Thanks for the detailed reply...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
swerve1
I was a part of 2/4ID staff when it did its transition to the new HBCT design from the Force XXI model and later commanded a maneuver company in the BCT, which included a tour in Iraq. Early on we identified several shortfalls to the new design but made little headway with Big Army in affecting the changes we saw as necessary. Still, there are some definite positives within the new design.
First, the Combined Arms BNs are monsters. They have more infantry than the old tank BNs and more tanks than the old mech BNs. They also lend themselves very well to all companies task-organizing for combined arms opns.
Second, despite how large they are, the BCT HQ have many more capabilities than the old BDE HQ. It can sometimes be very unwieldy, but having so much organic C2 under one roof provides many capabilities.
On the other hand, the lack of a third CAB handicaps the BCT. the ARS has no ability, doctrinally or practically, to do any more than light reconnaissance and screening opns. It can't attack, defend, cover, guard, or screen. It also lacks adequate dismounts to field multiple long-term OPs. The mix of BFVs and HMMWVs wasn't the best idea either. The lack of platoons is also a problem. The ARS needs lots of external support to really make it combat capable. Now in the current fight in Iraq, one could make a credible argument that the ARS was sufficient for its tasks. However, it's very unlikely an ARS would have been able to do the same things 3-7 CAV did during the initial portion of the Iraq War.
The FA BN is woefully inadequate. In order to field more BCTs, the Army watered down its combat power and it's clear in these two-battery FA BNs. Supporting the CABs and the ARS simultaneously is a bridge too far without external support, which makes the BCT incapable of self-reliance.
The engineers are scattered across the BCT. Sometimes this is good, sometimes bad, but the problem is that BFV-equipped engineers get looked at like just another maneuver element instead of engineers who can maneuver if need be. Also, lacking a BDE EN limits the real visibility on the engineer situation.
CS support is inadequate. There's a need for more MPs and other combat enablers. CSS didn't seem to be much of a problem, but that's outside of my scope.
In the future, I wish the Army would reduce the number of BCTs in favor of making the existing ones much more robust and capable - real self-sufficient fighting forces, capable of throwing the kitchen sink at the threat. Add a 3rd CAB, make the ARS into an organization able to fight for information, field additional FS assets - both howitzers and mortars, include more dismounted scouts, and make the MP PLT an MP CO.
The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?
The very foolish American proclivity for buying
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Tukhachevskii
The HMWWVs in your recon elements always intrigued me. What was the rationale (assuming there was one) for marrying them with BFVs rather than more BFVs or even MBTs?
General Purpose (GP -- precursor for the once ubiquitous 'Jeep') equipment rather than sensibly buying designed for purpose items.
The M3 Bradley was a political compromise purchased by the Armor and Cavalry folks to assure that the Infantry folks (who were buying the M2 Bradley) supported their buy of the M1 Tank. A part of the cost was cancellation of the XM8 Armored Gun system and of a dedicated Scout vehicle. The HMMWV is a lousy scout vehicle but is the standard, GP 'light' (???) wheeled vehicle.
IOW, there is no rationale. Both items were and are simply available and the best of many poor solutions given a refusal to buy dedicated equipment...
We do a lot of really dumb stuff.
We over-Armor our Recon elements because we do not have the patience to wait for effective, time consuming reconnaissance to be completed, we just load up on Armor and go out looking for trouble. Dumb...
We've identified a lack of effective Reconnaissance capability as a tactical and operational shortfall again and again -- we still haven't really fixed it, mostly because we're unwilling to buy dedicated equipment (or adequately train our people) and have impatient Staff Officers who are unwilling to wait for information...
At the risk of sounding/behaving like a librarian...
...…the following theses may be of interest regarding S/BCTs and the reconnaissance/third manoeuvre Bn conundrum;
Maj. C. D. Taylor, The Transformation of Reconnaissance: Who will Fight for Information on the Future Battlefield?, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005;
Quote:
This research seeks to determine if reconnaissance operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom required engaging the enemy in close combat in order to be effective. Qualitative examination of the interviews from the Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group yielded seven consistent themes that impact on this primary research question. Those seven themes are summarized below:
1. Tempo drives reconnaissance
2. The movement to contact is the most common form of the offense
3. Adaptive enemies often do not fit doctrinal templates
4. Commanders required human intelligence more than imagery
5. Most useful intelligence is bottom up
6. Lightly armoured scouts cannot support high tempo operations
7. Divisional heavy cavalry squadrons tend to fight as independent manoeuvre units. (p.40)
Maj. D. Mark, Effective or Efficient: The Conundrum of the Armed Reconnaissance Squadron, MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;
Quote:
Brigade level reconnaissance units exist solely to allow the primary warfighting organization in the Army, the Brigade Combat Team, to have perfect Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (SA/SU). However, much of the doctrine, organization, and technologies required to pursue RDO simply do not exist within the Army today. The Army's answer to the capability gap is the modular force and the centrepiece organization, the Brigade Combat Team. However, one of the primary failings of the modular
design was that the HBCT traded a manoeuvre battalion for a cavalry squadron. Although the ARS proves far more capable than the BRT it replaced, the ARS has lost its identity and has become a poorly resourced third manoeuvre element. As a result, the ARS does not even perform
reconnaissance missions well. Under the current construct, the ARS does not provide the brigade any unique capabilities (p. 23).
Maj. M. A. Dooley, Ignoring History: The Flawed Effort to Divorce Reconnaissance from Security in Modern Cavalry Formations, MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006;
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For all of the optimistic discussion in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 about making contact with sensors and developing a situation out of direct fire contact, there is little difference now between the realities of brigade reconnaissance squadron techniques and the capabilities of World War II ground reconnaissance. Other than the fact that reconnaissance squadrons no longer have the organic helicopter assets or armoured firepower formerly common to division cavalry, cavalry scouts must still execute their reconnaissance and security missions much as they have for the past sixty-five years. As a result, the newest reconnaissance squadrons no longer possess the critical assets historically required to bail themselves out of trouble once it is encountered.[...]
It seems the sensor troops that were to have sufficed as a replacement for organic combat power in the original FCS proposals are not controlled by the very reconnaissance forces that were to depend upon them. So long as the sensor systems remain controlled by brigade headquarters, the concept of sensor-to-sensor target handover, in most cases, will require constant coordination through multiple echelons of command. Without physical possession or operational control of sensor assets at the reconnaissance squadron level, the new HBCT and IBCT reconnaissance organizations technically do not even qualify to be labelled as “RSTA,” because they have no ability to acquire targets beyond the short range capabilities of normal ground recon troop assets. The much vaunted application of joint and precision fires, proclaimed in the latest version of FM 3-20.96 as a substitute for organic combat power, is thus not likely to occur efficiently if at all. (p. 72-4)
Maj. M. R. Howell, A CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCE REDESIGN OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS WITHIN THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS MMAS thesis, USMC Command and General Staff College, 2009;
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First, the new modular cavalry formations have severe flaws in their design. Second, the current mindset, doctrinal foundation and leader training focus of these cavalry formations have severe flaws in some of its key concepts. Finally, and most importantly, these new formations cannot perform the full spectrum of reconnaissance and security missions that cavalry formations doctrinally executed in the past. The combined effect of these flaws is likely to cause a serious capability gap to develop within BCT cavalry squadrons. These changes signalled a significant shift in the doctrinal roles and missions of the majority of current U.S. cavalry formations (excluding the 3d Armoured Cavalry Regiment). In sum, the transformation and modularization of the U.S. Army's BCT cavalry squadrons has had a negative impact on their effectiveness.(p. 1)
Just to be a pain in the Ar$e...
I've popped in and out of this discussion for a couple of weeks...
I have heard several different rules of thumb regarding force ratio vis a vis security mission... Of course it is all METT-TC dependent (especially enemy, troops, and terrain), but...
Cover Guard Screen
Corps DIV Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+
Div Regiment/BDE+ Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+
BDE Squadron/BN+ Troop/CO+ PLT+
Source FM 17-95
Of course you can do that -- should do that
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners
but will it give you that enemy commanders intentions or merely his capabilities and some indications? I don't think either of those will put you inside the mind of an opposing commander. Not to mention a good deception plan can lead one astray. Badly...
This is partly semantic but it has very real and important point. You can learn things, assess what you've learned and usually determine possibilities and even occasionally, enough to ascertain probabilities -- however you must consider that the other guys is at least as smart and experienced as are you and is as capable of a startling and innovative effort. Not stating his 'intentions' is simply to avoid the mindset "that's what he's going to do..." That's a strong human predilection without reinforcing it by believing you might have learned his intentions.
It is simply avoiding target fixation. More particularly, potentially wrong target fixation...