Whole of gov't? Or whole of DoD?
This thread started with CavGuy posting a map that shows how DoD and State breakdown the world map into regions. So that is one big-picture question regarding the "whole of gov't" approach. I was also recently thinking about the activity down at the individual level. After googling for some statistics I made the following graph (I admit to not spending lots of time searching for the best data, but I think these are ballpark figures)...
The DoD numbers are from the FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill. Other sources - if anyone cares - are listed in my rambling blog entry. There seems to be a tremendous disparity in "troops available," which most likely causes all agencies to rely heavily on DoD and, as a result, tend to follow DoD's lead.
Here is the breakdown in Afghanistan (again, my data sources are not the greatest, but I think these are ballpark)...
If you add up State, DEA, and CIA, they are still outnumbered by more than 30 to 1 by DoD (none of the bars include contractors, of which, I think DoD has a whole lot more). I've seen "other" agencies get quickly marginalized on military staffs because the military staff wants to know "what do you bring to the table?" If the answer to that question is not what the military cmd/staff is looking for, then that person has a long, uneventful deployment and gets very little accomplished. The military staff drives ahead and the other agency individual is just along for the ride.
I'm not pointing the finger at DoD, so much as just observing that when one agency dominates the organization, then the other agencies are forced to fall in line and you get no real serious collaboration that differs from what a joint staff produces. You only get a few other agencies coming along for the ride. But they never take turns driving or even touch the GPS. They just sit in the back and stare out the window (and lounge around the pool in the green zone). Obviously, there will be individual exceptions here and there (I'm thinking, for example, of Pol-Mil FSO's comment on another thread - see his last sentence). But, for the most part, when DoD outnumbers everyone else combined by 30 to 1, you're going to get a DoD-run operation, not a "whole of government" approach.
To reiterate, I am not pointing the finger at DoD. On the contrary, I think the other agencies are doing themselves and the country a disservice by failing to field adequate personnel. Take State, for example. I signed up for the FSO exam months ago. I just took it yesterday. Depending on how I did (I'll find out in several weeks), I might get an interview at some point in the future. And then how long will I need to wait before clearing the next hurdle? And why is this time-consuming process so selective? I've seen Soldiers join the Army with a GED and criminal record who deploy to Iraq and are masterful at their jobs, interacting smartly with locals, gathering solid intel with only the assistance of a lackluster interpreter, and establishing a great rapport with entire neighborhoods. Maybe we're working too hard to recruit ideal candidates with fancy degrees and impressive resumes and not working hard enough at recruiting enough people who have enough potential to do a good enough job.
State ran it despite shortfalls
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Just out of curiosity, how did State assert itself? I'm wondering if there is a lesson learned that could be applied in Afghanistan. A'stan seems like a military-run operation that any other agency would be hard-pressed to insert themselves into with any significant amount of influence.
Was it made clear from the start that State was in charge? Was State in charge at first, and then the military came in to augment? Perhaps when the military takes charge from the get-go, it is difficult to hand the reigns over to someone else.
Good questions, and I'll try to pull up some unclassified studies of this successful operation and send them later, because it is important to understand the context of this irregular conflict and our role vis a vis ECOWAS and the UN.
However, to specifically answer your questions, DoS was in charge from day one. In some respects State didn't have enough manpower (but they had some real heroes working incredibly long hours), so to help them we pushed out augmentation teams that worked in support of State (we pushed folks all the way back to D.C. to help them there also). Gets to your original point about State being under resourced.
Since we supported ECOWAS (various West African nations) deploy peace keeping forces, we sent small teams to each representative mission to support the Country Team by providing military expertise as required. Our mission in Liberia at first was more security focused. We wanted to minimize the presence of U.S. forces on the ground, so the JTF was afloat on the ARG/MEU, but we sent reps forward to work with the Ambassador in Monroivia to ensure any action we took was in accordance with his objectives (which were clearly spelled out). As you know getting right person (personality) is critical, and our commander and the ambassaor complemented each other perfectly.
The transition to a UN lead was well executed under DoS supervision. Of course there were rough spots along the way, but that is to be expected with any mission. Overall this complex operation was well executed because there were clear objectives that were understood by all (U.S. military, State, UN, ECOWAS, etc.).
I can't speak to Afghanistan, but I think if we transitioned to a State lead in Iraq after phase 3, we may have had a different outcome. Hard to say, either way it would have been a tough row. The key is how do you transition from a Dod led to a State led mission? You have to also consider the personalties involved (Rumfield, Chenney, Powell, etc.) back in the beltway. Rightly or wrongly State was marginalized. It would be interesting to hear from State reps what they would have done differently if they were put in charge.
Assessing quality and effectiveness…
…using the indirect method with apologies to Robert Pirsig.
Harley Davidson Nightster’s are joy to view, ride, and tune and so are BMW Roadsters; despite many similarities however their respective twin cylinder designs lean towards drag racing and sport touring. Both motorcycles are products of organizations organized and staffed so that they consistently and profitably (productivity =output/input) meet the design specifications for their product (quality of conformance). Both organizations systematically produce designs, which meet customer (CRM) expectations (design for six sigma). HD has 9,300 employees and BMW has 98,261 while today’s HD (HOG) stock price is $ 21.85 and BMW’s (ETR:BMW) stock is $ 31.77. Although there is certainly a minimum amount of employees necessary to meet the mission of motorcycle development and production, focusing solely upon the number of employees does not sufficiently describe the situation so that we can confidently invest our hard earned cash.
The SWOT and Value Chain Analysis are pretty powerful ways to systematically assess an organizations reach and effectiveness. HD and BMW’s histories need to be considered as well.
To further examine where to invest scare resources for maximum return, modeling and simulation offer a cheap way to consider the effects of the good, bad, and ugly. Factors used to model stock prices with may be described as fundamental factors (valuation, solvency, operational efficiency, operating profitability, financial risk, and liquidity risk), technical factors (usually constructed from past price & volume data), and economic factors (GDP growth, yield-curve slope, unemployment, and inflation), among others (steel, aluminum, tires, etc). Knowing which factors to examine and incorporate into a model at which times can be tricky, time consuming and costly or profitable depending upon who is doing the modeling.
Sometimes it’s faster and easier to find someone who represents the organization we are studying and who can share his or her insights with us. Some questions might be how long have John Olin and Stefan Quandt been doing their particular type of work, how many years/type of education do they have, who do they know, who are they related to, what are the resources at their command, how effective are they, and are they representative of the organization? Perhaps 'outsiders' have important information to consider.
Can business analysis methods apply to assessing public institutions? If not what methods are better suited? Lets consider some of the State Department’s internal QA/QC analysis, produced by it's Middle East Regional Office, of its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Review of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq, OIG Report No. MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009
Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence in Iraq, OIG Report Number MERO-A-09-10, August 2009
Lets consider some of the DOD's & DOS' internal QA/QC analysis produced by SIGR:
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management, January 2006
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, January 2009
the interagency strategy mess
Dave Maxwell's blog post on the interagency void was spot on. Since for reasons currently beyond my control I cannot post there, I wanted to highight his final paragraph with the endorsement, if it works, use it. I would also add the following:
Before you think about what you want it to be, first see it for what it is
Thanks Dave
Tom
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Finally, the search for the “perfect solution” in terms of organization, training, education, lessons learned collection, concepts of employment and terminology hinders both effective operations and preparation for the future. There are two places where the Interagency process functions well – at the Country Team and on the ground in conflict areas. The men and women working overseas are getting it done despite a perceived unresponsive and inefficient National Security system. They have learned and adapted yet at the National and Strategic level there has been a lot of energy spent coming up with new ways to try to do old things and it has not helped the men and women on the ground. What is required is a national level system and processes that are simple, agile, and responsive to the challenges the US faces. Ideally, the system will defend against the 3 historical failures in conflicts around the world – the failure to learn, the failure to adapt, and the failure to anticipate.5