Storming the World Stage: The Story of LeT
Hat tip to Abu M for carrying a review of a new book on LeT by Stephen Tankel:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...r-e-taiba.html
The last sentence:
Quote:
Tankel has produced one of the definitive accounts of Lashkar’s rise as well as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and his book should be the go-to-guide for those looking to understand Pakistan’s reliance on proxies against India and its attached baggage.
Link to:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/023...SIN=0231701527
LeT and the Pakistani State
The current issue of the "Survival" magazine contains an article from Georgetown professor and AfPak expert C. Christine Fair. Therein she tries to revise the widely accepted opinion that Pakistan relies on terrorist groups like LeT to solve its external security needs especially vis-a-vis India. For Fair this view "overlooks the domestic significance of militant groups. In fact, LeT plays an important role within Pakistan, countering other militants that have begun attacking the state and citizens alike, especially since 2002."
This means that solving the Indian-Pakistani rivalry is only one part of the solution and will not motivate Pakistan to cut its ties to these radical groups.
C. Christine Fair, Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani state, Survival 53, 4, 29-52
Stephen Tankel's book reviewed
By none other than Zenpundit, albeit in an Indian magazine, pg.26-28 on the PDF link:http://zenpundit.com/wp-content/uplo...ommunityed.pdf
His review ends:
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Storming the World Stage is a solidly researched book by Stephen Tankel that is apt to become the mandatory reference on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and a useful resource on the general subject of Pakistan’s historical resort to proxy warfare. With his examination of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tankel has made a worthy contribution to our understanding of terrorism and jihad in South Asia.
We have elsewhere discussed the Mumbai attack in 2008 and Zen comments, if not qualifies his review:
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LeT also demonstrated in Mumbai a fluid tactical excellence in its use of off-the-shelf technology, small arms and mobility to reap an enormous return-on-investment by attacking soft targets, much along the asymmetric lines advocated by warfare theorist John Robb. Tactics that are a critical threat to any open society by forcing it to take preventive measures which are ruinously expensive and contraindicated to keeping society free and democratic. This is another topic that might have received greater analytical exploration.
'Storming the stage' or an 'Entry, exit' move: LeT
It took time to fully read Dr. Stephen Tankel's book and here is my review.
'Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba' by Dr. Stephen Tankel is a superb piece of scholarship, notably in the access gained to insiders, observers and members of the group (commonly referred to as LeT).
Yes it contains some puzzles, many of which pre-date the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and he answers nearly all in detail.
The relationship between LeT, ISI, and the Pakistani Army is made stark, which will reinforce much of the despair many in the Western governments feel about dealings with those institutions. What I think is more important is the description and evaluation of how LeT, as a civil and religious organisation has grown to a point where the Pakistani civil state cannot confront them.
We know that militant and extremist groups fractionate by their very nature, what Dr. Tankel repeatedly observes is that LeT whilst disciplined it is also un-disciplined. Key members, often acting as cadres or direct action / paramilitary advisers leave and pursue their own objectives for the ‘cause’ often returning to the group. Given the reported skills of LeT this aspect should not be overlooked and one issue is how much attention should be given to the international movement of possible members, many of whom will be “clean skins” and have Western passports?
The ‘exit, entry’ aspect begs a simple question, are LeT a new version of Conan Doyle’s ‘White Company’, skilled mercenaries who will fight (or today facilitate) well for any part of the ‘cause’. With their trans-national network it is surprising we’ve seen LeT on the world stage so little; reflecting in plots in Australia and Denmark notably.
Given that LeT’s origins lie in Kashmir and the now intermittent violence in the Indian-ruled part, in which LeT can play a role I am surprised that Dr. Tankel does not consider the contemporary support for this primarily nationalist cause beyond Pakistan. In the UK there are those who argue the Kashmiri cause resonates far less today and is reflected in the lack of any type of support for LeT. The callous shootings in Mumbai, notably at the main railway terminus, which included Muslims, undermined their legitimacy – ‘Not in my name’ comes to mind and something I've heard here in the UK amongst South Asian Muslims.
Making an assessment of LeT who entered ‘the stage’ in 2008 is made harder by the simple fact that it appears to have exited the stage since then. Was the response so negative after the media spotlight shifted, perhaps the attack a ‘one off’ and are LeT just a capable reserve option for it’s Pakistani partners?
History will be the judge of this actor, Dr. Tankel thank you; now the audience can know them better and so judge them far better.
Bounty on "information leading to arrest"..
The US government has made an interesting announcement: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...TL&type=health
Since Hafiz Saeed lives openly in Pakistan, addresses huge public meetings, and has appeared on live TV several times since this "bounty" was announced, its not clear what the point of the bounty is.
Is this a bargaining chip? to be shelved if Pakistan cooperates with a face-saving exit from Afghanistan?
Is it to buy Indian cooperation against Iran?
Is it a colossal bureaucratic SNAFU?
Or is it real? and what does it mean if it is real? What if Pakistan doesnt arrest him or just asks him to pipe down for a few weeks (as has been done in the past) under "house arrest"?
Inquiring minds want to know..
LeT Recruits From Pakistan’s ‘Best and Brightest’
An in depth CTC research paper 'The Fighters of Lashkar‐e‐Taiba: Recruitment,
Training, Deployment and Death', published yesterday; hat tip to Circling the Lion for a reminder.
The Executive Summary opens with:
Quote:
This paper is a study of over 900 biographies of the deceased militants of Lashkar‐e‐Taiba (LeT), a Pakistani militant group that has waged a campaign of asymmetric warfare against Indian security forces and civilians in the contested region of Kashmir for over two decades, as well as other parts of India more recently. (Later it explains)Specific emphasis is placed on providing insights into the following four research questions:
1) What is the general background of LeT’s localfighters?
2) How and from where are these fighters recruited?
3) What level of training do these fighters have and where were they trained?
4) Where exactly do LeT’s fighters die?
There is a lot of data to absorb in the sixty pages.
From the conclusion:
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This research contributes to the evolving body of literature that suggests that poverty, limited education and time spent at a madrassa are poor predictors for determining either support for terrorism or participation in terrorism in Pakistan.
Which appeared on this SWC thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16304
Link:http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/u...-LeT_Final.pdf
For other comments on the research see: and http://www.propublica.org/article/te...-and-brightest
What strikes me is that based on 917 LeT combatants killed between 1989-2008, based on their published biographies, and the speculation that LeT has trained far more, from the low tens of thousands to two hundred thousand, that is a remarkably low loss rate. Which once again, IIRC as Stephen Tankel concluded in his book, LeT is not about fighting, but the political struggle within Pakistan - leaving aside its long suspected role as a resource for Pakistan's not so covert conflict with India and maybe others.
See a parallel thread on militants giving up:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15691
The 'Rambo factor' in recruiting terrorists
For Ajmal Amir Kasab, the LeT recruit who killed - with another - fifty-eight commuters @ Mumbai train station, his actions were:
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It [jihad] is about killing and getting killed and becoming famous.
I recommend you read this superb long article, using Kasab's own testimony, as the only gunman captured alive after the Mumbai massacre in 2008:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...a-monster.html
Quote:
Dr Christine Fair, a terrorism expert from Georgetown University in Washington, DC, who has studied the recruitment of young men into terrorist organisations, describes the appeal of LeT to young Pakistani potential recruits as its having the 'Rambo factor – even more of the “wow” factor than al-Qaeda’.
Personally I think CT professionals, let alone the public and others undervalue the non-Jihad aspects of the recruiting process. I recall Germans were recruited for an IMU camp in the FATA for "a summer vacation with guns".
There are threads on the 'Mumbai Attacks and their impact' at:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6345
Pakistan and militants: collaboration, benign neglect, belligerence plus
Hat tip to WoTR for the superb SME Stephen Tankel's article 'Pakistani Militants and the State: friends, foes and frenemies'. A topic that is in several threads.
The donor journal's Abstract:
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States commonly take one of three approaches to militant groups on their soil: collaboration; benign neglect; or belligerence. All three approaches are present in Pakistan, where some groups also move back and forth among these categories. I employ the term “coopetition” to capture this fluidity. The dynamic nature of militancy in Pakistan makes the country an excellent laboratory for exploring a state’s assessment of the utility an Islamist militant group offers, and the threat it poses relative to other threats informs the state’s treatment of that group. In this article, I put forward a typology that situates Islamist militants in Pakistan in one of the above four categories. I also illustrate how a group’s identity, objectives, and alliances inform assessments of its utility and threat relative to other threats. In addition to enhancing our understanding of militant–state dynamics, this taxonomy builds on and helps to unify earlier typologies of Pakistani militancy.
Link:http://warontherocks.com/2016/07/pak...and-frenemies/
Given his work on LeT I'd missed this in his book, but it sums up the relationship complex well:
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In terms of collaboration, LeT remains Pakistan’s most reliable state-allied organization. The group is not only the military’s most useful proxy against India, but has also has
carried out a propaganda campaign against al-Qaeda and the TTP, demonizing them for attacks in Pakistan. The Pakistani security services used LeT to gather intelligence on anti-state militants and, at times, to neutralize them. LeT has
provided similar services against separatists in Balochistan.
There is a thread on LeT:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13337
Saudi DNA tests confirm 2016 Jeddah bomber was Indian
An Indian newspaper reports:
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Saudi Arabia has confirmed on the basis of DNA tests that the (suicide) bomber who blew himself up outside the US Consulate in the western Saudi coastal city of Jeddah two years (July 2016) ago in a foiled suicide attack was Fayaz Kagzi, an Indian national and alleged operative of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, a senior security official told The Indian Express.
Link:http://indianexpress.com/article/ind...toiba-5157858/
Note the bomber was aligned to LET and then ISIS; where was he most of the time? Saudi Arabia. With bombings in India linked to him in 2010 and 2012, plus a suspect for training the Mumbai attackers in 2008.
The Evolution of Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Tayyiba Terrorist Group
This FPRI paper was published in Orbis, in November 2018, by Tricia Bacon is an assistant professor at American University's School of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C,, but was only spotted today.
The Abstract:
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Ten years ago, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba launched an attack that paralyzed the Indian megacityof Mumbai for days. The operation, occurring in the midst of major instability and violence in Pakistan, raised concerns that Lashkar—the Pakistani military’s most powerful proxy—had gone rogue and would now operate as an unrestrained global jihadist organization. However, it subsequently became clear that the operation in Mumbai was actually a product of Lashkar’s long-standing ties with the Pakistani military. The past ten years have further solidified their close relationship. Far from going rogue, the group has remained responsive to the Pakistani security establishment’s agenda in India, Afghanistan, and at home. The past decade has only reduced the policy options available to counter the group, while the constant danger looms that it will conduct an attack that precipitates a war between India and Pakistan—two nuclear powers.
Link:https://www.sciencedirect.com/scienc...98X?via%3Dihub and also available as a PDF:https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/s...62711792A1E73A
Former US businessman to face murder charges over Mumbai terror attacks
India may finally get a Mumbai suspect:
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A former Chicago businessman imprisoned for aiding terrorist groups has been arrested in Los Angeles to face murder charges in India for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that killed more than 160 people, US prosecutors said on Friday. Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-born Canadian, has been charged in India with conspiring to plot and carry out the deadly attacks that are sometimes referred to as India's 9/11.
Link:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/202...e_AvgHtC7VdZz5
