The problem of intervention/occupation and resistance
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Originally Posted by
Backwards Observer
In your opinion, is there any activity, short of withdrawal, that the occupation forces can engage in that would have a positive effect?
When we were a couple weeks into the Marjah campaign things we're starting to look a bit better, but the populace was very reluctant to embrace the Coalition. The first week was hell, with everyone literally stuck in the mud within small perimeters barely extending beyond the original LZs. All roadways were heavily planted with IEDs and the muddy poppy fields were a mess and covered by fire from Taliban forted up with innocent civilians in their compounds. Fortunately they changed tactics after a week or so, and stopped challenging the Marines, ANA and SF directly and engagements became more sporadic, with IEDs remaining a major challenge.
During this period, MG Carter was engaging with commanders and staff about the need to gain the support of the populace of Marjah. The populace, quite reasonably, was concerned that the government would ultimately leave again someday, and that the Taliban would return and punish those who had collaborated. During that talk he made made the comment that "we need to assure the people of Marjah that we will not leave them." To which, my reply was "Actually sir, we need to assure them that GIROA won't leave them, and that we won't stay, and that is a far more difficult thing."
Overcoming the presumptions of illegitimacy of a government placed in power and then protected by a foreign army is virtually impossible. Understanding the criticality of doing so and the natural occurrence of resistance when one does not succeed is the first step.
Shortly thereafter we delivered the, now notorious, "government in a box" to the people of Marjah. Under the current constitution Karzai simply created a new District and named a new governor, and the USMC then delivered that governor via USMC military aircraft and guarded by USMC personnel. A Dari speaking German none of them had ever heard of before, picked by a President they did not select, and delivered and guarded by a foreign military power.
I give us an "F-minus" for "Effectively reinforced perceptions of local legitimacy" on that one.
And the Resistance insurgency continues to grow.
Humpty Dumpty's not just a nursery rhyme
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I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.
What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.
Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?
Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.
I would point out that "break and leave" is how WWI morphed into WWII, and how post-Soviet Afghanistan morphed into the Taliban, to give a couple of examples of the problems that arise out of abandoned broken societies. As for the notion that it used to be acceptable to muck things off and then do an exit stage left, I would argue that it did not work historically that you could simply go in and break an entire society and walk away. There was usually some hell to pay. On the other hand, once Rome fell, for the centuries until the French Revolution, war was a much more limited affair, so blame Napoleon, not the Brits.
Powell was exactly trying to keep people from thinking that breaking was all you had to do, and trying to make people realize that once broken the thing is very hard to put back together.
The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?
Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea.
Jill
I go out of town for a few days and you go on a rampage (minor variant)...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government.
Most are, some are other things couched as such a political challenge. We've written claim and counterclaim on that before so no rehas here, just a note to remind you that many aside from me, here and elsewhere, do not agree with that quite positive statement of yours. *
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The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."
Base canard, there ;) . I and many others in the war is war crowd do not agree at all with that statement. Many have complained about the fact that the attitude you cite does exist but point out that existence is due more to political misuse and desire of the armed forces to comply with the wishes of their civilian taskmasters -- once again, you lambaste the pore ol' GPF wrongly. SF hasn't covered themselves with glory in these latest wars (also due to 'political' misuse and not totally their fault -- though not so much by politicians as by service / congressional / budget / turf politics...).
As usual, after a couple of hyperbolic statements, you get real:
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But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.
True and that applies not only to insurgencies but to many forms of domestic unrest.
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I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.
Again true -- also not amenable in many cases to any military solution...
As any aside, anyone who praises Lyndon Johnson to me is highly suspect of misplacing priorities. I met the man, talked to him, served under him and participated in his funeral. I am not a fan and his passage of what was effectively Kennedy's Civil rights Bill was a piece of crass political opportunism and party politics covered in glowing rhetoric. Give the Devil his due, he did get the Bill passed -- but give him full due; his errors and and blatantly foolish foreign affairs dabbling and terribly flawed Viet Nam engagement created ill effects world wide -- some of that 'American arrogance' and support of Dictators you often decry -- that permeate the world, this country and the Armed Forces to this day. Not favorably, either. :mad:
That's shorthand for "I disagree with your frequent characterization of Johnson as COIN warrior." Fixing a governmental problem long overdue for repair is not always counter insurgency... :rolleyes:
* I'll also point to Backward Observer's quote of Chairman Mao (LINK) -- and the issue of ideology versus spontaneity which Bill Moore and I frequently see you ignore... :wry:
As jcustis wrote:
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Having said this...in the Afghan context, I think you are right on the money Dayuhan that inconsistent policy goals lead to terrible strategy and tactics. One of our greatest problems in doing anything consistent is the simple fact that we and GIRoA are not "same-same" in deciding the way ahead. When we are adrift at the national level, it's no wonder that at the district and provincial level, things tend to fair only slightly better. It's also no wonder that higher-level policy matters aren't easily translated down to the tactical level (where folks tend to forget that strategic compression can have the greatest positive or adverse affect).
That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).
Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...
Sargent is on the right track(Good post, Jill):
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The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?
Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea. (emphasis added / kw)
Indeed. Iraq occurred because the toolbag had been purposely limited in what it could do in order to constrain the Politicians.
The Politicans didn't play fair and used the only tool seemingly available. We should avoid that in the future. Diplomatic solutions preferred, military involvement only as a last resort, then not in the costly and unsustainable FID / COIN mode but as Strategic raids. Short term, ability to avoid major breakage, economical, adaptable easily to the US political milieu...