Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.

Villages and other populated areas can be considered sanctuaries for insurgents until counter-insurgent forces wrest control away. As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way, and they need not be a black or white proposition that has been sensationalized in recent media offerings.

ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have been slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night, to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.

The chance to disrupt the disruptors at very low cost seems to me a great opportunity.

A strategy of pinning down insurgents through denial of movement and then eliminating them at a convenient time appears to offer an effective way to decimate TB at low risk to allied forces.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.

As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way.

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How the Taliban take over a village is similar to how a gang takes over a neighborhood.

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How the Taliban take over a village is similar to how a gang takes over a neighborhood.

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Indeed, and they can get away with it through carefully applied intimidation, "night letters", and outright murder during visits in the night.

Are we unable to stop them simply because we often do not have a durable presence in those villages, like a beat cop should have durable presence in his assigned neighborhood? Or is it more due to a lack of a mechanism for said villagers to anonymously report when the insurgents are maneuvering through their land/homes?

Put another way, does law enforcement succeed primarily from presence or speed in response?

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Originally Posted by jcustis

Indeed, and they can get away with it through carefully applied intimidation, "night letters", and outright murder during visits in the night.

Are we unable to stop them simply because we often do not have a durable presence in those villages, like a beat cop should have durable presence in his assigned neighborhood? Or is it more due to a lack of a mechanism for said villagers to anonymously report when the insurgents are maneuvering through their land/homes?

Put another way, does law enforcement succeed primarily from presence or speed in response?

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Not really either one. Mostly a combination of surveillance and informants. Beat cops in the old days would be able to prevent a lot of it, but those days are gone. But criminals also have extraordinary economic leverage to, they can simply buy peoples silence, especially in poor neighborhoods. More neighborhoods are taken over that way then many people realize but intimidation and force will certainly be used if need be.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.

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Hi Jon,

Know that your CAG-guy would be working his assessments of Security, Economics ($/hectare), and Governance of their side and ours for you. Here is something from the civilian side of things that might be of use to you as well.

From Marketing Strategy 3rd Edition by O.C. Ferrell and Michael D. Hartline (man they are proud of that book...my wallet cried for days):

Internal Environment

• Availability and Deployment of Human Resources

• Age & Capacity of Equipment or Technology

• Availability of financial resources

• Power & Political Struggles within the Firm

• Current Marketing Objectives & Performance

Customer Environment

• Who are our current & potential customers?

• What do customers do with our products?

• Where do customers purchase our products?

• When do customers purchase our products?

• How & why do customers select our products?

• Why do potential customers not select our products?

External Environment

• Who are the Competition?

• Economic growth & stability?

• Political Trends?

• Legal & Regulatory Issues?

• Technological Advancements?

• Sociocultural trends?

Merry Christmas

Steve

Under current widely-held definitions of "sanctuary" (ungoverned spaces) both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are really simply battling for temporary access through the exertion of force.

Better, I think, to take a more wholistic view on what truly contributes to "sanctuary":

1. Legal status: A border often provides this; but so does a non-state status like AQ has; or a quasi-state status like LH has, that takes them outside the rule of law.

2. Support of a poorly governed populace. Only a small portion of a populace may take up arms, but the factors that give rise to insurgency (causation) affect regular, peaceful people as well. When a popualce feel little loyalty to its government, it is ripe "sanctuary" for an insurgent to hide within and draw support from. BL, sanctuary comes far more from poorly governend populaces than from un or undergovernend spaces.

3. Some favorable terrain, vegetation, cover, concealment. Can be mountains, a swamp, deep forest, or urban, or some mix. Open desert doesn't work well.

So, a mix of legal status, a supportive or neutral populace, and cover/concealment. That is sanctuary.

Operations in the Arghandab, or nearby areas like Shah Wali Kowt and Khakrez to the north; or Zari -Panjiway to the South, or within Kandahar City itself can in fact temporarily deny physical sanctuary so long as one occupys the ground (and is willing to stay and not return to ones FOB at night..); but this is not the denial of "Sanctuary."

True denial of sanctuary requries targeting legal status issues of the insurgent; addressing poor governance issues of the populace; and then designing capabilities to work within the type of cover and concealment being employed in the area of operaitons. All these are things that require time and a holistic approach to address.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Operations in the Arghandab, or nearby areas like Shah Wali Kowt and Khakrez to the north; or Zari -Panjiway to the South, or within Kandahar City itself can in fact temporarily deny physical sanctuary so long as one occupys the ground (and is willing to stay and not return to ones FOB at night..); but this is not the denial of "Sanctuary."

True denial of sanctuary requries targeting legal status issues of the insurgent; addressing poor governance issues of the populace; and then designing capabilities to work within the type of cover and concealment being employed in the area of operaitons. All these are things that require time and a holistic approach to address.

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Very well put- particularly the last two paragraphs. To expand, coersion can be used by the USG or HN to clear the sanctuary. Coersion can be a mixture of population control measures, increased application of violence, and limited/resitricted civil affairs operations. These measures can destroy the existing enemy or encourage them to flee the area. Force should be focused on destroying the existing political, military, and judicial structures of the enemy. This use of military force can best be defined as occupation.

However, without real political reform (conflict resolution between HN and populace(a form of marraige counseling), land reform, and sustainable political and security systems) then the clearing efforts could be for naught.

Merry Christmas all.

Mike

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Who are the Competition?

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Excellent item to consider!...I think I will frame any question about a way ahead for my unit's operations with a single starting point: Why is the enemy here and what does he want?

From my experience, not a lot of time has been spent kicking that can around enough to ascertain precisely what is going on. Even after RIP/TOA, a good bit of recce needs to happen in order to confirm ground truth, since all friendly ops need a solid starting point.

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Excellent item to consider!...I think I will frame any question about a way ahead for my unit's operations with a single starting point: Why is the enemy here and what does he want?

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I like it.

If the staff have time perhaps they can diagram for you the business plans......of the orchard farmers, poppy farmers, fertilizer suppliers, small animal farmers, militia's, etc.? Supply chain or value chain analysis is very illuminating...and we have the muscle to help or harm at key points in the chains.

From the help standpoint, and from an armchair view, I wonder about the potential for some sort of small business development, training, co-op effort run and staffed by locals and perhaps assisting across the economics, governance, and security spectrum?

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From the help standpoint, and from an armchair view, I wonder about the potential for some sort of small business development, training, co-op effort run and staffed by locals and perhaps assisting across the economics, governance, and security spectrum?

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What's a realistic life cycle required for something like that to be effective, do you think? Seven months? Twelve? Fifteen? I like the idea, but there has to be a logical endstate, and it's always next to impossible to get there without being on the ground for the right duration to start, sustain, and transition those types of efforts at the right time.

I like short, big impact efforts the same as the next guy, but they always strike me as though we are just giving the guy fish.

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What's a realistic life cycle required for something like that to be effective, do you think? Seven months? Twelve? Fifteen? I like the idea, but there has to be a logical endstate, and it's always next to impossible to get there without being on the ground for the right duration to start, sustain, and transition those types of efforts at the right time.

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During my last long trip to Iraq, we worked as specialty teams for a DIV. Some of my friends were able to analyze land locations, coordinate for permissions, and get a facility built for a business center. The follow-on folks were able to move things further with local staffing, equipment, etc. I just checked for their website...no longer up (as least I haven't found it yet) but it was up a year or two ago. There are 2008 you-tube videos for this business center.

The next question that has to be considered is what are the metrics to be and what's acceptable? Their way is not ours...

Locally provided grants and funding are also very interesting to think about. Are there nearby NGO's or IO's who want to work?

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Under current widely-held definitions of "sanctuary" (ungoverned spaces) both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are really simply battling for temporary access through the exertion of force.

Better, I think, to take a more wholistic view on what truly contributes to "sanctuary":

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On this note, what do we call it then when an element like the Taliban are operating almost at will inside a district area, which is in turn inside a coalition AO? What better phrase could be used?

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Originally Posted by jcustis

On this note, what do we call it then when an element like the Taliban are operating almost at will inside a district area, which is in turn inside a coalition AO? What better phrase could be used?

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Sanctuary as presented is a western POV.

Suggested noun or phrase: emigrant, combat emigrant, or combat emigrants...as opposed to immigrant.

If I speak the language, know the culture, know the land, and can come and go as I wish...I live there...I am no short-term tourist, even if I don't plan to live there forever.

Having lived on the economy in a number of countries it's my observation that one eventually becomes part of the community at some level. Thus my comments regarding the need to understand the economics in order to understand the area.

Slap has a more holistic analytical method - the 4F's - Family, Friends, Finances, and who's Fooling with who. I believe the policing model is worth deeper examination in order to be successful in the COIN fight.

Finally, we might also consider the reports of Hezbollah troops intermarrying with locals (This headline from Lebanonwire: Hezbollah political manifesto asserts intermarriage between resistance and army to face Israeli aggressions ) in terms of permanence and commitment. Again, not our way, but a way...

One aspect that has been touched by some already is the importances to address the realm of polity, politics and polity in the villages, districts, provinces and regions to fulfill (our) overarching political purpose. We all know that Afghanistan is a mosaic composed of different ethnics, cultures, families, tribes, alliances, religions (or interpretations of), terrain, infrastructure.... and so on. The recent conflicts have reinforced the reliances on both the family, the village, the tribe and a coalition/warlord and the identity found through them.

To deny the Taliban it might be necessary to give the lower levels of governance (and of the coalition too) greater autonomy and power, in certain regions and villages even over the local security forces. Doing so might make - togheter with other policies - COIN their fight too. It is a risky way, but maybe less so than not taking it.


Firn

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Originally Posted by jcustis

On this note, what do we call it then when an element like the Taliban are operating almost at will inside a district area, which is in turn inside a coalition AO? What better phrase could be used?

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First, all of Afghanistan is divided into Coalition AOs, so that fact in of itself has no impact on what regions of that country are possesed of the combinaiton of poorly governed (and or overtly coerced) populace, favorable cover and concealment, and also utilized by both nationalst insurgents and other non-state UW elements taking advantage of that legal status outside the law to operate there

Question, if one removes the insurgents and other non-state UW agents from a region, has one either "defeated" the insurgent there or "denied" the sanctuary? So long as you have an enduring and persistent presence, perhaps.

To truly deny the sancutary you must address the motivations of the popualace to provide support. Some of this is building the confidence that you will stay and not merely take what you yourself need from the populace, and then leave and abandon them to the certain retaliation of the insurgent when he flows back in behind you. Most of it though, is a combination of the commitment to stay and to address the elements of governance that are precieved as "poor" by that particular populace. Such commitment to ones populace will have a chance to truly deny the insurgents and his UW enablers such internal sanctuary within a state.

That is if the populace percieves that governance as legitimate (it can earn legitimacy through doing this);

If the popualce percieves it is respected by and can receive justice from this govenrance.

A governnace that treats a populace with disrespect or injustice, or that is not seen as legitmate will have a very hard time addressing issues of sanctuary within its borders.

I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.

Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.

• ENEMY ASSESSMENT
• Determine why the insugent/narco-terrorist/thug is operating there, what he wants and/or needs.
• Determine the avenues of approach that are used to gain access to these areas of operation, the choke points along them, and other key terrain along the route that can be of advantage to friendly forces.
• Determine who's who in the zoo, both for and against you, and sitting on the fence.
• Determine if the local populace is complicit in the insurgent's activities or in fact merely compliant due to the intimidation encountered.
• Strive to understand why, in a culture that embraces honorable struggle and protecting things tribal and familial, the able-bodied males do not (or cannot) protect themselves, if threats against them and their families have an impact..
• Look at the 4F's - Family, Friends, Finances, and who's Fooling with who.
• Determine how local governance is viewed...is it legitimate? Is support provided to the insurgent a matter of poor governance or under-governance (thanks BW for this specific point, as it certainly means different things)?
• Determine what IO the enemy is conducting in the village/area, and determine its effectiveness [*need a model to look at effectiveness of enemy IO]
• Determine if the insurgent is using the economic fabric against you. Can you leverage off of the goings-on in the market?
• When security forces enter the area, where are the insurgents likely to go? Do they even leave at all, or rather just melt into the background to watch and conduct counter-recce against you as friendly forces bumble about?
• Although his actions do not necessarily follow a shape-clear-hold-build in precisely the same fashion as our operations, he is nonetheless conducting operations along a similar continuum. At what point are his operations...is he shaping through night letters but not yet invested in the village, or perhaps already attempting to clear through murder and intimidation of local officials, elders, or intelligentia? Is he transitioning between phases, and can that be exploited?
  
• *The bullets above can form the backbone for an effective situational template which, while not traditional in terms of what we are taught in formal PME schools, has to be built nonetheless. The more daunting task is portraying the information and ensuring that the collections plan accounts for information gaps as part of a continual loop. The effort also has to account for collections that will confirm/deny the analysis so that it remains current and reduces the latency.
  
  FRIENDLY FORCES ASSESSMENT
• Determine if force, applied by the coalition side, can destroy the existing political, military, and judicial structures of the enemy, and influence them to leave the area.
• Determine if patrols and the siting of patrol bases are causing adverse disruption, considering the fabric and rhythm of the village(s) (thanks Infanteer for this relevant snippet). Are you a help or a hindrance?
• Determine if the siting of patrol bases provides a permanence that visiting patrols do not provide, and facilitates true information collection from locals who feel safe enough to provide walk-in tips.
• Is the area most influenced by the imam/mullah, or by the malik? How much does that matter, and is any one particular type of influence good, bad, or complementary? Would the the village be better served by having the malik as the dominant influence or would a religious leader do better? Which of the two could support your efforts the best? Although you may be able to influence one, the other, or both, are they the right targets you should be trying to influence in the first place?

Does a model exist for building sit temps in a 4th Gen/UW/Irregular Warfare environment?

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Originally Posted by jcustis

Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.

• Determine why the insugent/narco-terrorist/thug is operating there, what he wants and/or needs.
• Determine who's who in the zoo, both for and against you, and sitting on the fence.
• Determine if the local populace is complicit in the insurgent's activities or in fact merely compliant due to the intimidation encountered.
• Strive to understand why, in a culture that embraces honorable struggle and protecting things tribal and familial, the able-bodied males do not (or cannot) protect themselves, if threats against them and their families have an impact..
• Look at the 4F's - Family, Friends, Finances, and who's Fooling with who.
• Determine how local governance is viewed...is it legitimate? Is support provided to the insurgent a matter of poor governance or under-governance (thanks BW for this specific point, as it certainly means different things)?
• Determine if force, applied by the coalition side, can destroy the existing political, military, and judicial structures of the enemy, and influence them to leave the area.
• Determine what IO the enemy is conducting in the village/area, and determine its effectiveness [need a model to look at effectiveness of enemy IO]
• Determine how disruptive patrols and the siting of patrol bases are, considering the fabric and rhythm of the village(s) (thanks Infanteer for this relevant snippet). Are you a help or a hindrance?
• Determine if the siting if patrol bases provides a permanence that visiting patrols does not provide.
• Determine if the insurgent is using the economic fabric against you. Can you leverage off of the goings-on in the market?
• Is the area most influenced by the imam/mullah, or by the malik? How much does that matter, and is any one influence good, bad, or complementary?

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Very good start. Don't forget terrain and maneuverability. I'd also recommend:

-Determine enemy's avenues of approach (mounted/dismounted)
-Determine trafficability of routes (Stryker/MRAP)
-Determine/verify map reconnaisance (crossing points on rivers, LZs, etc)
-Determine/verify key terrain

And the big one-

-Determine if there is a sphere of influence OUTSIDE of this area that can achieve your desired goals without boots on the ground (ex. Sistani or Sadr). If so, can he be co-opted for mutual benefit?

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-Determine if there is a sphere of influence OUTSIDE of this area that can achieve your desired goals without boots on the ground (ex. Sistani or Sadr). If so, can he be co-opted for mutual benefit?

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That's a little big for the scale that I'm looking at right now, but I like the direction of atk.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

Good start to an important issue folks. Here is what I am hearing. Some material has indeed come from previous bits and pieces in other threads.

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Like the list, they look so deceptively simple to make don't they?

Our SWJ community has been happily bashing powerpoint the last week... so how do we transform the resulting information into knowledge? Back in the day we did acetate overlays on maps for the Army side of my life. I guess that's part of why I enjoy Arcview so much on the civilian engineering side. Here is a typical algorithm:

1. Take geotechnical samples at set intervals, depths, and locations.
2. Use the resulting information to paint a picture of the existing underground stratigraphy.
3. Match engineering properties to each layer - ie the ability to carry a set load (ie ~2,000 pounds/sf for sand, much more for rock depending upon type), exhibit permeability (I worry about waterflow - clay cores vs. sand cores), etc.
4. Analyze data via finite element modeling to identify weak and strong areas
5. Develop a statement of work or design, cost estimate, and project schedule.
6. Get a construction specialist to build the sucker and inspect the heck out of them for QA/QC :wry:

Beyond all of the calculations paper/calculator/excel/mathcad/proprietary calculation programs we capture and share the geo-referenced knowledge using AutoCad Civil 3D (not applicable for our SWJ project) and Arcview before, during and after the project. We also use powerpoint ;)

While developing/evaluating a business plan for a small group of investors we use excel, google earth, typical business metrics for our reference industries, capital budgeting techniques, marketing, and lots of shoe leather.

It may be just me but I see many parallels between the civilian side and the military side when we wisely decide to address the non-kinetic part of life in our solutions. Governance, economics, and security covers alot of ground...

Amazing no one is talking forced population controls for hostile areas including:

- Barriers/walls to village to restrict entry/exit
- Biometrics and photo ID cards for entire population
- Census and registration of all personal property (vehicles, houses, carts, animals)
- Designation/appointment of local responsible leader for each sub-area, held accountable
- "Gated communities", if necessary
- Curfews and movement restrictions
- Infiltration of villages by "turned" detainees
etc. etc. etc.


Harsh, yes, but needed in the worst areas. Population control is extensively advocated by almost all the major COIN theorists for hostile areas. Recommend reading Sir Frank Kitson for a good treatment of how to do this. Trinquier discusses in detail, see chapters 6-7,9, and 10. Galula, Chapter 7. McCuen, all of Part 2.

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control. As one of the above said, "without security, there is nothing".

I've always thought that it would be an interesting topic to compare the use of barriers in Sadr City in 2007 and the use of berms to surround cities, as was attempted in 2005/6.

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Originally Posted by Cavguy

Amazing no one is talking forced population controls for hostile areas including:

- Barriers/walls to village to restrict entry/exit
- Biometrics and photo ID cards for entire population
- Census and registration of all personal property (vehicles, houses, carts, animals)
- Designation/appointment of local responsible leader for each sub-area, held accountable
- "Gated communities", if necessary
- Curfews and movement restrictions
- Infiltration of villages by "turned" detainees
etc. etc. etc.


Harsh, yes, but needed in the worst areas. Population control is extensively advocated by almost all the major COIN theorists for hostile areas. Recommend reading Sir Frank Kitson for a good treatment of how to do this. Trinquier discusses in detail, see chapters 6-7,9, and 10. Galula, Chapter 7. McCuen, all of Part 2.

One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control. As one of the above said, "without security, there is nothing".

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My research does not lead me to believe that those measures are part of any ISAF campaign plan at the moment.

I sat back last night and though about the Sexton article, and how close it rang to accounts of what the VC would often do when trying to establish control of an area. That in turn made me think about the strategic hamlet project effort. Then I had to ponder how that fits into the current fight in AFG.

Quite a few not-so-small towns in Iraq have substantial berms around them now, and they facilitated control of traffic flow to a great degree. Are we exploring and/or utilizing this at all in Afghanistan?

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Originally Posted by BorderEnforcementAdvisor

I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.

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Any law that constrains that actions of those enforcing the law, but enables the actions of those violating the law is clearly a problem. This is exactly what borders are.

In Vietnam we hand built an insurgent sanctuary by creating the state of North Vietnam; let alone allowing the use of Cambodia and Laos relatively free from attack.

Similarly the Durand line is a matter that must be effectively dealt with between the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West if there is to be any hope in working toward an enduring solution. It means nothing to the Pashtun people; it is a constant source of irritation to Afghanistan; and a critical national interest to sustain for Pakistan; and the primary sources of legal status sancuary for Taliban insurgents and AQ UW operators. This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.

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While that is probably how it will need to be resolved, I don't think it will ever get to the table due to the efforts of those people. An issue this thorny will be kept under the rug unless a lot of large NGOs rally a lot of public concern in many countries and make a loud clamor for the self-determination of the ethnic groups in that area - not just the Pashtun, but the Baloch, too.

I often wonder if Pakistan exists for any reason other than the benefit of its ruling class. The instability in Kashmir, NWFP, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan seem to be justified only so that the Pakistani government will not fall, because they need to remain in control, because they have nukes. If they didn't have nukes, what would be the point? Propping up a government that requires a large region of instability to remain in power - what a way to run a planet.

Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction

This drifts a bit off topic for what my aim is, but this I found this Army professional Writing Collection article when running a Google string for "sanctuary denial".

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Originally Posted by jcustis

Quite a few not-so-small towns in Iraq have substantial berms around them now, and they facilitated control of traffic flow to a great degree. Are we exploring and/or utilizing this at all in Afghanistan?

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I think it may be a bit tough to do this on a large scale in A'stan for two reasons: 1. Feasibility 2. Manpower requirements.

1. Feasibility- 30,000(?) villages, extended sparsely populated rural areas and mountainous terrain. That's just tough to attempt control.

2. Manpower requirements. Each village would take at least a platoon plus to seize.

I suppose it could be done on very small targeted areas for a short period of time, but the commander would have to choose wisely and determine if the potential pay-offs outweighted the cost. Some primer questions I'd ask would deal with purpose and intent

For instance, in Baghdad, the barriers were used to seperate the populace from the ethnic-sectarian fighting. In Ramadi and Zaganiyah, the control measures were used to convince/coerce the populace that the US forces were the biggest tribe. In Tal Afar, the berms were used to separate and protect the populace from the insurgency. So, population control measures can be used, but you gotta figure out purpose and intent.

Cavguy said:

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One of the areas of broad agreement in almost all the theorists I have read for dealing with hostile areas. Influence ops and CA projects are useless in areas under insurgent control.

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True, but your actions can be your influence operation. Depends on what you want to achieve.

One final point. I can't overstate the importance of good reconnaisance and surveillance prior to execution into denied areas. The confirm/deny of your initial hypothesis based off incoming information may drastically change what you thought you were getting into OR you may find decisive point that you could have missed (ex. location and massing of guerillas in a training camp).

JC, did you see this when I posted it awhile back?
Identifying Insurgent Infrastructure by Major James A. Harris
This guy was SF during the late 80's and he was so frustrated that know one ever showed him how to Identify the hidden insurgents that he turned to LE techniques so he could figure out how to do it. Good stuff in there I can testify to;) Link is below.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

Slap, thanks for the link to the paper by Maj Horris, I am currently working my through it.

Jon, thanks for the link to the paper Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction...it's a thought provoking piece.

Firn, help us out and give us some examples of how to apply CvC to this exercise. As an applied science guy I certainly can use the assistance.

Bob's World; in the west our system of living (a system of systems) ensures that we have to pay attention to right-of-ways and other borders during construction projects or things can get very expensive very quickly. As you often state and are no doubt intimately familiar from both your barrister time and military time however many problems are not necessarily constrained to artificial boundaries delineated by right of ways and treaties. To me the term Sanctuary implies definitive borders and that those receiving Sanctuary have the mandate of heaven...thus the negative visceral reaction to it's use with respect to our enemy. As an up front stated assumption I also believe that it skews the follow-on analysis.

Schmedlap, would you agree that at the end of all conflicts some sort of mediation or negotiation occurs? If so, would we not want the most experienced negotiators representing our interests when this time comes? I would also posit that we need these negotiators to help shape the situation along the way towards resolution.

MikeF; I paraphrase..."don't forget METT-TC dumbass" ;) I was very lucky to have had an airborne/air assault/ranger Cpt out of Alaska as an instructor for those first key years...so, yea verily you are right.

Cavguy; security is very important and desired but believe it or not 'low level' local efforts persist even in high threat environments. I use the heuristic life threatening, life sustaining, and life enhancing for a rapid assessment/solution tool.

B.E.A.; thanks for the references.

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So, given that we have a rough first draft in place regarding some of the issues of concern how do we involve all of the force (our respective units plus the units we will be working with) in gaining understanding and ownership of our situation both kinetic and non-kinetic?

Sandtables are a integral piece of kinetic training. Recently me and mine were able to learn from a nearly 7 foot Marine who used small team training techniques supported by sandtables and applied video games...the event ranks among the top ten of my kinetic training experiences with my CTC rotations still in the lead.

For stateside non-kinetic training I have had mine tour water treatment plants, wastewater treatment plants, landfills, and city councils. I have also had the troops break up into teams lead by our civilian experts who serve in the reserves (irrespective of rank) and use google earth and the 'interweb' to put together open source assessments of state owned enterprises. Currently some of mine are studying a value chain analysis example .... quiz to follow ;)

So what are the suggested fusion methods to bring it together with the units we support? Do our mobilization centers address the realities of integration of active and reserve and if not how do we improve our stateside training given limited time and resources?

I am using my Christmas iPod touch to review short instruction blocks (free) on materials engineering...

Slap, that's a unique and valuable piece of work. As I got to page 43, it jarred me to the notion that I needed to modify the bulletized list...one of the most critical things is to force the intelligence side to produce a relevant and accurate situational template. Any information gaps that prevent that template from connecting the dots need to be published and incorporated into the ISR collection matrix, plain and simple.

I admit that with all this COIN jazz, it's easy to let things go a little amok and forget to employ basic tools of the MCPP/MDMP system.

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Originally Posted by MikeF

I think it may be a bit tough to do this on a large scale in A'stan for two reasons: 1. Feasibility 2. Manpower requirements.

1. Feasibility- 30,000(?) villages, extended sparsely populated rural areas and mountainous terrain. That's just tough to attempt control.

2. Manpower requirements. Each village would take at least a platoon plus to seize.

I suppose it could be done on very small targeted areas for a short period of time, but the commander would have to choose wisely and determine if the potential pay-offs outweighted the cost. Some primer questions I'd ask would deal with purpose and intent

For instance, in Baghdad, the barriers were used to seperate the populace from the ethnic-sectarian fighting. In Ramadi and Zaganiyah, the control measures were used to convince/coerce the populace that the US forces were the biggest tribe. In Tal Afar, the berms were used to separate and protect the populace from the insurgency. So, population control measures can be used, but you gotta figure out purpose and intent.

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Obviously you can't do it EVERYWHERE, but you don't have to. Isolate the worst areas, take a census, institute controls, and counter-mobilize the people. Again, this is medicine for the worst insurgent areas, not the best. I'm assuming that these villages described in Hemland are key terrain for some reason, influencing a route or a population group. Otherwise we wouldn't be operating there. METT-TC rules as always.

One of the things that continues to baffle me in Iraq and Afghanistan is why we didn't start licensing/registering cars and issue difficult to forge IDs to the people. With today's computers and printers it is easier than ever before. We have BATS/HIDE down to unit level now anyway.

If the Romans could do a census c. 2000 years ago, we can do one now. Biometrics, etc.

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True, but your actions can be your influence operation. Depends on what you want to achieve.
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Agree. Your operations are your influence ops, I was talking more about the common naive belief that you can shape some message to a foreign audience that will magically cause them to switch sides without a whole lot else.

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So, given that we have a rough first draft in place regarding some of the issues of concern how do we involve all of the force (our respective units plus the units we will be working with) in gaining understanding and ownership of our situation both kinetic and non-kinetic.

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So what are the suggested fusion methods to bring it together with the units we support? Do our mobilization centers address the realities of integration of active and reserve and if not how do we improve our stateside training given limited time and resources?

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There is certainly very little training for the battalion task force-level training audience (at the Marine Corps' Exercise MOJAVE VIPER) in integrating OGAs into the mix. We figure it out as we go along, but for the most part it's self-study and experiential learning that allows the green side to function best amidst these supporting elements.

Just as we are pushing civil affairs down to the battalion level, and pushing intel cells down even further to the company, there needs to be a component for CMOC training, even if it were just one or two modules for select personnel. We don't have that resource at this moment though, and yet COMISAF's campaign plan would lead most to believe that cracking that nut is the most important task we must master.

Great links from JCustus and Slap. This thread is turning into a "power" thread of good ideas. Here's another consideration. Neil touched on it yesterday.

Surveys and Census.

1. Surveys. A well structured survey prior to infiltration or post-clearance can be a powerful tool to gather relevant information for the commander to add to MDMP, civil affairs considerations, and future psyops info ops. This is one tool that I think we've underappreciated in Iraq/A'stan. However, in a hostile area, should we trust the results? It seems like many locals that are distrustful of the HN gov't would not answer truthfully.

2. Census. This is a bread and butter task, and I have no idea why we've don't use it. Yes, some units have conducted mini-census in Iraq (ID cards and biometrics on the neighborhood/village level), but a nation-wide census would provide the building blocks for many tactical and operational decisions.

From Cavguy

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Obviously you can't do it EVERYWHERE, but you don't have to. Isolate the worst areas, take a census, institute controls, and counter-mobilize the people. Again, this is medicine for the worst insurgent areas, not the best. I'm assuming that these villages described in Hemland are key terrain for some reason, influencing a route or a population group. Otherwise we wouldn't be operating there. METT-TC rules as always.

Your operations are your influence ops, I was talking more about the common naive belief that you can shape some message to a foreign audience that will magically cause them to switch sides without a whole lot else.

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Agreed.

From Surferbeetle:

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"don't forget METT-TC dumbass"

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METT-TC means different things to different people. I was considering how my views changed over time (from cadet through major) b/c of experience, maturity, common sense, intuition, whatever. Nothing on this thread is new, but it drives your earlier question- how do we capture and institutionalize this stuff? And that's a million dollar question.

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Originally Posted by jcustis

Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction

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I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.

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If the advantages of sanctuary and access to border transit are critical to the insurgency, then the sanctuary becomes a center of gravity to be attacked. Insurgents in sanctuary are inherently vulnerable because the government they establish within the sanctuary will automatically threaten their host's sovereignty. Other vulnerabilities include the support they need from the local populace, their sources of supply, and their base defense systems. Insurgents must conduct a fine balancing act to protect all of these vulnerabilities, but their challenge to the host government's authority could be their biggest problem.

In a sense, insurgents hand us a gift when they establish sanctuaries and base camps. Most insurgencies are fought on "human terrain," offering few instances when the counterinsurgent can actually find, fix, and fight the enemy. But when the enemy seeks sanctuary, engagement becomes possible. Once we have located and defined the sanctuary area, we can focus our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets on it and then, in at least some instances, our combat power. We would be negligent if we didn't force insurgents to earn their pay when they congregated and surfaced. Of course, attacking them in their host-nation sanctuary will require synchronization of military and other government agencies' capabilities at the operational level and higher, to ensure that kinetic actions do not result in defeats in the international court of public opinion.

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Originally Posted by MikeF

I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.

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But if your goal is counterinsurgency (defeating the reasons the government is being challenged and not just those individuals or organizations who currently dare to operationalize that challenge); then this is a pretty limited view IMO.

There is far more dangerous sanctuary to Great Britain among the disaffected Pakistanis heritage British Citizens living in Great Britain than than there is in either the countries of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Thus the importance of understanding and addressing the sanctuary within poorly governed populaces over that of undergoverned spaces. As this author states, dirt can be surrounded, searched, and cleared of insurgents. But while that may be a critical supporting effort to a larger COIN operation, I would caution strongly against considering it decisive, or a COG to ones larger campaign.

The irony is, the harder one works to defeat the physical sancutaries in the lands of others; may very well be intensifying the sanctuaries among your disaffected popualces at home with ties to the issues and people of those regions. Win the battle, lose the war. When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.

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in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.

Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.

Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...

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violence is pretty fundamental; and warfare is violence for the sake of politics. Warfare between to separate parties is a clash of separate politics for separate populaces, a resoloving of conflicting interests that could not be resolved by other means. CvC spoke to this, and most thought on warfare is on this dynamic.

insurgency is all about internal politic (discounting the external politics and interests that are often engaged by FID and UW forces that show up at various insurgencies around the world to wage pawn warfare at the expense of that troubled host). More like an election gone bad, when the votes don't count, when the supreme court can't resolve it, when the populace rejects what the government is dishing out. Still politically driven violence, but to very different terms. Is this more complex? Perhaps not, but it is definitely much harder to grasp as the inclination of politics is to blame the other guy and refuse responsibility for ones shortcomings; and effective COIN requires that hard look in the mirror first.

So effective COIN goes against our human nature. Effective conventional warfare is at the essence of our human nature.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

So effective COIN goes against our human nature. Effective conventional warfare is at the essence of our human nature.

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Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...

As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:

Sun Tzu says it well when he states: ‘And as water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.’

It would then seem to follow that COIN operations, although chameleon like, are no freer from the presence of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity than are Conventional operations nor are the associated efforts of either type of warfare isolated from the people, the commander/army, and government.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...

As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:

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My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own.


At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

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Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

Hi Bob,

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

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I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

This problem (technically a "breech" in our assumed reality), turns around and really highlights the problems with a lot of our doctrine and operational stance. For example, the entire concept of "poor governance" or "corruption" assumes particular socio-cultural standards of both, and the ascribes causality for an "insurgency" to them. Why? Probably because that is what caused a number of them in our own past political history. That, my friend, is the real definition of ethnocentrism - the ascription of a cultural assumption as a universal law.

So what happens if we through out the assumption that 'states" exist as anything other than socio-cultural constructs? Well, for one thing, it forces us to be a lot clearer on what our campaign intentions are. It also highlights the ways in which campaign planning would have to change, and that specifically includes what political institutions should be imposed / changed.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

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One of the "insurgencies" that we never seem to discuss is the Liberal Revolts of 1847. I think that it would really help clarify some of our thinking in this boundary zone (i.e. the interface zone between politics, warfare, insurgency, policing, etc.) to take a look at how they were handled in the Austrian case from 1847-50. Very little "fighting", and the entire "revolt" (and separation) of Hungary ended when their own minorities "rose up" against them.

Part of the reason why this is a useful case is that it is primarily "political" (i.e. non-kinetic conflict) and that it happened at a time of fairly rapid technological change, which makes it a useful analogic case. As an added bonus, it is one of the few really good European instances where a "state" and a "people" are not the same which, BTW, tends to be another one of those nice little ethnocentric assumptions about "states" that we have.

Anyway, I need more coffee :D.

Cheers,

Marc

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

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This question is the crux of the debate isn't it? In the formal model that BW suggest

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insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

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we're assuming a state versus a counter-state. This model can be an insurgency or a civil war. In reality, there are multiple actors vying for power and control on the micro or local level. When we interdict as an external actor, we become a third player into the two-person game. We have to define a role. In Bosnia, we played a role as an arbitrator splitting the competing factions. In Iraq, at times we became a competitor, fighting for control. It's a slippery slope, and it can get messy. On the batallion and below level, we often don't get to choose our roles or our friends. We simply execute operations in support of higher's stated goals.

Here's an interesting example- Kurdistan. To some in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, Kurdistan is a terrorist safehaven that possesses a potential existential threat. To the US, the Kurds are our allies.

That drives back to BW's early point on conducting COIN versus being a counter-insurgent. On the ground level, it's a moot point. I'd submit that's an operational issue. When you're given a mission to clear a denied area, you gotta figure out how best to do it.

Best

Mike

My take is the that people who live within what is now called Afghanistan have an ancient and accepted system of local governance; a flegling and unproven attempt to apply centralized "state" governance; a Taliban led insurgent challenge to that central role; and a mix of competitors for regional influence in the midst of all.

At the local level I think the best you can hope to do is enforce the ancient local systems, and then work to help connect them effectively to the fledgling centralized systems to a degree and in a manner that is acceptable to that populace. There is nothing simple about that task; but I think the key is to see it as bringing the two together, vice imposing one upon the other. Some of those informal competitors, be they labled "warlord" or "taliban" etc may well be essential connectors in many areas.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

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Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:

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When tasked to help suppress an insurgency...say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

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You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:

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"Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own."

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Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:

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At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.

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that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

I would like to emphasize some of the deep and subtle insights made so far on and compare them with a 'real-time' report regarding the interdependencies of the trinity of governance, economics, and security...

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Originally Posted by Ken White

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

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...and from Dr. Marc Tyrrell

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The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

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From today's Washington Post by Blaine Harden: In N. Korea, a strong movement recoils at Kim Jong Il's attempt to limit wealth (H/T to Daniel Drezner)

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It was an unexplained decision -- the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim's near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.

Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend its confiscatory policy. Exchange limits have been eased, allowing individuals to possess more cash.

The currency episode reveals new constraints on Kim's power and may signal a fundamental change in the operation of what is often called the world's most repressive state. The change is driven by private markets that now feed and employ half the country's 23.5 million people, and appear to have grown too big and too important to be crushed, even by a leader who loathes them.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...

My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...

Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...

My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:that my initial statement was and is correct:

"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."

Thank you for your support. ;)

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Ken,

While I have tremendous respect for the SWJ community, and certainly there are many very keen insights posted here, I offer just this in response to your middle point of:

"the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception."

So, because you and a handful of others disagree with a theory it becomes a "dangerous misconception?" You may have taken the recent Ken White thread a bit too seriously. If I claimed that everything I either didn't understand or disagreed with "a dangerous misconception" I'd be a bit of a lunatic.

No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this, that is a position I am quite comfortable with. I'm sure my thoughts will continue to evolve, and I suspect yours will as well.

Bob.

Hi Bob,

You and I have had a low level (decibels) discourse on your "good governance" and "self-determination" concepts from the gitgo. Some agreement; some disagreement.

I think you need to clarify this statement:

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from BW
No, it may not be 100% accurate, but I've yet to find a better theory and I've been looking, and listening. Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support.

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Now, my knowledge of the Malay "insurgency" in far southern Thailand is based only on what I've read from Kilcullen, from which I gleaned:

1. Viewed from an all-Thailand viewpoint, the Malays are a "small group with a distinct agenda" which is "taking on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

2. Viewed from the Malay enclave, the Malays are a large group in that enclave with the "distinct agenda" of "self-determination", where the Malay populace is largely dissatisfied with the "goodness of governance" as to the Malay issue.

So, are the Thailand Malays an "insurgency" ? From whose viewpoint do you measure "good governance" ?

I've made it clear that I regard "governance" as an integral factor in the Political Struggle. But, as Bill Moore has made clear in a number of posts, governance is only one factor in that political effort (which BTW is not the Politik that drives both the political and military efforts to a common end goal).

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

If I am considered a bit of a lone ranger on this...

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I am closer to your position, kemosabe, than I am to the opposing view. But, I have two problems with the following excerpt.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Are there exceptions where a small group with a distinct agenda takes on the government in a country where the populace is largely satisfied with the goodness of governance? Sure. But that's not insurgency as it lacks the key ingredient to be an insurgency: popular support. Where does popular support come from? The populace. When does a popualce support such movements? When it feels it is a better option than what they are getting from the current team, and when they also feel they have no way within the law to exercise that change.

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1. Popular support - how does one define this?

2. The notion of feeling a movement is "a better option than what they are getting from the current team" - is this to suggest that the populace thinks as one system or brain, rather than just a bunch of people reacting to short-term fears?