Generals fault Iraqi security forces

Generals fault Iraqi security forces. Tina Susman and Garrett Therolf, LATIMES. 11 June.

Quote:

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Two U.S. generals gave poor marks Sunday to Iraqi security forces for a lack of readiness, assessments that bode ill for Iraq's ability to fend for itself as pressure builds in Washington to draw down American troops.

Though both military leaders said Iraqi soldiers had made progress in recent months, one said the Shiite-led Iraqi army lacked top-notch senior officers. Both described the national police force as riddled with corruption and sectarianism. One general told reporters that in his area of command, the situation was so dire that the U.S. military was looking to fill the void by arming Sunni Arabs linked to tribal sheiks and militant groups who were willing to work with Americans enforcing security ...

Speaking separately, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who commands a region encompassing four provinces south of Baghdad, said Sunday that about 10% of the territory had no Iraqi police whatsoever. "And in many areas where we do have police, we have corrupt police," said Lynch, commander of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division.

As a result, the U.S. military is planning to establish "provisional police forces" that would arm men affiliated with Sunni tribal sheiks and militant groups who are willing to assist American forces, Lynch told journalists. He said that U.S. generals were trying to persuade the Iraqi government to support the plan, but that the American military was determined to pursue it, even without government backing ...

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The success of the Iraqi Security Forces and the bureaucratic systems that support them are our center of gravity, if they fail, then we need a new strategy to address that reality. Using a tribal approach may result in short term success and more stability (in the short run), but it will eventually result in a quasi-state like Afghanistan, where the tribes rule, and the State presents a pretense of being in charge. Who knows how it will sort itself out the in long........ run.

Of course the article motivates me to ask a few what if questions to ensure we don't repeat mistakes, or take the wrong lessons from this conflict:

1. What if we didn't demobilize the Iraqi Army?
2. What if we didn't try to accelerate the development of a new Army, which resulted in a poorly trained, equipped, and led armed force with the exception of Iraqi's CT force?
3. Tied into question, what if we implemented the current strategy in 2003 to create a semi-stable state, before the insurgency spun out of control? Perhaps resulting in an environment where the new Iraqi Army and Police could be successful, when we fielded them?
4. What if we actually established functional bureaucratic systems where the Iraqi Soldiers were feed, equipped, resupplied, etc.?

There are gems of hope throughout the Iraqi military and police, and the situation can still be turned around, but it didn't have to be this hard.