The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)

Restraint as a Successful Strategy in the 1999 Kargil Conflict
by Colonel Devendra Pratap Pandey, Indian Army, Small Wars Journal

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In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of the Pakistan Army, orchestrated a major intrusion into an unoccupied but strategically sensitive complex of Kargil along the northern border of India. The Kargil intrusion was an operation of strategic importance conducted by Pakistan to provide a much required momentum to its weakening proxy war in the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a state of India. Pakistan had waged an irregular war, in J&K, for a decade, exploiting religious similarities to incite secessionist activities, by actively supporting, financing, and training insurgents, while exporting foreign radicals and so called jihadist elements across the borders. This latest aggression across the border by the Pakistan Army was another attempt to redeem its prestige after the defeats of 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. The 1998-99 act of intrusion was of even greater significance because it was enacted during a political peace process when the then Indian Prime Minister was visiting Pakistan on invitation. The surprise intrusion, along a stretch of the border that had historically remained peaceful due to the terrain difficulties, was a spark in an already charged regional tinderbox...

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The Pakistan Army has always been psyched to believe that “one Pakistani is equal to ten Indians”.

This has been repeatedly debunked in all the wars fought between India and Pakistan.

While the outcome of wars is debatable, 1971 and 1965’s Battle of Assal Uttar (the physical graveyard of Patton tanks which were superior to anything India had) gave Pakistan no leeway to cover up their inadequacy at combat unlike the fact wherein Pakistan’s Operation Grand Slam is not discussed in history, military or otherwise or for that matter, any other debacle, not even the 1971 fiasco of their own making (except in general vague and defensive terms)!!

That apart, Musharraf has a chip on his shoulder. He is a Mohajir and hence non martial as per the British classification. And yet he was the COAS. In addition, he pipped Khatak (a blue blooded Pathan and a martial race man) to the post of COAS. He also had a personal grievance to settle. Gen. Zia chose Gen. Musharraf (then a Brigadier) in 1987 to command a newly-raised Special Services Group (SSG) base at Khapalu in the Siachen area. To please Gen. Zia, Gen. Musharraf with his SSG commandos launched an attack on an Indian post at Bilfond La in September, 1987, and was beaten back.

Therefore, Kargil.

Mujahideens were not used as a front. They were used as porters. The whole campaign of Pakistan was excellent so long as it was confined to the sand model discussions (sand table). As is wont with all Generals, the logistic aspect was given short shrift. That is where the Waterloo manifested. No re-supply, NO victory! No medevac, low morale! The diary of a Pakistani officer indicated that Allah alone was the panacea! That does not work in real life!

More later since I was there!

The 1971 War was a watershed. Unlike before, where the troops returned to status quo ante after the war, the Simla Agreement stated that the Line of Control would be as is where the troops finally were. Thus the Suchetgarh Agreement redrew the Cease Fire Line to the present Line of Control. It meant de facto that what was captured in Jammu and Kashmir, belonged to the captor!

The terrorism unleashed by Pakistan assisted terrorists, mostly foreign terrorists, for nearly two decades were spluttering. The pipedream of wresting Kashmir which was an impossibility, given the terrain and the military capability was about to be snuffed out since there appeared to be a serious move towards a peace standstill between the governments led by Vajpayee and Sharif. It was the last chance to grab as much territory before it happened and it would give the necessary fillip to the Moslem pride of having had a victory in the end, washing away the previous ignominy!

Ideal to the plot of a final victory was the sparsely guarded area of Kargil, where an independent brigade with elements of the Border Security Forces guarded the rugged, knife edged High Altitude and glaciated frontier from West of Dras to East of Turtuk . The troops were inadequate if it were to have been in the classical LC deployment but the appreciation pre Kargil indicated that it would be sufficient to guard the avenues of approach, whereby large gaps and unheld heights were commonplace.

Given the density of deployment elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir, Kargil appeared to be ideal for the picking. And so the plot was cast.

However, while on a sand model (sand table) it was an easy operation, logistically it was and proved to be a nightmare. Infiltrating and holding unheld heights was not difficult, but the Pakistani Army blundered on the logistics essential to sustain isolated post well within the Indian territory with hostile adversaries on the flanks and rear, in addition to the problem of moving porter and animal will logistics over knife edged, deep snow covered and rugged footpaths, there being no roads or transport capable tracks. Courage and Allah (as the diary of an officer indicated was the motivation) alone cannot overrule military necessities of food and ammunition replenishment and casualty evacuation and reinforcement. And it was impossible to move by day and some posts created deep was beyond a one night march, given the terrain and climatic conditions!

Thus, failure was axiomatic!

Pakistan has always used the Indian card to divert attention from internal problems. However, it is foggy as to whether Nawaz Sharif had categorically given the green signal or was it a sleight of hand of the Pakistani Army that embarked on this foolhardy and highly flawed military operation. What is the truth will never be in the public domain unless Pakistan has a Commission to probe the debacle. Even then, it might be a whitewash as the Justice Hamdoor Rehman Commission probing the 1971 Bangladesh rout!!

While it was a diplomatic coup for India not to escalate the conflict, it is moot point if India could have confined the area of conflict to J&K if the conflict changed from push to a shove! There can be no doubt that Pakistan would open all the fronts so as to ensure that the Indian forces are dispersed and not concentrated anywhere.

The Indian public indeed wanted Pakistan to be put in its place. However, none wanted the conflict to escalate into a full blown war. The involvement of the Indian public with the Indian war machine was for the first time intimate since the private TV channels and newspapers vied with each other to be first with the news and reporting from the frontline itself! One TV anchor was so enthusiastic that the anchor gave away the game even before it was executed! Of course, the anchor was no Pakistani agent, merely a starry eyed teenager having a grandstand view!! The Army HQ baulked and for a short while all reporters were expelled to only return since it did mobilise the public support!

In so far as Indian politicians were concerned, they were back to the usual game of doing each other down with no a shred of nationalism to care for! Natwar Singh of the opposition Congress Party was at his shrill best and was dithering and frothing at his mouth like a raving lunatic!

In so far as the contention that India could have embarked on a full scale war, the defence purchases during the conflict is an indicator of the feasibility of a win win situation.

In so far as the Air Force is concerned, they had never operated in a combat profile in the High Altitude and thus there were many limitations to their success in the High Altitude. It was a repeat of using Bofors in Siachen till the new Range Tables were formulated. Even PGMs had their limitations.

Notwithstanding what is written by various commentators and notwithstanding the debate whether it would be a better option to cross the Line of Control and take the war into Pakistan held Kashmir, the maturity shown by the then Indian government was an example of statesmanship and in the overall context, India did appear to be a responsible nation that could assert its will without endangering world peace!

Correction to the above, the independent brigade was covering an area West of Dras to West of Turtuk or what has now known as Sub Sector Hanif.

Typographical error.

Thanks to a lurker's pointer to this Carnegie research paper on an intriguing issue in a delicate setting:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf

From the preface:

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The role of airpower, however, was tinged with controversy from the very beginning. Both during and immediately after the conflict, it was not clear whether the Indian Air Force (IAF) leadership of the time advocated the commitment of Indian airpower and under what conditions, how the IAF actually performed at the operational level and with what effects, and whether the employment of airpower was satisfactorily coordinated with the Indian Army at either the strategic or the tactical levels of war. Whether airpower proved to be the decisive linchpin that hastened the successful conclusion of the conflict was also uncertain—but all these questions provided grist for considerable disputation in the aftermath of the war.

What the Kargil conflict demonstrated, however, was that airpower was relevant and could be potentially very effective even in the utterly demanding context of mountain warfare at high altitudes.

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There is an earlier short thread on Kargil, although the word appears on twenty threads:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5576

Airpower in Kargil was not really a coordinated effort as one would want.

There was much to be desired as far as a coordinated effort is concerned.

The IAF, in any case, was not trained for combat in support of High Altitude land operations.

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Kargil conflict was a “poor test” of India's air warfare capability, a prominent US think-tank has said, warning that with threats of future wars with Pakistan and China persisting, Indian defence establishment has to prepare accordingly.

“Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, the IAF's fighter pilots were restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they had more room for maneuver,” said the think-tank in a report released on Thursday.

The Kargil war, in which India emerged victorious over Pakistan, the 70-page report titles 'Airpower At 18,000: the Indian Air Force in the Kargil War' further brought to light the initial near-total lack of transparency and open communication between Indian Army's top leaders and the IAF.

The report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said the covert Pakistani intrusion into Jammu and Kashmir had exposed a gaping hole in India's nationwide real-time intelligence.

“On a strategic level, the Kargil War vividly demonstrated that a stable bilateral nuclear deterrence relationship can markedly inhibit such regional conflicts in intensity and scale -- if not preclude them altogether,” it said.

“In the absence of the nuclear stabilizing factor, those flash points could erupt into open-ended conventional showdowns for the highest stakes. But the Kargil War also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is not a panacea,” the report said.

It said the possibility of future conventional wars of major consequence along India's borders with Pakistan and China persists, and the Indian defence establishment must plan and prepare accordingly.

According to the report, Pakistan's military leaders miscalculated badly in their apparent belief that the international community would press immediately for a cease-fire in Kashmir out of concern over a possible escalation of the fighting to the nuclear level, with the net result that Pakistan would be left with an easily acquired new slice of the terrain on the Indian side of the LoC.

Carnegie said the nuclear balance between the two countries did not deter a determined Indian conventional response, and the successful reaction that India ultimately mounted on the Kargil heights fell well short of being all out in scale.

“Furthermore, since the Vajpayee government scrupulously kept its combat operations confined to Indian-controlled Kashmir, the international community had no compelling reason to intervene,” it said.

As a result, a remote but high-intensity and high-stakes showdown was allowed to run on for more than two months, something the Pakistan Army's leaders all but certainly did not anticipate when they first conjured up their incursion plan.

The Kargil experience also suggested that if China and Pakistan came to appreciate that India possessed overwhelming conventional force preponderance in the region, that presence could act as a deterrent against such provocations in the future, it said.

According to the report, prudent Indian defence planners will likely find themselves shortchanged in their preparations for the full spectrum of possible challenges to their country's security in years to come if they draw undue comfort from the happy ending of the Kargil experience and accept that conflict as their only planning baseline for hedging against future contingencies along the Line of Control.

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http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ka...tank/1005858/0

Misleading : what actually won the war were the Bofors, diplomatic pressure & the Pak army chickening out...and not necessarily in that order. Despite being an infantryman myself and notwithstanding the gallant but suicidal assaults by our light infantry at 18000 feet, it was firepower, information warfare & psychological pressure which won the day. The Air force now boasts about it, have few LGB videos to show about interdiction blah blah.. but as with the old axiom : "success has many fathers while defeat is always a bastard !!"

If one can lay his hands on the book "A Ridge Too Far" by Capt Amarinder Singh, who is ex Maharaja of Patiala, one would be able to get an idea of the Kargil War.

He was there after the war and interacted with the people and the units and with us at the Div and then wrote the book.

I would take the IAF doing a great job not very seriously, though the helicopters (Army and IAF) did much service.

Attack on objectives from the air which are narrow and just a spot on the ground by flying in laterally across the mountain ridges and narrow valleys with high performance jets is not an easy matter.

The IAF was new to this type of warfare is the best way to explain.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Hi...iger-Hill1.jpg

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Hi...iger-Hill5.jpg
(courtesy Bharat Rakshak)

Pakistan Air Force role in Kargil has been well covered by PAF officers (and seems like the truth to an outside observer): http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/...air-force.html

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Originally Posted by Gurkha

...what actually won the war were the Bofors,...

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That is an interesting comment. Could you expand on it a little so I can understand better?

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Originally Posted by carl

That is an interesting comment. Could you expand on it a little so I can understand better?

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Because of the dispersion of the artillery shells as is natural, there were too many 'overs' and 'unders', missing the objective on the narrow ridgeline. Such overs and unders would also affect the attacker since it (the attack) was on mountain slopes.

The Bofors were used in Direct Firing Role to achieve pin point accuracy with devastating effect, as also conservation of ammunition - an important logistic issue given that the single lane precipitous road was under direct enemy observation.

It maybe mentioned at these High Altitude heights there is no cover. Cavalier assault were also not feasible owing the the lack of oxygen which made movement slow and laboured. Therefore, close support was an absolute necessity till as long as possible and so safety distances of Direct Firing infantry weapons were reduced. Artillery in the classical mode of firing would have a greater safety distance owing to the natural dispersion pattern of shells being fired. Direct Firing of Bofors allowed one to overcome the natural disadvantage of the dispersion of artillery shell fired in the classical manner. This allowed the infantry to close in with close support of the Artillery in direct firing mode. The Bofors being capable of greater pin point accuracy than the other guns, having a greater devastation effect of its shell and being capable of faster loading, the number of shells effectively delivered were more and relentless. This had a devastating effect on the physical integrity of the defender's post and also on the enemy's morale. At the same time, it allowed the attacker to close in onto the objective closer with this devastating close fire support and in relatively greater safety.

The credit for deviating from the standard artillery practice goes to Lakhwinder, the Commander Artillery and then Maj Gen Mohinder Puri.

LINK, not the one with which most in the US are familiar (LINK).

Bofors Haubits FH77/B Swedish 155 mm howitzer is the one used in Kargil.

HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE

THE INDIAN ARMY AND ITS ARTILLERY

Howitzers on High Ground: Considerations for Artillery Employment in Southwest Asia

An Analysis of Kargil

The first paper is especially instructive. I will comment in detail later.

I shall have to re-name this thread, 'Airpower at 18k’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War' we have moved away from air power to the "queen of the battlefield". Some good gains here too, SWC at it's best and good to see our Indian contributions too.

The new name: The Kargil War (all aspects) and will be merged with an old thread 'Restraint as a Successful Strategy in the 1999 Kargil Conflict'.

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The Indian Air Force’s (IAF) efforts, Operation Safed Sagar (White Sea),
produced mixed results. Thin air diminished weapon accuracy and hindered aircraft
performance. Adverse weather and the heightened SAM threat hampered the IAF’s
attempts at close air support (CAS). Aircraft proved unreliable in rapidly changing
weather, and a lack of pilot training for CAS in the mountains further diminished the
IAF’s ability to provide firepower in coordination with ground maneuver. The IAF
eventually adapted and enjoyed some success, primarily against fixed targets. The
introduction of laser-guided munitions (LGM) increased accuracy and contributed to the
fight on Tiger Hill. IAF pressure on NLI soldiers had a significant psychological effect.
Unconventional techniques, such as using aerial munitions to create avalanches over
trails, isolated Pakistani defensive positions and destroyed supply sites.

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From the US thesis mentioned above.

IAF's side of the story.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jSeJmlGOsbA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9B8_W...eature=related

It's true that IAF did more psychological damage than physical.

As for the artillery.

As per the official list of Pakistani soldiers who have been killed during the war period, put up on its website by the Pakistani Army, about 190 of the over 400 dead were killed because of shelling by the Indian Army.

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation...il_669140.html

The Indian artillery fired over 2,50,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/n...in-kargil-war/

The Gunners of the Indian Artillery fired their guns audaciously in the direct firing role, under the very nose of Pakistani artillery observation posts (OPs), without regard for personal safety.

http://mod.nic.in/samachar/jan15-02/html/ch3.htm

As usual it is helpful to think in a simple yet disciplined fashion trough METT-TC ( Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations) keeping in mind that the missions were framed by the primacy of politics on both sides.

The papers and Ray, blueblodd and Gurkha have described aptly the impact of the specific endowment on the various factors and the adaption to it, especially from the Indian side. For example the time and human effort, mostly by porters, needed just to prepare the infantry part of the final assault was great indeed. According to an unidentified Indian Army major:

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a single night-time operation may see as many as a thousand men moving against a single post occupied by only ten people.

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From:145, HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE

Personally I wonder how to explain the relative lack of counter-battery fire by the Pakistani forces, especially considering the excellent OPs. Was it due to masked position of the relevant Indian batteries? Was it an insufficient political will (plausible? deniability, underestimation of Indians will) to muster enough ressources to muster enough artillery and supply?

Even though deployment space was minimal being mountainous. one could attribute it to the Bofors shoot and schoot!

The positions hugged the mountains.

While the road was visible, there were places that were masked.

One could not muster all the artillery available in the IA since other sectors had to be covered and there was no guarantee whether the other fronts will get activated by the Pakistanis or by the Indians.

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Originally Posted by Firn

As usual it is helpful to think in a simple yet disciplined fashion trough METT-TC ( Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations) keeping in mind that the missions were framed by the primacy of politics on both sides.

The papers and Ray, blueblodd and Gurkha have described aptly the impact of the specific endowment on the various factors and the adaption to it, especially from the Indian side. For example the time and human effort, mostly by porters, needed just to prepare the infantry part of the final assault was great indeed. According to an unidentified Indian Army major:

From:145, HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE

Personally I wonder how to explain the relative lack of counter-battery fire by the Pakistani forces, especially considering the excellent OPs. Was it due to masked position of the relevant Indian batteries? Was it an insufficient political will (plausible? deniability, underestimation of Indians will) to muster enough ressources to muster enough artillery and supply?

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http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndt...ng-point/87144

This video though partly in Hindi should clear some of your doubts.

Some of the factors which might have contributed to the lax counter-battery fire by Pak could be

1) Lack of optimum resources i.e. 155 mm guns. PA had some 100 odd M198 guns which they kept for the plains in case war escalates.

2) Lack of aerial assets i.e. helicopters. Both PAF and PAA used light helicopters in limited numbers. Thus, had to dismantle and reassemble the 105mm guns unlike India which used Mi-8/17 to airlift the entire gun.

3) Since Indian troops didn't crossed the LOC, Pak arty couldn't have used their guns in direct fire mode.


Notwithstanding my assumptions Pak fielded significant arty formations.


Typical artillery support methods provide one artillery battalion (16 cannon) to support one brigade (approximately 4,000 troops). Due to the terrain, the artillery employed during the Kargil conflict far exceeded conventional support. Pakistan employed 18 artillery regiments, or more than 100 guns, in support of the 5,000 committed troops. To ease the limited space for the howitzers, Pakistani forces expanded firing positions by using dynamite to carve away parts of the mountain walls. Pakistani helicopters carried dismantled 105mm howitzers onto key outposts using the reverse slope of the mountains to cover their tight flight paths........

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...illery-forward

@ Brig Ray and Gurkha, which infantry units were first on the scene? I read somewhere that Kumaon, JAK LI and Laddakh Scouts took part in the earlier operations and paved way for less acclimatized units.

3 Inf Div was already deployed there. Ladhak Scouts was also there.

The first unit of 8 Mtn Div was 1 NAGA.

Later the Div built up in Dras and Matiyan.

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Originally Posted by Ray

3 Inf Div was already deployed there. Ladhak Scouts was also there.

The first unit of 8 Mtn Div was 1 NAGA.

Later the Div built up in Dras and Matiyan.

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Thanks a bunch sir. One more thing, what about the expulsion of Brig. Devinder Singh ? Was it merely a feud ?

He is my friend.

I know the Corps Cdr too.

Too much of pressure for instant victory from Delhi, as if it was so easy!

I would say it was all some misunderstanding.

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Originally Posted by Ray

He is my friend.

I know the Corps Cdr too.

Too much of pressure for instant victory from Delhi, as if it was so easy!

I would say it was all some misunderstanding.

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Both media and IAF officials accused army brass in general and Lt. Gen. Kishen Pal and Brig. Devinder Singh in specific of downplaying the extent of intrusion. Could it be that Devinder Singh was scapegoated?

@Ray and @blueblodd thanks.

This thread generated a post by me on our blog: http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/10/03/kargil-war/

@ Firn - You are welcome.:)

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Originally Posted by omarali50

This thread generated a post by me on our blog: http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/10/03/kargil-war/

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Fairly good article but I would like to contest few points.

1) Article by aeronaut. I know him from a pak forum and I were you, I will take his assessments with a pinch of salt. Instead, I will suggest you to contact Murad K, a veteran pilot of PAF used to be an active user on the Pak forums.

2) Starved and "out of ammo" Pak soldiers is as big a myth as the “great tactical success but a strategic blunder”. Up until the bombing of Muntho Dhalo by IAF on June 17th, Pakistani supply lines were intact.

Dug in for a long war, the dead and escaping intruders had left behind ghee, tinned pineapple, butter packed in a military farm, and plenty of honey. Soldiers of the ration-starved Rajputana Rifles assault team used the ghee to keep themselves warm during the night when temperatures dipped to -10 degrees centigrade. Next morning, breakfast consisted of chunks of butter dipped in honey. "We really enjoyed that," says Major Sandeep Bajaj.

http://www.kashmir-information.com/Heroes/tololing.html

Nevertheless, NLI and SSG did fought bravely against the overwhelming odds.

3) I am no soldier but AFAIK Indian army at present focuses more on regimental traditions than British traditions as it differs from regiment to regiment and IA has lots of them. On the other hand PA firmly believes in the "martial race" traditions dictated by the Brits.

But I do agree that earlier both armies had the "British mindset" i.e. to follow the most conventional tactics on the battleground but things have changed a lot in IA not sure about PA.

For eg.

http://indopakmilitaryhistory.blogsp...ravery-or.html

Major (retd.) A.H. Amin is a very harsh critic of PA and is no fan of IA but he pointed out the strategic timidity by armoured corps commanders on both sides in 1971.

The Indian Army recognise valour even of the enemy.

It commended the bravery of Captain Sher Khan for his action in the Kargil War.

The government of Pakistan awarded Captain Karnal Sher Khan with Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest gallantry award. Captain Karnal Sher Khan was posthumously awarded Pakistan's highest gallantry award, the Nishan-e-Haider, for his actions during the Kargil Conflict with India in 1999, on the recommendation of the Indian Army
http://www.defence.pk/forums/kashmir...onflict-4.html

Also

Based on a citation forwarded by Lieutenant Colonel (Later Lieutenant General) VP Airy, Commanding Officer, a GRENADIERS Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Akram Raza, Commanding Officer of 35 Frontier Force of Pakistan Army was awarded Nishan-e-Haider (Posthumously) by Pakistan.
http://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/FormTe...4bviloc24iOw==

We appreciate valour be it even displayed by our enemy.

The conduct of war is not personal hatred, but doing our duty to our Nation.

As soon as one makes issues personal, the mind gets clouded and not clear!

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The 1999 conflict between India and Pakistan near the town of Kargil in contested Kashmir was the first military clash between two nuclear-armed powers since the 1969 Sino-Soviet war. Kargil was a landmark event not because of its duration or casualties, but because it contained a very real risk of nuclear escalation. Until the Kargil conflict, academic and policy debates over nuclear deterrence and proliferation occurred largely on the theoretical level. This deep analysis of the conflict offers scholars and policymakers a rare account of how nuclear-armed states interact during military crisis. Written by analysts from India, Pakistan, and the United States, this unique book draws extensively on primary sources, including unprecedented access to Indian, Pakistani, and U.S. government officials and military officers who were actively involved in the conflict. This is the first rigorous and objective account of the causes, conduct, and consequences of the Kargil conflict.

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Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict - Peter R. LaVoy (editor).

http://www.amazon.com/Asymmetric-War.../dp/0521767210

Blueblood, I have no direct knowledge of what happened in Kargil, just going by published reports. Most of them played up the "starving soldiers" bit, so that was my impression. After your post, I have adjusted my mental picture to "some posts ran out of food and water and low on ammo, while others had abundant rations".
Does that sound reasonable?
Btw, on our blog, I just asked the question, why have India-Pakistan wars been generally low in casualties until now (hopefully we wont have another one)?
Just one of those things that happened to be the case until now ("case by case", each war unique and each with specific reasons why slaughter was less intense)? or is there some deeper explanation? (after all, the British Indian army probably lost more men in the battle of Monte Cassino than India and Pakistan did in entire "wars")
http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/10/...#comment-18821

Actually, there was still foodstuff on the Pak intruded posts when they were captured.

The casualties would depend upon the duration of campaign and the degree of difficulty.

Now let us look at your blog with 'starving chaps and low on amn'.

If that was the case, it shows utter irresponsibility of command because a battle or a campaign cannot be conducted without securing lines of communication to ensure uninterrupted logistics.

It indicates the desire for tactical grandeur without concern for the nuts and bolts of conduct.

I am not surprised since many Generals of all armies are totally centred on the tactical aspect giving short shrift to logistics!

The result is what happened to Pakistan in Kargil. Some say that it was a bold plan, but one would tend to be closer to reality - it was a case study of Himalayan blunder with misplaced bravado and military stupidity!

From an Indian POV:

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By all accounts, Wangchuk is an extraordinary soldier, a contradiction even. "We could never imagine he could even hurt a fly," recalls Pintoo Norbu, hotel owner in Leh who knows him. The son of a paramilitary soldier, Wangchuk is a deeply religious Buddhist -- before going to battle he and some of his men went to the Dalai Lama, who was visiting Leh, to seek his blessings -- soft spoken and scrupulously polite. But that gentleman's exterior hides the tough interior of an officer the army is proud to showcase.

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http://ikashmir.net/kargilheroes/wangchuk.html

Lots of links come up if you search "Ladakh Scouts" and "Kargil" but I don't have enough knowledge of the subject to help me sort out the various links....

Omar,

As someone interested in the military history of the region, have you read any of Rakesh Ankit's work (Indian Rhodes scholar)?

http://www.scribd.com/doc/45084187/1948-Jammu-Kashmir

Just curious if anyone knows more about the subject?

PS: On your earlier question on the low casualities, I think it's interesting the "limitedness" of the various Indian/Pakistan conflicts. What I mean is that even before the conflict going "nuclear", so to speak, there were various reasons that conflicts were limited and some due to the larger context - two poorer countries within the larger context of the Cold War and the late stages of the British withdrawal from the subcontinent.

I dunno what I'm trying to say, I mean, I think I'm intuiting something but I can't articulate it exactly.

PPS: I think what I am intuiting--if that is even a word--is that the Western presence, like a particle/wave duality, is both stabilizing and destabilizing at the same time. So, the presence is essentially destabilizing because "rock-paper-scissors-like", destabilizing wins out. Yeah, once again, I don't know what I am trying to say. So, maybe the limitedness is something else yet again that I can't put my finger on....

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Originally Posted by omarali50

Blueblood, I have no direct knowledge of what happened in Kargil, just going by published reports. Most of them played up the "starving soldiers" bit, so that was my impression. After your post, I have adjusted my mental picture to "some posts ran out of food and water and low on ammo, while others had abundant rations".
Does that sound reasonable?

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PA brass had to save face. Just as it was in 71, in 99 Pakistani masses were being fooled that they were winning the war and had IA on the run. You being a Pakistani know better about the conspiracy theories and their popularity in Pakistan.

Airstrike on June 17th,1999 on Muntho Dhalo effectively crippled the Pak logistics. But by then major battles were already over and most of the higher peaks were recaptured. So yes, it is very much possible that in the later operations Pak troops could have ran out of ration and ammo.

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Btw, on our blog, I just asked the question, why have India-Pakistan wars been generally low in casualties until now (hopefully we wont have another one)?
Just one of those things that happened to be the case until now ("case by case", each war unique and each with specific reasons why slaughter was less intense)? or is there some deeper explanation? (after all, the British Indian army probably lost more men in the battle of Monte Cassino than India and Pakistan did in entire "wars")
http://www.brownpundits.com/2012/10/...#comment-18821

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It is a somewhat complex issue in my opinion. So please bear with me. Comparing battles of any war to the battles of WW2 is not a fair comparison. For eg. German casualties in Stalingrad alone was ten times the strength of current German Army or the combined troops of Indo-Pak wars.

1)Strength

We are talking about the times (cold war) when both armies were small if not tiny compared to the rest of the major powers especially in case of India. In 1965, Indian army had 17 armoured regiments i.e. 765 tanks against 15 regiments i.e. 660 tanks of Pakistan. On the other hand, Israel had 800 and Arabs had 2400 tanks in 67 & 1700 and 3400 respectively in 73.
.You do the math.

FYI, current numbers are nearly 4000 for India and 1600 for Pakistan.

2)Geography

Both countries shared a very long border which is 3300 km Indo-Pak + 4100 km Indo-Bangladeshi border. Compare that to 250 km Egypt-Israel border. Where do you recon troop concentration would have been more.

3)Duration

None of the Indo-Pak wars were fought to death so to speak. With the exception of Sino-Vietnamese war, I don’t think short wars can be as bloody as even the larger battles of longer wars like Korean War for example.

In 65, UN intervened and both claimed victory. In 71, East Pakistan was lost in less than a fortnight and West Pakistan didn't challenge the Indian unilateral ceasefire.

Hope this clears some air.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Madhu

http://ikashmir.net/kargilheroes/wangchuk.html

Lots of links come up if you search "Ladakh Scouts" and "Kargil" but I don't have enough knowledge of the subject to help me sort out the various links....

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I was thinking of preparing a report about the mountain regiments, thanks for initiating.

For people new to the IA infantry regiment system, a short summary might explain a few things. Recruitment in the regiments is done through the army rallies held in the areas indigenous to the particular regiment. For eg. Rajput regiment organizes rallies in the states of Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, northern Gujarat and northern Madhya Pradesh etc but not in any southern or eastern part of the country. Officers however can be of any part of the country.

@Ray correct me if I am wrong.

Let's start with Ladakh Scouts.

The Ladakh Scouts, also known as the Snow Warriors or Snow Tigers, is an infantry regiment of the Indian Army.[1] Specializing in mountain warfare, the regiment's primary role is to guard India's borders in the high altitude areas of the Ladakh region, as well as Jammu & Kashmir in general.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ladakh_Scouts

First, the war was an attack in their backyard; the intruders were close enough to enter their homes. Being ‘sons of the soil’, it punctured their pride first. Second, the terrain was familiar; this gave them a strategic advantage. The peaks and ridges in the line of fire had been their playground as young children.

To put it simply, they were well versed in mountain warfare, and knew how to use the mountain to their advantage. Best acclimatized, best suited, most fit - the superlatives are indeed many. In time, they have established themselves to be the most affective infantry units to be deployed in the high altitude area. Ladakh Scouts or ‘lama fauj’ has etched a permanent place for itself in India’s military history.

http://archive.deccanherald.com/decc...122004/sh1.asp


Please neglect the childish antics of the presenters. A good video nonetheless.

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/jai...-scouts/197904

Recruitment is done at the Recruiting Offices where a Board of Officers supervise the physical and educational level tests followed by a Medical at the military hospital (MH) or by the Medical Officer if the MH is not close by.

Then there are the Recruitment Rallies as has been mentioned by Blueblood where all the parameters for recruitment are gone through.

And there is a small percentage for recruitment at the Regimental Centres of all Arms and Services.

Each Regiment has its own Regimental Centre and each combat support and combat service support organisations have their Regimental Centre(s).

There are Infantry Regiments, Armoured and Artillery units which have fixed class compositions.

These days, however, there is a swing towards All India mix except those Regiments or units that are on fixed class composition.

To better understand the customs, traditions and ethos of the Indian Army, one should read Philip Mason's book, 'A Matter of Honour".

Quote:

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The men who witnessed the Kargil fiasco continue to spill the beans. Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, a former chief of general staff of Pakistan Army who has till now kept his peace about what he witnessed in the summer of ’99, says the ‘misadventure’ was a four-man show the details of which were hidden from the rest of the military commanders initially.

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There is more to come, the General, who also served at ISI, is about to publish a book. Needless to say what he say now is noteworthy.

Link:http://dawn.com/2013/01/29/kargil-ad...-show-general/

A peek at the summer course of High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBZbu-Y0pfE

A short excerpt from a new book 'The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy' on how India's disadvantages at the time of the Kargil crisis enhanced the Indo-Israeli relationship, it describes how India turned to Israel after finding itself short of crucial surveillance and military equipment. The link refuses to allow citing passages.

Link:http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantag...aeli-relations

Link to Amazon.uk:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Evolution-Indias-Israel-Policy-International/dp/0199450625 and publisher:http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199450626.do

No, not the book that led to one retired Pakistani General being prevented form leaving, rather one by a Pakistani journalist and a review in a Pakistani newspaper. Here is a chunk:

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Indeed the misadventure exposed the civil- military gap, but that was only one aspect of the story. The real issue was how a coterie of generals could bring the country to the brink of a nuclear conflagration. So much so that even the senior military leadership was unaware of the operation until things started unravelling. The Kargil clique, as the author described the “group of four top generals” who later usurped power overthrowing the elected government, declared it a brilliant strategic move that failed to achieve its objective because of “spineless” civilian leadership. The book has assumed greater significance because the Kargil issue had not even been discussed or critically examined at various military forums.
From Kargil to Coup confirms that the civilian leadership was never taken into confidence on the operation, leave aside getting its approval that is legally required. It was in May 1999, almost six months after the start of the operation, that the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was given a full briefing by the military leadership about it.

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Link:https://www.dawn.com/news/1410891/facts-and-fiction

I had a post about the Kargil war a while ago at Brownpundits

Excerpt:

..Back in 1999 I thought that Musharraf should have been dismissed and prosecuted for his role in the affair, but I also bought into the propaganda that the operation was a “great tactical success but a strategic blunder”. As time went on and more details came out, it became clear that the planning at the tactical level was as bad as the stupidities and mistaken assumptions that underlay the strategic vision of General Musharraf and inner coterie and in particular the commander of Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), General Javed Hassan.

The men (primarily Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and Special Services Group (SSG) volunteers) who did the actual fighting from the Pakistani side performed with suicidal bravery, but once the Indian army learned from its early mistakes and brought all its resources to bear on the operation, these brave men were left to literally starve and bleed to death while Javed Hassan and his boss tried to bluster their way past their disastrous mistake. Musharraf’s coup protected the plotters from facing any consequences within Pakistan and a systematic disinformation campaign was used to crease (not just in Pakistan but also in some casual observers and Anatol Leiven level analysts abroad) an impression of tactical brilliance. The above reports provide a good corrective and one hopes that the day may still come when Musharraf and Javed Hassan will face the music for their role in this terrible disaster…a disaster that led to hundreds of needless deaths on both sides in an operation that civilian prime minister Benazir was able to see as “crazy” at first glance. Unfortunately, Nawaz Sharif was not that sharp…

..All these assumptions proved wrong. After some early charges that failed with heavy casualties (but also showed that Indian troops were perfectly capable of suicidal bravery of their own) the Indian army figured out how to use its artillery to great effect and went up near vertical slopes at night under cover of accurate artillery fire and recaptured crucial heights. They also managed to interdict most of the resupply effort, leaving many freezing Pakistani troops exposed on the heights without food or water. There is no evidence that either Javed Hassan or Musharraf made any real effort to come up with new solutions once their original assumptions proved wrong. Musharraf seems to have focused mostly on making sure the blame could be pinned on Nawaz Sharif, and that some sort of domestic (or intra-army) propaganda victory could be salvaged from the disaster.

The status quo is indeed in India’s favor by now. The critical period for India was the early nineties. Once they got past that, they were never going to be kicked out of Kashmir by force; and by using outside Jihadis and then the regular army and failing to dislodge them, Pakistan has already played all its cards. Another attempt could set the whole subcontinent aflame, but is not likely to change that outcome.

The fact that Kashmiri Muslims (or at least, Kashmiri Muslims in the Kashmir valley proper) remain thoroughly disaffected with India provides some people with the hope that human rights and democracy campaigners can win where brute force did not. But this too seems unlikely. The same Kashmiri Muslims are almost as disaffected with Pakistan as they are with India, so that the main demand seems now to be independence. But the demographics, geography, history and international situation of Kashmir all make any smooth passage to independence inconceivable. Inconceivable in the literal sense of the world; what I mean is, try to conceive or imagine in concrete detail what this independence would look like and the steps via which it would be achieved. Enuff said.