Obama:Future Commander-in-Chief Gives Advance Notice To Enemy He Will Retreat

OBAMA: FUTURE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GIVES ADVANCE NOTICE TO ENEMY HE WILL RETREAT

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Barack Obama has committed in military strategic terms the cardinal “sin”: Giving advance notice to the enemy when America will withdraw its troops from Iraq, which is the inverse of giving advance notice to the enemy when he is going to be attacked. It’s neither surprising nor astonishing that Senator Obama committed this “hellish” mistake. Sprinkled by Saint John the Baptist with the holy waters of populism--which in present day America many politicians consider it to be the primary pass that will guarantee a presidential candidate to enter and ensconce himself into the Oval Office--the springy and eloquent senator has entered along with other Democrats the contest for the golden trophy of the candidature for the presidency. The White House however, in our dangerous times, is no longer an easy entry for the smooth and the eloquent--as it was in Clinton times--is no longer a treat for the weak. So Senator Obama even if he wins the golden trophy as the Democratic candidate for the presidency, it’s most unlikely that he will be given the chance to put his trophy on the desk of the Oval Office. It’s more likely that he will place it on the mantelpiece of his lounge room rusting as memorabilia. As G.K. Chesterton observed, "a dead thing can go with the stream...but only a living thing can go against it'. Senator Barack Obama is "a dead thing". ......

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Originally Posted by kotzabasis

OBAMA: FUTURE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GIVES ADVANCE NOTICE TO ENEMY HE WILL RETREAT

Barack Obama has committed in military strategic terms the cardinal “sin”: Giving advance notice to the enemy when America will withdraw its troops from Iraq, which is the inverse of giving advance notice to the enemy when he is going to be attacked. It’s neither surprising nor astonishing that Senator Obama committed this “hellish” mistake. Sprinkled by Saint John the Baptist with the holy waters of populism--which in present day America many politicians consider it to be the primary pass that will guarantee a presidential candidate to enter and ensconce himself into the Oval Office--the springy and eloquent senator has entered along with other Democrats the contest for the golden trophy of the candidature for the presidency. The White House however, in our dangerous times, is no longer an easy entry for the smooth and the eloquent--as it was in Clinton times--is no longer a treat for the weak. So Senator Obama even if he wins the golden trophy as the Democratic candidate for the presidency, it’s most unlikely that he will be given the chance to put his trophy on the desk of the Oval Office. It’s more likely that he will place it on the mantelpiece of his lounge room rusting as memorabilia. As G.K. Chesterton observed, "a dead thing can go with the stream...but only a living thing can go against it'. Senator Barack Obama is "a dead thing".

The present attack by the leader of the Opposition Kevin Rudd on Prime Minister Howard for the latter’s critique of the doltish and politically and militarily irresponsible announcement of Senator Obama, that if he became the next president he would withdraw the troops by March 2008, is a shameful diversion from the real issues of the war, that Rudd will have to carry with obloquy in his public persona. In answering Laurie Oakes’s question Howard by spelling out the verities of the war and reminding Australians of the impending dire consequences that an American defeat in Iraq would have not only in our region but in the West generally, he acted as a responsible leader, unlike Rudd who is gamboling with the vital interests of the nation for his own narrow egotistical political interests. The fact is that the defeat of the US will embolden all the terrorist organizations in our region and will turn the Indonesian archipelago, as I have said in a previous article of mine, into a tidal wave of Islamic fanaticism crashing on the shores of Australia. To defend our country from being subdued the losses of our military will be in the thousands in comparison to the few loses that Australia might sustain with the new strategy of the Coalition forces under general Petreaus. Moreover, the protection of Australia from this great portentous threat will require America to come to our help.

We are at war with a remorseless, fanatic, mortal foe, who furthermore is irreconcilable and deaf to the sounds of reason. The clever thing to do is to destroy this implacable enemy whilst he is still weak and not to give him time to become stronger and hence make his defeat more difficult in the future, and at an enormously higher cost in human lives and materiel. To achieve this strategic end, the new strategy under the command of general Petraeus must not be constrained in using overwhelming force as a last resort to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. History pellucidly illustrates that all protests and demonstrations against war are dissolved in the cup of victory.


Delenda est furor religiosus

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I'm no Obama fan, but I'm uncomfortable with logic of this essay. Iraq--like all counterinsurgency--is not a two-way game which pits the United States against the insurgents. While I personally disagree with the set-a-time-definite-for-withdrawal crowd, I can understand their argument (even while I do not accept it): the Iraqi government is not fully motivated to do what it needs to do to resolve the conflict as long as the American presence remains what it is. Moreover, every conflict forces the participants to decide whether the costs of persisting outweigh the costs of disengagement. Certainly an American withdrawal from Iraqi would be trumpeted by AQ as a victory, but the question is whether that is worse than the costs of persistence (in terms of blood, money, the erosion of the military, political prestige, etc.)

Not sure if you wrote the essay or someone else did, but I also take great issue with the contention that Petraeus can or should defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Primary responsibility lies with the Iraqis; secondarily with the U.S. embassy. Petraeus, in military jargon, is the "supporting" participant, not the "supported."

One problem, among many, in Iraq is that its sovereignty is a legal fiction. Without the Coalition, the Iraqi government controls little. So, in a very real sense, the occupation has not ended. If that is true, then as the de facto occupier, we are also the de facto sovereign. Thus, responsibility for defeating the insurgency falls on the Coalition/US. Because of the sovereignty fiction, the American embassy is the lead agency but because there is an ongoing major military operation, GEN Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker.

To pose the question you raise, Steve, a bit differently: Who is the supported commander and who the supporting? And, who should be whom? My opinion, for what it is worth, is that Crocker should be the supported commander - supported by both Coalition and Iraqi military and security forces. Crocker's mission should be twofold: 1. Achieve reasonable security in Iraq and 2. build sufficient capcity in the Iraqi government so that de facto sovereignty can be transferred as well as de jure.

Note that I made no attempt to answer the first question. I simply don't believe that the answer to that one actually exists but to the extent it does, it depends on persoanl relationships.

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Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

One problem, among many, in Iraq is that its sovereignty is a legal fiction. Without the Coalition, the Iraqi government controls little. So, in a very real sense, the occupation has not ended. If that is true, then as the de facto occupier, we are also the de facto sovereign. Thus, responsibility for defeating the insurgency falls on the Coalition/US. Because of the sovereignty fiction, the American embassy is the lead agency but because there is an ongoing major military operation, GEN Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker.

To pose the question you raise, Steve, a bit differently: Who is the supported commander and who the supporting? And, who should be whom? My opinion, for what it is worth, is that Crocker should be the supported commander - supported by both Coalition and Iraqi military and security forces. Crocker's mission should be twofold: 1. Achieve reasonable security in Iraq and 2. build sufficient capcity in the Iraqi government so that de facto sovereignty can be transferred as well as de jure.

Note that I made no attempt to answer the first question. I simply don't believe that the answer to that one actually exists but to the extent it does, it depends on persoanl relationships.

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It may be a de facto fiction, but it's not a legal fiction--the government does have legal standing and the nation has legally recognized borders.

My position is that one of the conundra in the way we approach counterinsurgency support is that we, on one hand, admit that we cannot attain decisive, strategic success through military means, but we emphasize military means, treating counterinsurgency as a variant of conventional war. If I were king, I would have made Iraq a three star command and had him report to the ambassador (but would have made someone like Zinni ambassador). But, then, that could be why I'm not king.

Steve--

Certainly, Iraq is, de jure, a recognized state.

Whether it was wise to end the formal occupation when we did or not is not the question, we are stuck with the results.

If I were King, I would have Petraeus report to Crocker, but then I, like you, am not King:D

Cheers

JohnT

My experience with the DOS, although limited, has not given me any reason to believe that the military should be reporting to them. The guy I met is supposed to be this hot shot. He speaks fluent Arabic and has spent quite a bit time in the ME but he totally discounts the tribal aspects of this culture. He seems to be another of the many cool-aid drinkers who believes that we can undo 4,000 years of tribal culture and create a western style democracy in five years.

SFC W

Hi U 509--

One of my hobby horses is that we should never settle for a vague unity of effort IF real unity of command is available. In principle, I would generally argue for the American ambassador to be "in command" in an overseas environment - as is the normal peacetime case. (Even the military reports to the ambassador, with one exception - when there is a major military op ongoing.) In the exceptional case, I would argue that the President should designate his ambassador or his military commander as being in command of all US assets in country.

The Iraq case argues for the ambassador for 2 reasons: 1. the de jure status of Iraqi sovereignty and 2. the apparent strong positive and mutually supportive relationship between Petraeus and Crocker. In the end, who is designated "commander" may well depend on personalities.

Short summary: The principle of civilian control should generally be dominant but can be overridden in specific cases where personality is the powerful factor.

Cheers

JohnT

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We are at war with a remorseless, fanatic, mortal foe, who furthermore is irreconcilable and deaf to the sounds of reason. The clever thing to do is to destroy this implacable enemy whilst he is still weak and not to give him time to become stronger and hence make his defeat more difficult in the future, and at an enormously higher cost in human lives and materiel. To achieve this strategic end, the new strategy under the command of general Petraeus must not be constrained in using overwhelming force as a last resort to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. History pellucidly illustrates that all protests and demonstrations against war are dissolved in the cup of victory.

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I've tried three times to phrase a lucid and compelling reply to this gross oversimplification, gross exageration and unhelpful unworkable proposed solution, complete with its 'ends justifies means" conclusion.

The closest I can come to it is to aver that there is no monolithic enemy with a world plan for conquest. As the evidence shows there are a multitude of small insurgencies, all with different motivations for fighting, and against which, the use of "overwhelming" force is not only inefficient, but impractical.

I further fail to understand how withdrawing from a nascent civil war in Iraq is going to result in hordes of Iraqi insurgents embarking for Australia, landing on the beaches of Port Phillip Bay, and marching up Collins Street to take Premier Steve Bracks prisoner.

I also fail to understand why a former Director of the highly acclaimed SBS Television Service, whose programming is aimed exclusively at non English speaking immigrants to Australia, would publish such unhelpful statements.

SteveMetz

I would agree with you entirely that one has to count the costs of withdrawal with the costs of persistence if the Iraq war was an isolated one disengaged from the war against global terror. The fact however is that the war in Iraq now-whether it was so or not in the past is no longer the question-is an essential part of global terror. We see this not only in the pull that it has on the true believers of Islam from all over the world who fervently enter the ranks of the insurgency, but also in the imitation of the techniques of the latter, since they appear to be so successful against the coalition forces, by other jihadists, who are also waging war against the infidels in other parts of the world.

Hence, America is involved in a long global war and not an isolated one, and must therefore count its costs on a mega-scale as they issue from its long term strategic interests, prestige, and indeed, its existence as the sole superpower that is the sine qua non of the stability of the world in these most dangerous times.

Taking a cue from John Fishel, the coalition forces are engaged in continuous major military operations against the insurgents with the goal to create the necessary security that is vital for the stabilization of the Iraqi government and the linchpin of its ability to govern the country without American props. It seems to me therefore following this logic, that your question whether GEN Petraeus is the "supporting" or " supported", can be answered that he is both. Supporting the Iraqi government to stand on its own feet and supported by the political establishment (Ambassador Crocker) to do exactly that.

Hence, it seems to me to be obvious, that the paramountcy of resolving the conflict in Iraq, lies with the military and not with diplomacy. Especially when this conflict is drenched so heavily with religious fervour that is not open to the rational discourse of diplomacy, as we have witnessed lately of Hamas.

To your question whether I wrote the original article, the answer is yes.

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Originally Posted by kotzabasis

SteveMetz

I would agree with you entirely that one has to count the costs of withdrawal with the costs of persistence if the Iraq war was an isolated one disengaged from the war against global terror. The fact however is that the war in Iraq now-whether it was so or not in the past is no longer the question-is an essential part of global terror. We see this not only in the pull that it has on the true believers of Islam from all over the world who fervently enter the ranks of the insurgency, but also in the imitation of the techniques of the latter, since they appear to be so successful against the coalition forces, by other jihadists, who are also waging war against the infidels in other parts of the world.

Hence, America is involved in a long global war and not an isolated one, and must therefore count its costs on a mega-scale as they issue from its long term strategic interests, prestige, and indeed, its existence as the sole superpower that is the sine qua non of the stability of the world in these most dangerous times.

Taking a cue from John Fishel, the coalition forces are engaged in continuous major military operations against the insurgents with the goal to create the necessary security that is vital for the stabilization of the Iraqi government and the linchpin of its ability to govern the country without American props. It seems to me therefore following this logic, that your question whether GEN Petraeus is the "supporting" or " supported", can be answered that he is both. Supporting the Iraqi government to stand on its own feet and supported by the political establishment (Ambassador Crocker) to do exactly that.

Hence, it seems to me to be obvious, that the paramountcy of resolving the conflict in Iraq, lies with the military and not with diplomacy. Especially when this conflict is drenched so heavily with religious fervour that is not open to the rational discourse of diplomacy, as we have witnessed lately of Hamas.

To your question whether I wrote the original article, the answer is yes.

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Important points but to me the President's logic seems somewhat like the "domino theory" as applied to Vietnam. That turned out to not be true.

In terms of Iraq, we're damned if we do, damned if we don't. Disengagement will bolster the morale of Islamic extremists and reinforce the point that they can defeat the U.S.; persisting will erode the morale of the American public and do damage to the U.S. military. Which is the lesser evil? I myself am not sure.

I am worried, though, that Iraq becomes a pyrrhic victory--the costs of success there so weaken us that we have failures elsewhere. To take one illustration, I think a case can made that if American morale and prestige had not been so weakened by Vietnam, we would have been able to act more effectively in Iran in the last 1970s. I'm concerned by that by so devoting ourselves to Iraq, we allow other, perhaps bigger, problems to fester and grow worse.

While an argument can be made that the foreign fighters in Iraq are not amenable to any sort of political resolution and simply need to be killed, if their support network among Iraqi Sunni Arabs is taken apart, killing them becomes much easier. Plus, I don't think AQI can, on its own, attain anything like "strategic success" without its allies in the Iraqi Sunni Arab community.

Personally, I'm just hard pressed to imagine a military outcome that totally prevents suicide bombers. You can't guard everything and everyone all the time (unless we want to reinstate the draft and deploy a few million forces).

Walrus

If you were a defensive lawyer compelled to plead your cause of peace in conditions of war you would send, as sure as hell, your cause or client to the gallows.

Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions , than to be ruined by too confident a security. Edmund Burke,writing before the terror of the French Revolution.

MARK O'NEIL

I concede that I might have been ingloriously wrong about the motorcycles as a result of being a greenhorn in this area. I thought in an environment where your enemies are too fearful to engage you directly, that cycles, equipped with some armor to protect their riders, because of their speed, smallness, and maneuverability to traverse on both smooth and rough grounds, would be more effective vehicles, and less easy to target than humvees, for the transit movement of your troops in urban warfare conditions.

But as an upstart in this field and a "pigeon" to boot, I have learnt my hard lesson not to perch where eagles fear to tread. And I will stick to my perch where I think I can make a modicum contribution.

As to the style of my prose is like the color of one's skin, each person has his own and cannot help it. But I can assure you that I will not be using it to abuse anybody, especially military personnel of whom I have the greatest respect.

SteveMetz

It's certainly true that the U.S. is in the unenviable position of being damned if she does and damned if she doesn't. Bur I would still argue, in the face of the great and ominous dangers that the West is facing and America being the only power that can defeat global terror, it's better to be damned for doing something than for doing nothing. ("Nothing comes out of nothing" King Lear.)

This despite all the errors that inevitably are committed in all wars as a result of human limitations. And before the daunting huge scale operations involved in war, it's nigh impossible to probe and foresee all the unknowns embedded in them.

Steve, ref "the domino theory", the fact that no dominoes fell doesn't necessarily mean the theory was invalid - just ask the dominoes whether the extra years we gave them mattered to them, and whether the Viet communist imperial threat of the 1960's was stronger or weaker than it had become in 1975? Invocation of the 1960's domino theory in regards to the Iraq war is as revisionist and polemical as describing Tet 1968 a VC victory or the Phoenix program as an assassination project. There are many legitimate pro and con arguments around the GWOT and Iraq, but invoking Vietnam war comparisons is merely an historical sleight of hand, not a useful metaphor.