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Again JMM is as clear as mud ....
I do better in I Law and associated areas.
OK, I'll try again - with a diagram - and the question (which I didn't really ask in the prior post) is: does this make sense ?
What I'm suggesting is that DA is a very different thing from COIN-FID (no Genghis Khan suggested there; FM 3-24 and Niel's courses, etc.). In fact, DA may be contra-indicated in a COIN-FID situation; or maybe not.
In the case of DA, there are two preliminary issues: (1) defining the targets, in accord with US domestic law (including I Law accepted by the US) in such a way as to allow them to be hit by DA; and (2) gaining access rights in others' sovereign territories (or establishing a clear "white-space" doctrine) to allow DA to be executed. And other issues to derive ROEs.
We then move away from my little world to the world of intelligence and martial artistry to identify and destroy the targets. That seems to be a world in which McCrystal has walked well (even if with some controversy - it's a dirty world), based on other posts.
Basic question is whether I am nuts - as to this suggestion. :D
Heh. You know better thant that...
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
Hmmm....so perhaps there is something to modeling human behavior after all? ;)
Best,
Steve
My 'evidence' is anecdotal, no data points, ergo it isn't modeling it's heresy. Oops, er, uh -- it's hearsay... ;)
I know all that, John but IMO
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
Ken, although we can't know for sure how well or badly done that relief was, we do have a few indicators... So, all in all, it seems that it was as well done as it could have been in those circumstances.
It could've been done with, as Gavin said, more class.
Gates went all the way over there to tell him face to face and good for Gates for doing so. My personal belief is that it was not done with more discretion -- or class -- so that the new President gets props for being decisive and forceful. If that's correct it's shoddy; even if not the relief could've been done with a bit of finesses; McKiernan I think deserved better. Any US ARmy General who has the testicular fortitude to approve Armored Brigade Thunder Runs through Baghdad is okay in my book.
No, we don't know and in any event, it's done.
I will point out though, that Woerner's case and this one are a couple of many that answer the question about why Generals stick together and don't criticize each other in public...
I agree McKiernan probably wasn't the right guy for the job; didn't think he should've gotten it in the first place. First he's a heavy guy; second he's probably too nice. My perception is that Afghanistan is run sort of loosely -- which is fine if you have a well trained and educated Army -- we don't. Mc Crystal may be better, he's sharp, no question and he's one senior SOF guy who's not opposed to the GPF on principle. We'll see.
Think it'll be Petreaus replaces Casey, McCrystal replaces first Olson and then Petreaus... ;)
Ah, yes, the class of '76. Now what was it about them. Oh, no -- that was '77... :D
You left out Odierno, '76 -- and Petreaus, '74. ;)
Barno, McCrystal and Rodriguez are all Ranger Regiment Mafiosos. :eek:
I think I don't understand all I know
about what you might be asking...:wry:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jmm99
What I'm suggesting is that DA is a very different thing from COIN-FID (no Genghis Khan suggested there; FM 3-24 and Niel's courses, etc.). In fact, DA may be contra-indicated in a COIN-FID situation; or maybe not.
Yes.
Use of DA in going after High Value Targets may or may not be a viable option in COIN / FID. Personally, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, I thought it worthwhile -- but I also think we're close to overdoing it based on what I read in the funnypaper. That's just my take...
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...And other issues to derive ROEs.
All true but even there ROEs rule (with the normal self defense latitude, enhanced).
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That seems to be a world in which McCrystal has walked well (even if with some controversy - it's a dirty world), based on other posts.
True but he's also worked well with the GPF and has insisted that SOF elements coordinate with said GPF.
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Basic question is whether I am nuts - as to this suggestion. :D
This is where I get lost -- not sure precisely what you're suggesting.
If it's "victory as to that list," well, yeah, I suppose so -- but I'm dubious that would accomplish much of anything in Afghanistan or the world. IOW, what would be the point?
Not IMO. Or they should not be...
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Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
Really, though, how much difference does background and training make?
In my observation it depends, some folks can put aside their past better than others, some can acquire new skills faster than others and, of course, specific situations can have an impact. Basically, the short answer to your question is 'probably some, probably not totally.' See my Post above on 20%. :D
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How the new team will actually work in the environment of the Afghanistan war remains to be seen. But as I said in the previous post, this feels better.
Agreed. The key will be the amount of DA emphasis, I think. We'll see.
To satisfy my curiosity before I retire to lurking again,
What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?
I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?
Two strengths to consider
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Bertrand Russell pointed out that 20% of the people do 80% of the world's work -- that applies to Generals as well as Privates.
Two out of ten that really have their acts together seems about right to me...:D
Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) He truly gets small unit tactics (company and below), and he has a knack for team development. In his former capacity within JSOC he gets much credit for bringing interagency to the forefront of military doctrine today although he his somewhat humble and would probably give his staff more credit than himself. 2) He is all about "flattening" organizations with regards to C4I. He would often say "Centralized command with decentralized control", so I think you will see a paradigm shift in letting BCT/RCT and Bn commanders make strategic and operational decisions at their level vice waiting to push CONOPs up and down the reporting chain.... Again, I don't know LTG McChrystal is the purist in a COIN sense (SF versus Ranger arguments) but he will bring a new approach to the way the war is fought. I look forward to it...
PT SENDS
Based on the little I know
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Originally Posted by
Pragmatic Thinker
Having worked for LTG McChrystal two things he has going for him that will be crucial in Afghanistan. 1) ... 2)...
I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.
Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...:mad:
Others know better than I but based on
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
What does DA mean to you guys in the Afghanistan context?
I get the piece about targeting HVIs, but beyond that, how pervasive could DA possibly be?
what little I do know from all I've heard and read, most of the DA there is HVI. The issues that I think arise are some small ones and these three biggies:
How sure are we that X is in fact (a) HVI; (b) actually located at the strike point?
Allied to that is how many bystanders are likley to get zapped -- and is that cost worth the price of that HVI?
Do we have people doing HVI strikes that could be more profitably employed in other things or other places?
I think all those are important because I know that pressure to identify HVTs, any HVTs; to DO something; to not scrub a laid on mission, to discount the 'collateral damage' problem and a few other not really war fighting considerations can intrude and skew what happens...
I know that most people most of the time don't fall prey to those traps and are busting their tails to do good and do it right -- and are doing just that.
I also know that some folks will fall into those traps if we aren't careful.
We have a bad tendency, as Armed Forces, to put constraints on processes (four hours to get approval for aircraft as a rule...:mad:) and not on the effects of what we do. :confused:
Quote from "Killer Elite"
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I think you're correct on all points. I do know he pushed folks to work well with the GPF troops in the AO and that he used GPF elements widely and wisely.
Even better, he would have done more had the CentCom staff not flummoxed the troop allocation process as they're prone to do...:mad:
Michael Smith quotes LTG McChrystal in his book "Killer Elite" (pg. 276)...
Although Task Force 145 was under the control of the coalition commander, its operations were largely autonomous and heavily influenced by the JSOC Commander LTGEN Stanley McChrystal. His views were articulated in a memo sent to all JSOC operators at the same time as the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism was published. "This has been, and will be, a long and serious war," McChrystal told them. "Although initial structures and TTP's have evolved tremendously from where they were even two years ago, we are still operating within manning and operating processes that need to be improved to be more effective and professional. We must increasingly be a force of totally focused counterterrorists-that is what we do. This is a complex as developing Long Term Strategic Debriefing Facility that feeds our in-depth understanding of the enemy, and as simple as losing the casual, "I am off at my war adventure," manner of dress and grooming. In every case it will not be about what's easy, or even what we normally associate with conventional military standards. It will not even be about what is effective. It will be about what is the MOST effective way to operate- and we will do everything to increase the effectiveness in small ways. If anyone finds this inconvenient or onerous, there's no place in the force for you. This is about winning-and making as few trips to Arlington Cemetary en route to that objective."
I think this type of thinking and attitude are what SECDEF Gates was referring to when he spoke publically about LTG McChrystal replacing GEN McKiernan. There is no doubt that LTG McChrystal brings great management and leadership skills to the helm of this fight. He is also a huge proponent of SOF-GPF integration and isn't one to engage in who is better but rather how each compliments the other on the battlefield, but it has to start with getting over the egos and attitudes of "us versus them." He has on more than one occassion said that very thing... I think we will see some fresh ideas and some real shifts in doctrine for ALL forces in Afghanistan as he brings his unique leadership and management style to USFOR-A headquarters...
PT SENDS
I'll see your M-60 and raise you
an M4A3E8 an M26 and an M-46...
Some Tankers are true heirs of John Buford. Some are heirs of McClellan. I've served under both kinds. I suspect the 20% rule applies. :wry:
Tanks aren't going away. I've heard that prediction on and off since the 50s, they're still here -- and still needed. :cool: