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Its time to rethink the benefits of Jointness. Yes there are many benefits associated with the Jointness concept but there are also many negatives. Good interservice competition like we saw in the Cold War and before would increase efficiency and innovation and decrease waste. Anybody disagree/agree?
Ed, I agreed with your first sentence, and your first sentence only. Yes, we sometimes try too hard to be joint, when joint isn't appropriate just to be joint, which is a form of military political correctness. On rare occassions that has led to less than desirable results for some missions, such as Operation Eagle Claw.
On the other hand, our military has "evolved" to be more joint because we learned through the school of hard knocks that it is absolutely essential to our operational success. I'm not sure why you would want to turn back the clock?
Since the services have different core missions (even the Marines and Army while similiar have different focuses), so what exactly is the field of competition? Should the Army compete with the Navy in submarine warfare? Should the Marines challenge the Air Force in their ability to conduct deep strike operations? Not sure how that would result in cost savings or more innovation.Quote:
Good interservice competition like we saw in the Cold War and before would increase efficiency and innovation and decrease waste. Anybody disagree/agree?
The services already compete for resources, but there is more cooperation than between the services at the upper levels than you might think, because no responsible leader wants to defang any of our services, since they all need to be capable to support the joint fight.
I think you will see more innovation and more efficiency with increased jointness, but jointness for a purpose, not just pretending to be joint when it isn't appropriate because it sounds good during a brief.
The darker side of human nature will always be there. You'll always have your idiots who think the Air Force can bomb our way to victory, and the Marines and Army have their share of bone heads who can be service and branch centric to the point of mission failure. However, those who get to the top positions, while still dedicated to their service, fully understand and support the importance of jointness.
A standing joke is that joint is spelled "A-R-M-Y" due to all of the staff procedures used to run joint staffs being derived from army staffing processess. I'm coming up on 5 consecutive years in Joint headquarters, and it has it's pros and cons. At its best, it is excellent. SOCPAC, as a subunifed command of PACOM, and a deployable operational HQ as well as a highlevel staff was (and is) a great mix of SF, SEALs, and AF and Marine SOF operators at its core, with a great supporting team from all walks. You can gain a special synergy from such a mix, as each sees similar situations in unique ways. Walk out the door and down the hall to PACOM, and there joint is spelled "N-A-V-Y." Totally different world and culture.
Real downside is the PC effect described above. Commander is Army, so Deputy must be Navy and the COS will be AF and the 3 will be a Marine, etc. Sometimes worrying about keeping the mix right hinders getting the right guy for the job. Just as bad are the joint pubs, where definitions are too often a crazy mix of service definitions, with anything that could not be agreed to either simply left out, or worse, with both conflicting positions included. It's getting better, but we've a long way to go.
But as to service competition, have no fear, the Service Chiefs and their staffs at the Pentagon don't worry about joint and are all slamming away at ensuring their service equities get fully (if not justifed in the big scheme of jointness) funded. JFCOM manages the force provided by the services and allocates it out to the GCCs to employ, but JFCOM knows it must wear kid gloves in dealing with the Services, which remain the true power brokers in DoD.
Personally, I think there needs to be more "joint" not less. One of the biggest problems I see is not enough joint training, particularly between the Army and Air Force. I also wouldn't mind seeing most weapons development and procurement managed at the joint instead of service level.
I think that the Army and Air Force cultures are almost polar opposites, to the extent that joint training will not work for Army units.
For example, the Air Force is a time driven organization, and the Army is a mission driven organization. The ATO cycle drives the Air Force, to the extent that, except for planned flexibility, they can't or won't flex it, in my experience.
Another example is training CAS requests. The Air Force wants to program training CAS a year out. That means that if I drop a request the day I return from deployment, I might get supported the last 30 days before I deploy again (when I have essentially stopped training to ship my stuff and gives guys a break with their families). I can't lock in training resources until 8 weeks or so, so I train with Navy or USMC CAS.
I will second 82nd redleg's experience
At JMRC, Air Force reps usually showed up at the daily meeting, bitch about CAS not being used, and then announce how we should script our training so that we would be using CAS missions that were already scheduled by Air Force the next day.
They then threaten the chain of command with being negligent if even one soldier is "killed" in a mission where CAS is available and not used. (Right, JDAMS that wedding party; it's the American Way)
Nevermind that JMRC is largely "free-play" and we're trying to teach non-lethal or less than lethal for that rotation.
I'll echo others remarks about the USAF and Joint training -- the AF position has always seemed to me to be our way or we won't play and they are totally lacking in flexibility. I've never had real problems coordinating training among Army posts or units, with the Navy or Marines. Compromises were made and things got done. However, doing that with the USAF has always been tedious and irritating-- and frequently unsuccessful, compromise is a word that the AF doesn't seem to know. I understand airplanes are expensive. So is a Rifle Company of 150 plus bodies...Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
That said, I agree that there needs to be more and not less. The question is how do we get there?
I strongly disagree with joint weapons development and procurement; DoD's current single manager approach to the procurement of most things is undoubtedly efficient and has saved the taxpayers some money -- but it also buys stuff that is frequently not fit for purpose. Competition and multiple sources produce multiple weapon types that make system defeat less likely. The American penchant for one size fits all solutions is militarily a very bad approach; the Army is bad enough with their reluctance to buy special purpose equipment for special units (That's a big part of the reason there is now a SOCOM). They're slowly growing out of that but not nearly rapidly enough -- the M4 Carbine debacle is a good example. Crass stupidity.
Given joint development and procurement there would be no F-22, only the F-35...:eek:
Ken,
I think, as usual, we agree more than we disagree.
On the training issue, I don't dispute the AF is a bad apple (probabably the worst) a lot of the time which is why I think there needs to be more "adult" intervention at the joint level to ensure the services play nice with each other. We want to minimize "on the job" training as much as possible. And to be sure, the AF perception of the Army is not that different from what's been said about the AF in this thread so far. This division speaks, in my view, to a fundamental lack of communication, understanding and to too much bad blood caused by years of distrust. I'm frankly tired of it and strongly think that someone above the service level needs to tackle this institutional grudge-match head on and force some cooperation and change from all parties.
I also agree in principle with your concerns about joint weapons development, but in my mind the unfortunate reality is that the services (all of them) have proven incompetent at it. They need, at best, mentoring, and at worst, a very very short leash until they can demonstrate some competence as well as to control things like requirements creep. This isn't to suggest that the Army should set requirements for air superiority weapons or that the Air Force should have input on the next destroyer.
120mm,
I understand what you're saying, but the Air Force has training requirements too that need to be met. I have to say I find it kind of amusing that the perception has changed from the AF hating and ignoring CAS to being overly focused on CAS. Some accommodation and artificiality must be introduced for everyone to meet their training requirements. I understand (and fully support) the goal of more non-lethal options in theater, but that should not mean that CAS training should be reduced. After all, when you really do need CAS, do want a pilot supporting you in theater who spent most of his/her time at JMRC burning circles in the sky?
Most of my large training exercise experience is from my Navy time, and accomodations were always made to ensure everyone met their training requirements and got to actually practice their wartime skills. This inevitably means that some players will have to do things they wouldn't actually do in wartime. For example, submarines in exercises will let ASW assets get an initial detection so that ASW assets can practice tracking, engagement, etc. - something a sub would never do in a real war.
I agree.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
Can't argue with that. My point, of course was, that DoD has done little if any better. Procurement is a knotty problem -- but I do believe that Congressional interference for political reasons has been a huge contributor to the problem. I have no solution to that -- other than Vote against all incumbents!!! :wry:Quote:
...I also agree in principle with your concerns about joint weapons development, but in my mind the unfortunate reality is that the services (all of them) have proven incompetent at it.
I agree with your first post, when you mention it has more to do with the "how" they do it. My main problem with that scenario was the high-handed, arrogant way the senior trainer came off.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
As currently configured, "live" CAS doesn't synch well with "live" freeplay and we just shouldn't even think of doing it, for the reasons you mention. Of course, if we had a cheaper, long-duration COIN platform, that could take off and land locally, we could do all the "Joint" training we wanted....:)
BTW - I used to coordinate military aircraft for airshows and never had a problem with USAF support. I fail to see how different that was from CAS; except the whole exploding ordnance part. "Jointness" is more about mind set than anything.
I recall times when the AF was being very accomodating - under Gen. Larry Welch. Still, we should never forget that the USAF was once the Army Air Corps and thinks we'd like to put them back in that box. (Now, maybe that's not such a bad idea;))
One area where we should do some joint procurement, IMO, is in combat uniforms. Is there any reason why Army ACUs should be different from USMC digicams, or why the USAF and the USN need their own version of a camoflage combat uniform?
Cheers
JohnT
Utility uniform was a DoD wide prescribed unigram. Worked. Was around from the late 50s until the late 70s. Cost about $20.00 a set. Then the Jungle uniform came in and the Army got approval from someone to go to the BDU and it all went downhill from there. Current uniforms run about $70-90, contract dependent. Camouflage band for the Helmet used to cost Nine cents, the new one with two useless luminous tabs sewn on costs over a buck...Quote:
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
Camouflage uniforms really don't work universally. They look sexy in garrison but in the field the OG 107 -- or better, a dark sage -- single color is harder to detect in most environments; all the 'flage patterns suffer from environmental specificity. Not to mention that the multi color dying adversely affects fabric durability.
Lotta things are far better today -- including uniform pattern (not fabric, uniform; pockets and such), a really big and valid reason for service specificity without even getting to the tanker / mech nomex or the flight suits -- and make sense. It costs more but to back off much would be to effect compromises of effectiveness and compromises themselves have a cost. No easy solutions.
I think the definition and degree of "Joint", needs to be clarified, but I have a sneaking suspicion that "Joint" is something like "love" - it has to be good, and to speak against it, is to worry the herd of sacred Bovine that wander the halls.Quote:
Originally Posted by ed
But Wilf, for "love" to be "good", there has to be a strong "pain" component. Doesn't it??? At least it has in my experience. So what if you can get the mission done without the pain?Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
(I typed this tongue-in-cheek but the more I reread it, the more I like it.)
Last month I spoke at our Command and Staff College ( a joint school) about the need for National policy for the conduct of small wars and insurgency. The presentation seemed to go well and the questions were quite benign (it was the lecture before morning tea...) until...
One of the Naval O4 students posed a question that was actually a statement. He queried why when I spoke about the issue of counterinsurgency that I took an "land centric' approach.
After reassuring the audience that there were valuable tasks for all of the joint team in the fight, ultimately I had to point out that most populations live on land.... I did conclude by reassuring the white suiters that when populations started to live underwater we would be guaranteed to start talking a whole lot more about the naval roles in COIN.
You have no idea how many times I had this conversation with my brothers from PACFLEET and PACOM. Tremendous energy and money were committed to complex programs to control the waters of South East Asia. Radar systems, etc. And this was all sold as COIN. My standard line to them was very similar to yours. "Insurgency doesn't happen at sea."Quote:
Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill
This points to a larger issue though, that the Army guys get just as wrong as the Navy - the issue of border control to solve insurgency. Be it the PAK-AF border, the many "borders" of sub Saharan Africa, or the waters between MY-RP-ID. The fact is that these populaces have been "globalized" for thousands of years, and their culture and commerce rely on what is now considered illegal trade across these modern borders. To close borders has a tremendous negative impact on the very populaces that are already supporting insurgency against their respective governments, all in the name of stopping trans-national crime/terrorism. This, even though everyone also knows that criminals and terrorists have no particular recognition or concern for these borders either, and that networked operations can much more effectively be short-circuited by identifying and taking down the critical nodes on either side of the border where these actions either originate, terminate, or transit through.
So, yes, the Navy looks at the problem in a very Navy way. control the seas. The Army looks at it in a very army way. Defeat the enemy, control the borders.
I take a populist approach. Understand the populace, and the failures of governance that is causing their unrest. Also understand the legitimate cultures and activities of the populace as well. Then design and implement a program to help the governance address its failures and better care for the populace, while at the same time implementing a tailored security program and operations against the insurgent. Never forgetting that the insurgent also a member of the populace.
As to those outside actors, that come into a country waging UW to leverage these insurgencies (AQ all over, the JI in the Philippines, Iranians in Iraq, etc) Apply CT to these, and also seek to understand and then disable their network.
I guess the key thing to remember is that we are all slanted by our training and experience, and will try to fit any given problem into that paradigm. I never met a Marine who didn't think any military problem could not be resolved by an amphibious assault, nor an Air Force pilot who was not convinced that air power, or "global strike" was not the key to victory.
Know your enemy and know yourself...Joint doesn't fix us, but we are getting to know ourselves a lot better, and that is a start.
...and only half in jest. There is an old Jewish saying that the perfect woman must be the devil.Quote:
Originally Posted by 120mm
Seriously, "Joint" is like "comprehensive," "holistic" or "System". It's a word loaded with supposedly benign effectiveness and utility. Of course everyone wants to work towards a common cause, all in agreement and all being more than the mere sum of the parts - nice if you can get it.
"Armoured Infantry" are neither good armour or good infantry, not because the logic is bad, but because the human understanding is poor. Someone skilled in "Joint Planning" is not as skilled as someone in "Land Operations" planning, at planning land warfare operations.
Personally to me, Joint means saving money and reducing effectiveness.
Wilf,
I think "joint" is more than that and is an overall boost to effectiveness. Let's look at the official definition: "...activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate." That pretty much describes almost every military operation.
Also, to me its about making the services cooperate and reducing service parochialism. Standardization through joint doctrine and procedures have been very beneficial in many areas. Minimal joint procurement standards are also necessary - in the bad old days the services literally couldn't communicate with each other because of radio incompatibility, or one service's piece of equipment would disrupt that of another service.
120mm,
Agree with your comments on training.
Ken,
Don't get me started on uniforms. The AF has screwed that up as well. The only two positive things I can say about the ABU is that it is wash-and-wear and it has sizes that fit females much better than any of the older uniforms.
And like the ACU, I'm dubious the color scheme provides much camouflage except in cases such as this:
http://i98.photobucket.com/albums/l2...couch-camo.jpg
At least the first part is; they mean well but fail to realize that increased efficiency does not equate to increased effectiveness -- and that, frequently it can actually decrease effectiveness.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
There are some benefits of increasing joint efforts and most who wish to do so are well intentioned but the big drivers have been just as you say -- an effort to save money which has, even if often inadvertently, adversely affected effectiveness in many areas.
There's nothing wrong with the concept, it's fine -- it's the implementation that counts and to let the Program and Budget folks drive ANY train is an invitation to disaster.
*Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*Quote:
Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill
and it's been a naval role for centuries. So not COIN but COPI.Quote:
Originally Posted by selil
How are they doing on that nowadays, by the way... ;)
Yep, the pirates are winning over the cargo ship population by first coercing them to act in accordance within pirate expectations, and then as the world's cargo fleets realize that the world's navies can't protect them they'll recognize the pirates as the new government of the sea and willingly start supporting them. This must be an insurgency, and it is obviously the Navy's problem. :D In all seriousness, pirates like other organized criminal groups do present a challenge to the State. I still think our definitions for COIN, FID, UW, etc. are inadequate to address the security challenges we face today. Words have meaning, and many times those meanings can lmit our understanding of reality.Quote:
*Cough* Somali Pirates *Cough*
As for joint operations, our joint doctrine has some flaws, for example the aspects of it that are ATO centric (time table driven operations that nests well with the way the Air Force manages operations, but not necessarily with the other services), which is one example of a process that should be largely service doctrine, yet in many ways the ATO drives our joint targeting process.
I think the reality is that most of the problems with joint operations (I don't want to touch procurement and similiar issues) is not the doctrine, but rather how the doctrine is put into practice (if it is put into practice). In this case the shortfalls are due to the personalties involved, not the doctrine. All people, even our best commanders, are not without fault. It is a human trait we cannot overcome (even with EBO); it is simply part of the uncertainty of war. So when I read comments on one joint command being Army centric, and another Navy centric, that isn't a reflection of our joint doctrine, it is a recognition of the failure of people to transition from service centric methodology to joint methodology. Still I believe we are getting better at joint operations each year. I personally wouldn't want to fight an OIF-1 like fight without the synergized capabilities of our joint force empowered by our joint doctrine. Call me bias, but like many of you I have seen the power that this joint force can bring to bare on a situation.
Admittedly our joint doctrine is largely focused on warfighting, NEO, etc., so it doesn't sufficiently address the role of the services in an irregular warfare scenario (we'll get there). The reality is IW is largely ground pounder focused, with air and sea power providing critical enablers. All the services play critical roles, but part of our service culture, based perhaps on our captialist social norms and our Congressional funding process, motivates many officers to attempt to undermine the other services and overly boost the value of their service (or branch). This iis what causes jointness to fail.
Look at the bright side, we know we have our faults, but generally our enemies are much worse. They're stuck with the imperfection of being human too.
Selil,Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Mate, surely after all this time on SWJ and the countless posts, you don't mistake the criminal act of piracy for insurgency? where have we failed?
:(
Mark
Selil and Bill Moore raise some very interesting issues, and I for one am not ready to dismiss the issue of whether or not piracy is insurgency.
Nor am I convinced that piracy is a Navy problem; God help us if it is.
The topic deserves more and deeper analysis.
I have used the Barbary Pirates as an example of Small Wars and Irregular War--with a dash of COIN thrown in as in the pirates against the world's maritime-based economy of the day. Interesting that recent statements by the Somali pirates point to their "country"'s disastrous state and say they turned to piracy against the world. Recent connections between the Muslim extremists and the Somali pirates reinforce that connection. All of that may be streched a bit too far but I feel very comfortable in seeing the phenomenon as an element of irregular warfare. Our Navy runs hot and cold on the issue of brown water operations; sometimes they are for the concept, sometimes they are not. At least some of them are looking at it.Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
This relates well to the DoD Directive on IW under discussion on the blog. That directive gives JFCOM the mission to push the training for IW rather than SOCOM. I see that as a good thing not because SOCOM cannot handle IW--they can and do so quite handily. Too many folks however across the services would have seen that as a reason to once again forget about IW, COIN, or any related matter.
Tom
Counter Piracy was certainly the reason we created a Navy, and shaped their engagement from 1803 to Stephen Decatur in 1815(or so). But the decisive actions in those campaigns happend on land and were executed by Marines.
The at Sea portion of countering piracy is important today as well, but the ocean is a big area. There those who say that we then need to implement a blockade. Well as I recall the coast of Somalia alone is as long as the coast of California. Navy ships are big, pirate "ships" are more like 11M RHIBs. That too is too costly and too much area. Once again we will need to follow the vipers to their nest and kill them there.
Young men are becoming pirates in growing numbers because they escape the norm and gain rockstar-like status and money. Governments turn a blind eye because they are not held accountable for doing so, and also gain money to their weak economies in general, and to their own pockets in particular.
Simple cost/benefit analysis by all. We need an engagement plan where the benefit exceeds the cost; and we (we being the global maritime economy) need to make the cost of being a pirate exceed the benefit. It will always exist, but clearly the current balance is tipped the wrong way.
ISTM piracy can be symptom of an insurgency, but if one is looking for true "naval" insurgents, there is always the LTTE, which has the most advanced naval capability of any insurgency that I'm aware of.
I've thought that the definitions for insurgency have been to strict. A couple days ago in some prescient Odom channeling moment I was discussing the Barbary Pirates and the Somali Pirates and I expressed that these would definitely fall into small wars territory and likely insurgent activities. This was how the Marine Corps got into the business in some respects.
To understand and define an organiztion, focus on their purpose for action over the nature of their actions themself.
Too many are labeled "terrorists" that are actually insurgents using terrorism as a tactic. Similarly, while most pirates are criminals (profit motive vs political motive), some are in fact an arm of an insurgent movement, and some are a loosely affiliated fund-raising arm of an insurgency. Same goes for the use of drug cartels by insurgencies, or by non-state organizations waging UW like AQ is.
The key is to not automatically group or defines organizations with differing purposes by overly focusing on affiliations or similar actions. A piracy organization that is part of an insurgency requires a COIN based solution set. One that is purely profit based can be engaged quite well with more of a CT/law enforecement approach. For those that are a mix, understand the mix, and proceed cautiously. Complex business that is too often over simplified and reduced to simply attacking the symptom directly without regard for what the actual underlying cause is.
My Dad was on active duty back when the BDU was coming into service (and was involved in it, and getting it standard throughout DOD via DLA), and always said that there was nothing wrong with the pickle suit (except maybe the cap), and that camouflage uniforms should be organizational issue for combat units, for when they go to war or the field and need to be camouflaged.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Seems to me that piracy is piracy and insurgency is insurgency. The DoD dictionary agrees:Quote:
Originally Posted by Old Eagle
Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.
Piracy: An illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.
That does not mean that insurgents may not use piracy to further their goals nor, I suppose, does it mean that Pirates cannot be insurgents but the two still remain distinct acts.Oh, I dunno, they've been landing the Marines to take care of land based pirates around the world since 1801 in Tom's Barbary effort; dozens of landings from the Caribbean to Sumatra and even to Korea. Generally successfully. There've even been a few Naval and Marine officers court martialed for 'exceeding their authority.' ;)Quote:
Nor am I convinced that piracy is a Navy problem; God help us if it is.
Perhaps. Probably deserves action at some point... :cool:Quote:
The topic deserves more and deeper analysis.
or do people want to expand definitions to include their pet rocks? :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by selil
Been my observation that straightforward definitions focus thinking and amorphous terms encourage fog and groping. Contrary to popular opinion, all cats are not gray in the dark...
Most rocks are gray, and almost all cats prrrrrrrrr; thats gotta count for something.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
don't it;)
Ken, that simple sentence probably best sums up my overall concern with my pet rock. We have increasing piracy off Somalia, we street gangs that are getting more and more powerful (not just in the U.S.), we have narcotrafficers who have well trained and equipped militias that are more than a match for most law enforcement agencies around the world.Quote:
Perhaps. Probably deserves action at some point...
In Mexico I think an argument could be made that the drug cartels are in fact waging a quasi-insurgency, because they are vying for power (control) with the State over certain geographical areas to facilitate their business, but they don't want to overthrow the entire government. Their concern is not taking over Mexico, but creating the conditions to facilitate business. However, if that involves killing off good cops and judges, and buying off bad ones, then that is a form of subversion intending to effect control of at least part of the government.
Your argument is still correct, by the legacy definition you posted, that is still not an insurgency, but then again this isn't your grandfather's mafia either. The nature of the threat has changed, and in the end the one point we can probably agree on is that these elements present an increasing threat to our national interests and the safety of our citizens in some cases.
Back to the definitions and my concern with them. Words not only have meaning, they are associated with authorities and perceptions. If we fall back on defining the problem in N. Mexico as a criminal threat (it is, so you wouldn't be wrong), then it is a law enforcement problem, even if it is beyond their capacity to suppress. The military can provide limited support. On the other hand if the threat is defined as an insurgency (only in cases where appropriate), then that implies that other authorities could be implemented if our nation wanted to take more decisive measures to suppress the problem.
A perfect definition would be nice, but we're all used to working in gray areas. I don't want to spend too much time tripping over definitions, they are what they are, so I'll close with your point, this threat requires more action than we're applying to it now.
While disagreeing on this:Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Not our job -- unless we're asked to help. Even then, I'm concerned that out help would be overboard and out of control as it has been in too many cases where we have 'helped.' That's why a lot of people -- sensibly -- do not want our help and do not trust us.Quote:
On the other hand if the threat is defined as an insurgency (only in cases where appropriate), then that implies that other authorities could be implemented if our nation wanted to take more decisive measures to suppress the problem. (emphasis added /kw)
Words are important. Spinning things to get ones own twist is as old as mankind and it's not going away. Insisting on relative precision in terms helps keep the system honest; shading the terms help politicians and the unlawful do stupid stuff. There is no such thing as absolute precision and that's particularly true in the use of words but trying to be reasonably accurate doesn't hurt and may help.
On your pet rock, I share your concern but I think that each nation should approach the problem in its own way and other nations should support that. There are nations like Mexico where Armed Forces involvement is desirable or necessary. For the US, my personal belief is that a military solution or reaction to gangs and trans-national criminality would be totally wrong.
My one assignment (so far) to a Joint Staff led me to believe that Joint works very well in a garrison and/or CONUS based organization, but there are many challenges when people are deployed into a Joint Command/Staff that has been operating in a combat theater.
I had two USAF and two USN personnel work for me, and to be frank, they were untrained for the job at hand (mainly because Astan is a largely Army fight). So in addition to actually having to work and lead, I also had to spend time training them on the most simple aspects of the Army.
When I say simple, I mean the difference between infantry units and capabilites, then the differences in organization from company through BCT level, etc...
I would like to see more true Jointness occur at the BN and lower level for both NCO's and Officers. Create a strong base of knowledge and expertise, and then allow these individuals to move up through the Joint world as they become more experienced and wiser. Would make a lot more sense than sending an 03 to a Combined/Joint Staff for the first time and asking "what's the difference between light and mechanized infantry?"
The problem, at least in my experience, is the people who are in the joint staff during wartime were not the ones who are on it back in conus for training or whatever. This leads to the very real problem you identify:Quote:
Originally Posted by Ski
When I was in the Navy, I was one of those guys who didn't know squat about ground stuff to include the basics you cited (I eventually learned them when I got to the AF). It simply wasn't a part of my training. I also was woefully ignorant of the Air Force despite the fact I was in naval aviation, which you'd think would directly translate. The problem you identify is huge, but I think the answer is more "joint" and not less.Quote:
I had two USAF and two USN personnel work for me, and to be frank, they were untrained for the job at hand (mainly because Astan is a largely Army fight). So in addition to actually having to work and lead, I also had to spend time training them on the most simple aspects of the Army.
When I say simple, I mean the difference between infantry units and capabilites, then the differences in organization from company through BCT level, etc...
The main problem I've seen (again, very limited anecdotal experience) is that many people on joint staffs (at least in the beginning) are so ignorant of how the other components/services operate that collaboration is very cumbersome in the beginning. Once the team finally figures things out the campaign is over or new people rotate in and the process begins anew. Not very effective, IMO.
It's important for me to note that I came to this perspective due to my experience spending a significant amount of time in two different services (Navy and AF). It's hard to overemphasize how valuable my Navy experience turned out to be when I got into the AF. Not only could I educate my AF brothers and sisters about the way the Navy does business; Naval capabilities, culture, mindset, etc., but it paid real dividends whenever my units did anything with the Navy. Being in two services really made me understand how ignorant most people are about the other services. That ignorance is not an individual service member's fault - after all, one can't expect them to know without training and exposure - but its a problem that hinders the combined arms team IMO. As part of the Air Force team, for example, I can't provide good support if I'm completely ignorant of the Army, even if I'm a genius on the Air Force. Such ignorance makes it very difficult for me to translate those Army needs into effective Air Force solutions. And the reverse is also true - an Army guy who's ignorant of the Air Force may not ask for support because he/she is unaware that it exists or believes it's not useful. When the individual members of a joint team understand what the others bring to the table and have a basic understanding of their mindset, lingo, capabilities, etc., then that team will probably be effective from the start.
As an aside, a big reason I originally came to this forum and why I still spend a lot of time here (more than anywhere else, practically) is because I want to learn about the Army and how you Army guys (and gals) think and do business (in addition to learning about small wars, of course). I've already learned a lot here and continue to learn more everyday, which is great for me personally and will hopefully pay more dividends when/if I go downrange again.
I agree, and the solution, IMO, is to educate officers and NCO's to succeed on joint staffs from the beginning. I would recommend a joint school where people can get "Army/Navy/Air Force/Marines for dummies" so they at least go in knowing the fundamentals. Additionally, it would be nice to have exchange tours, but that might not be practical and the service personnel systems would probably punish officers and NCO's for taking them.Quote:
I would like to see more true Jointness occur at the BN and lower level for both NCO's and Officers. Create a strong base of knowledge and expertise, and then allow these individuals to move up through the Joint world as they become more experienced and wiser. Would make a lot more sense than sending an 03 to a Combined/Joint Staff for the first time and asking "what's the difference between light and mechanized infantry?"
Ski, this is not a failure of joint operations by any stretch, but it may be a failure of task organizing incorrectly. I really don't think Jet jocks, submarine skippers and surface fleet officer/NCOs need to be an expert on Army Infantry operations to be a valued joint partner. I sure as heck am not an expert on subsurface warfare, fleet operations, strartegic bombing operations, etc., but I can still function effectively in a joint HQs. Your example sounds like another example of trying to make something joint that doesn't need to be under the excuse of giving these officers "joint" experience, which is increasingly important for promotion.Quote:
I had two USAF and two USN personnel work for me, and to be frank, they were untrained for the job at hand (mainly because Astan is a largely Army fight). So in addition to actually having to work and lead, I also had to spend time training them on the most simple aspects of the Army.
In a major joint combat operation, one way to keep the chaos manageable is to make one component the main effort, thus the supported component, and other other components support as appropriate, the component that is the main effort can shift by phase or sub phase of an operation. To execute this you need the overall joint force commander and some of his key staff members to have a good grasp of joint capabilities across the force (so they can envision an overall concept, and also sniff out BS if one service is trying to sell the JTF some snake oil). However, the others need to be experts in their specific field/service, that expertise is what they're bringing to the table.
Joint planning and operations can get rather heated sometimes, that is simple human nature, especially for type A personalities that really want to see things done right. The process is generally one of give and take dialouge to get to an acceptable course of action, all the services educate one another on their capabilities and how they should be employed to best support one another and accomplish the mission. No one said it was smooth process.
Getting back to your example, why are Navy and Air Force officers planning infantry operations?
That's just the thing, though. In most cases it's just a ticket punch, so often any Joint billet will do, and an officer needing a Joint assignment gets slotted sometimes into whatever becomes available. But other times, the span of the billet could mean that the incumbent will encounter situations where he will shine (where the situation plays to his professional experience), and others where he may be completely adrift. For example, the O6 in charge of my group until recently at JFCOM J7 was a submariner, but yet was tasked with technical training development for Irregular Warfare. Of course, he has staff that has experience in IW (however you define it), plenty of Army and Marine infantry types, but it's tough to be the talking head when your experience is so different from the subject matter at hand.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
A propos of Ski's comment on levels of preparedness for taking a Joint billet varying with service, we have quite a few simulation planners - officers who plan out simulations/ synthetic training environments for various Joint exercises. Well, the Army has a functional area devoted precisely to that subject matter: FA 57. Every officer from the Army we got that was put in as a sim planner was well prepared, and all were FA 57 course graduates at least, with most having already an FA 57 tour under their belts. The other services don't have anything like that, and quite a few officers from the Nvy and Air Force we received had zero experience in the field, or even really knew that this kind of job existed prior to be assigned there. That's not to say that we haven't had some really good guys quickly climb the learning curve and do well - one of the best I've known was a Navy S-3 pilot - but most take 18 months to learn their job, then they're gone in another 6. It's not like this is a "Joint is spelled A-R-M-Y" thing; all the services use simulations heavily now in training, it's just that only one really prepares officers professionally for it (though I think the Marines must have some level of participation, as all their guys coming into those jobs seem to know their business fairly well).
Not sure if there is some deeper point to be made there, but there it is.
Bill
Check your PM's, I'll explain more.