no real plan to do that. By analogy, we need something akin to the European socialists who were anti-communist, but scarcely supportive of USG announced policies. I suppose support of certain Muslim governments (which ones ?) would be the answer. I also expect the tradeoff would be a much lesser role for the US in the Muslim world. That seems to be where Kilcullen is heading at the end of his book (Accidental Guerrilla).
As Ken noted, we are just getting into this - e.g., changes in Cold War strategy over decades.
Anyway, this is really a question for the younger generations.
So, what are your solutions to gain specific and general deterrence re: AQ ?
25 Jul 2010 - Well, one can question ....
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whether a "COIN" strategy ever existed in Astan; and whatever the "Plan", the political side of the ledger was feeble at best ("lipstick on a pig" and the the rest of the cliches).
That didn't bother me cuz my rationale for being in Astan in the first place (and I never saw a reason to change the rationale) was to mount direct action operations against the AQ leadership cadres in Astan and Pstan (more a matter of "rental" operations), based on principles of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.
Other folks at much higher pay grades than mine, had different ideas.
Anyway, agreed: alia jacta est - and we are now in the period of Afghanization and exit strategy(ies).
The foregoing rationale (to me) constituted an overriding "but", even though Astan is in the middle of my personal "Never Again, but..." region - which looks like this:
Attachment 1432
However, that "but" only goes so far - especially when state building (or nation building) - which doesn't start to meet my "but" test, gets in the way of the direct objective for which we (US) started in 2001 Astan.
Frankly, if we would have a better chance of killing our tall brother and his shorter comrade, by letting Astan revert to its pre-2001 condition (and by using better targeting methods than used in the Clinton era), I'd say let that happen.
Both OEF and OIF had a certain initial cleanliness and clarity (the run up to Tora Bora and the run up to Baghdad) - and I count those among the most beautiful military efforts I've seen in my cognitive lifetime.
So, my question to those who have been or are there (such as 120mm, who must have much of the time in for Astan citizenship ;)) is this:
Is what we are doing now substantially advancing the direct objective I've outlined above ?
If not, then we should revise the "Plan"; and if that requires a tactical withdrawal, so be it. If it requires other affirmative actions in Astan or Pstan, so be those.
Regards
Mike
More blogging on this subj:
It’s time to leave Afghanistan
http://jbsanctuary.wordpress.com/201...e-afghanistan/
Time to leave Afghanistan?
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2011/0....html#comments
Should we give up on Afghanistan?
http://thisainthell.us/blog/?p=22807
The comments on these blogs are an indicator that some of the most sympathetic and supportive members of the domestic target audience are disgusted and demoralized. Whoever does the SITREP Live from Afghanistan for the MILBLOG Conference will need to slip down to Dubai and spend a night in a Holiday Inn Express or La Quinta before they strategically communicate to that crowd.
Hey T - have banter, will travel ....
:). Quite seriously, the banter does contain some nuggets that apply here - as from your Julian Stafford Corbett, Some principles of maritime strategy (1911; the same year as Mahan, but more overtly CvC and fairly arguably more modern) - from p.326-328 (emphasis added):
Quote:
Notes on Strategy
PART ONE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS
INTRODUCTORY
Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.
The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.
War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.
MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY
We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.
Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign.
Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.
Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds — Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.
Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.
Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes:
(1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior [pg 327] object;
(2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.
Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war.
But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem.
It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versâ. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versâ. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.
Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.
Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—
(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.
Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—
(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.
[pg 328]
It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.
Quite a decent summary of how to frame the boundaries of the problems presented and their solutions (as in Astan and Pstan).
As to this:
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from T
Do I detect a touch of the Monroe Doctrine in your spatial representation/policy preference? Does that mean the the US does not rule out land operations in Latin/South America? The Bay of Pigs didn't turn out too well IIRC and nor did the whole business with the Contra allthough you had a creditable showing in Panama and Haiti, in recent years (quite apart from Asian landwars).
If so...das is sehr gut! I myself am all in favour of the establishment of Grossraume (a la the late great, and much maligned, Carl Schmitt).
A number of questions and probably a digression from this particular thread - Maybe a later PM on them to see whether I can summarize my views in a semi-coherent manner. :D
Regards
Mike
We Leave, al Qaeda Returns: Time to Nuke Afghanistan?
http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/207206.php
The Counter Insurgent-Supportive Blogosphere is begging for some credible, confidence-inspiring Strategic Communication from somebody.
In answer to the thread question,
Yes.
In support of said answer, we had a discussion nearly two years ago - e.g., some posts in it:
BW: What would "moderate" look like...
jmm99: What would "moderate" look like... part 1 and What would "moderate" look like... part 2
We could today be discussing the very same issues without substantial changes in what is expressed - and in fact we are ! :eek:
We (US) have various open-source (and perhaps classified) "partnership agreements" with the GoA (initiated in the Bush administration and confirmed early on in the Obama administation). Based on the open-source documents, these are legally Presidential Executive Agreements; and could be legally terminated by the US.
With respect to the region (South Asia), I'd like to see all US military forces withdrawn - you all know my boundary lines; and that "Never Again" has a "but..." attached to it. One "but" could be direct actions of the type we have just witnessed.
Further with respect to the projection of non-military US capabilities, we would continue and rely on:
1. Diplomatic under DoS.
2. USIA - yup, good old agitprop under an agency independent of State.
3. USAID - yup, good old focused on local developmental liaison (tied into US trade and commerce) under an agency independent of State.
4. Peace Corps
5. Intelligence (Gathering and Analysis) - You decide on the organizational setup.
Not very isolationist, but it would be as non-interventionist as possible.
The key concept would be to move away from "partnership agreements" (and the "dammit, we made a contract" mentality) and into personal, emotional relationships with the people of South Asia.
Since I'm not "touchy feely", it ain't that - or close to that. What I'm talking about is mutual respect and communication based on shared, enlightened self-interests.
So, "Who [and Where] is John Galt?"
Regards
Mike
PS: Ray, sometimes I change my mind - temporarily hanging my Nehru jacket on the shelf (ha, ha).