Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?
Printable View
Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?
As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.
With the greatest respect to Gian Gentile, I think he's slightly over complicating the solution. The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time. That's it. You need a pretty slim manual to get that across.Quote:
Originally Posted by SWJED
Basically FM3-24 needs burning because it should never have been required and the solution does not require it either. A "Small Wars / Irregular Enemy" manual would more than suffice.
If the enemy is dead, any clown can "re-build" because no one is going to stop him doing it. To paraphrase the Sultan of Oman, "Defeat the rebels SO THAT, we can begin development."
Maybe I don't get the meaning in English, but I would certainly add "violent" as required criterion. Otherise you'd need to kill, capture and deter millions.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.
Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.
My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.
Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.
We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.
Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.
They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.
Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."
The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.
Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.
I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.
The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).
Steve
Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.
Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
IMO the problems, while significant, are largely nuance. If one just went through the current manual and addressed those points of nuance it would only take 3-4 weeks.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
So, 3-4 weeks to make the fixes, 3-4 years to get such a manual approved.
Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).
Bob, sometimes Wilf is right. There are situations where that may be the best option.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Just of interest...I recently attended a book signing for David Kilcullen. At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning). He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that. :D
Slap,Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on. It's when he applies warfare to COIN where he starts to drift off track. Our reasonable (or unreasonable, as its really up to others to assess that status) minds will differ, but it is such public differing that makes SWJ such a handy tool.
The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.
As to the FID force (that intervening role we find ourselves in), I would strongly advise staying out of the insurgent killing business altogether, and to keep our focus on guiding governmental reform and mediating the popular voice into that process (or staying out of the mess altogether unless national interests truly demand our presence).
AQ and non-state UW organizations like them that seek to employ such insurgent organizations and populaces to conduct their acts of terror for them are another matter altogether, and for them we should show now mercy or respite, wherever they might hide. (Just don't listen to the Intel guys who paint everyone they talk to with their same stink, as that throws us right back into killing nationalist insurgents 9 times out of 10).
We really gotta come with a better name....sounds like a girls softball team:DQuote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
This FM 3 -24 is designed for battaluion level and above "leaders and planners". So it's not a TTP manual.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?
Start with what the private soldier needs to know to effectively fight this type of war and then take it from there. It doesn't matter what the colonels know if the soldiers on the ground know Jack.
It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...:rolleyes:Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...:wry:
No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).
Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.
As simple as that? Now I am begining to understand where it is all going wrong out there...Quote:
Originally Posted by Infanteer
only correct IF you got trained right in the first place. When I was doing my basic in 1980, all the training was peppered with Northern Ireland TTPs. The problem was that by 1988 when I was doing Recce Commanders, NI TTPs had washed out what you needed to fight a Soviet MRR.Quote:
Originally Posted by Infanteer
I used to have great respect for Dave, back in the day, but I think he's wrong these days, unless I am not understanding what I keep reading.Quote:
Originally Posted by Polarbear1605
a.) FM3-24 was not out of date. It was wrong and bad.
b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.
NOW, - I admit, my ideas have changed. I have learnt. I have publicly viewable record of my though in the 3,000+ posts here, BUT my ideas now all conform to what got taught back in the old days and was written down a long time ago. The problem with the COIN-fusion is that is simply ignored history to pursue either the avant-garde or reputations.
....yet clearly that was the source of the problem because they weren't killing the right people and only the right people.Quote:
He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that. :D