HASC, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 25 Jul 07 testimony on A Third Way: Alternatives for Iraq’s Future (Part 3 of 4):
Bing West
Quote:
In summary, I would make four points.
First, General Petraeus is our wartime leader. He has a smart, experienced staff. He will provide to you a fulsome, balanced assessment in September - far superior to anything you will hear in the interim.
Second, how you, our elected leaders, depict our withdrawal will have profound consequences. To a very large extent, you will shape the narrative, determining how our great nation is perceived and how friends and enemies respond to us.
Third, if the rationale for withdrawal is because Iraq seems hopeless, then leaving behind a residual force is fraught with peril. You cannot quit, and expect to manage what happens after you quit. Iraq, if it perceives it is being abandoned, could fly apart quickly.
Fourth, the rationale for withdrawal drives everything that comes thereafter. Why are we withdrawing? Is it because we as a nation have given up, concluding that full-scale civil war is inevitable; or has our military succeeded, allowing Iraqi forces to maintain stability?
I do not see a compromise "middle ground" between these two rationales.
MG (Ret) Paul D. Eaton, Former Commander, Coalition Military Assistance Training Team
Quote:
You must force, in an asymmetric approach, rational governance by this administration. It is irresponsible for Congress to allow the executive branch of the United States to flail diplomatically when we are faced with an existential threat. The power of the purse can be used with much greater finesse to coerce an this administration into prudent governance.
Stephen Biddle, CFR
Quote:
Under the circumstances, perhaps the most important recommendation that can be offered is to urge the Congress to require by law that the Defense Department develop properly detailed, rigorous, comprehensive contingency plans for the possibility of US troop withdrawals from Iraq – whether partial or total. The United States began the occu-pation of Iraq with inadequate planning; it should not end it the same way. For now, however, it is widely believed that detailed planning for “Plan B” alternatives to the surge would be tantamount to an admission of failure and that the Administration will not sup-port such an effort for fear that it would leak and undermine political support for the war. Such a planning effort, however, is a requirement of prudent policy making. Our best ef-forts to the contrary notwithstanding, we must face the real prospect of failure in Iraq, and we owe it to the American people to be as carefully prepared as we can be to mitigate the consequences of that possibility should it occur.
COL (Ret) Paul Hughes, USIP
Quote:
America has never won a war without the solid support of its people. While many Americans have indicated they see little to be gained from the continued war in Iraq, the U.S. military sees itself becoming further distanced from the people it protects at a time when our forces face significant challenges in recruitment and retention of its troops. Parents are dissuading their sons and daughters from joining the services; company grade officers are leaving the military in record numbers; and children of soldiers are under tremendous – and generally unrecognized – stress from repeated deployments of their fathers and mothers.
A new partnership between the Executive and Legislative branches is needed if the military is to regain the support of the people. In the past, these two branches have not communicated well with each other, which resulted in no clear articulation of our war aims to the American people. According to the Washington Post, less than 1% of America has served in the military; less than 5% know of someone who has or currently serves. That means upwards of 94% of the American people have no direct stake in this conflict. When both branches work together to articulate policy, this serious gap can be fixed so that our people understand what is at stake, the price being paid and the realistic consequences of failure.
