New essay: “The Shadow COA or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NSC-68"
Light bathroom reading....
http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/2009/10/21/...d-love-nsc-68/
A little shameless self-promotion. :) I'd appreciate any constructive feedback.
Essay primarily focuses on a way ahead for the US Government in Central Asia by dissecting flawed political-military strategic assumptions to date. It then ties this together to a new understanding of geopolitics and global challenges to generate a new grand strategy by modernizing Kennan’s writings for the 21st century.
The essay covers four main points:
1) That although GEN McChrystal’s assessment calls for one of two courses of action in Afghanistan, there is a third, more suitable course not being debated;
2) That current plans and concepts developed after 9/11 are, in fact, causing many of the national security issues we face now and will in the future;
3) Argument against the conventional wisdom that Afghanistan or wars like it are a vital national interest (as a point to formulate a subsequent US grand strategy);
4) Proposal and recommendations for a new grand strategy.
The views expressed are my own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
At the risk of annoying all Planners *.
With respect to your four points:
1) I think there are many more than three courses of action and we do not know what is being debated at the decision level. My personal view is that we should not stay indefinitely but that we cannot leave too precipitously -- or by any announced date. Credibility is in the eye of the beholder and many beholders do not share your western view of what's important.
2) A correct statement but in part caused by simply a need to use what was available -- I see nothing in your paper that truly addresses that practical shortfall. You do attempt to sidestep the capability issue but I'm not all sure that is possible. A 'grand strategy' require a marriage of ways, means and ends. You provide an idealized -- and perhaps not totally achievable - end but do not discuss ways and the all important means.
3) Agree Afghanistan is not a vital national interest. It is, however, an important national interest. As an aside, comparison of Viet Nam and Afghanistan are, as you say, superfluous -- but I suggest the allusions to British and Russian experience there are equally flawed.
4) Americans can do grand strategy as you say; there are hundreds of examples of that. However, the American political system is decidedly inimical to a grand strategy. I have on this board many times made the point that the 'Cold War' was not nearly the monolithic good thing / grand strategy some appear to like to believe. Got to be careful which myths you subscribe to. You really need to figure out how to fix the interface of a 'grand strategy' and the US political process -- specifically, elections every 2,4, 6 and 8 years that can significantly change directions -- as occurred repeatedly during the Cold war (simply look at canceled weapons systems...). I believe that interface needs to effected and cleaned before you push too much grand strategy. If you really want it to work, that is...
I'd also argue that DoD does not by any means excel in direct actions necessary against imminent threats. In fact, the track record in that is far from good. MDMP is a terrible strait jacket and it totally discourages innovation. Our practice of having 'Planners' is also dangerous. Bunch of guys sitting around in air conditioned comfort and absolutely no situational awareness in far too many cases end up prematurely second guessing guys who are on the ground doing the work. Afghanistan offers numerous examples of that and the terrible flaws it engenders. Flaws that get people killed unnecessarily. That stupidity did not end with Shah i Kot in 2002...
That's a nice, idealistic paper. Not least your prescription for getting the SCO, India and Iran on board for a program that is inimical to all their interests. I'm curious to know why you think they might want to do that without also insuring that the Great Satan takes a hit or two? You might also want to look far more deeply at the idea that bad governance causes insurgency or the like. That, as the Scots say, is 'Not proven.' Far from it.
* When you all get to be Generals, do away with your Planners -- instead have two Ops cells, one to do current ops ('A'), the other to plan for the future ('B'); when time comes to execute 'B', they swap out and the 'A' crowd goes to work on 'C.' it is amazing how having to actually execute what you have planned focuses the mind on essentials and reality rather than simply process. Yes, I have done that and yes, it works beautifully.
No intent to annoy planners, they're doing what the system says they should do -- the system is screwed up.
More like the Third and Fifth Fleets in WW II.
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
What would it look like ? E.g., MAGTF "A" under OpCell A command for current operation; MAGTF "B" under OpCell B command for next operation ?
MAGTF "A" has two Ops cells and no planning cell in their S3 shop; same applies to MAGTF "B" -- and to I MEF and 2/6 Marines. Or III Corps, 1st CavDiv and 2/7 Cav.
At higher levels, use the Two Fleet concept -- the ships and their crews generally stayed in theater but due to maintenance and other things, were not constantly in contact. The Fleet Headquarters and Staff OTOH could get worn to a frazzle very quickly dependent upon OpTempo so the Staffs rotated and when Halsey and his crew were in charge, it was Third Fleet; when Spruance was there it was Fifth Fleet. Both worked for Nimitz and Pacific command while Seventh Fleet worked for southwest Pacific command and MacArthur. The latter had a lower tempo and did not need to rotate fleet commands.
Of course it helped in WW II that there was a broad plan, a strategy if you will. Thus the change in command styles did not have too detrimental an effect...
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I can visualize something akin in my profession. Trial Team A does trial; Trial Team B does appeal. There it depends on how much redundancy can you afford...
Given the size of today's military staffs, that's easily affordable in the Armed forces of today... :rolleyes:
Thanks for the response, Jeremy. Good points all...
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Originally Posted by
kotkinjs1
...When does pursuing courses of action to take into account another's perspective or viewpoint turn from maintaining credibility in their eyes on one hand to pushing up against your own culminating point or being led around and following the spasmodic demands of a foreign public or, even worse, strategy of the enemy itself on the other? At some point, and I think we're quickly approaching that point, we need to do what's right for us. And doing 'right for us' can still be nested inside what's right, geopolitically for other actors with shared interests.
Excellent points. In order, I think that tipping point is very much situation dependent and is almost certainly the proverbial moving target -- thus it is easy to err in both directions in the process of determining if it is near or present depending upon ones situational awareness and risk assessment capability added to one's aversion to risk. Three items to be considered in the current situation are that our 'credibility' is cited by the current opponent as a major issue; what is right for us is in the eye of the beholder and many do not agree with your assessment that said point is near; lastly, the heroin issue...
So yes, we need to do what's right for us, no question. We can differ on what that might be at this time. As for nesting inside what's right, geopolitically for other actors with shared interests, one has to be quite cautious in assessing what those shared interest truly are -- if they exist at all...
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The shortfall I tried to address is the continuation of a global campaign plan designed for one specific threat at one specific time still being used in perpetuity...they need to be a harmonizing of State and AID along with a (much) lower military presense.
I do not disagree with your premises -- I was pointing out that you have not addressed the impact of the US political system on your goals and that, lacking that, said goals are unlikely to be achievable. That crops up again below.
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On the bigger scale, the economic and political points that jm99 referenced from Kennan are the ways and means.
The esteemed Counsellor known as jmm99 said:"The Cold War containment strategy (as opposed to the alternative roll-back strategy) was aimed at containment of communism (the threat). It had its instances of armed conflicts; but, in the end, boiled down to an ideological and economic struggle - in their terms, more of the Political Struggle than the Military Struggle. The Sovs also made more mistakes than we made." True that -- however, I've been confused over the last eight or nine years by the many scholars who have surfaced 'containment' as an option by one major point -- how do you contain an ideology that has no infrastructure to threaten and which, due to that lack, happens to vastly more flexible and nimble than we are? What, precisely are your ways and means to do that?
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.. But at the strategic level and for the political and military decisions made, all three are of value.
I suggest that if that is true, one should be careful to avoid cherry picking items to arrive at a foregone conclusion. :D
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... (i.e., not getting into an Ideological pissing contest with various groups of criminals) to build a strategy off of that the American people and their elected representative can get and stick behind.
I hate to be an old cynic but good luck with that. Seriously... :wry:
I also suggest that the contest was started by others and is more than ideological and that some of the players are more than criminals. Those two factors make a difference -- not least in US public opinion.
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I might disagree here but I think the failures of the Clinton and early Bush administrations were not military or intelligence failures (to prevent attacks or hit HVTs) but political failures. Agree, MDMP is far too linear and hence the focus and shift to Operational Design. That's not a panacea for planners but it does allow for more innovation and holistic approaches.
My frame of reference went back far beyond the two Administrations you cite. My experience from Korea through Desert Storm says we are not well trained or educated, we are slaves to dogma and we are terribly inflexible -- ergo we invariably over react to situations and we do not excel at eliminating threats, far too often we exacerbate problems by that over reaction. That is a judgment based on military and intelligence performance AND the political aspect -- all three are interdependent -- which must be 'fixed' for your goals to be achieved. So to get where you want to go; you must first fix the political system of the US or figure out a way to flank it to get where you wish to go; improve the Intel community; improve the Armed Forces at all levels from the strategic to the tactical, we don't excel at nearly as much as we think we do. Far from it. MDMP and the fact operational design has to be 'adopted' are proof of our shortcomings. :rolleyes:
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We probably would but that's diplomacy. It doesn't need to be a zero-sum game.
True but doesn't the intensity of the possible hit(s) versus the potential gain merit consideration? Seems to me an objective and detailed cost-benefit analysis would be required rather then blithely assuming it'll work out. Again, I'd suggest the US public opinion might have to be a consideration.
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Sorry, I've been too corrupted by Bob's World. I know he probably disagrees with some of my arguments and assertions for the current 'war,' but I still subscribe to that theory for most, if not all, insurgencies.
Bob and I also differ on that score, I'm flexible enough to accept 'most' but draw the line at all, having played games in a couple where governance was not the real (but in one case was the stated) reason. I also have raised with him the triple dichotomy of saying bad governance is the cause and at the same time saying that the governance others choose is none of our business and that we can stop most of these things by judicious use of diplomacy and SF... :D
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If the nukes are somehow "stolen," well, I just think that the strategic risk calculation of likelihood vs. cost end up being cheaper in the long run than pumping $7.5B into a country who's national interests are not mutual to ours.
Are those the only considerations?
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None; that's one of my main points; we're fighting a war to solve a problem that's not military in nature.
If by war you mean the GWOT etc., I agree. If you mean Afghanistan, true but that fact is transcended by the fact that we elected to stay after extracting our pound of flesh when we should not have done so. That is also fact, we are there and you cannot wish it away. You can ignore the intangible issues if you wish, not everyone will do so. Figure out why NATO and some other Nations agreed to get involved there and are mostly statying...
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Because we view RU, CN, and IR as threats themselves, we fail to see a different route.
I do not believe that's a true statement. Change threat to competitor and I would agree. Really. Ponder that. It's important...
Is this where I get to say 'Improve training; assess METT-TC?'
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Originally Posted by
Major Riptdie
Having worked in both Plans and Ops,this solution (to what I presume is poor planning) strikes me as interesting, but difficult to envision.
Been there done that -- seen it work in peace and war.
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There are other ways to enhance the situational awareness of those planning operations without a wholesale remodel of the staff.
True -- why aren't they used? :(
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Still, I do see merits in your solution (possibly at lower echelons)...
If you mean Bde and below in combat, I agree. I'd do away with the Division, useless level IMO, A Corps should be able to control up to nine BCTs with no problem. Corps probably needs planners -- but they also should have dual Ops teams.
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First, this assumes contiguous operations with definitive start and stop times, presumably when the whistle would blow and Team A would stand up and Team B would sit down.
Not in mid to high intensity combat. Just adapt it to other control measures.
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...The word "counter" being key because it implies reacting to enemy action, and thus having ceded the initiative. The wisdom of making such operations the mainstay of your strategy is debatable (and beyond this discussion). Attempting to figure out when Team A stops and Team B starts may be problematic during "counter" operations.
Agreed, as all such operations entail adaptation, this is just one more. The intensity and degree of stasis are the guiding factors.
I also strongly suggest that a tenet of our future doctrine and training should be an orientation that emphasizes and trains to be the intitiator of action in such operations -- reacting to the enemy is a losing game. Yes, I understand the difficulties and I know that good units can do the initiating...
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Second, it seems that your solution may lend itself to operations at the tactical level, since that is really where the operations cell plays a direct role in the execution (i.e. command and control) of an operation. At the operational and strategic levels, however, I would argue that the primary function of OPS is not to directly command and control (having the Division or Corps Commander in your truck, tank, or cockpit is annoying), but rather to maintain situational awareness to feed operational and strategic planning.
First, I suggest that having a Bn S3 or Cdr or even in some cases, a Co Cdr in your tank is just as annoying -- and more importantly, distracting -- as is a Corps Cdr (we can dispense with Div Cdrs...). Secondly when the Bn Staff's need to maintain situational awareness, exacerbated by the foolishness at the major TCs, get into the 'Car 54, where are you?' mode -- which it does way too frequently -- they are not helping. Impatience and lack of trust in subordinates will not last in a real war so why do we encourage it in training and in 'counter' operations? :confused:
Having pontificated, I strongly agree that in combat, as you say, the focus of the staff should by upward, not downward. They should be gathering information and feeding it upstream and they should not be doing this by hassling the operating units due to a fear of being asked a question they cannot answer. That is a significant training and PME shortfall. Very significant.
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However, I think the solution is probably very different depending on the level of warfare and types of operations you are conducting.
Always true, all generalizations are subject to situational modifications. I suggest that better training coupled with the always critical assessment of the METT-TC factors can handle those adaptations. :wry:
