NPR has an interesting story about the debate between preparing the Army to fight counterinsurgency versus convention war. Many SWJ contributors were interviewed for the story. Here's the link: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=90200038
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NPR has an interesting story about the debate between preparing the Army to fight counterinsurgency versus convention war. Many SWJ contributors were interviewed for the story. Here's the link: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...oryId=90200038
I think my incoherent ramblings on this matter are well known, but I'm happy to stick in flag in the sand, for us all to wrestle over.
1. The idea of COIN versus Conventional is not helpful. It's a false dichotomy. There are not many types of conflict. There are two basic different types of opponents. Neither is new, and both are well understood.
2. To be a proper army, you have to have to ability to defeat both Insurgents and Combined Arms Formations, in any terrain and amongst a population. That gives you the capability to do all else. Being good at one should enhance the other. Good is good.
3. Just because it has caused problems in the past, does not mean it should not be addressed, and solved in pretty short order. - because it has been clearly demonstrated to be me, that the men and intellects capable of doing it, are present on this board. :D
We are having an internal food fight about whether to buy bananas and strawberries or cinnamon buns or danish, not whether or what to eat for an early morning snack. You can cover that up by discussing nutrition but the reality is what the particular appetite craves.
As Gian himself says, war is war... :D
Last time I looked at planning and executing this kind of stuff from a High or Mid intensity perspective, a significant part of any operational planning included civilian population control. Admittedly that planning primarily focussed on displaced persons/refugees, but it nonetheless had strong protection and law enforcement (AKA anti-looting) aspects applied to the non-combatants who might happen to be "inconvenienced" by one's planned mil ops. While that planning was set against a backdrop of Western Europe, is it really that much different from what we are trying to accomplishment in the current operating environments? I, for one, do not think so.
To what extent, if any, are people making distinctions between two pairs of issues:
(1) COIN as urban-warfare/kinetic ops rather than peacekeeping and policing
(2) Ability of soldiers and Marines, given proper training, to conduct both missions vs. service doctrine, procurement, training, etc., becoming focused on COIN to the detriment of potential developing situations
That is, for #1, I would certainly agree that troops are more than capable of conducting the kinetic side of COIN ops or engaging in high-intensity maneuver warfare, but you guys wouldn't agree that we've seen some issues in Iraq and Afghanistan with units having serious adjustments from kinetic combat ops to more policing-based stability ops?
Additionally, the example of the IDF and Lebanon in 2006 is a bit of a frightening precedent.
As for #2; the personnel themselves will be able to conduct themselves in either environment, but is there not a danger of gearing the Army's "tail" systems too exclusively for COIN?
And yes, I certainly see the irony in suggesting that after years of ignoring the problem we may now be too exclusively prepared for COIN. . .
Regards,
Matt
Good post. Although from the little I've read on Lebanon in 2006, it looks like the Israelis had a host of leadership and organizational problems that can't simply be explained away as the result of decades of West Bank and Gaza service.
Seems to me that procurement is the big elephant in the room. I saw General Sir Rupert Smith speak last year, and while it was a good talk, he repeatedly said "I'm not here to talk about equipment, it is how that equipment is used that has changed", which struck me as evasive. Ultimately, with a finite amount of money to spend (and maybe less and less, the financial shape we're in) choices need to be made. Not to turn this into another F-22 thread, but we can't invest in more light infantry, and spend a lot more on recruiting, retention, professional military education, etc., if we're buying tons of new fighter planes and destroyers at hundreds of millions of dollars a pop.
All,
I think we have all covered the philosophical aspects of this discussion in the past.
As a tip of the hat to WILF… There are obviously commonalities between COIN/LIC and Conventional/HIC. No debate there, and given the time and resources to train… I am sure that today’s crop of Soldiers and leaders could maintain competency in those aspects that are common and train to those tactics that differ… but make no mistake TTPs do differ based on the conditions/context.
Ken and wm … While the linked article highlights the larger philosophical debate regarding the Army's appropriate aim point on the spectrum of conflict. The impetus for the article was a white paper authored by three former BCT commanders that laments/warns of the crisis in the FA Branch in particular and several others in general. The gist of the white paper (sent to CSA, VCSA, and HQDA G3) was that the FA branch is broke from the perspective fire support competency. Also important to note that this was not a stone throwing event, rather that the cause of the problem is that FA units have spent so much time providing invaluable contributions to the current fight in anything but an FA role. War is NOT war in the sense that there is a very real difference in how you organize, train, and equip a force. As current events support, a good force balance for COIN does not equal a good force balance for HIC. A blinding flash of the obvious I know. I also acknowledge that the intensity of conflict at the individual/tactical level is directly proportional to your proximity to the fire fight. In that sense, war is war…. However, with respect to Title X type responsibilities – war is anything but war, and that is the level at which Gian has been beating his drum.
My lament regarding Gian is that he gets so much attention as the wild-eyed prophet screaming in the desert about a COIN-centric force, rather than his more important message… OK in some sense – certainly as it pertains to FA, the focus on COIN-specific training is very detrimental. Not so much that they are training in a COIN contect, but that they are training no traditional skills as opposed to the core competency as field artillerymen. However, the larger point that Gian raises routinely, but that I have seen no senior leader echo is that we, as a Nation, have lost complete balance between strategic objectives and resources. This is where we have become most discombobulated.
So that leaves us with three different options…
1. Curb strategic objectives (regarding democracy in ME… etc) pull back deployed forces and retool, refit, and reset conventional forces within current resources to deal with most dangerous contingencies. This has obvious implications regarding diplomatic power, encouraging extremists blah blah blah
2. Acknowledge strategic risk, remain engaged in ME and fight the war we have, and hope we’ll have the time and resources to retool, refit, and reset conventional forces before they are needed.
3. Match resources to current strategic objectives. Problem is $$$. Just not sure there is the $$$ or people available to support current strategic objectives unless we mobilize the Nation. That seems unlikely in current paradigm
No easy solutions
Hacksaw,
I suspect we were actually trying to make the same point. I only let one shoe drop in my post, expecting that folks would understand that we have training failures/shortfalls that need to be remedied. (I really hate teaching folks to suck eggs.) FA operations is not the only place where that happens to be the case; I believe that non-combatant control, among others (like air defense ops and probably combat engineering), is another sucking training chest wound.
You are correct about the inbalance between objectives and resources. The other drum. one that Ken beats routinely, that is being ignored is the need to resource training accounts (and that includes the personnel in training account) to reflect what really needs to happen to have a force trained and ready for the spectrum of missions it may be called upon to execute in at least the next 20-40 years. I use that time frame as one that covers a career and provides an overlap for the next two "generations" of military career holders.
I wrote about this on a previous thread, so sorry for repeating myself a bit, but one aspect that I think does not receive sufficient attention in general in this debate is the financial trade-off that absent some major unforeseen event will need to be made by the future administration.
I agree with Wilf that it is largely a false dichotomy, but I suspect that the reason some people on the inside are seeing it as either/or is that, when it comes to resources, the budgetary requirements can be fairly divergent IMO - I would greatly welcome a good counter-arguments to this.
But I am thinking that, while being proficient at one could help with fighting the other (the war is war argument) if we think in terms training or doctrine, when it comes to resources it's rather different. If we spend $200 bil on FCS, a program clearly designed for force-on-force combat, we would have a very different army 10 years from now than if we would spend the same amount of money on COIN oriented capabilities, which could simply mean more soldiers to make longer-term campaigns more sustainable.
Macgregor says. "if there is no legitimate government to begin with, your intervention is doomed to inevitable failure."
To me this is the key point. We're using tactics designed for use against a single anti government insurgency, but we're fighting multiple factions, many of whom are part of the government.
Procurement, especially WRT the long lead and development timelines for new equipment, is certainly an issue. But so is the AVF. Even if most procurement money was diverted into manpower, recruiting, etc., how much more manpower could be raised? So far it looks like the Army will have trouble meeting the modest end strength increases it's received. Is it even possible to recruit the manpower we'd like to have for Iraq and Afghanistan - perhaps double the force we have now?
Furthermore, we must consider the scale of conflict. We need a COIN capability obviously, but how much do we need? Enough for another large Iraq-style operation or something smaller? Those kind of questions are what underpin the capability requirements in QDR's which determines where the money goes, etc. Personally, I see "small wars" being more the norm in the future, but I think it will be a generation or more before we do something like Iraq again which is a "small war" in name only.
Absolutely, I think increasing the armed forces, especially given demographic and economic considerations, will be really hard. And in regard to your second paragraph, I used to believe the standard line, "we don't have enough ground troops, Bush/Rumsfeld should have made the Army much bigger after 9/11, etc.", but recently read an article Steve Metz co-wrote a few months ago, where he talked about how we shouldn't be basing our manpower needs on Iraq and Afghanistan, which are probably anomalous, we need to craft a grand strategy which suits our advantages. Really opened my eyes.
Still, if we're spending hundreds of billions on FCS, F-22, and other platforms, even much more meager funding for small wars specifics is going to be hard to come by. Not to mention, I'd tend to think that a service built around these super expensive, high tech platforms, and needing to justify them to Congress and itself, is going to be a service that plans its warfighting and service cultures around them (Air Force resistance to CAS, Big Army still in Fulda Gap mode).
Which may be why they are called problems.
Hacksaw, not to be simplistic or to ignore the many various complexities of this particular conundrum but many are of our own making and I believe it is important to acknowledge that before embarking on courses that create more problems -- a tendency at which the US Government excels...
With respect to the White Paper, I believe most of us are aware of that and that most agree with the definition of the problem to a greater or lesser extent -- I don't think anyone with any sense is in denial about the problem; the discussion is on the degree of trauma it could invoke. While it is true that FA and Armor have been used (wrongly in my view) as everything from MPs to Infantry to god knows what, most have also been doing their nominal mission. The counterpoint to FA not getting to train to their primary mission is that those that do get to fire are shooting at good targets under combat conditions and that they are shooting Excaliburs and GMLRS which few would get to do in CONUS; the Armor counterpoint is that a whole lot of Tankers haver gained a far better appreciation for what the Infantry contends with than they would have normally had -- that can only enhance combined arms efforts in the near future. there are pluses and minuses to everything and every action has a cost.
You say:Arguable at best. My sensing is that the Army has the Title X responsibility to be the nations repository of land war fighting expertise and capability -- to my knowledge, there are no stipulations or caveats on to what sphere of land warfare that capability should be directed; it seems to me that full spectrum is implicit. Whose fault is it that the Army was not and is not prepared to do that within resource constraints -- which do not generally affect doctrine or training methodology?Quote:
...However, with respect to Title X type responsibilities – war is anything but war, and that is the level at which Gian has been beating his drum.
That has been the case for my lifetime and the Army has varied over those many years in its ability to meet the requirement. Some of those variance have been due to the exigencies of the time, as now. Most, though, have been due to the Army unilaterally deciding to restrict or change its focus. I submit that since at least the early 80s, many of us -- and many in high places -- warned the nation and / or the Army of what was coming and that the senior leadership of the Army diligently ignored those warnings. During the 80s, their desire to focus on major war in Europe was understandable (if short sighted...); post 1989, their continuing, mostly, to do so was borderline criminal IMO. We are where we are with respect to force structure and state of training because they resisted change -- and IMO a lot of that was influenced by (not due to) branch parochialism.
You also say:True. We have, as Americans, many advantages and an almost too pleasant life style for most people. We have never really balanced those two things well unless it was in every sense of the word, vital. That discombobulation is the price those who serve pay for the reasonably pleasant life led most of time. I have often railed about it but on balance after many years, came to accept it as that price -- and I think it's worth it (and did think that long before I hung up my war suit). YMMV.Quote:
"...However, the larger point that Gian raises routinely, but that I have seen no senior leader echo is that we, as a Nation, have lost complete balance between strategic objectives and resources. This is where we have become most discombobulated."
On your three options, I think 1. would be a bad mistake for which we would pay later -- folks in the ME read such actions far differently than do we westerners. I also believe 3, as you seem to think, is not going to happen.
That leaves number 2. I'm quite comfortable with that. I think I have more confidence in the people in the Army and Marines (as opposed to the senior leadership thereof) than some who post here seem to, possibly as a result of having seen the services bounce back from circumstances worse than we see today on several occasions. I'm firmly convinced that both the Army and Marines are capable of doing far more than many seem to credit them with, that the shift and refocus ability is phenomenal and little understood or appreciated and that the biggest problem in the way of that is a lack of confidence, to include self confidence, on the part of some senior people -- and I think a large part of that is engendered by the lack of trust in subordinates that our flawed training regimen provides.
If commanders are not confident that subordinates can do the job, they will micromanage -- and fear failure. Today's commanders are products of a flawed system that has not trained the basics well to newly entering officers or EM so they expect poor performance. What kind of sense does that make?
General Bruce Clarke's "An organization does well only those things the boss checks" became Army watchwords in the 60s. Very bad mentality, that. Those words and that philosophy totally screwed up command relationships and duties.
You said, early in your comment:True but that emphasizes my point on training -- conditions do vary; they always will. The task may or may not be the same but if it is, the conditions can shotgun all over the place. Our adoption of task, condition and standards training from civilian industry in the 70s was a terribly bad idea as was the ARTEP. Yet if one were to train to achieve a desired outcome under varying conditions...Quote:
"I am sure that today’s crop of Soldiers and leaders could maintain competency in those aspects that are common and train to those tactics that differ… but make no mistake TTPs do differ based on the conditions/context."
Fort Jackson is doing some good things with CATC and outcome based training, hopefully it'll catch hold...
Off topic, that; back to the point. No question that major combat is our imperative and COIN is a desirable ability. Unfortunately, the focus now, rightly or wrongly, is COIN. The Army has no choice but to emphasize that. A lot of senior people are correctly pointing out we're losing the imperative conventional capability, just as they did -- and we did -- during Viet Nam. My belief is that we'll have adequate warning and prep time to adjust training and focus. As for equipment, no US Army has ever gone to any war with all the right stuff in place at the onset; that, regrettably, is unlikely to change (See Congress, U.S.).
In summary, I agree that a deterioration of mission capability on the part of some branches is a problem; that it needs to be addressed and that we are not doing that well. I also believe that much of the problem stems from flawed planning in the past and today in high places and that the extant problem is no where near crisis level at this time. I further think that much of the current discussion is at least partly engendered by branch parochialism -- and that is NOT to say anyone is dealing in bad faith, I simply mean we are all products of our experience and that branch loyalty within the Army is not unknown thus those two factors combine to give one a branch centric view of any problem. To me, that is perfectly understandable, natural and not wrong in any sense -- though I'd submit that it should be recognized as a factor.
We can do better.
Very long way of of acknowledging I hear what you're saying but disagree pretty strongly on the potential 'danger' at this time.
Macgregor is omniscient? I don't -- but I do think 'inevitable' is evitable.The guys in Iraq don't know this???Quote:
To me this is the key point. We're using tactics designed for use against a single anti government insurgency, but we're fighting multiple factions, many of whom are part of the government.
:o:DKen, wm, etal,
I suppose we are mostly talking past each other at this point… I can acknowledge/agree with most of what you say, those points that where we don't agree are issues of nuance and not worth the time to quibble over…
As I’m sure you could tell, I get a little heated when I hear 'war is war'. A broad generalization that at some levels works – e.g. reacting to an ambush is reacting to an ambush, firing an artillery mission is likewise – but the approach is unhelpful when it bumps up against reality at the Title X/Generating Base level.
You will get no argument from me wrt the fine quality of small leader and their competency that result from current operations. Additionally, leaders of that quality can and will adjust and regain a level technical and tactical competency in their MOS (Arty, AR, AD, whatever).
I suppose the question is what level of competency and whether you buy into the argument that we are in an era of persistent conflict, and that we will continue to conduct these types of operations (although admittedly to varying degrees of scope). As well as what that means wrt the aimpoint/weighting of training effort and said resources with regard to time, personnel and training resources.
It is easy to forget that we are neigh on 5 years into an era in which units, Soldiers, and leaders have formed, trained and deployed with a sole focus of COIN operations (for many outside their traditional mission) in the current operational theaters. We have a community of junior leaders (officer & NCO) who have never fired gunnery tables (FA, AR, AD, others I don’t know). The type of expertise that we have come to expect was built on these and other types of training experiences. I don't think you can get away from the fact that it is cumulative. The situation may not be critical today, but we ain’t far off.
As you surmised I think COAs 1 & 3 are more or less throw-aways but for different reasons (unacceptable/unfeasible respectively). However, I think it is unwise to assume we can continue on our current path COA 2. When viewed through a strategic lens, the US has passed its culmination point (specifically wrt to ground capability, but it appears the same is true wrt to maritme and air operations).
culminating point — The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. a. In the offense, the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. b. In the defense, the point at which effective counteroffensive action is no longer possible. (JP 5-0)
I know plenty of bright people who think otherwise, I just can’t see it. We retain some freedom of action, but not enough to account for contingencies within the realm of the possible.
Thanks to all for their time and patience.
Live well and row
With some experience in the force generation business, I understand your point but do not fully agree. The issue is to deliver competent forces to the battle area. My contention is that we have failed at that in the past to one extent or another (to include both current theaters) but we recover well.Quote:
"As I’m sure you could tell, I get a little heated when I hear 'war is war'. A broad generalization that at some levels works – e.g. reacting to an ambush is reacting to an ambush, firing an artillery mission is likewise – but the approach is unhelpful when it bumps up against reality at the Title X/Generating Base level."
One can and should make the point that we should not have to recover -- I agree but reality intrudes. My seeming digression into the training regimen, the discombobulation of the cost those serving pay for the life style we have and the Army's penchant for wrongful focus on occasion were all based on the fact that such failures are a fact of life and that we have (purposely, inadvertantly or by default is immaterial) elected to operate that way. It could possibly be changed to preclude that in the future but I'm doubtful of the true possibility and dubious that will occur.
Thus, IMO, to say the Title X responsibilities dictate that 'war is not war' is not stating an immutable fact, rather its a euphemistic phrase for 'it's really difficult to be ready for everything.' With that, I totally agree. I'd also submit that to do less than be prepared for everything to the extent possible in spite of the difficulties is a disservice to the nation, to the Army as an institution and to the troops. But that's just me...
WRT:I think "buy into the argument" evades the point which to me is to be prepared for that to be the case. As Casey Stengel said, it's hard to make predictions, especially about the future. I have no clue whether such will be the case but I think it would be terribly remiss not to prepare for that at some level just as it would be terribly remiss not to prepare for a big war. It is not hard for me to say we have an obligation to be prepared for whatever the future brings; it is very hard for the Army to do that and I'm quite cognizant of that fact. Where I think we differ is that I'm pretty sure it can be done -- but that means breaking some Rice bowls and that is never easy (though I'm a long standing proponent of just such crockery smashing).Quote:
I suppose the question is what level of competency and whether you buy into the argument that we are in an era of persistent conflict, and that we will continue to conduct these types of operations (although admittedly to varying degrees of scope). As well as what that means wrt the aimpoint/weighting of training effort and said resources with regard to time, personnel and training resources.
We can disagree on that. I agree with those other bright people :DQuote:
"As you surmised I think COAs 1 & 3 are more or less throw-aways but for different reasons (unacceptable/unfeasible respectively). However, I think it is unwise to assume we can continue on our current path COA 2. When viewed through a strategic lens, the US has passed its culmination point (specifically wrt to ground capability, but it appears the same is true wrt to maritme and air operations)."
We will never be able to account for all contingencies; no democratic nation will -- and that's okay. What we have to do is be prepared, as best we can, for the likely contingencies. I submit our current capability to do that has been lessened but it's a long way from being in the tank. The doctrinal culminating point and many prophets of doom fail to account for the human dimension, the young guys can adapt. The issue is; will the old guys adapt?
Rank,
I may be wrong but I think that statement is probably more specifically in regard to the necessity for planning to govern until good governance is established than don't go cause it's broke. And in that context I would think most everyone would agree with him.
The one question that comes to mind in this regard is
If current ops are viewed in a world context has the precedent been set now that we may be required through no intentions of our own to attend to other areas in a similar fashion whether we like it or not.
As usual I think your dead on but I do have a question for all regarding training/preparation now vs then.
(WARNING: Big time run on sentence coming):wry:
In the last two years I have seen what seems like immense changes in how and what we train. I'm quite certain they would be reflected in how we train what we train as well and as such is there a possibility that much of the training which would traditionally be expected to require X amount of time may actually take less time and or personnel to accomplish?
Extremely good and quite important point, that...My perception is the you're very perceptive. I think that's the case.Quote:
In the last two years I have seen what seems like immense changes in how and what we train. I'm quite certain they would be reflected in how we train what we train as well and as such is there a possibility that much of the training which would traditionally be expected to require X amount of time may actually take less time and or personnel to accomplish?
Warning, diatribe approaching. We erred mightily in the 70s by listening to a lot of new hire Education (NOT Training, Education...) Specialists who had advanced degrees in Education. Nice guys but they didn't know much; they convinced the Army to do two really dumb things. Bear with me through the boring bit because these are important.
First they sold the Task, condition and standard training regimen -- bad deal, it worked for industry but if Eastinghouse screws up a run on widgets, they sell 'em at a discounted price, get a tax write off and keep on making widgets. We screw up and someone gets killed. Totally different milieus -- and rules. The principal problem with that approach is that the Task bit worked okay but the process could not and would not account for variables in condition. My pet example was, coincidentally, "Clear a building" Not difficult in many cases, very much so in others. Do you want me to clear the Chrysler building, the US Capitol, a medium sized mansion, a five bedroom ranch or a mud hut in SEA? The variance in conditions is humungous. It was and is an extremely poor training process and needs to be totally discarded.
I'll also pound one of my pet rocks here; one of the reasons it was admired and adopted was because it simplified things immeasurably for poor instructors (see ODB above; he's right on that...), a second reason was that it provided 'firm metrics' and 'removed the subjectivity from training.' Horse hockey, you absolutely cannot -- and should not -- remove subjectivity from training. My opinion of most metrics is well documented here so I needn't repeat that.
The second thing they did was run a slew of surveys which discovered that the average enlistee had a fifth grade reading level -- so they insisted on tailoring all training material at that level. Dumber than a box of stove bolts. fortunately, that got rectified fairly rapidly but it did some damage and it still persists in some quarters.
In short, we hired the very people who had produced a generation that read at a Fifth Grade level to fix a problem they had created in an environment they did not at all understand. I'm sure a lot of 'em are still in TRADOC. hopefully, they've gotten smarter.
Which gets to your question, as I said, I think you're correct; we are training better -- not great but better, I'll even go for a lot better -- and we have realized these kids today take to it like a duck to good bourbon. As I said above, the kids can and will adapt; I'll give the system beaucoup credit for trying to do so, now if we can just get the Pachyderms to follow and adapt instead of trying to return to business as usual...
The more I study the operation in the Second Lebanon War, the more I become convinced that,
a.) a lack of funding was the critical problem. The cheap options on training, deployments and equipment, all had disastrous effects. The same lack of funding stuffed the British Army in 1940.
b.) there was a leadership failure, at the highest levels, to understand what would have been useful and how it should have been gained.
I don't like Rupert Smiths book, because it is short on solutions and advice, but he makes some good points. He and I had a fairly sharp exchange of views when he spoke at the House of Commons, two years ago, as to where the blame for the current situation lies. However, he is right about equipment. Fighting insurgents does not generally require specialised equipment, that does not have some application fighting other threats. MRAPS could be worth their weight in gold, as concerns some of what they bring to the party.
What exactly is the major concern regarding the transition from COIN to HIC? If we look at the battle of Fallujah, it seems as if the Marines and Army were very capable in conducting HIC within the larger COIN environment?
Besides Fallujah, our ground forces have conducted large scale operations in Iraq and Afghanistan which were HIC in nature?
I've been out of the Army for about 4 years now so can someone please give an idea of what the major concern is? I would think that the military would be more "battle hardened" than it has been since Vietnam? Are units doing no HIC field exercises at home station?
Give me a scenario in which our "worst fears" would occur.
Exactly. That's why I do not like the LIC/HIC description. You may need the same operational skills to fight insurgents, as you would any other enemy. In terms of capability, Insurgents are variations on light infantry.
The debacle in Mogadishu, in 1993, was a failure to understand the threat, and the capabilities they possessed. The type of conflict was utterly irrelevant, except that it confused people as to the capabilities required.
I concur. I don't see "winning battles" as accurately describing the capabilities required to defeat both insurgents and combined arms formations.
Correct me if I am wrong, but the only reason you restrict the application of force against Insurgents is to prevent civilian casualties, because you must protect the civilians. That gives you the freedom of action to do other things - elections, build schools etc.
If the insurgents are out in the jungle, away from civilians, you kill or capture them, like any other enemy, and making best use of resources - so capture is preferable because of exploiting intelligence.
If the enemy has a Motor Rifle Regiment parked in a town in Texas or the Ukraine, you are still going to have to destroy all his vehicles, without killing too many civilians. If the Motor Rifle Regiment is thundering across a desert somewhere, then "nuke it from orbit" - :)
'At least for the foreseeable future, only the military that plants its flag on the enemy’s hilltop is the victor.' - Ron Tira The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations
So we've won in Iraq?
As Ron said t me over lunch the other day, "he does not completely agree with his previous position!" :) ...and to be fair, this is taking his quote out of context.
Actually, in terms of "victory" is believe this to be correct. In terms of "peace" it fails to be useful. Few, if any Insurgents have ever been defeated by a "military victory,". What seems to defeat them is "peace" - as in security and the denial of their ability to threaten it, so I think we may be in agreement.
Ratzel asked:
The American Army (and Marines) are battle hardened after 6 years of Astan and 5 years of Iraq. No question about it; lots of hard-nosed combat experience. But it is a combat experience of a certain discrete type using certain types of discrete combat skills. We should not delude ourselves to think that just because we are good at coin and the types of combat ops that go along with it in Iraq that we are automatically prepared for other forms of higher intensity combat. I have used this example before but consider the fact that operational logistics in Iraq are node-based and carried largely by civilian contractors. What would happen if a couple of combat brigades in Iraq had to pick up, move in a certain direction and conduct a sustained land operation in the field without fixed bases for support for 3 months? You see the concern here? When was the last time in Iraq that a Division moved off of its fixed base and conducted a movement to contact? Not since I was a BCT XO in the march up in 2003. Clearly there is supreme tactical expertise at the small unit level with the combat outfits fighting in Sadr city now; but we should not confuse that expertise with the kind of expertise that it took the lead American armor divisions in the break out of St Lo. And again the Israeli experience in Lebanon is instructive here. Read Andy Exum's superb battle analysis of Hiz in that fight where they fought tenaciously as small squads of infantry and AT teams. The Israeli Army was woefully unprepared for this higher level of fighting after many years of conducting counter-terrorism ops in the Palestinian territories. These are the concerns that many of us in the American Army have today; and they are not made up and hyperbolic but real. Lastly, the British 7th Armored Division by 43 had themselves become battle-hardened after years of fighting the Germans in north Africa. But when that 7th Armored Division hit the beaches in Normandy and over the next few weeks tried to take Caen they ran into many problems due to unfamiliarity with the new terrain and a different German force. The point here is that battle experience of one type is not automatically transferable to another.Quote:
I've been out of the Army for about 4 years now so can someone please give an idea of what the major concern is? I would think that the military would be more "battle hardened" than it has been since Vietnam? Are units doing no HIC field exercises at home station?
Wilf said:
Agree, sort of. At the very small unit level of say infantry squads the skill set for hic/lic is similar. i mean in coin in Iraq do we really think that a private rifleman or cav scout is meeting with the nac chairman or imam? Of course not, he is doing basic stuff like providing security, shooting, kicking in a door, zip cuffing, observing and reporting, etc. But take things a number of levels up from there and that is the point where you start to run into problems and where it is important to distinguish between hic/lic so as to see where certain skills have atrophied.Quote:
That's why I do not like the LIC/HIC description. You may need the same operational skills to fight insurgents, as you would any other enemy. In terms of capability, Insurgents are variations on light infantry.
As an another instance of the points Gian is making, I recommend a read of When the Odds Were Even, a discussion of 7th Army ops against the Germans in the Vosges during WWII. I cannot guarantee the historical accuracy of the the author's claim that this is about the only campaign where US and German forces fought at technical and strength parity. However, he concludes that the US was able to win handily because of better organization and interoperability at higher levels of organization. He points out that while the individual German soldiers were potentially as effective fighters as their American counterparts, they did not have the organizational "comraderie" required to be an effective combined arms fighting force. The bottom line argument in the book is that a signficant force multiplier for US forces in ETO WWII operations was that they had trained together for a year or more as a Division prior to deployment for combat. BTW, Rommel noted that he could have been even more successful in both 1940 in Belgium/France and 1941/42 N. Africa had he had more time to have his formations train together at Division level and above.)
I submit that something like this may be the real issue in the current "broken" Army debate. Ken may well be right that individual troopers will be able to find the well of personal resources they need to make it happen at their level. However, integrating all of what we used to call the BOS/battlefield operating systems (I think they now are called warfighting functions--WFFs --reflect on baseball, and think of what else is called a wiff :confused:) takes a lot of practice that I have a hard time believing is actually occuring either down range or back at home station train ups at much above the company level. I suspect that a root cause analysis would disclose that the current organizational structuring that Transformation has yielded is a significant source of the problem.
We addressed this subject with Col. Robert Abrams on a Bloggers Roundtable back in November. Here is the transcript:
http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmssha...transcript.pdf
According to him and others I've spoken with the gist of it is we must train for the fight we're in with an eye toward the future so there are no plans to quit combined arms training, but our deficiency today is in COIN. We'll be doing both now, but as soon as we get better at COIN we'll see more balance.
A friend of mine currently downrange had this to say in our discussion on this very subject yesterday:
"I just finished nearly 18 months of TRADOC schools at Fort Benning last year and the cadre were adamant about not teaching or facilitating COIN in the curriculum. They went out of their way to avoid delving in COIN discussions it seemed to focus basic skills and knowledge development in the core functional areas of conventional war fighting and military decision making. The reasons my instructors would give were of two sorts. First, they would indicate that the Tradoc command intent was to prepare for the battles and wars in the future, not the current ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. The second explanation was that as soon as we left our safe structured environ in Tradoc and joined a unit, we would mobilize and attend a COIN train-up giving us the latest TTPs and CALL experiences, delving into the COE in Iraq. They were right, much of my training to deploy this round was COIN centric. Although, much to my dismay, I am using NONE of it!"
Frontier 6 also has had much to say on this. I'm sure we can search around and find his comments, which I believe will probably bring us back to Col. Abrams take on it.
My point - we must first take out the 25 meter target.
I guess there's two levels to think about then? It would seem as if you're talking more about the Battalion level and above when talking about your scenario. I'm not very familiar with that level of planning.
From the company and below, the soldiers are used to working in a stressful environment and have most likely gotten down the little things like "actions at the objective" or clearing a building. The company medevac and skills like calling for fire or even familiararity with equipment should be much improved. These skills work the same wherever one goes (except for issues of terrain of course).
The higher level is something I know little about. I'll take your word for it that nodal based logistics are less complicated than a long logistics train, (like the one up to Baghdad). I took part in the invasion as well, and am uncertain of why we would "loose" this ability though? I don't remember seeing many contractors on the way to Baghdad either (I'm not saying there weren't any I just didn't see any)?
My final point is this: If I had to choose between the current military after 5 years of combat with less HIC training compared to the military that existed before 911 that had loads of HIC training; I would choose the former any day. That's not to say we should be overconfident of course.
I will check out the reading your suggested, thank you.
He noted:That's of far more concern to me than is our ability to crash train and reorient units and people if required. Over reliance on contractors for logistic support is something that the Army cannot control for. My suspicion is that factor has not been adequately addressed in planning for any type of future operation; hopefully, I'm wrong...Quote:
"...consider the fact that operational logistics in Iraq are node-based and carried largely by civilian contractors. What would happen if a couple of combat brigades in Iraq had to pick up, move in a certain direction and conduct a sustained land operation in the field without fixed bases for support for 3 months? You see the concern here? When was the last time in Iraq that a Division moved off of its fixed base and conducted a movement to contact?"
To build on Tom's statement; or a Division Headquarters. This gets at another area of concern; command and control at battalion level and higher. Company and below the C2 skillks that we have from Iraq and Astan now I think are pretty easily transferable to a higher intensity fight. But battalion and higher it becomes on the mild side problematic and on the worse very worriesome.
gian
As far as C2 goes, it may not be as bad as we think. I do not see much value currently being added by HQs at Division level and higher anyway.:rolleyes:
I wonder how many more BCTs we could field with the manpower and payroll savings from eliminating/streamlining those bloated organizations.
to moving the Div Hq is to abolish it * -- but I know that's not likely to fly... ;)
The biggest detriment to shifting to major combat from or in any even moderately long COIN op is the static location of BCT and higher hq and the stasis that builds in mindsets and outlooks. Given a campaign ala Korea where in the early days the shift was from one form of warfare to the other in short time spans, that was not a problem. In Viet Nam with the slight exception of a couple of 'fire brigade' units, it was a problem.
* Only partly tongue in cheek, I know we aren't able to do that on several levels but once we get the log piece adjusted, I do believe a TF Hq setup that is truly attuned to accepting a mixed set of subordinates would be better; the current Div has a tie that is ephemeral and psychological to its subordinates (and vice versa) which inhibits fully flexible plug and play. As an aside, CentCom's ideas on that score are not particularly helpful...
I suspect that at least a small portion of this centers on what many "flattened" civilian organizations are discovering....what do you do with people when you promote them?
With "up or out" chugging along, people in the military get promoted. And then you have to find something for them to do (or at least a chair to sit in)...and that breeds higher headquarters.
Sorry for the simplistic analysis/comments, but I'm on the fly here and this just occurred to me. I've worked in "flattened" civilian organizations, and morale tends to suck because there's no place to go within the organization. If the military flattens, then they have to find places to put all those O4s, O5s, and so on. Staffs tend to make good hiding places.
Just a random thought. YMMV, as always.
Oh by all means you are on target. Much of what has sprung up are the very structures that were flattened and pushed down to BCTs. It left quite a gap in targets for battalion and brigade command in the various CS and CSS categories. And of course, really getting rid of 3-star corps commands whenh we were calling them UeXs etc was unlikely at best.
Tom
Honestly if they would maintain the flattened structure and ramp up actual combat power of the BCT (versus staff and all others), I would not mind that happening --if that BCT became and independent brigade like we used to have. But as you imply if it happens under current and emerging structures it would just be another case of rampant rank overkill.
Personally I always thought that Defense Attaches should be called Generalissimos or maybe just El Heffe Supremo with SLA Marshall oversized stars....:D
Tom
maneuver strength was that, come a war, they'd add a maneuver Bn, enlarge everything else, maybe add a GS Arty Bn and go to a one star. Y'all may be right, they may do it regardless.
Sigh...
Rick Atkinson mentioned in The Day of Battle, that the U.S. Army in 1943, exceeded 6 million and was "...led by 1,000 generals, 7,000 colonels, and 343,000 lieutenants."
How many of each are there today? In an army of what...522,000?
I think the question becomes not how many generals does it take to screw in a light bulb, but rather how many generals can we promote IOT enable light-bulb screwation.
Sorry to have declinated a few degrees off thread, but inflated GO billets rub me raw
Division staffs are chock full of good, smart, professional people. They usually have competent, intelligent commanders. The problem, as we have transitioned to BCT structures and gotten involved in small wars, is that divisions (mostly morphed into JTFs) have less and less ability to influence the fight. Most of the resources are pushed down to the brigade level; a good chunk of the remaining forces are in self-contained, specialist task forces; logisitcs becomes routinized; there are no reserves to speak of. As a result the division becomes involved in parceling out a handful of helicopters or PSYOPs teams or whatever - there is rarely even a need to prioritize resources as the pace is slow enough that nobody ever goes without air support or MEDEVACS or ammunition. Due to human nature, the division staff and its leadership therefore begins to micromanage and meddle while turning into an information vacuum. At one point, CJTF-76 in Afghanistan had six (count 'em, six!) general officers, at least four of whom had only a single colonel to supervise.
The problem with just bagging the idea of the division is that someday we will be invited to a war involving brigades passing through each other, opposed river crossings, brigade-level deep aviation operations, commitment of reserves, terrain management, artillery that has to displace, and more targets than we can service simultaneously. Hell, maybe even integrated air defense!Some form of higher headquarters will have to do this (and be trained to do it before being called upon to execute). As others have pointed out, these are the kind of requisite warfighting skills that we are neither training for nor learning-by-doing.
the BCT and below theater -- or Army, situation dependent -- level. I believe that a Hq on the original WW II concept of the Corps (fairly small, tactically oriented, no fixed units) with an as required two or three button an able to control two to six BCT is doable. Need to continue to tweak the log processes, obviously.WR to 'training for' makes one wonder what the Divisions here in the states are up to. Getting ready for the next trip, yeah -- but the staffs are certainly more than large enough to do multi-tasking...Quote:
...As others have pointed out, these are the kind of requisite warfighting skills that we are neither training for nor learning-by-doing.
I would like to know the counsels thoughts on the lack of divisional control in the current fight? Could this be part of the many battlespace issues? The last I checked the Army's structure is in such a way that no one directly leads more than 4 men. For this we will look at a divisions structure, CG has how many direct subordinates? A fire team leader has how many direct subordinates? In theatre today what is the structure? Who really answers to who from the BCT level up? Then throw into the mix how many direct subordinates does the BCT commander have? IMO if your going to bump the BCT commander to a 1 star then he should have 2 full birds below him (kinda like a division). I cannot believe I just said that!!!!! Additionally then we must bump my SF brothers as well. (Officers and enlisted) Unfortunately in todays politically correct Army many will only deal with you if your of certain rank.
I have to ask this here. Why are units not training thier basic (conventional) tasks during their non-deployment time? This past off rotation for us we went back to the basics. Started with weapons, every weapons system in our MTOE was trained and shot (pistols to 81 mm mortars), day and night. Then we went and did basic FM 7-8 battle drill live fires. Imagine that an SF team doing movement to contact, through the woods day and night. Somewhere along the way we had leaders realize we were getting away from training the basics and needed to get back to it. As I look at the multitude of problems that ones are griping about my question is what are they doing to fix it? Why are they not doing their, wait here it comes, METL tasks? I gather by what is being said, we have thrown out our METL tasks and are doing our own thing? I understand repeat rotations, but I'm sorry if we can do it in six months between rotations why can't it be done in 12 months? Before someone says we have more resources and money, one might want to know that every piece of land here except 1 training area (for an entire SF group) has been given to the BCTs. Any training we want to conduct at home station we have to beg, borrow, and grease the palms of the BCTs. Figure that one out!
Maybe I am to simple minded and naive to look at this and that is why I think the way I do, but then again maybe others are too quick to not take the hard road. Yes I love family time and down time, but I love my life and my brothers lives even more. It is our job to train and be prepared for whatever is required of us. If this means a few more days or weeks away from the family then that is what it is. That is what we are paid (not enough) to do and what is expected of us. Man how I wish I could be SMA for a day!!!:D
Or maybe the government should throw in the towel and admit that the mass outsourcing of functions to contractors in DOD was never the good deal it was promised to be, either financially or otherwise, and return those functions to military/ government personnel? This all got underway in the early 90s, IMO at least heavily influenced by the wild popularity of management cult gibberish and the downsizing/"rightsizing"/consolidations going on in business at the time. The military is not a business and what works in industry has limited application at best in the profession of arms.
EDIT: this is starting to drag the topic OT, my apologies... I'll shut up now.
I'm not sure that it would even be possible to "throw in the towel." The Army is having trouble meeting its goals for man power as it is, do you really think we could recruit the 150,000 troops that would be required to replace these contractors? I'm not trying to give you a hard time, but can you provide me with any data to support your claim that outsourcing certain functions is not "a good deal" financially? I would think, that if there's at least one very solid argument for outsourcing that it would indeed be financial.
Besides that, why should we waste precious man power on cooking, guarding the base camp, and driving trucks when we can have patriotic civilians do it? Many of the contractors we use are retired service people who have the skills and motivation to preform these functions and not using these people would be a major waste of human capital.
Contractors also have a comparative advantage at certain skill sets. Blackwater does a fine job at guarding diplomats. How many SF people would we have to divert from doing their missions if we didn't have Blackwater to preform this function? How many troops would we have to have back in Kuwait if we didn't have contractors repairing tanks and Bradly's in the rear? Before the invasion of Iraq, my unit was trained by ex-SF people for MOUT. This training was the best training I ever had in urban combat and I can say without a doubt that this training increased my units skills for the war. All of our trainers were ex-SF and Rangers with 20 years plus of experience and each one of them had seem combat. Why should these guys be back in the US when they can used to train people? What else should people of this caliber be doing while a war is going on? Perhaps they would be better off as the town sheriff or the sporting goods manager at the Wal-mart?
This is not to say there isn't negatives with contractors. We all know there's issues relating to accountability and the possibility of Special Forces personal leaving for the big money that some of these firms provide. But in general, I think a cost-benefit analysis would prove the contractors to be beneficial to the force.