http://www.stripes.com/news/afghans-...iency-1.182972
This article beautifully captures the obstacles we face on a daily basis as Advisors.
I still don't understand why they think this is all going to work out....
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http://www.stripes.com/news/afghans-...iency-1.182972
This article beautifully captures the obstacles we face on a daily basis as Advisors.
I still don't understand why they think this is all going to work out....
Funny that it takes a Navy SEAL to point out the obvious to the Army and Marine COIN experts that have been running the show over there for years.
Quote:
At the same time, though, Sheppard said Western forces are partly to blame for stoking the belief that the coalition would always ride to the rescue. For years, the coalition funded many projects and programs, without involving higher levels of the Afghan government, and took the lead in solving a slew of problems, obviating the need for Afghan officials to seek aid from their government.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly criticized the provincial reconstruction teams for that approach, blaming them for undermining his government’s effectiveness and authority — a characterization Sheppard and others said is not without merit.
“They are accustomed to not getting what they need from the Afghan government and getting what they need from the coalition,” said Nancy Abella, a State Department representative who works on the PRT’s staff.
Precisely… We call it, “Advisor Fratricide”
So Karzai is complaining that we are stealing his opportunity to provide services for his people? Are we supposed to believe he's desperately striven for this since his presidency began?
Theres no doubt that the can do/will do attitude of most american combat men could lead them to not "waste time" going through the Afghan govt and instead do the project themselves.
My question to those with experience in this would be; Is it better to try to get the government to do it and see the funding poof and disappear or do it ourselves and create a dependency? SFAT's reply suggests the former is more valuable but the latter would suggest that people on the ground could see some net change. Or is the answer option C, neither.
What is better would depend on what the goal is... and that's something I think we lose track of now and then.Quote:
Originally Posted by Wyatt
The word “no” and the phrase “use your own systems “ are like a broken record within my team. Advisors teams have an insatiable urge to “do for” and “pay for”, quite frankly it makes us feel like we’re making progress and getting things done. Only recently (since the start of my team’s tour) has the priority shifted to the “do it yourself” dynamic. It has proven to be quite the problem set with most teams because of the fact previous Advisors “did” and “paid” and now we are not.
In the Afghan mind we are bad advisors because we don’t help and support them. They consistently drop names of other Advisor teams who “did” and “paid” and question why we don’t do the same.
What’s the solution? Continue doing what we are doing. Do not “do” and “pay” anymore. The afghans must be cut loose of the USG umbilical cord once and for all. Yes, our relationships are suffering and will continue to suffer, but…. It is better for them to learn hard lessons while we are still here to help rather than two years from now.
But men, I’m here to tell ya, after eleven years there is still a long long way to go. Corruption is king and there is nothing that can be done about it.
Have they got systems of their own? Not systems that exist in theory or on paper, but systems they are comfortable with and that actually function for them?Quote:
Originally Posted by SFAT
One mistake we often make in foreign countries (by no means exclusively in the military realm) is to assume that systems are installed or built, when in fact systems have to evolve, and they have to evolve along with those who are to use them. If people who have dealt with systems all their lives and take them for granted try to "install" systems in places where there are none (or none that the installers would recognize as systems), it's easy to come up with something that makes perfect sense to the installer, but is effectively dysfunctional for those who are supposed to use it. If people are consistently unable or unwilling to use the system, maybe the system needs to be re-evaluated.
There always is a long way to go... but are we clear on where we're going? What are we trying to accomplish here, and are those goals and the goals of those we wish to assist on the same page?Quote:
Originally Posted by SFAT
Granted, my observations of US military assistance are in an entirely different environment, but sometimes I feel that what we're actually producing here is a security force that's remarkably adept at parroting out doctrine back to us and generally telling us what we want to hear while pursuing their own goals (not necessarily consistent with ours) at the same time. One consistent factor is that corruption is king here as well.
SFAT:
This is ditto Iraq c. 2008.
As long as we are there, we impede their own sense of self-responsibility.
It has to go the way of getting the US out of the business of running Afghanistan, great and small before their systems can evolve.
Corruption is part and parcel of non-functioning systems. Accountability for anything will only improve when routine economic forces (scarcity) drives everything.
Tough love is tough.
Steve
PS:
Bear in mind that when the money dries up, so to does the influence.
Why call you if you aren't going to "fix it?"
Where does that take you?
This system is there, and would work if they chose to use it. I told myself when my boots first hit Afghan soil, to seek first to understand, then to be understood.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dayuhan
That’s exactly what I did. I learned the intricacies of the system; I prepared my lessons, then reached out to teach them. Turns out my audience new a lot more than I had anticipated, they could even give me name of people at each supply/sustainment node and were all too familiar with the process. Why didn’t they use it? Why should they? Why should they have to devote the effort to writing and photo copying MOI/MOD 14s when 1. They didn’t believe it would work, and 2. The American advisors of the past gave then everything they needed. Talk about shooting yourself in the foot.
An argument heard many times over my friend. “why are we trying to teach them systems similar to ours” “why don’t we let them design their own systems and we will just sit back and mentor when needed” “these systems must be Aghan sustainable”. There is nothing new about this. The ugly truth is if we left it up to the ANSF, their system would involve a cell phone call to the supply warehouse to request more blankets and when they didn’t arrive, claim that system is broken also. Plus the power brokers at the top of the list are who controls the supply anyway. I don’t care how many requests you send for fuel. If the man doesn’t think you should have it, or the requesters didn’t pay enough in bribes, you aren’t getting it, and even if you did get it, you would only get a third of what you asked for because the rest has been skimmed of the top somewhere else.Quote:
One mistake we often make in foreign countries (by no means exclusively in the military realm) is to assume that systems are installed or built, when in fact systems have to evolve, and they have to evolve along with those who are to use them. If people who have dealt with systems all their lives and take them for granted try to "install" systems in places where there are none (or none that the installers would recognize as systems), it's easy to come up with something that makes perfect sense to the installer, but is effectively dysfunctional for those who are supposed to use it. If people are consistently unable or unwilling to use the system, maybe the system needs to be re-evaluated
The systems must start somewhere… I man who has never seen a house, doesn’t necessarily want to learn how to build one does he?
Brother, I know where our USG thinks we're going, I know what I am trying to accomplish, and no I don't think the goals I have and goal they have are on the same page all the time. But I know I'm going back home to the home of the brave; they know they're stuck here to deal with the next regime...what would your goals be if you were in their shoes?Quote:
There always is a long way to go... but are we clear on where we're going? What are we trying to accomplish here, and are those goals and the goals of those we wish to assist on the same page?.
Well said. You are absolutely correct. they do tell us what we want to hear, but what's the alternative? We want to hear they are analyzing, planning, resourcing, and executing unilaterally.Quote:
Granted, my observations of US military assistance are in an entirely different environment, but sometimes I feel that what we're actually producing here is a security force that's remarkably adept at parroting out doctrine back to us and generally telling us what we want to hear while pursuing their own goals (not necessarily consistent with ours) at the same time. One consistent factor is that corruption is king here as well.
Sorry all, responding with quote technique eludes me. I'm sure someone will fix it up.
and replace the Equal sign in your OPENING 'quote' wi the clsing bracket; i.e; insteAd of this:
[QUOTE=
Use this:
[QUOTE]
The closing quotes {/QUOTE] are correct -- yours, I mean, note I replaced the opening bracket there with a { so it wouldn't make a quote in this example.
thank you Ken.
Keep the faith... ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by SFAT
This is what happens when you try to bring a western-style of centralized govt and govt services to a tribal-based country that's barely out of the stone-age, where corruption is rampant, starting at the top.
Makes me wonder how different things would be if we took the piles of money we've already "invested" in Afghanistan, and instead of giving it to Karzai and his cronies at the national level, if we divided it evenly amongst every man, woman, and child in that country, or at least at the local or provincial level? Think things would be different now? I'll go out on a ledge here and say yes...
We're destined to fail in Afghanistan, just like every western power that's gone before us, because some numb nuts at the puzzle palace and white house dream up some grandoise strategic plan that fails miserably at the tactical level.
Just curious if anyone in your higher food chain has looked at what "works" in similarly situated countries, like Yemen, Oman, Bangladesh or Pakistan?Quote:
Originally Posted by SFAT