You can't handle the truth about ...
Beneficiarius placement - but since you asked .... :D
This also ties in with fmr11a's military-civilian team idea - seriously.
Here is as much as you need to know about the grade of Beneficiarius (also a standard and an insignia of the Beneficiarius):
Quote:
In the principate, the term came to be used for a specific grade of officer within the military staff (officium) attached to each equestrian officer of an auxiliary unit; each camp prefect; each legionary tribune and legionary legate; each provincial procurator and other equestrian officials within a province and each provincial governor.
In short, they were of the Roman Professional Soldiers (or Marines in the smaller Roman Navy), who had come through the ranks to centurion or super-centurion grades.
The Roman officers, for whom they served, whether their social class was senatorial (Caesar) or equestrian (Pilate), were trained in rhetoric and served as often as magistrates than as soldiers. In short, they were trained and served as lawyers. Some were gifted military amateurs; some were definitely not gifted military amateurs.
The Beneficiarii, like other centurion super grades, functioned as a link between the lawyers (the top dog officers) and the professional military. A Beneficiarii of the governor's staff had a lot of clout (he could draw a circle in the sand with his belt insignia - and say: "I am Rome. Cross the line if you dare."):
Quote:
Whatever duties they carried out away from the provincial capital they did so as the representative of the governor. This explains the number of miniature “beneficiarius lance” badges found on military sites in Northern Europe. These would have been attached to leather belts or strap ends and showed that the person was an official of the governor and operating on his behalf independently of any other military officer.
Since a bear wears no belt, I can only see it being pinned to the obvious male appendage - sort of a pizzle stick, I suppose.
Cheers
Mike
My take ("on the record") on Krulak-Hoar
Here it is, at Hi Fuchs.
Note that, by making the Army Manual the standard for both military and non-military agencies, the effect was to move part of our Laws of War into our Rule of Law. Krulak-Hoar probably could have stated it more precisely.
We also have had discussions about the UCMJ moving our Rule of Law into our Laws of War.
Regards
Mike
PS: I expect I may be a bit spotty in replying to posts here or elsewhere at SWC for the next few weeks - may be, may be not.
hmmm...is that a gaunlet at my feet?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
Hey Steve,
Once LawVol decompresses from Afghanistan, I'd hope he'd join in the discussion. Of course, Polarbear1605 is always decompressed when it comes to "Rule of Law". :)
Mike
You know the bear never misses a chance to charge a windmill...and probably should not pass this one up but I do need to read the reference...remember, what drove Don Quixote mad was reading besides I would never describe myself as compressed...concerned and a bit fanatical is better. ;)
Bear: Neither gauntlet nor pugil stick ...
;)
My plan was to answer Steve's question by commenting on the USIP monograph in general; and on its Rule of Law section in particular.
I do have some initial thoughts - without commentary now.
In Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Glossary), one finds the following definitions, which provide some boundaries for the scope of "Stabilization and Reconstruction":
Quote:
Stabilization
Ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict and creating the conditions for normal economic activity and nonviolent politics. (UK Stabilisation Unit, “Helping Countries Recover From Violent Conflict.”)
Violent Conflict [defined by USIP]
A clash of political interests between organized groups characterized by a sustained and large-scale use of force.
Peace Enforcement
Coercive action undertaken with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. (UN DPKO, “Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.”)
Peacekeeping
Action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. (UNDPKO, “Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.”)
Peacebuilding
Measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management and laying the foundations for sustainable peace. (UN DPKO, “Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.”)
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)
A process that contributes to security and stability in a stabilization and reconstruction context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures, and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods. (United Nations, Integrated DDR Standard.)
Reconstruction
The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development. (United States Army, Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations.)
Development
Long-term efforts aimed at bringing improvements in the economic, political, and social status, environmental stability, and the quality of life for all segments of the population. (DRAFT UK CAWG, Inter-Departmental Glossary of Planning Terminology.)
These are not modest boundaries even if one reads them conservatively.
The scope of the Stabilization and Reconstruction concept is established by its summaries of End States:
Quote:
2.1 End States
Below is a summary description of each end state, framed according to the perception of the host nation population, as they will be the final arbiters of whether peace has been achieved.
• Safe and Secure Environment
Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.
• Rule of Law
Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.
• Stable Governance
Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.
• Sustainable Economy
Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.
• Social Well-Being
Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.
and Key Principles:
Quote:
3.1 What are the key cross-cutting principles in an S&R environment?
• Host nation ownership and capacity means that the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. Ownership requires capacity, which often needs tremendous strengthening in S&R environments.
• Political primacy means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.
• Legitimacy has three facets: the degree to which the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree to which the government is accountable to its people; and the degree to which regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government.
• Unity of effort begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.
• Security is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts an S&R mission to begin with. Security creates the enabling environment for development.
• Conflict transformation guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building host nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.
• Regional engagement entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation’s and the region’s security and economic and political development. It has three components: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation.
To me, this looks like a comprehensive state-building program which has its legal bases in the UN Charter and Conventions; International Human Rights Law; and, to a lesser extent, International Humanitarian Law (which goes beyond the Laws of War [LOAC] accepted by the US).
In any event, in considering the value of "Stabilization and Reconstruction", one has to view the concept in terms of - Where am I ? Who am I ? Why am I here ? Who owns me ?
Regards
Mike
Yup, Solis is a great read
Technically, the killing of a civilian in South Vietnam could not be a war crime. The victim was a resident of an allied nation, protected by the laws of Vietnam. So, the charge would be some version of homicide (murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide), with a probable 916 (Justification) defense. A Retro Haditha or Back to the Future, which you know well.
Now, if the shootee were an enemy combatant (NVA or VC Main Force), perhaps protected by the Geneva Convention in full (GCs III) or Common Article 3, there would be no crime at all - unless the shootee was shot after capture (which could be prosecuted as a war crime).
One problem in Vietnam (which was solely for GVN and USG political reasons) was treatment of the VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) as civilians. Let's take our friendly VC political cadre associated with a VC company. In reality, that cadre would usually hold a grade one step higher than his military counterpart ("civilian" control of the military ;)); and would personally dabble in selective violence if needed.
If the VCI cadre was killed by, say, a PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Unit), he was technically a civilian under South Vietnamese law. On the other hand, our Civil Affairs officers were legitimate military targets. In terms of functional equivalence, the VCI cadre had more military clout than the US CA officer.
Vietnam mucked up things in a number of areas.
Regards
Mike
PS: For those interested in the OSO shooting, it's at Part 7, pp.2-4 pdf. Basic facts - not contested:
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On 2O July 1969 a USO show was in progress in the Staff and Officers' Club at the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company's base camp. Miss Catherine Anne Warnes, singer for the Australian musical group, "Sweethearts on Parade," stepped back from the microphone after singing the show's final song, just as there was a muffled shot. The 20-year old Australian fell to the floor, dead.
...
By 2100 the Staff and Officers' Club was filled with Marines anxious to hear the band and the attractive singer in the pink miniskirt. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company commander, Major Roger E. Simmons, sat about eight feet from the stage. ... Later investigation revealed that the killer had fired one .22-caliber round from behind a jeep that was parked 35 yards from the Staff and Officers' club. The bullet cut through the club's screen wall, entered Miss Warnes' left side, pierced her aorta, and exited her right side, killing her almost instantly.
Was Major Simmons the intended target? Newspapers speculated that Miss Warnes had stepped into the line of fire ("Was Girl's Killer Gunning for Maj?" read one headline), but Major Simmons thought not. It was not an issue at trial, although a straight line could be drawn from the major's position to Miss Warnes to the jeep from behind which the fatal round was fired.
I conned myself just now into ordering a used hardcover of Solis' Son Thang: An American War Crime, whose title is a misnomer in light of what I wrote above (Son Thang was not a "war crime").
Back to the USIP & "Rule of Law"
I could rip at Section 7 and rewrite many paragraphs. That would take a lot of time, which I'd rather devote to my Neanderthal Manual. ;)
I did find three sections that stood out to me as being positive (even though written in something of a UNese dialect) - and worthy of some thought since they are principles.
First,
Quote:
7.4.2 Act only with an understanding of the local context.
A proper rule of law assessment is vital because assistance should be designed in relation to the context rather than universal templates. A multidisciplinary team comprising both host nation and international actors, that covers both urban and rural areas, is optimal [JMM: is mandatory]. Consult the users of the system as well as justice institutions.
Key questions for assessment include the following:
• What does the formal justice system look like on paper and in practice? Can it perform basic rule of law functions?
• What are the informal rules, traditions, and culture that underlie the system and its capacity and needs?
• What subsystems of justice are used by the population, including non-state justice and policing?
• What are the broader conflict-related factors, including regional influences, the security/crime situation, how human rights are being protected, the socioeconomic and political context, the cultural context, and the treatment of marginalized groups?
• What was the role of the justice system in the conflict? Was it part of the problem or part of the solution?
• What are the key drivers and mitigators of conflict that are affecting or could affect rule of law?
From the People; back to the People, said Mao. In practice, Mao's movement failed in that regard. As stated, Mao's theory is the true Rule of Law; that is, the rules come in raw form from the People, are refined by the Government and sent back to the People for approval; and so on, to arrive at an acceptable product.
Of course, you can have Rule by Law, where the rules are made by the Government's fiat. So long as the People accept those rules, you have a workable system; and can call it "Rule of Law". If a significant portion of the People does not accept them (feel they are "unjust"), you have a problem.
Second,
Quote:
7.4.5 Recognize interdependence.
Rule of law requires more than an exclusive focus on formal justice institutions. It is an interdependent system of many parts involving institutions that manage justice (e.g., ministries), law enforcement agencies, courts, prisons, oversight bodies, law reform agencies, and legal education institutions. The justice system also depends on interaction with non-state justice systems, non-state actors (e.g., civil society), and the general population. Progress in security, governance, economic development and social well-being are all dependent on a functioning rule of law system.
Accepted as written.
Third (three parts, all intertwined),
Quote:
7.5.3 Approach: Legal Framework Assessment
Understand the existing legal framework as the first step in working toward a just one. Laws may be chaotic, meaning it is difficult to answer the question of what law applies. They may also be deficient, meaning they contain provisions that are inconsistent with human rights or are antiquated and fail to address common S&R challenges, such as property rights, human trafficking, and organized crime. In most war-torn states, the legal framework frequently exhibits signs of neglect and political manipulation, contains elements of discrimination and seldom meets the requirements of international human rights and criminal law standards. Legal framework assessment involves a comprehensive mapping of all laws and decrees - formal and informal - followed by an analysis that identifies areas that require urgent attention or longer-term treatment.
7.5.4 Gather, catalogue, and distribute the applicable laws first.
Reach out to legal practitioners, ministries, the courts, the police, the prison services, law schools, academics, NGOs, and legal diaspora to collect applicable laws. This will involve multiple sources of law. Identify and collect core documents including the constitution, criminal code, civil code, commercial code, civil procedure code, administrative law, citizenship law, and property law. Also, look for regulations, acts, bylaws, internal procedures (e.g., police procedures), and laws and decrees regulating the customary justice system or parallel justice systems (e.g., rebel laws). Catalogue the laws gathered and translate and share them among host nation and international colleagues.
7.5.5 Conduct a comprehensive analysis of the applicable law.
The laws gathered need to be analyzed to ascertain compliance with international human rights law, criminal law, civil law, and commercial law (e.g., treaties on organized crime; drug trafficking; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Convention on the Rights of the Child); to assess how religion impacts the law; and to understand what problems are not addressed in the laws. One body or organization should coordinate this analysis. Have a mixed team of academics and practitioners, legal and nonlegal, who can contextualize the law as it relates to the host nation. The analysis should be carried out by both host nation and international actors, and the team should consult widely within and outside the justice system. Start the assessment early; a full assessment can take up to one or two years.
One or two years - get real. Michigan did this in the 1960s - and was working out the kinks into the 1970s. That was under optimal conditions. I have complete agreement that this is how to do it. I also doubt it will be done.
Exactly how these "international actors" get involved - and how involved they get - are questions not answered in what I've quoted above.
Regards
Mike
input form a knuckle-dragger
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
Like-new hardcover of Son Thang (just under $8 inc. shipping) showed up in my mailbox this noon. It was the property of the Kiel, Wisc. Public Library (no one took it out); and sold by a used book-dealer from near Green Bay. A fluke in parcel post delivery - their loss, my gain. :)
Bottom line: Gary Solis would be a formidable opponent (smart guy and good writer).
OK: I followed your tactical advice - books ordered (under $10 inc. shipping) ;)
I know...I love that used book function! For an old book worm it is just GREAT!
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
Something hits me in the gut wrong about a spCM (Herrod's "delayed transition" from 3/3 to 1/7) for a guy who twice went out for a wounded Marine (the same guy, who happened to be Ollie North) and is up for a Silver Star.
Regards
Mike
Yep, I am sure if confronting Gray in a legal boxing match, he would leave marks. Gray also has another book out “The Law of Armed Conflict”… trying to read through it for some time now…I believe it is Mr. Solis’s text book…I keep putting it down to read more fun stuff.
To me, Herrod’s SPCM for UA is also surprising but does reflect his command situation. Good combat leaders work real hard on unit cohesion and Ollie North is one great combat leader regardless of his political issues late in his career. Combat firefights/battles are also tremendous cohesion builders. If you suddenly lose your leader and your unit with a transfer to a different division the “system” support structures have been kick out from underneath you and a sudden UA problem should not be unexpected (and does need to be addressed). Unit SOPs normally set an unofficial standard that the Company CO gets the first NJP offense, the Bn CO gets the second, third offense gets the super NJP option of a summary court and that is the normal route to a SPCM.
OODA Loops and Deming - Boyd theory was never sold as something new…at least not by its author. It was an historical analysis of sorting out and picking what works and then an assembly of those piece parts. Boyd Theory is much richer than just OODA loops. I don’t remember any references to Deming but the list is extensive. The Boyd briefs (slides) are available on line and the USMC Quantico Library now has a copy of COL Boyd delivering the audio portion of those briefs (12 hrs+). If you ever want to spend the time, let me know and I will let you know how to get your very own set Boyd CDs. I personally feel you have to have both (the slides and the audio) to understand Boyd.
Read the reference…it is very good and I am especially impressed by the reference list. Of course, being the dedicated fighter of windmills (besides being a knuckle dragger) I have to state my criticism.
The doc seems to rely heavily on UN and NATO references and that presents, in my opinion, a considerable flaw. I would sum up that flaw with the phase: “its fine, if you are dealing with the villages of Europe, but how does this work in a tribal content, specifically a Muslim tribal content?” In addition, I feel it is a tactical manual that ignores and glosses over some of the strategic realities. I mention that because I believe we are going to add Afghanistan to the now growing list of wars that we have won tactically but lost strategically.
The strategic issue is which ROL do you want to implement? Ours or theirs? Especially, when theirs is culturally very different from our ROL. Either way presents us with a dilemma. Their law, for example, requires that an adulteress woman is publically stoned. In the US, we always have an opposition party. If we attempt to implement a Muslim based ROL, the opposition party (and I am convinced it makes no difference which party is in the minority) will see this as an opportunity to garner power. Another example is President Bush was politically attack for using the LOW to fight the war on terrorist; Eric Holder is being attack for trying to use the ROL. States can legally execute their own citizens, so how will the US public handle the legal and public execution of a convicted adulteress by stoning?
Boyd Strategic Theory states that whatever works for you must also work against the enemy (Boyd’s cheng/chi theme). Clausewitz calls for a balance in the trinity of war …people, government, and the Army. “The theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.”
Of course, my favor windmill that cocks my barber’s bowl sideways, is the separation of the ROL and the LOW. The manual does not address it and therefore, I my mind, it is flawed. It is still a good manual as long as you understand the flaws. I understand that the legal folks view them as the same thing. But as a knuckle dragger, I do not see how I can operate under both; Inter arma silent leges. I still feel that there has to be a coordination point between the two as you transition from the LOW to the ROL. If you mix them, at some point there is going to a sorting out…and the sorting always means someone is going to lose and any loss, either way, means you undermine your own strategy. I recently finished “In the Shadow of Wounded Knee” by Roger Silvestro…and like Haditha, I think it is a great example of mixing them and then sorting it out with winners and lossers demonstrating a flawed strategy.