Grunts and Jarheads: Rethinking the Army-Marine Division of Labor
Grunts and Jarheads: Rethinking the Army-Marine Division of Labor by Council member Dr. Steven Metz. US Army Strategic Studies Institute Op-Ed.
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Debate rages today about the future of America’s ground forces. Gone are the days when serious strategists could suggest that that utility of landpower was receding. Now no one questions its importance. But there is disagreement on the type and number of ground forces that the nation needs.
Among the most contentious points are the size of the force (by how much should the Army and Marines be enlarged?), specialized formations for irregular warfare and stabilization operations, and the role of the reserve components. All of these are vitally important. There is, though, another issue which receives less attention: the relationship between the Army and the Marine Corps—the two primary components of America’s ground forces. Does the United States need two ground forces with virtually similar capabilities? I once heard a perplexed foreign officer say, “I’ll never understand your military—not only does your navy have an army, but your navy’s army has an air force!” Is there a strategic reason for this beyond simple tradition? If not, what should the division of labor within the ground forces be? These are not new questions but are ones that should be asked anew, given the evolving national security environment...
Is there a role for a Marine Corps in the world now?
Dr. Metz brings up the cloying issue that haunts the halls of large five sided structures not that any would be willing to change things, but what if. I’ll be the first to say that force size and structure aren’t my areas of expertise but that’s never stopped me before.
Why do we have services at all rather than a national defense force? Why are there four national academies (Army, Navy, Air force, and Merchant Marine)? Dr. Metz puts this into the perspective of a budgetary exercise that offers up a few options regarding the geographic or mission objectives of each force but I think there is more.
I know it’s slightly pedantic but lets generalize heavily for a moment and then I’ll get to one almost original thought. The Navy is about the ocean above and below it and flies airplanes off and onto portable airfields called carriers. The Army owns the brunt of land-based warfare. The Air Force owns the atmosphere. The Marine Corps is special operations. Amphibious assault, small wars, counter-insurgency, police operations, protecting the mail, and securing embassies is what the Marine Corps does. Of course we find every other force stepping up and saying “me too”. Special forces, or special operations commands are stood up in each service to fill that role, and everybody agrees to disagree or vehemently argues the point.
You can have quick, cheap, quality pick any two
So what do we know? We set up the military during the cold war to fight a continental theater wide war against another super-power that didn’t occur theater wide but happened as hot spots, only to “transform” that large scale military force into a smaller highly flexible entity that has issues meeting the large scale military force issues in the current conflict, and only to look at the looming baby boomer draw down because grandpa will need his Viagra. I would argue that we need to look generations ahead and see where the next battles are likely to occur or might occur for how we should structure the services. If an aging populace and a hefty current debt are going to affect us let’s plan for the future well ahead and determine the areas of conflict. You can’t know the unknown so let’s build sustainable and flexible without sacrificing capable.
If catastrophic climate change is real and world wide flooding and coastal erosion decimate the world’s ports and cities a Marine Corps will be vital for fighting in that role or amphibious operations. A Navy capable of shallow water operations will be vital. If climate change causes substantial refugee populations necessitating strategic food or energy a flexible and deployable Army will be more important than Armor and close air support.
“The Cadillac Desert (1986/1996)” details the issues of fresh water and impending shortages in the Western United States. The Great Lakes represent one of the largest concentrations of drinking water in the world. Domestic and foreign enemies may find this a tempting target as water rights and issues of reclamation become larger. Take the range wars (water wars) of the American west and realistic or not globalize them. What kind of force structure do you need to protect vital resources like a lake?
Terrain is changing. Two thirds of the planet is covered by water (a point the Navy emphasizes often). There is a resource rich ocean floor that is currently mined and drilled for oil and other high value resources. Aquaculture has taken on a new emphasis as the ocean fisheries have given up to farmed resources that fill the gap. These become points of contention as they move away from the shore into international waters. With corn and other bio-fuel commodities exploding in cost it won’t be long until “vital interest” includes primary suppliers who no longer are national or the concept of national changes. What would infantry operations under water look like? Fanciful? Ask a SEAL.
Finally the atmosphere envelope is the purview of the Air Force. I’ve personally worked with SPACE COMMAND so I know the Air Force claims outside the atmosphere too. The fact remains that so does the Navy. As a Navy commander reminded me they’re called space ships. The treaty and pacts of space put a damper on military operations beyond satellite right up until somebody forgets about those niggling little details like diplomacy by treaty. What will this new terrain look like? Every body including civilians are getting into the space business. A decade or three from now what will we see? If you think about Burt Rutan Ansari X-prize winner as analogous to Orville and Wilbur Wright in about forty years manned space planes will be the owners of the combat high ground and satellites and such the observation balloons of a by-gone era.
All of this fanciful discussion and wild flippancy isn’t about the probable. I can’t prognosticate any better than others. What (and here’s the first almost original thought) I’m suggesting it as follows. Systems that are strong and capable have several common themes. They are made of components that are highly redundant. No component has a single use and multiple uses are good. The components may be specialized in their mission but their capability is generalized. Components in highly successful systems should be competitive in the sense that they provide naturally occurring evolution to the system. No one component should make the system fail. The components should integrate seamlessly without increasing complexity. Diversity in supplier and customer strengthens the overall system. Finally, highly successful systems are oiled by success and inter process communication.
Do you really want to trust your safety to the lowest bidder?
Should a draw down occur and I’ll be the first to admit that I expect one. So, when the draw down does occur, the reservists go home, the veterans of OIF sip spirits at the Marine Corps Ball there will be the primary services. Not because they are the most cost effective. A military is not about being cost effective. There will be the primary services because they make each other stronger and create a more flexible military platform in their entirety for response to new challenges.
Yet another jarhead weighing in
What Dr. Metz doesn't address is the core competency of forcible entry from the sea, something not currently duplicated and inherent to our role within the Department of the Navy. Certainly, after entry we have served as a second ground Army. But we offer a very esoteric skillset that, as an interventionist naval power, we cannot afford to lose. That is our raison d'etre, though Dr. Metz has a point in that some more thought needs to be given to our role post-entry.
I have wondered, however, about reconciling the protracted nature of CoIN with the relatively short-term operations that our MAGTF's are structured for.
Let me kick off the debate.
Here's how I see it. :D
Note: These two assumptions arbased on what follows.
- The Army needs to get bigger.
- The Marine Corp should stay the same size or (don't get angry) perhaps should be smaller and have a even higher level and standard of training. The Marine Corp's size, like special forces, has a dwindling relationship to the population. Yes, during major conflicts the Marine Corp was able to grow significantly while maintaining relatively high standards, but this was partially due to so many men enlisting to avoid being drafted into the Army (I've met a lot of people who enlisted in the Marines for this reason in Korea, WWII and even Vietnam.)
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But in my eyes it's impossible. Can any of you imagine a major conflict breaking out, and the national command authorities specifying that the Marine Corps will wage the conflict because it's a counterinsurgency or because it's in Nicaragua and the Army as an institution accepting it? Absolutely not. There would be an immediate and self-righteous fury within the Army and probably a stampeding rush by senior brass to send as many assets as possible to the theater.
Likewise, a sudden conventional conflict against North Korea would not be limited to a few Army heavy divisions. The Marine Corps would storm ashore anywhere on the Korean peninsula in order to get into the fight.
As much as I get what you are saying this argument just doesn't hold up. Even if the services are divided by specialties almost every conflict, with the exception of the smallest of small wars, will require a broad are of specialties. Yes, the proportions of Army/Marines will be determined by this but no matter the conflict they will need each other. This is assuming the specialty breakdown is reasonable.
Before I go any further I have to adress the AF. The AF needs F22 (but don't dare call the F/A) to maintain air supremacy. Despite their low numbers they will be necessary to take on our enemies equivelant fighters. The only problem with them is how few there are. If for some reason we ever had to take on, for example, China we might run into the situation where they are so badly outnumbered that their technological superiority means nothing. Also, with the price to maintain these marevels I don't know if our fighter pilots will get enough time to practice dogfights (the f22 only carries 8 missiles.) On the other hand the AF desperately needs to decide what they are going to do about bombers. Although the B52's are probably good for another 40+ years, we need to figure this out. Although they may not have the image the AF is going for these days they are more economical the fighter-bombers. They also will be needed if we really get into a big one.
Marine Corp:
- Amphibious Operations
- Securing Littoral Regions
- Expeditionary Warfare (the Marines should be our high mobility/quick reactions force)
- COIN (Overlapping duty with sections of the Army. Too many of our small wars are too big.)
- Non-Combatant Evacutions (Again this area should be overlapped based on the size of the evacuation and location. Anything neer the ocean is a given.
- The Marines should be used as shock troops to break through, or leapforg over, enemy lines due to the expeditionary capabilites lending themselves to this capability.
- Humanitarian Operations and Peackeeping (again the expeditionary capabilities lend themselves to this)(there will be more overlap here.
Army:
- Everything else and the areas I outlined for overlap. For the Army the issue is more that they ned to understand their job is to have the staying power in smaller operations. Again, most small wars today are too large for just the Marine Corp.
Annother area that has to be dealt with for all services is special operations. The Marine Corp should have special operations units. What we should be trying to avoid is what appears to be happening today. SOCOM looks as though it is trying to (whether by its own opinion or our former secretary of defense) turn all of the services special operations units into the same thing. Again, they should be able to handle each others jobs, but they should stick to and be utilized according to their specialties when possible. This is almost the same situation as whats happening between the Army and Marine Corp.
There you have it. Its an outsiders point of view.
Now that I've said all of that please tell me whats wrong with it. :D
So I can fix it. LOL :D
Adam
Service Missions and Nat'l Defense Strategy
I think Stan and RTK have defended the Army's honor well. The discussion should probably avoid arguments over internal standards for recruitment and retention. I think it should target that which went unsaid in the intiating article. In the summary of the article no suggestion was given for a means to rectify the issue of redundancy in the face of force reduction. This is not a new argument.
Marines of all ranks have to read Victor Krulak's First to Fight it is required. In it particularly chptr 8 -You can't get there from here: the Inchon story-you see a similiar discussion and the way the Corps fought through. Krulak quotes then SECDEF Louis Johnson (28 March 1949): "Admiral , the Navy is on its way out. There's no reason for having a Navy and a Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything that the Navy can do, so that does away with the Navy." Then on 15 Sept 1950 the Marines land at Inchon with Navy Surface and air support.
That said it is a common refrain within the Corps to say: the nation does not need a Marine Corps, it WANTS a Marine Corps.
With that out of the way, the discussion returns to what are the roles and missions of the 4 services? Which ones over lap and which ones can be consolidated in one service for economy sake.
For example: Expeditionary Operations, the Marines and Navy tend to have the lead here, @70% of the world is accesible via the litorals, yet almost all op plans for amphibious operations/forcible entry call for integration with the airfield seizure capability of the 82nd Airborne and other like units. Further without AF refuelers airpower for these ops would take a hit. Once in country, most Marines (from my experience) would prefer to let the Army continue the heavy lifting, we can look to the sheer number of armored vehicles and tanks for emperical evidence, the Corps has just 2 battalions of active duty tankers.
There is a need for better interoperability and there is a need for a division of labor. The downside is that as budgets shrink the acrimony between services grows. No one can tell precisely what the future of warfare is going to be. There are many who claim they do but it is an art not a science.
The current U.S. nat'l stragtegy as laid out by the President is to maintain Military Superiority in all aspects of warfighting over any of our national rivals. Of course current fight problems with COIN and transnational nonstate threats have clouded this recently. All actions by the services have to be guided by the National Defense Strategy, and the National Defense Budget is the battlefield. The problem arises with the upcoming election and the uncertainty as to what comes after Iraq. Force reductions? Huge budget cuts? That would be the traditional post conflict scenario. The great line by Robert Duvall in Apocalyps Now "some day this war is gonna end..." and he looks sad when he says it. Perhaps he senses the upcoming budget and mission battles.
Selil has it right. The current system * has built
in competition for resources and roles that are not cost efficient but are effective. Unification and centralization are money savers but that's not what it's all about. Effectiveness should be the guiding principle and while that inter service competition causes slight degradation of effectiveness in some circumstances, it does far more to enhance it overall.
Stan's also right on the need to dump the lowest bidder routine, DoD has enough buying power to insist on buying design rights and then competing production on items and systems it owns. We buy a lot of good stuff and we buy a lot of not so good stuff -- and we can, of course, over-engineer anything...
We will have fewer people because the quality needed and wanted has a cost and that's okay IMO. We do better now than we did but we still waste a lot of spaces in esoteric jobs in all the services. Most of our headquarters could be significantly cut thus forcing the system to put effort and functions at the proper level and curtailing the micromanagement habits built up post Viet Nam.
* I 'm not a USSOCOM fan in many respects but their procurement system is miles ahead of anyone else's...
