Again straying OT, but...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
91bravojoe
Confuses tactics and strategy. If Professor Pape and his group at the University of Chicago can be believed, the goal and the strategy are crystal clear: get the troops of "western democracies" out of Islamic countries.
Possibly some confusion among tactics, strategy, and policy here.
Certainly AQ's long term "policy goal" (or fantasy, possibly a more appropriate word) would be to expel the west and all who associate with them from the Middle East, establish a Caliphate, etc. By the late 90s, though, the operative goal was a lot simpler: survival. Pursuit of that goal required a jihad against an infidel invader in Muslim lands, and there wasn't one. AQ tried desperately to sell the idea of the US presence in Saudi Arabia in that role, but it didn't work, at least not in a sense widespread enough to make a difference.
The sequence that began with the 1998 fatwa and culminated in 9/11 were, as far as I can see, less about driving the west out or building a Caliphate than about provoking military occupation and providing AQ with the raison d'etre it lost with the Soviet withdrawal.
The beliefs of suicide bombers do not necessarily reflect the goals of AQ. The actual goals and the pitch used to persuade suicide bombers and jihad footsoldiers were likely very different. This is often the case: soldiers are always told that they are fighting for the noblest of motives. Hard to get people to blow themselves up by telling them that fundraising is way down and if we don't get the Americans to invade somebody it's gonna dry up completely.
The brotherhood... in or out?
Was looking at Google News this AM, good way to see what's being said about things in other parts of the world. Came on this:
http://www.jpost.com/International/A...aspx?id=207553
Quote:
Congress members wary of Muslim Brotherhood role in Egypt
Defense Minister Barak holds meetings in Washington with top officials to discuss Cairo crisis; legislators slam Obama administration for suggesting Islamist group should have some role in government.
WASHINGTON – Members of Congress warned about the risk posed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation in a new Egyptian government Wednesday and scolded the Obama administration for suggesting an openness to the Islamic group having some role in its composition.
“The Muslim Brotherhood had nothing to do with driving these protests, and they and other extremists must not be allowed to hijack the movement toward democracy and freedom in Egypt,” declared Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, at the start of a hearing Wednesday.
Natural I suppose for the Jerusalem Post to play up that angle. The more I think about it, though, the more I think the US should be pushing for inclusion of the Brotherhood in Government, ideally in a substantial role. The reason why:
When Mubarak goes there's going to be huge euphoria and great expectations. Ding, dong, the witch is dead, Mubarak was the problem and Mubarak is gone, so the problems are over and everything's gonna be ok. All that is going to come to a crunching head-on collision with reality very quickly.
Very early in the new government's term some poor SOB is gonna have to crunch some numbers on revenues and expenses, assets and liabilities. Those numbers will be beyond ugly. The new government will have to manage a civil service, local government apparatus, military, and police that are riddled with patronage and an entrenched culture of corruption. They will not be amenable to reform. Prices of food and fuel will still be high. There will still be a huge demographic bulge of unemployed youth, and "create jobs" is easier said than done. Domestic investment will be constrained for years: I haven't seen figures on capital flight but you can bet Mubarak's cronies have been getting everything they can get their hands on out of the country, and that's plenty. Most of it won't come back. The foreign investment climate is not exactly hopping. Foreign aid may be sustained, but donor countries have their own issues and it's not likely to be increased. The new government is likely to be a coalition of groups that have little in common but opposition to Mubarak, and there will be all kinds of infighting and gridlock. I could go on (and on, and on) but that's enough. it will be very difficult, and there will be a lot of disappointment and frustration.
The last place we want to see the Muslim Brothers in all this is outside the tent in a pure opposition role, with no responsibility or accountability, blaming, criticizing, and building their own constituency and influence around that disappointment and frustration. Far better to have them sharing the hot seat, making their share of the mess and taking their share of the blame.
So we should make sure, IMO and as much as we can, that they are in the tent. The Israelis will have a cow and some Americans will shriek "who lost Egypt", but it may be time to do something sensible for a change. Fearful breach of precedent, yes, but some are worth breaching.
Case studies supporting inclusiveness...
Steve,
For what it's worth, I agree with this analysis...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
I think you rather overstate the influence he has, especially now, in his dotage and with his world sliding apart around him. Even in his prime no despot rules alone: he needs the army, the police, the business elite, all kinds of key sectors around him, and he needs to keep doling out to feed and keep the barons in balance. When the edifice starts to shake there is little or no loyalty. Everyone in the picture knows Mubarak is gone, whether next week or in September makes no difference. The people around him may still be kissing ass in front of him, but the moment his back is turned they are plotting ways to turn the situation to their personal advantage and ways of covering their exits if things go badly. There will be lots of deals being cut behind his back.
...as well as this one.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
Very early in the new government's term some poor SOB is gonna have to crunch some numbers on revenues and expenses, assets and liabilities. Those numbers will be beyond ugly. The new government will have to manage a civil service, local government apparatus, military, and police that are riddled with patronage and an entrenched culture of corruption. They will not be amenable to reform. Prices of food and fuel will still be high. There will still be a huge demographic bulge of unemployed youth, and "create jobs" is easier said than done. Domestic investment will be constrained for years: I haven't seen figures on capital flight but you can bet Mubarak's cronies have been getting everything they can get their hands on out of the country, and that's plenty. Most of it won't come back. The foreign investment climate is not exactly hopping. Foreign aid may be sustained, but donor countries have their own issues and it's not likely to be increased. The new government is likely to be a coalition of groups that have little in common but opposition to Mubarak, and there will be all kinds of infighting and gridlock. I could go on (and on, and on) but that's enough. it will be very difficult, and there will be a lot of disappointment and frustration.
The last place we want to see the Muslim Brothers in all this is outside the tent in a pure opposition role, with no responsibility or accountability, blaming, criticizing, and building their own constituency and influence around that disappointment and frustration. Far better to have them sharing the hot seat, making their share of the mess and taking their share of the blame.
We both agree that the journey towards equilibrium in Egypt will take some time, 'grown' in your paradigm and 'built' in mine. I am curious as to the shape of your predicted equilibrium and the steps it may require, beyond encouraging inclusiveness. From what I have observed Darwinian fights for power are often characterized by no holds barred struggles which usually occur behind a facade of adherence to socially acceptable mores. To me, grown implies a genetically defined endpoint, whereas built captures some of the 'creative tension' which is part and parcel of collective social experiences.
Some of the steps on the way towards equilibrium that I see include media access, technocratic transparency, and room for political discourse...however all of these require a powerful team of referees...perhaps a regulated MMA vs. 'Vale Tudo' MMA match analogy applies. I would say that the population of Egypt, who are but ‘one’ of the participants in this struggle, has a better chance of meeting some of it's aspirations because of the role that international/new media has assumed in acting as a referee (part of a team of referee's which still includes, from this armchair, the Egyptian Military). 'Neutral' technocrats, backed by power brokers/barons (building and maintaining bases of power and negotiating agreements), can also use new media as a tool to provide transparency into corruption and thus leverage public outrage in order to influence politicians. Democratic structures can act as relatively safe (as compared to war) arenas for political brawls among interested parties.
Like many others I am thinking about Indonesia as well as some of the Eastern Block countries in Europe, during their transitions to democracy, as case studies. Any recommendations?
Steve
Causes of Egyptian Unrest
Found this analysis of why the Arab Regimes are falling on the World Politics Review media roundup. The author is a professor of political science at Cairo University and Central Michigan.
Touches on the varied sources of the unrest, especially the demographic ones.
V/R,
Cliff