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http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE66B0A220100712Quote:
"Over the last eight to nine years there has been a dynamic change in the age of fighters. Most fighters now are between 14 and 18 years-old," said Lieutenant Colonel Guy Jones, commander of 2-508th Parachute Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, based in Arghandab.
"In 2002, fighters were 22 to 30-years-old and commanders were between 32 and 40," said Jones who is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan.
This happened to British forces in Sierra Leone with the West Side Boys, too. Once. They got over it.
the leaders of the TTP and Haqqani network are both 30 years old. i guess part of the reason is that when it comes to the tribes the sons take over.
From Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons From a Failed State (The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 28, CSI Press 2008) pp. 77-78 pdf:
and, when all was said and done, with rescue effected (p. 83 pdf):Quote:
On Friday, 25 August 2000, British Major Alan Marshall, stationed at Benguema Training Camp decided to make a visit to one of UNAMSIL’s battalions near the town of Masiaka, about 65-kilometers east of Freetown. Marshall and his men were part of the stay-behind British training contingent. Accompanying him on this visit was an SLA liaison officer and 11 soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment. After visiting with Colonel Jehad al-Widyan, commander of the UNAMSIL battalion, he decided to take his patrol to the WSB base in nearby Magbeni. Marshall received an intelligence report that only a few rebels were present at the base and he wanted to check out the situation. His three Land Rovers were armed with .50-caliber heavy machine guns and the soldiers with SA80 rifles. As the patrol approached Magbeni, located 50 miles east of the capital in Freetown, the WSB blocked the road and denied them movement. Major Marshall tried to reason with them, but they insisted that he wait until their leader, 24-year old “Brigadier” Foday Kallay arrived.
As they waited, Major Marshall carried on a conversation with the boys and offered them cigarettes. Communication with the base at Benguema Training Camp was established via radio and the base camp was informed that the patrol was being detained. Once Kallay arrived, the situation turned tense. Kallay began issuing orders to his armed soldiers, became angry with Marshall for entering an unauthorized area without coordination, and surrounded the patrol with soldiers and a captured SLA truck mounted with a 14.5-mm heavy machine gun. As Marshall made attempts to reason with the WSB, he was physically beaten. Within 5 minutes, the rest of the Royal Irish soldiers were overwhelmed, disarmed, stripped, and taken by canoes upstream, across Rokel River, to Gberi Bana, Kallay’s headquarters.
What if the WSB in the initial encounter were treated as the armed combatants that they were ?Quote:
British forces killed 25 and captured 18 WSB members.
No statements are OTR. :D
Regards
Mike
The ROE were drastically revised after that incident and child soldiers were treated as real ones by western militaries operating in Africa, even if they wore dresses, wigs and makeup and fought drunk out of their minds. If not for the existence of Lord's Army Resistance and their untouchable record of sad weirdness, these guys would be the most whackjob insurgent force in modern times.
Interesting takeaway from that and other such conflicts is that without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them.
They'd better treat them all as real ones. A twelve year old can kill you just as dead as can his Father. Lot of foolish angst over 'child soldiers' for no good reason. A ten year old who throws a grenade in your lap as has happened here and there for a great many years may not be a Soldier in many senses but he's a fighter, he's your enemy even if he doesn't fully understand why, he's dangerous and deserves a shot as quickly as an adult.Quote:
Originally Posted by 40below
Before the AK there were far fewer people in the world, so the second clause is correct. The first, not so much...Quote:
Interesting takeaway from that and other such conflicts is that without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them.
History shows that fighting children is far from a modern phenomena, there are just more kids and better communication. Nor are or were they all in Africa or 'third world' nations. The third pic is Polish, WW II, the second Russian, the White Army. Note the webbing on the WW I trench cleaning kid in the first one...:wry:
My point was not that there have never been child soldiers, only that a malnourished 14-year-old can handle the recoil of a bullet hose like an AK (and with eight moving part on some models and not real picky about maintenance in the field) far better than from a western rifle where aim and upkeep counts, let alone the kick from a WWI Lee-Enfield or a similar battle rifle. I fired the latter in the Arctic when I was on presence patrols with the Canadian Rangers (they still use our WWI stock from stores because unlike plastic guns they don't shatter when you drop them at 50C below), and the average child soldier would get about one shot in his active military career before seeking treatment for a broken collarbone and a dislocated shoulder, maybe a broken jaw too.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
but as a big bore (.30-06, slightly more potent than the .303 and not to mention that %$&* 12 gauge...:D) shooter at age 11, I do not agree. Not at all.Quote:
Originally Posted by 40below
The Australian, British or Canadian Soldier in the third picture above may not be malnourished. he has the pre-war British pattern ammunition pouches for the .303.SMLE (the WW I Mk III, not your Ranger's WW II era No.4). The Poles and the Russians are probably malnourished. Note the Russian all have Nagants and the 7.62x54 is a contemporary of the .303. I posted two pictures showing .303 category weapons in the hands or likely so of 'child soldiers' and you come back and impute that weapon recoil would be a determining factor. :confused: Not a good argument, kids were padding their shoulders with rags a long time ago-- in the era of muzzle loaders... :wry:
While it is fact the AK enabled a proliferation of 'child soldiers,' for the reasons you cite in your response, my initial comment was not aimed primarily at refuting your perhaps unintentional overstatement. You said'None' initially then added the caveat 'or not as many.' I agreed on the not as many, just as a minor aside, really, disagreed on the none. ;)Quote:
"...without the AK, we wouldn't have child soldiers at all, or at least far fewer of them." (emphasis added /kw)
The comment by me -- and the pictures -- really was intended to make two important points. Thanks for allowing me to reiterate them:
(1) Armed kids are not an African or third world only problem.
(2) Whenever and wherever armed kids exist and attack, they are as dangerous as adults. Perhaps more so because many through a false sense of concern will not react as quickly to kill a child and they deserve no special consideration. None.
Me too, though it was SMLE No.4 and I was 13, but whole generations of British School Boys from 13-18 learnt to shoot on .303 until very recently.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
In Vegetius' essay on reforming the Legions, he discusses beginning the training of young men in the military arts as soon as they reach puberty. The concept of "child soldier" is a late 20th century invention. For most of human history, across all cultures, when humans entered puberty they were considered adults. For females, this meant marriage and children. For males, it meant farming, hunting and warfare.
Nonetheless, the issue here is first, reluctance on the part of Western troops to kill combatants the perceive as children, and second, the psychological problems resulting from the engagement (i.e. either killing them, or suffering casualties from reluctance or hesitation to kill them.).
This highlights one of the major problems with the tactical directives in Afghanistan: They placed illogical emphasis on Age and Gender over situational factors such as time, manner, place, activity.
A Coalition member engaging a young man such as described by Guy is likely to face challenges from higher HQ regardless of the activity engaged in.
One of my goals was to shift the focus from "CIVCAS" to criteria more practical. (All insurgents are, afterall, civilians) I actually got MG Carter, COM RC-South where LTC Guy Jones operates, to agree and he publicly took the position that his command would no longer use the term CIVCAS and instead use "Combatant" and "Non-Combatant." His LEGAD had a cow. Because the phrase civcas is what is written into the law, regardless of how illogical and wrongheaded it is on the ground, we had to use it. The lawyers won, and we went back to CIVCAS.
I tried to have a conversation with LEGAD on the topic and all she could do was stare at me like I had a horn growing out of my head and bluster about the terminology in various articles of international law, the terms they use, that must be adheared to.
Add this to my list:
If you don't understand insurgency, you can't do COIN;
If you don't understand insurgency, you can't legally advise a commander doing COIN either.
(Oh, and I suspect a rather large portion of those who fought in the American Civil War were in this 14-18 age range, and handled their .58 caliber rifles with ease and deadly skill; rode their cavalry mounts with the same agility and lack of fear they ride skateboards today; and generally were tremendously resilient and effective)
Doesn't Infantry literally mean, Boy Soldier?!
Just one quick google:
http://www.civilwarhome.com/boysinwar.htm
(only 46,000 out of a sample of 1,000,000 over the age of 24)
Napoleon is quoted as holding that Generals over the age of 40 were over the hill. (though I suspect strongly that this is a misquote from him saying as he rode away from Waterloo, "I'm too old for this Sh#%")
This situation would probably be beyond my capacity to survive without going postal:
You have to have a strong stomach or a large ulcer.Quote:
One of my goals was to shift the focus from "CIVCAS" to criteria more practical. (All insurgents are, afterall, civilians) I actually got MG Carter, COM RC-South where LTC Guy Jones operates, to agree and he publicly took the position that his command would no longer use the term CIVCAS and instead use "Combatant" and "Non-Combatant." His LEGAD had a cow. Because the phrase civcas is what is written into the law, regardless of how illogical and wrongheaded it is on the ground, we had to use it. The lawyers won, and we went back to CIVCAS.
I tried to have a conversation with LEGAD on the topic and all she could do was stare at me like I had a horn growing out of my head and bluster about the terminology in various articles of international law, the terms they use, that must be adheared to.
My initial reaction was that the LEGAD was bad and that all would be well if a "good lawyer" had been on call - in short, blame it on the lawyer (a variation of pile on the wabbit). If that were the problem, the solution would be solved by employing SJAs like COL Hays Parks, who wrote in 2003 re: Astan, Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms:
While there is truth to that solution (or to the alternative, "get rid of all the lawyers") in many situations, the problem you faced is part of a greater problem in Astan.Quote:
At the US Special Operations Command (“USSOCOM”) annual Legal Conference, May 13–17, 2002, the judge advocate debate became intense. While some attendees raised questions of “illegality” and the right or obligation of special operations forces to refuse an “illegal order” to wear “civilian clothing,” others urged caution. [3] The discussion was unclassified, and many in the room were not privy to information regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Special Forces, its special mission units, or the missions assigned them.
[3] In the debate that ensued over the next year, it was my observation that those most strident in their criticism were most distant from Special Forces ground operations or were judge advocates not serving with or familiar with the missions of Special Forces units.
COL Parks bio (from same) - Law of War Chair, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense; Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army, 1979–2003; Stockton Chair of International Law, Naval War College, 1984–1985; Colonel, US Marine Corps Reserve (Retired); Adjunct Professor of International Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC.
That problem (also directly involving the ROEs, RUFs and EOFs) has been the conscious election by the political and military masters (of ISAF, including the US; and of the Astan national government) to adopt "bad law" even though (at least for the US and Astan) that would not be required. That "bad law" hinges on the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II, Direct Participation in Hostilities and Customary International Humitarian Law as endorsed by the ICRC - many in the ISAF would see that "bad law" as "good law" (as apparently does Nick Carter's LEGAD).
It has to be frustrating to deal with nonsense like CIVCAS, restrictive ROEs, etc. (and please note, while I'd prefer a broad hunting license, I do not believe that everything in the woods needs to be shot).
Regards
Mike
The argument that child soldiers are not only a third world problem cannot be made by showing pictures of European children from a century ago. Those european kids also lived in "third world" conditions without economic alternatives. I guess it depends on what your definition of "third world" is.
When it comes to afghanistan, demographics plays a huge role. With an average life expectency around 40, they start an adult life at an early age. Not only in terms of fighting, but also working, farming, getting married early and having kids etc. 18-21 is a very arbitrary line to define adults anyways.
I have not verified the statistics from this Quote from this WSJ article but:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...461719008.htmlQuote:
In 1979, the Russian army faced 2.5 million Afghan males at the traditional fighting ages of 15 to 29. Some 1.7 million of those Afghan males were second, third or fourth sons. They were surely loved by their parents but the family's property was inherited only by the oldest son. Younger sons had to struggle hard to find their places in society and—with decent jobs hard to find—could be easily recruited by militant groups. In 1979, 3.5 million Afghan boys still younger than 15 when the Soviet Union attacked were getting ready for just such a fight.
This endless supply of angry, ambitious young Afghan men never appeared on Russian radar. Yet it eventually forced them to give up the war and go home. Afghanistan was down to 13 million inhabitants.
In 2009, the situation is even more volatile. Today there are 4.2 million Afghan males aged 15 to 29 out of a total population of 33 million. Two and half million may conclude that violence offers their only chance for a successful future. Are these men on the radar screen of the 65.000 soldiers of NATO and the International Security Assistance Force? Is NATO/ISAF aware that 6.7 million Afghan boys under 15 are getting ready for battle? In Afghanistan, 45% of all males are younger than 15 versus 21% in the U.S., 18% in the U.K. and 14% in Germany.
Another thing to consider is that the wise Afghan family diviersifies its investments just as the wise American family does.
So, while the American may have a percentage of his money in Stocks, and a percentage in Bonds; it is not uncommon to find an Afghan father who has one son in the Afghan National Police and another in the Taliban. This is a survival strategy, as one never knows who will prevail, and by having a son in both camps the family will likely weather the storm. If age requirements to be in the ANP require my oldest son go there, then I will by necessity send my younger son to the other program.
This is a country where one is either on the winning side, or one is totally and completely F'd. This is why I see Afghanistan as the easiest country in the world to conduct UW in; there is always about half the country totally excluded from participation in economic and political opportunity that is ready, willing and able to assist you in swinging the balance the other way.
The key to true stability in Afghanistan is to break down (slowly over time) this all or nothing dynamic. A bit off topic, but I suspect it feeds into the youth of some of those who are fighting the current regime.
I cannot resist weighing in here. I think it is time for Commander’s to start pushing back on their lawyers regarding ROEs and the Laws of War. They need to push back based on the individual Soldier and Marine’s right to self-defense. They also need to push back on the fact that the Laws of War state that military necessity is determined by the “field commander”. Another process that might teach lawyers about the Laws of War is to have them start charging for violations of the Laws of War instead of the Rules of Law.
I can’t wait for the responses on this one…it’s one of those spider fly thingys.
One has to give the Taliban ten out of ten for seeing and exploiting the weaknesses in the ROE caused by the sensitivities towards negative media exposure. Don't blame the lawyers, blame the idiot generals that allowed them in in the first place.Quote:
Originally Posted by Polarbear1605
hear, hear!Quote:
Originally Posted by jma
thought you'd find it hard to resist this topic.
I'd say look not only to generals, but to a confluence of politicians and generals who set the legal policy. The SJAs can influence it to some extent, but are still instruments of the national command policy.
Realistically, what could you and I do in Astan given the policies in place ? But, if the policy was to go back to FM 27-10 and implement its doctrines as written, I'd expect we could do more than just gnaw at ankles.
Best,
Mike
The pictures were to show two things. That not only the economically deprived rather anyone who is desperate will employ younger than the norm fighters and that said fighters were using rifles before there was an AK.:wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by subrosa
Consider the straits all the combatant nations were in a the time of the pictures. Desperately short of manpower... :eek:
The point was not that it was a "third world problem." There was absolutely no intent to pose the 'argument' you suggest. Indeed, IMO, it is not even a problem except in the minds of those who are foolishly determined to make it problematic. There's a large body of modern thought that holds those underage (whatever that means) should not or cannot be held to the same standard as 'adults.' That is insane. 'Child Soldiers' is, as I said, often a misnomer and 'young killer's is a far better appellation.
While the third world / economically deprived aspect is currently prevalent the pictures also illustrate that given the right (or wrong...) circumstances, the west likely will go back to doing what it has done before and what is done all over the world, using all available people power in a pinch. :cool:
The real issue and my only point in posting in this thread is that everyone should realize that regardless of genesis and / or age ethnicity, economic circumstances or whatever, they are still dangerous and still combatants. Period.
kenwhite you said-
when i read that and then looked at the pictures- i thought that these pictures are not representative of the modern day western society. and that the pictures do not support the point above because if anything the kids look deprived (but cute). i guess the pictures were in reference to the kids with guns prior to the proliferation of ak47 comment someone made- my bad.Quote:
(1) Armed kids are not an African or third world only problem.
i totally agree with your main point that little boys to old men have been fighting perennially regardless of caste or creed, and specially agree that they should be treated like adults in a combat scenario.
Much has been written on the use of child soldiers in combat. Most of the recent information available has been collected by International Organizations, GOs, NGOs, and the academic researchers. P.W. Singer published "Children at War," (2005) which goes into great detail on the subject from a military perspective. Singer provides some insight into dynamics associated with western militaries confronting child combatants. He does cite OP BARRAS, in which the estimates of West Side Boys casualties ranged from 25-150 killed in action. The highly trained British force had 70 wounded and one killed in action.
Singer identifies that western militaries are hesitant to engage children and offers some approaches to prepare for these inevitable engagements.
Along similar lines, I heard a story about a family where one son took off to become a Kuomintang enforcer with the Green Gang in Shanghai. His younger brother subsequently left to join the Communists, mainly because he thought his older brother was a jerk.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Then the Japanese came and the family was doubly screwed.
Is it true what they say that the US have more lawyers in Afghanistan than helicopters? ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Polarbear1605
...I'm not ready to laugh about it yetQuote:
Originally Posted by JMA
(though for all my frustrations on this topic with said legad, over all she did a tremendous job and was a great lady (also a good inch taller than me and a trained boxer, so I was always sure to either mind my manners or at least pay attention to if I had room to take a quick step back or not)).
The fact is that the law is a mess for these things, and she was merely representing that mess.
Another example, I got into a discussion on my belief that we were better served by employing legal terms, such as "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" to drive engagements over the current vague "Positive ID" that is leading to so many inappropriate engagements under the current ROE and Tactical Directives. "Impossible" "That would imply law enforcement rather than war, and while we are authorized to wage war in Afghanistan, we are not authorized to conduct law enforcement." "We would have to leave if this were a law enforcement matter."
Really??? Perhaps that is something we should seriously consider. I am resolved that insurgency is a civil emergency and should be addressed as such, with local civil authorities in clear lead, and any military involvement being brought in under the same auspices that we do for any other MSCA event. HN military first, and any foreign military behind and subordinate to that of the HN.
"Sorry, we'd really like to stay and help you with this mess, but the only proper way to do that is illegal, so we'll be going now..."
is exactly what you describe:
One of the "magic" terms in the PID definitions is a "reasonable certainty".Quote:
from you
Another example, I got into a discussion on my belief that we were better served by employing legal terms, such as "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" to drive engagements over the current vague "Positive ID" that is leading to so many inappropriate engagements under the current ROE and Tactical Directives. "Impossible" "That would imply law enforcement rather than war, and while we are authorized to wage war in Afghanistan, we are not authorized to conduct law enforcement." "We would have to leave if this were a law enforcement matter."
Now I know what a "certainty" is (probability = 1.0000....); but what is a "reasonable certainty" ? Do we have such a thing as an "unreasonable certainty" - apparently so, else "reasonable certainty" has no juxtaposition.
The term "reasonable certainty" is in fact lifted from civil litigation - as in: "Doctor, do you have an opinion within a degree of reasonable medical certainty." That phrase has neither a legal nor a medical meaning - and to find out, object to the question and voir dire both the lawyer and the doctor for supporting authorities. The doc will say I thought that's a legal term; the lawyer will say I thought that's a medical term - and both will be wrong.
Without due respect for your pugulist distaff LEGAD, her presentations cited by you lack "rigour" (as the Wilf might say). But, that's what happens when her masters attempt to satisfy multiple sets of conflicting LOACs.
The result in fact raises the bar over what would be allowed under a correct law enforcement approach (the paradigm you want), or a correct Laws of War approach (my take - aka the White Bear Construct).
Now, JMA, you may now proceed with your barrister and/or solicitor jokes. :D
Regards
Mike
Here is the answer (re: "reasonable certainty") from one of the cases that the Bear and I have followed:
LA Times, IRAQ: To shoot or not to shoot is the question, July 2, 2008
So, definition means the difference between a criminal indictment or a valor citation.Quote:
In the end, the criminal case against Marine sniper Sgt. Johnny Winnick may boil down to the simplest but yet most confounding question facing troops in Iraq: When can a Marine or soldier use deadly force against a suspected insurgent?
It's a question not even supposed experts can agree on. During the preliminary hearing completed Wednesday, a Marine lieutenant testified that he asked two majors - one a lawyer, the other a battalion executive officer - and got contradictory explanations.
Winnick is charged with manslaughter and assault for killing two Syrians and wounding two others.
Winnick says he opened fire because he believed the men were planting a roadside bomb, but no bomb was found. His superiors say he lacked the "positive identification" and "reasonable certainty'' needed to squeeze the trigger.
But what do those terms mean, particularly for snipers whose job is to kill the enemy from ambush at long range?
Winnick's attorney, Gary Myers, tried to get one of Winnick's fellow snipers to define "reasonable certainty." The young Marine said that, well, reasonable certainty means being reasonably certain.
"This is all words," said an exasperated Myers.
An officer testified that reasonable certainty means being "85% certain." Another said it means being "pretty damn sure."
A Pentagon expert called by Myers disagreed with the "85% certain" rule. He thinks young troops are being given confusing and contradictory guidelines by their superiors. He's written about his concerns in a tome titled ''Combat Self-Defense: How to Save America's Warriors From Risk-Adverse Commanders and Their Lawyers."
LEGADs can spout all they want about international law and international relations; but responsibility 1 should be to the rifleman at the tip of the spear.
Regards
Mike
My last post touts Dave Bolgiano's book. This one covers his Strategy Research Report at the War College, Bolgiano, Training America's Strategic Corporals (2008), a short 30-page summary of key ROE points and training methodology.
Here are two key points. The first is a declared hostile force, where PID is material (a status determination):
The second is self defense, where PID is not material but hostile acts or threats thereof are very material (a situational determination):Quote:
There are two – sometimes distinct – manners by which a military member can lawfully employ deadly force: (1) subject to a target being declared hostile by competent authority or (2) in response to a demonstrated hostile intent or hostile act (intended to inflict death or serious bodily injury to self or friendly forces).
Against a declared hostile, once PID is established, then there is no legal obligation to detain, capture or otherwise take less intrusive means. By way of example, a Soldier could walk into a barracks room filled with sleeping enemy combatants who have been declared hostile and shoot them. There is no legal obligation to wake them, capture them or make it a “fair” fight. By direct analogy, if a tactical operations center can lawfully drop a 2,000 lb laser-guided bomb on that barracks room (subject to collateral damage and proportionality analysis), then it is axiomatic that a lone Soldier could kill them with his M-4. For some reason, however, when some judge advocates and commanders review these close-in killing situations, they mistakenly analyze them under a self-defense methodology as set forth below.
And, emphasizing the right of self-defense in several other quotes:Quote:
In matters of individual or unit self-defense, as spelled out in the unclassified portions of the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. Forces [30], service members possess an inherent right of self-defense predicated solely on a reasonable response to a demonstrated hostile intent or hostile act (intended to inflict death or serious bodily injury to self or friendly forces). In self-defense situations, PID is irrelevant and proportionality is rarely an issue. Soldiers need to understand that they can use reasonable force to quell such a threat until that threat is over.
30. CJCSI 3121.01B (13 June 2005)
and:Quote:
First, Understand the Law: Self-Defense
11. Oracle Homeland Security Solutions, “Leveraging Information Technology to Secure America” (2003), quoting Sir Winston Churchill.Quote:
"One ought never to turn one's back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, you will double the danger. But if you meet it promptly and without flinching, you will reduce the danger by half. Never run away from anything. Never!" [11]
This is nothing new under the sun in US law - in fact, it is US law (FM 27-10 is still doctrinal).Quote:
As recently stated by Major General Gary L. Harrell, [37] USA (Ret.), former Deputy Commanding General, US Army Special Operations Command,
37. Major General Harrell made these comments in 2006 in a video-taped interview for the Navy’s Center for Security Forces as it was developing its own Judgment-based Engagement Training for its Riverine Forces. General Harrell formerly commanded Special Operations Command Central during OEF and OIF, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Delta Force), and at the Company, Troop, and Squadron level commands at that unit.Quote:
"The only tactical solution when confronted with an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury is to immediately respond with overwhelming force and continue to apply that force until the threat is over.”
Too often, commanders and judge advocates with little or no true CQC experience, attempt to substitute their own notions of reasonableness for the warrior on the scene.
The Supreme Court of the United States [38] has consistently recognized this as folly for our domestic police forces,
38 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).Quote:
… such reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight … the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.
Calm reflection and legal analysis cannot be imposed in the face of a raised dagger or an AK muzzle.
cont. - next post
Regards
Mike
So, what factors have led to what has become a "confusing mess" to some SJAs and LEGADs ?
Frankly, part of the problem lies in international coalitions and organizations. For example, this gem focusing on the Congo:
A second - and probably more deadly example of "collective thought" or "collective ignorance" in the long run - has been the presumptive criminalization of Soldiers and Marines who shoot hostile combatants:Quote:
On such fundamental concerns as self-defense, America may enter into short or long-term alliances, but must never submit to the will of the collective international masses when discerning what constitutes a justifiable act of self-defense. This is because collective thought might reflect collective ignorance as evidenced by the restrictions imposed by the United Nations (UN) that have plagued General Bipin Rawat, an Indian officer who commands UN forces in Democratic Republic of Congo:
26. David Blair, “UN commander says hands are tied in Congo,” The Daily Telegraph, London, November 17, 2008.Quote:
Under their rules of engagement, Gen Rawat's forces are always denied the advantage of surprise. They must shout verbal warnings and fire shots in the air before they can engage any rebels. Their operations are not allowed to risk a single civilian casualty. [26]
and:Quote:
For years now, nearly every line of duty shooting incident in Iraq has been subject to an often criminally-focused investigation whereby sworn statements are taken and service members are questioned without the benefit of legal counsel, psychologists, or even chaplains. While it is necessary to ensure that service members follow the rules and use force appropriately, the perception and reality is that continually subjecting our forces to the wrong legal standard and improperly-focused investigations inevitably results in hesitation and mistrust.
The following October 2007 communiqué from a young Army noncommissioned officer in Iraq highlights this folly:
31. Undisclosed noncommissioned officer (NCO) e-mail to the author, October 12, 2007. The NCO’s duties included providing squad-level escort duties to civilian members of diverse interagency task forces in the Iraqi theater.Quote:
There is nothing to come of this except making my Soldiers scared to pull the trigger and that's all that this is doing. They see me getting questioned everyday over something as dumb as firing back when fired upon. God only knows what they would be trying to do if we accidentally killed one[of] the ‘wrong’ people. [31]
The upshot is, at the least, missed military advantages; at the worst, dead Marines or Soldiers:Quote:
The frustration with the tactical – legal – policy interface is highlighted by the following account from an infantry battalion commander recently returned from Iraq:
33 Colonel Ben Corell, USA, US Army War College Class of 2009, Seminar 4, interview by author, 15 Oct 2008.Quote:
My battalion along with other elements of my BCT spent six months training up for our OIF rotation. We completed the mandatory training events to include a JRTC rotation preparing us well for “full spectrum” kinetic and non-kinetic operations at the tactical and operational levels. When we would have an escalation of force that involved any shots fired, it was a CCIR to my higher headquarters. Initially the BCT SJA would review each incident and recommend that the BCT Commander issue letters of concern to Soldiers for any and all EOF’s [escalations of force]. This practice confused and frustrated my Soldiers. These young men were working in difficult, challenging, and potentially deadly situations. In my opinion it did not require a legal review for every EOF that had warning shots fired. In every case that I reviewed regarding an EOF they were doing the right thing with all the right intentions, and doing what they needed to do to protect themselves and others in the unit. I was eventually able to get through to the BCT Commander that the SJA was applying a CYA, one size fits all mentality from the comfort of his air conditioned office. These letters of concern from the BCT Commander made my Soldiers and my unit more vulnerable to frustration and hesitation in a dangerous game in which you can’t just stick in a green key and do it over. [33]
The upshot may be to place Soldiers and Marines in a less safe position than a cop on the homefront:Quote:
Sniper teams in Iraq or Afghanistan performing counter IED missions may engage persons conducting overt hostile acts (such as actively emplacing an IED in a roadway surface) or persons demonstrating hostile intent (a lookout using a cell phone while communicating the approach of coalition forces), both clear examples of using force in self-defense. That same team may also be employed to engage a designated hostile force or enemy combatant, and may engage without regard as to whether that hostile force presents an imminent threat. This concept extends to fleeing subjects previously identified as hostile by adjacent friendly forces.
Some commanders have been reluctant to authorize the shooting of insurgents clearly emplacing IEDs in roadways late at night. They have prevented the targeting of insurgents conducting probes of friendly positions; and, have also failed to authorize the kinetic engagement of clearly identified hostile vehicles speeding away from a mortar “point of origin” as they “were not a threat at the time of acquisition.” [34]
This last point is important to clarify; some less tactically aware judge advocates and commanders have opined that “fleeing hostile actors can’t be engaged.” To so state ignores both the tactical concept of pursuit as well as the hard reality that such a fleeing subject continues to be a threat. To put it even more bluntly: nothing in the law allows a hostile actor to fire a weapon at coalition forces, then drop the weapon and flee without fear of being targeted and killed.Quote:
34. From the author’s duties, observations and readings concerning diverse classified and unclassified situation reports from both Iraq and Afghanistan from March 2007 until June 2008. At the time, the author was working as Deputy General Counsel, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Counter IED Operational Integration Center (JIEDDO-COIC).
Added to a failure to recognize well-established self-defense and community-defense concepts from the civilian world, is a misguided attempt to make war more humane - and to give awards for "humanitarian conduct" (an idea which apparently came out of CLAMO):Quote:
Even in civilian law enforcement settings, such fleeing hostile actors are well-recognized as a continuing threat that may be engaged. [35]
[JMM: see also, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)]Quote:
35. E.g., Chicago Police Department General Order 02-08-03, Section III stating in pertinent part that “[an officer may use deadly force against an escaping subject if the officer reasonably believes]:
a. has committed or has attempted to commit a forcible felony involves the infliction, threatened infliction, or threatened use of physical force likely to cause death or great bodily harm or;
b. is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon or;
c. otherwise indicates that he or she will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.”
And so it goes in the battle against one strain of "collective thought"-"collective ignorance"; perhaps better defined as "trained indifference" to the fate of the individual Marine or Soldier.Quote:
Some well-intentioned but ill-informed judge advocates have recently opined that
36. United States Army’s Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) e-mail message to deployed legal offices, January 16, 2008.Quote:
“one of the most effective ways to drive home the importance of EOF to soldiers [such as exercising fire discipline] at traffic control points and on convoys is by giving awards to soldiers who DO NOT SHOOT when the ROE may have allowed them to, thereby saving innocent lives.” [36]
The intent of this guidance – to save innocent civilian lives – is admirable, but the end result of incorrectly trying to apply the strategic concept of “minimum force” to a tactical situation is to unnecessarily expose military forces to imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Recognizing that missions are often ambiguous and dangerous enough, neither good tactics nor the law require one surrender the right and responsibility to exercise individual and collective self-defense.
Regards
Mike
jmm99,
Two interesting posts for the "armchair" observer. One question, in the US military do the lawyers have to serve in a front line role before a posting to legal adviser etc?
I know British officers who were to serve in the Imperial Indian Army did a year with a British unit and have a vaguer recollection that USMC pilots do a year as a squad leader. Not the same, but the principle is the same - see for yourself beforehand.
Nice to see some trans-Atlantic input and a good question:
Generally NO, with one exception. We'll cover the three major services first.Quote:
from you
One question, in the US military do the lawyers have to serve in a front line role before a posting to legal adviser etc?
Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army
Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy; and Navy Justice School:Quote:
Army Judge Advocate Qualifications
Prior to entry into the JAG Corps, all Army Judge Advocates must have graduated from an ABA-accredited law school and be admitted to practice law by the highest court of a state or federal district. While some Judge Advocates have prior enlisted or commissioned experience, most are direct commissioned and have no prior military training or experience.
Initial entry training into the JAG Corps is composed of three phases:
12 day military orientation course at Fort Lee, Virginia
10½ week Judge Advocate Officer Basic Course (JAOBC) at The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS)
6 week Direct Commissioned Officer (DCO) Course at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Quote:
In 1967, Congress decided to establish the Judge Advocate General's Corps within the Department of the Navy. The legislation was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on December 8, 1967, and ensured Navy lawyers' status as staff officers within the Navy, similar to physicians and chaplains.
.....
The Naval Justice School (NJS) is an educational institution of the United States Navy whose mission is to instruct Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers and enlisted personnel in the fundamental principles of military justice, civil and administrative law, and procedure. In addition to being licensed attorneys in any state or territory of the U.S., all attorneys in the Judge Advocate General's Corps must undergo training either in this institution, or in in the complementary institutions of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force, allowing them to act as trial or defense counsel at military courts-martial.
Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Air Force; and The Official Website of Judge Advocate General - Programs:
Each service has variants on these programs; but the bottom lines for Army, Navy and Air Force are judge advocates are staff officers, line officer experience is not required, and grade is generally higher than that of a line officer with the same in-service longevity.Quote:
How can I become an Air Force Judge Advocate?
Accession Programs
Each year, approximately 100-120 attorneys are selected as Air Force Judge Advocates through several different accession programs. A general description of each program follows. Select the program you would like to review.
Applicant Status - Available Programs
Civilian Attorney or 3rd Year Law Student - Direct Appointment Program (DAP)
2nd Year Law Student - One-Year College Program (OYCP)
1st Year Law Student - Graduate Law Program (GLP)
ROTC Student - Educational Delay Program
Active Duty Air Force Officers - Funded Legal Education Program (FLEP); Excess Leave Program (ELP)
Past Active Duty Officer with a Law Degree - Recall to Active Duty
Current Air Force Active Duty Officer with a Law Degree - Intraservice Transfer
Current Sister Service Active Duty Officer with a Law Degree - Interservice Transfer
AF Reserve & Guard Opportunities - Other Programs
Now, for the exception, United States Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division:
The bottom line is that every Marine is a rifleman (and I refuse to say "rifleperson"). :)Quote:
The Judge Advocate Division is the United States Marine Corps's legal arm, and is subordinate to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. The head of the Division is the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). Military attorneys (or judge advocates) in the Marine Corps work under the supervision of the SJA to the CMC to advise Marine commanders regarding legal issues including the laws of war, and to prosecute and defend courts-martial. Marine Corps lawyers are line officers, unlike their counterparts in the United States Navy and Army, which means they can fill any officer billet in the Fleet Marine Force.
....
Marine Corps judge advocates, or JAs, are licensed attorneys who are also officers in the Marine Corps. Each JA is a line officer in the Marine Corps, and goes through the same initial training as any other Marine officer. Upon graduation from TBS [The Basic School], the Marine attends Naval Justice School where they are instructed in the fundamental principles of military justice, civil and administrative law, and procedure, with practical application of those principles to the problems inevitably arising within every command, in order to assist in the attainment of a high standard of legal practice and administration of the naval justice and naval disciplinary systems, as well as the naval civil and administrative law system. Upon graduation from the school, the Marine is designated as a Judge Advocate (MOS 4402) and will begin their tour in the Fleet Marine Force as an attorney.
As line officers, Marine JAs can and occasionally do serve in non-legal assignments, including the command of combat units.
Hope this helps to explain the basic US approach to military lawyers and the one exception.
Regards
Mike
The Brit casualties were 1 KIA and 12 WIA. I don't believe that there was any hesitancy to engage the WSBs as the other camp across the river, Magbeni, was a free fire zone. The concern at Gberi Bana was for the hostages. It took 20 mins to secure the hostages yet the contact went on for 4 hours. The lesson learned from this op was how a first class op successful in the first 20 mins can drag on with resultant casualties due to the lack of initial and sustained airborne fire support (CAS).Quote:
Originally Posted by Harttm
25-150 kills on the WSBs side? Lets try to deconstruct that figure. It means 25 confirmed kills as evidenced by bodies found/seen/recovered. Where the 150 comes from is open to speculation.
Just ask Law Enforcement types about lethal feral youths on the streets of urban America. Without moral compasses, you get "Lord of the Flies" and all that goes with it.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
you get Lord of the Flies and all that goes with it.Quote:
Originally Posted by AdamG
I've got two sons that are long time Cops, one on each coast, both in major urban areas. Their concern is the 'legal' system apparently has no moral compass.
Or much sense...
virtual handshakes and salutes from me. Being a coastal cop (esp. in a major urban center) takes great fortitude and dedication. Or, else you have to be as dumb as a brick; but judging from their Old Man, that seems unlikely.
The civil and criminal justice system works better in the Heartland (its major urban centers excepted). I expect there is much greater direct accountability for judges, lawyers and police in smaller communities with lesser case loads.
-------------------------------
"Lord of the Flies" is an interesting book, which frustrated the hell out of me when I first read it in the late 1950s while in high school. My problems were with Ralphie Boy vice Jack. Ralph should have taken on Jack upfront, and if needed killed him. Ralph tried to protect the Piggies of his New World by playing nice all the way. That doesn't work in an environment ruled by the Laws of War.
And no, I wasn't a Piggy back then:
Attachment 1161
more like something of a cross between Ralph and Jack, I suppose. Both had good and bad features - and to some extent can stand as metaphors for the Rule of Law (Ralph) and the Laws of War (Jack).
Regards
Mike
Actually, they're smarter and better lookin' than I am -- a not all that difficult pair of feats...:DQuote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
I'm sure you're correct. Having watched the processes actually work in rural Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina and Virginia among other places, I continue to be totally befuddled by some case reports from all our larger cities...Quote:
The civil and criminal justice system works better in the Heartland (its major urban centers excepted). I expect there is much greater direct accountability for judges, lawyers and police in smaller communities with lesser case loads.
The west coaster son's three year long ordeal defending what was then his Dog Section from a local Activist's flawed and failed legal assault a few years ago over the fleeing felon who got bitten in the posterior was at least a hilarious break in otherwise sad stories.
Beyond fuddlement was the east coast kid's breaking his Asp in an arrest for the third time by him of one individual with a record of seven arrests and convictions for violent acts. Now eight. He's already back on the street...
The jails are overfull, they say...
Tell me Ken, is it really true that the police in LA are not able to handle the gangs?Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Haven't been to LA in 60 years. No desire to go back. Ugly town. LA Cops then were really pretty good, though and apparently still are better than most. Very small force for the size of the population, too...Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
However, I suspect that like all Police everywhere, they are not really able to "handle the gangs." If gangs were not a problem worldwide, there would be far fewer police. LINK, LINK, LINK, LINK.
You ask really weird questions but I'm sure you have a point in there somewhere, no matter how obscure it may be.
Well Ken, out here in the colonies we are probably cut from a different template.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
I'm trying to figure out the reason why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state. So I look at Mexico and then LA (and others). The simple deduction is that if its OK so close to home then who cares about Afghanistan, right?
Then again maybe not ;)
Highly redacted DOJ document on OMG's, this one deals with the Hells Angels.
http://cryptome.org/gangs/hells.pdf
One aspect of OMG's that is often overlooked IMO opinion is that these guys are very comfortable with technology...they still no how to make stuff with their hands, something not found in many gangs.
a very correct statement. That is neither an undeserved compliment nor a merited criticism, merely an acknowledgment of difference.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
That would indeed be simple deduction. Quite simple. Keep working at it, I'm sure some clarity will eventually appear...Quote:
I'm trying to figure out the reason why Afghanistan was allowed to develop into a narc state. So I look at Mexico and then LA (and others). The simple deduction is that if its OK so close to home then who cares about Afghanistan, right?
Uh, perhaps because the existing world system frowns upon excessive interference with other States and we generally adhere to that unless provoked? That would be my assessment, I'm sure yours differs. I'm equally sure that matters little. :cool:
I'm unsure why you appear to believe it was the US' job to clean up Afghanistan or just how we're supposed to do that but I note that once again you're strong on implications and innuendo and quite short on workable solutions. What is your suggestion? Please provide one that is not in accordance with the odd JMA version of what once was and forever should be but one that comports to what actually is achievable in this era.
The same thing applies to Mexico and even, slightly, to LA. We are a Federation and the Federal Government's powers to interfere in LA are limited. We also have a deliberately limited and unresponsive governmental process that the rest of the world, to include the odd Colonist, rarely understands or likes. That suits us just fine. ;)... And the point remains obscure... :DQuote:
Then again maybe not ;)
(Moderator's Note: couple of posts moved to the Afg & drugs main thread as returning to this issue does not belong here).