Excellent questions - my semi-coherent answers
Excellent questions from Zenpundit, and outstanding responses from jcustis and Tom Odom. I’ll try to answer as much as I can within the limited time and space that I have, and from my viewpoint as a company-grade officer (soon to be a field-grader) in the much-maligned (here and in other internet forums) Air Force who has worked most of his career assigned to units outside the Air Force. As a matter of fact I am getting ready to go back to Iraq to train the Iraqis with some of my Army friends. The world is increasingly purple. Time permitting, I might expand some of my thoughts in my own FX-Based blog.
Regarding the theoretical exercises Zenpundit mentions, all of them have been interpreted and misinterpreted by proponents and detractor alike. Some of these discussions are valid, but many of them are unproductive and irrelevant to those out in the field. Here’s my quick take on some of the concepts Zenpudit mentions.
Something like net-centricity (an NCW concept) is essential to function in a dispersed battlespace like the one in which we operate today. Now, the ideas behind NCW and EBO have been misunderstood in all sorts of ways. All these misunderstandings have led to long and some times needless discussions. (The puzzling thing to me is that I’ve discussed some of these theories with people in academia with no military experience, and they seem to know more about them than those of us who have been out in the field…or so they think.) In my experience, the best way to learn for a job comes from being in the job. No amount of book learning and theory can really prepare you like actual practice of the job. Academic education, theories, and what you learn in tech school can give you a foundation, but I also put a lot of weight in “on-the-job-training” (under the watchful eye of a sharp NCO, of course). I believe you learn by doing, not by reading about it.
Some of the misunderstandings between the services are due to differences in perspective depending on how each service views itself and how it conducts warfare. Not all warfighters are created equal and some will see more validity in some concepts than in others based on their job experience. If your job is orchestrating an air campaign, you will probably see more validity and relevance in the concepts behind NCW and EBO than in the ones behind the three-block war and 4GW. Not all of us approach and conduct warfare in the same manner. This is a good thing. Even within the services there is considerable disagreement over what each concept means and how it should be applied. I think disagreement is a good thing as long as it encourages productive discussions and outcomes. I would rather serve in a military where different points of view are encouraged and expressed than in one where everybody thinks alike and there’s very little room for discussion about how we do business.
Some of the disconnect between academia and the military stems from the fact that scholars and warfighters have to operate inside very different worlds with very different sets of demands placed upon them. An academic can discuss any of the concepts mentioned above for days, even weeks, in a classroom environment. He or she can write books and dissertations about these concepts and give lectures and all the things that an academic does, but ultimately, all of this happens in the relatively sterilized world of academia, where you can discuss issues at large and sometimes don’t have to reach a decision on the issues. A warfighter ultimately has to decide and act. Discussions are useful, but many times must be limited to a minimum in the time-sensitive environment of a combat zone. An academic can discuss all day long and ultimately not reach a hard and fast conclusion with his students (that is, sometimes, a good thing in an academic environment); a warfighter has to decide what to do and act based on limited information, many times in life-or-death situations, and in a very chaotic environment. If the warfighter makes a wrong decision the wrong people can die.
On the subject of theories, I think that any theory that does not take properly into account the messiness of the human element and the friction and fog of war is limited in its practical value.
On some job-specific questions the views of a service member that has been on the job are far more relevant to me than whatever a scholar writes based on his or her academic studies or on some quickie visit to the AOR. Communication with the guy or gal you are replacing in the AOR is always crucial. A lot of the preparation for a deployment comes from "non-scholarly", but useful, sources.
That being said, there is a lot that scholars can do to contribute to the warfighters. I will say though that it seems to me that many in academia have no interest at all to contribute to our war efforts. Having their works used as a reference to warfighters is probably not part of what they envisioned when they put pen to paper.
One of the scholars that comes to mind is Kenneth Pollack. I remember he came to our base and talked extensively to the troops about Iraq before OIF kicked off. I am currently reading his book on Iran titled The Persian Puzzle. I use works like those of Pollack and others to get background on some of the issues that we might be facing in the future. I recommend not stopping at reading one single book by a single author on any particular issue. An amalgamation of views is always best for understanding some of the complex issues we are likely to face. I try to stay away from authors with political agendas that might provide overly-biased assessments on the issues. I don’t think war and partisan politics mix very well when you are in a combat situation. I try to instill in my people that we don’t fight as Democrats or Republicans, we fight as Americans.
I believe that the work of scholars is very useful in helping us understand situations in countries where we don’t have a significant military presence (or no presence at all), e.g. Iran, Sudan, North Korea, etc. A historian can also give us a window on how warfighters of the past handled certain situations and how situations came to be what they are today. I am an avid reader of military biographies to get insights on the decision-making processes of these leaders from the past. I also value our military heritage and one of the ways to preserve this heritage is by learning about those who fought before you.
For current ops, I rely a lot on my peers and my direct predecessors to get relevant information. Continuity books, AARs and lessons-learned are extremely important in this regard. Even if you end up doing “your own thing” (like many of us do), they provide a foundation from which you can build your approach. Innovation is good, reinventing the wheel is not.
The work of the theorist Zenpudit mentions, particularly Barnett’s PNM are more suited to get an understanding of certain grand strategic situations, but are not geared towards an operational, let alone tactical, view of specific situations. That’s okay, because as warfighters in an increasingly complex world, sometimes we have to look at the big picture before we drill down to our very specific missions. In today’s environment the actions of a single squad, platoon or flight element on the battlefield can have serious strategic implications. As warfighters we need to have this global perspective on issues and think about the consequences of our actions beyond the present time and place.
I’ve passed a lot of my experience through writing AAR’s and lessons learned after each significant action. The vast majority of this work is classified and very specific to my specialty and to a time and place in our conduct of operations. One of the reasons why you might not see a lot of this work is due to security considerations. That being said, a lot of the lessons-learned from our current operations are not classified and reside in the realm of what I call “forgotten common sense” and should be widely disseminated throughout the community. Information is crucial in our current fight and we should ensure that the right information gets to the people who need it most, not just the general and field grade officers, but also to our CGO’s, NCOs and junior enlisted who operate where the rubber meets the road. The Small Wars Journal is an example of an outstanding forum to do this.
Somehow echoing what Tom said, I do recommend to all service members to start writing about their experiences either in a web log or in more private forms if you don’t want the exposure. I know that writing, in my blog and in my personal and professional logs, has helped me immensely, not only from an operational perspective, but also from a psychological standpoint. I wish I had started earlier, but it’s never too late. You learn how to shoot by shooting and you learn how to write by writing. And we have a lot to stories to tell.
My advice for the any aspiring or up and coming milblogger is to use your blog for something more than the expression of your political views, but also use it as a learning tool for yourself and others.
One more thing before I finish this caffeine-fueled post.
When I was a cadet in ROTC our Commandant of Cadets used to say that he wanted all of us to think of ourselves as athletes and work to improve our physical condition as the “other athletes” on campus worked on theirs. To that I would add that not only do I want warrior-athletes but I also want warrior-thinkers. Our current situation demands warriors-thinkers who can thrive in complex environments where, to paraphrase Tom, there are no black and white solutions.
I’ll leave you with this quote from Sir William Francis Butler:
“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”
