I'm not worried about NCOs micromanaging. Most don't...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
To micromanage means to spend much time on one or few things, which equals neglect of others because there's so much to do.
In US parlance, to micromanage generally involves excessive 'supervision' and failure to trust subordinates. Whether one task or a number, the degree of generally superfluous meddling is the issue.The US problem with micromanagement is, as someone stated elsewhere, generally at the Field Grade and above level. The Generals learned to do it in Korea after the line stabilized and they had little to do; Viet Nam merely made it worse and the current 'wars' have continued that. I recall someone in Afghanistan back in 2005 telling me that one operation required the approval of five General Officers and I'm sure that's worse today...
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This is especially true if said NCO is forced by his supervisor to not exhaust himself (enough sleep on campaign), which is necessary because an exhausted NCO cannot lead by example any more.
True -- and a recurring US problem induced by our five day a week, forty hours of work mentality. While that 40 hours is rarely more than a floor in the Armed forces; how productive the usually extra 20 plus hours a week in garrison or on base are happens to be a separate question...
We're focused on short term efforts and the normal routine of four five days of field training a couple of weeks a month is not helpful. Everyone can stay awake for most of that so no one sets up rest and sleep plans...
What the book says is nothing...
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Originally Posted by
ganulv
Just curious, but what is on the books in the U.S. Army and USMC as far as body armor and jungle operations?
What most know is that wearing protective gear in a hot, humid forest is bound to lead to excessive and unsustainable heat casualties.
No personal armor for ground troops in WW II. It did exist by the time of Korea. Not jungle but quite hot and humid in the summer. By 1952 after the line stabilized, wear was mostly mandatory but exceptions were made for Patrols and units with close combat potential -- things generally not done in Afghanistan and Iraq which have their own climate problems but also get quite warm in the summer.
As flawed as was the leadership in the past in Viet Nam it still had enough sense to not insist upon -- but to allow under some circumstances -- the wearing of vests and also to allow for some elements in most circumstances the wearing of soft hats instead of helmets (in both cases with minor excursions both ways).
Whether the senior 'leadership' of the time in the future will acknowledge the heat casualty reality is not known. :wry:
Fuchs:
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They specialised on beating up people in less humid areas lately, thanks to the Vietnamese people.
You got that a bit wrong, as you do on occasion...
It was US Politicians, not the Vietnamese people...
We're not allowed to beat up on people. We weren't allowed to in Viet Nam and have not been allowed to since. We are allowed, even wrongly encouraged, to tussle with them but we are not and were not allowed to beat up on 'em. Specifically precluded from doing so, in fact... :rolleyes:
Oh, I got it -- and you're still wrong...
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
It was the politicians, sure - but you didn't get what I wrote and thus you got me wrong. :D I wasn't writing as literally as you assumed.
The politicians and thus the nation as a whole specialised on beating up people in less humid areas.
This was no doubt triggered by the Vietnamese ascension to the throne of stubbornness previously shared by the British and Russians.
Take your pick of Politicians, either the dumb crowd that sent us there in the first place (both batches, both efforts...) or the two different batches that hamstrung the ongoing effort and would not allow us to beat up on anyone. Or even the other two batches who oversaw the end of the effort...
None of that excuses the Army for doing a poor job, BTW.
Stubbornness wasn't the issue though it contributed. Political and strategic failures were the principal problems and those errors were not rectified by less than decent tactical performance at the national (in South Viet Nam by the US Command) level. The Troops, the USAF and USN did the best they could with one hand tied.
My comment was and is that we aren't and weren't allowed to really beat up on anybody, we're just told to engage them fruitlessly and at far less than even decent, much less maximum, effort. :mad: