Only reel answers provided...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
...To date, little analysis has been conducted on AQ's ideology and strategy.
I think there may be more analysis than you suspect. The problem is that it's inconclusive but it is still being worked.
Quote:
...as many others throughout time have espoused, know your enemy as you know yourself.
Yeah, I've heard that, unfortunately or fortunately viewpoint dependent, I've discovered that one can't even know their friends as well as they know themselves, much less their enemies -- and, know what, that shortfall only complicates things a small amount. Quite small.
I think only in books and movies is that dictum workable; on the ground, it's extremely difficult and rarely provides any insights that significantly change the course of war.
A thorough historical review will show that most battles in the modern era were or are meeting engagements -- that's pretty much true at all levels from minor tactical to the strategic. So all you have to do is be better at correct (note NOT rapid; the OODA loops foolishness is fast draw stuff) response and you're ahead. If you've got a good sense of your opponent OR you've got good scouts, you can get a bit further ahead. Perhaps if you really knew him you could win easily -- but then if you really knew him, there might not be any cause for hostilities... :wry:
Yet hostilities are a constant, maybe mostly because we don't understand each other nearly as well as the Sociologists would prefer. Fortunately, it's also been my observation through the last 60 plus years that we have never known our enemy very well but happily, they always seem to be a little more discombobulated than we are. :D
Quote:
Throughout the last two years, I've searched for anyone trying to answer these questions.
Good questions but I certainly have no answers. I had a long discussion not too long ago with Wilf and 120mm with them taking the position that there were no cultural differences that preclude understanding others. They're entitled to their opinions but I disagreed. That disagreement was more than a bit based on the fact that I've fought people from at least four other cultures and neither I nor my superiors up to the national level really understood the opponents.
Quote:
but neither solution will solve our AQ problem.
Totally true. I suspect only time will really solve that...:wry:
Not a prob, we can disagree -- I've been known to be wrong.
Rarely.:D
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
Actually, I've posed the question to members of the NSC through JSOC. They were often left confounded and asking me for answers b/c they had not read enough, and yes, I had a high enough clearance to engage.
that doesn't surprise me in the least -- though I would suggest you're asking questions at the policy level where they cannot be bothered to know any details. I know of an analyst at DIA who's pretty knowledgeable and there are others around at lower levels.
The problem is not that "we" do not know, the problem is that the power structure is too egocentric to be concerned. Truth is also that they are not a significant issue. Same thing has occurred in all our wars since WW II. :eek:
Quote:
Honestly, it's not being worked. Everyone is hamstrung by the immediate threats in A'stan and Iraq.
At the execution level, that's the way of the world. Think of your Troop at Bragg and your foci there -- then consider your focus in Iraq.
Quote:
Bottom line-No one is focusing on AQ despite the rhetoric. The overwhelming problem remains that we have not defined the problem set.
We rarely if ever do define the problem set to any real degree of specificity.
Recall my comment above about not even really knowing ones friends. With that in mind, check the Op-Ed at the LINK. I would be willing to bet large sums that someone in State sent up a red flag on the issue and the Date. The NSC crowd could care less. I also believe effort is being expended on AQ, JI, Hezbollah and a slew of others. NSC crowd isn't cioncerned about them either. They are concerned about the multiple threats we face.
Quoth Slap :
Quote:
...AQ has a Strategy .....we don't! UBL has consistently said he is going to bleed us and bankrupt us. He hasn't deviated one bit from that and he is winning!
I have heard that also, only difference between Slap and I is that I don't think he's winning. Not even close. AQ is not the enemy, they are only one small, not terribly effective crowd in a much larger crowd of folks who dislike the US and do not wish us well. They are not nearly as dangerous and not nearly as bothersome as Hezbollah to name just one other. Nor are they as close to us as still others or as wealthy as still others.
Slap is right that they are focused and dedicated, they have a motive and a plan -- but they do not have the means to do what they say. They are only one aspect of twenty or so of concern to us strategically at this time. Slap also points out they target well. So-so, it seems -- yet if they overreach, a likely occurrence, all they'll do is hack off a whole lot of Americans. That's never a good plan; we tend to get stupid...
A single enemy makes it easy to focus ones effort, ala the Cold War or even WW II and most of the wars after that which were all Cold War influenced. Today, the enemy is multi faceted and multi polar; there are a bunch of them.
Spend too much effort focused on one and you'll miss what the others are up to. I believe the NSC is aware of that. I know others are...
The strategy against them at this point and publicly
available is to decapitate the leadership as it morphs, go after financial backers and sources and generally engage in a long term squeeze play that is mostly not military but Intel and Finance led and was last time I noticed, estimated to be in effective year four of a 20 plus year effort. The only military aspect at this time is AQ in Iraq and the small elements in Afghanistan. While some SOF may get involved as in Somalia recently, the Predator missile strikes in Afghanistan seem to belong to OGA. Plenty of fun for everyone. :wry:
However, I still say they're a relatively small portion of the effort; they just aren't that important except from a revenge standpoint and they really don't have a great deal of capability at this time. They're trying to change that and I know that's being watched.
Insurgency & meeting engagements
Ken, I suspect you are right that most post WWII wars have been characterized by meeting engagments including the war in El Salvador - which is where I'm going with this.
By1987, the ESAF, govt, and the US had developed a holistic COIN strategy that included political and economic reform and development - the development strategy had evolved from the 1983-84 National Plan to Unidos Para Reconstruir 85 - 87 to Municipios en Accion after 87; from centralized phased to decentrralized. The corresponding military strategy had three parts:
1. Protect infrastructure - a prime target of the FMLN - which also meant protecting the population because the infrastructure was located where they lived. This aspect of the strategy involved the most troops but was limited to regular brigades and miilitary detachments and Civil Defense (local militia) units.
2. 24/7 patrols by Immediate Reaction Bn in areas of FMLN concentration characterized by meeting engagements. The objective was to keep the FMLN off balance and constantly on the move. Since these bn were operating in thirds - one third in the field, one third recovering, one third preparing to go back - they were rested compared to the guerrillas.
3. Intel targeted operations by the national Special Operations Group (GOE) and similar operations by brigade long range patrol elements focused on specific identified concetrations of FMLN leaders and fighters.
Together this national pol-econ-mil strategy won the war. Clearly, El Salvador is NOT Afghanistan or Iraq but we can certainly learn and adapt that which is appropriate. It is also useful to note that it took between 8 and 10 years to get all elements of the strategy in place. It is equally important that the big picture really was not clear to any single individual at the time. I never heard the military strategy described as I just described it by anybody - US or ESAF - while I was in country conducting the Combined ESAF Assessment (87-88) and I was talking with the MOD, the C3, the US Ambassador, and the MILGP commander along with the Southcom J3 who headed the team. Nevertheless, that is what was actually happening on the ground.
Cheers
JohnT