CORDS-Phoenix - the South Vietnamese View
The articles linked above are all worthwhile and deserve DLing for future reference. However, they look at CORDS-Phoenix from a non-Vietnamese viewpoint. For example, the 2009 Canadian article (cited by David) does not cite Tran's "Pacification".
The story of the GVN's pacification programs (including CORDS-Phoenix) was told by Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL), who was a key player in the programs. All being said, "pacification" had to be laregly a South Vietnamese effort - the problem was their "insurgency" or "guerrilla war"; not ours. Tran tells the story of that effort - the good, the bad and the ugly.
One can classify the "Viet Cong" activities in the South in more than one way, legally and militarily. The articles linked above call it an "insurgency" - as do many books written on Vietnam (those that elect not to treat it as a "conventional" war). The Vietnamese Communists looked at it differently.
Their view was that the successful August 1945 Insurrection (ending their Revolutionary War) led to a unified Vietnam (as a nation-state), with Ho's government its recognized government (agreements with the French, 1945-1946). The French then reneged and attacked the Viet Minh (their view). The French and their Vietnamese puppets then occupied most of the country.
Thus, the following First Indochina War was in Viet Minh terms a Resistence War (with their guerrilla forces, North and South, being akin to the French Resistence of WWII). DPB and the Geneva Accords gave validity to North Vietnam, but a unified Vietnam (not Two Vietnams) was the North's goal. The formation of the RVN under Diem, and growing US involvement, was simply regarded as the same thing as the French occupation under its puppets.
The result by the early 1960s was a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare (as defined in FM 31-21 from that time). Thus, from the first 2006 article linked above:
Quote:
In Vietnam, the U.S. military faced arguably the most complex, effective, lethal insurgency in history. The enemy was no rag-tag band lurking in the jungle, but rather a combination of guerrillas, political cadre, and modern main-force units capable of standing toe to toe with the U.S. military. Any one of these would have been significant, but in combination they presented a formidable threat.
When U.S. ground forces intervened in South Vietnam in 1965, estimates of enemy guerrilla and Communist Party front strength stood at more than 300,000. In addition, Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese main forces numbered almost 230,000—and that number grew to 685,000 by the time of the Communist victory in 1975. These main forces were organized into regiments and divisions, and between 1965 and 1968 the enemy emphasized main-force war rather than insurgency.[1] During the war the Communists launched three conventional offensives: the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, and the final offensive in 1975. All were major campaigns by any standard. Clearly, the insurgency and the enemy main forces had to be dealt with simultaneously.
1. Thomas C. Thayer, How to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam, 1965-72 (Washington, DC: Defense Research Projects Agency, 1975), 788-89.
The end result was a juncture of conventional and unconventional forces (made up of guerrilla and auxilliary forces and underground cadres) - as called for by our own doctrine in FM 31-21. Thus, the Vietnam War did not involve an insurgency (as opposed to the situations in Malaya and the Philippines, which were true insurgencies). Rather, Vietnam was more akin to Indonesia - also where a successful Revolutionary War ended in 1945, followed by a foreign occupation and Resistence War. Fortunately for us (the US), the Indonesia Revolution was largely bourgeois nationalistic (albeit anti-Western). That feature led to the eradication of Indonesian Communism in 1965-1966; and to formation of ASEAN, which changed the SE Asian picture by 1968.
I'll take a better look at the Canadian article re: its Targeted Killings thesis - which issue, I believe, is covered in other threads.
Mike, VN was everything you
said... but it was also an insurgency. The winners have their myth - based on their perception of truth - but it remains the victors myth. We have our own myths... As some of us quipped at the time, the VN war was not one war 12 years long but rather 12 wars, each one year long (for the US, that is). Actually, there is another set of dimensions that need to be considered. It was a different war in each of the 6 military regions, in the air, and at sea. At some point, however, adding dimensions simply become counterproductive. In the end, I would argue that what we look at should depend on the question we are asking, remembering the complexity all the while.
Cheers
JohnT
Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
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Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
by Heather M. Brown
Download the Full Article: Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
In the mid-to-late 1960s, Americans became increasingly concerned with the strategic decision-making of U.S. leaders regarding the military’s presence in Vietnam. One of the most controversial decisions of the era was ratified on 7 January 1962, when the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army were given authorization under Operation RANCH HAND, to deploy the herbicides 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetate (2,4,5-T) and 2,4-dicholorophenoxyacetate (2,4-D), commonly known by its code name, Agent Orange, on South Vietnam. Operation RANCH HAND directed the herbicide spraying project from U.S. Air Force C-123 twin-engine aircraft, U.S. Army helicopters and infantry hand sprayers.
Download the Full Article: Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
Heather Marie Brown received her undergraduate degree from Texas State University-San Marcos in December 2010 as a double-major in History and Political Science.
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Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy
Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy
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The latest posted issue of Parameters (Winter of 2010-2011) is probably well worth reading because we most likely have not learned well our lessons from the past (What did Cohen and Gooch say about military failures in their book Military Misfortune – all military failures can be attributed for failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate).
Note the authors are a "who's who" of some of our great thinkers, generals, theorists, practitioners, and historians (well I guess Ambrose has had his issues!). Given the recent comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam I recommend one article in particular by the eminent strategist and mentor to so many of us, Colonel (Ret) John Collins' article from 1978 - Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy. COL Collins' article should probably be mandatory reading for decision makers before we embark on any future Afghanistans or Iraqs so we do not have a failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate again (a dream of fantasy I know!).
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The War Over the Vietnam War
The War Over the Vietnam War
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New Hampshire and Vietnam
New Hampshire and Vietnam
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How Could Vietnam Happen?
How Could Vietnam Happen?
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Assessing Pacification in Vietnam: We Won the Counterinsurgency War!
Assessing Pacification in Vietnam: We Won the Counterinsurgency War!
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Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
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Military Advisors Reflect on Vietnam War Experiences
Military Advisors Reflect on Vietnam War Experiences
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Viewpoint: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Vietnam
Viewpoint: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Vietnam
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Book Review: Marigold: The Last Chance for Peace in Vietnam
Book Review: Marigold: The Last Chance for Peace in Vietnam
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Why the U.S. Lost the Vietnam War
Why the U.S. Lost the Vietnam War
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Village Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan
Village Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan
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Preventing the Barbarization of Warfare: The USMC CAP Program in Vietnam
Preventing the Barbarization of Warfare: The USMC CAP Program in Vietnam
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