Ill Informed Blog Post at AM on Advisors
I guess I expect more from AM. This one does not cut it. The reasons for the shift to Polk deal with the congruence in training objectives at the JRTC.
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Polking the Advisor Mission in the Eye
This is the third in a four part series on training advisors.
Six years into the Long War, efforts to train advisors remain mediocre. But they are improving. Fort Riley Training Mission commander Colonel Jeff Ingram deserves special plaudits for taking a thankless mission after having the combat forces gutted from his brigade and attempting to foster effective, survivable combat advisor teams.
As an advisor-in-training in October 2006, the training we received was the worst I had received in the Army to date. The training schedule seemed to be an hour ahead of our current location, and often an hour behind. The idea that operating in Afghanistan might be different than Iraq had perhaps crossed the trainers' minds, but the solutions was simply to train as though we would go to Iraq and finish by saying, "Well, this should help for Afghanistan as well." If I had ten dollars for every time an instructor said, "So, where are you guys headed in Iraq? Oh, you're going to Afghanistan. Well, its about the same thing," I could have foregone combat pay.
A really ignorant comment read:
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The main reason is that Polk is looking for a mission in life vs the somewhat low number of personnel going through the JRTC---why not go to Irwin which is in fact in the desert- replicates both Afghanistan and Iraq has a 1200 role number of Iraqi/American, has a replicated IA/IP, a very active OPFOR, and a scenario built to replicate Diyala Province down to the governance piece, has HTTs, PRTs, NGOs,-has a BCT every month going through and is being strongly supported by the SOF community.
It is dumbfounding how ignorant some folks are. JRTC has trained the majority of units in both theaters for the past 5 years. Most of what goes on at Irwin replicates the JRTC.
Tom
Some of my best friends are from Louisiana ...
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Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
... the thesis that Polk will not be able to do a good job ignores the reality that the JRTC has been doing MREs for 5 years now and made a concerted effort to build MiTTs, PRTs, and other similiar complicating and bedeviing play into those rotations. The decision to move the MiTT effort here was well debated and studied. The drive to move the effort here was to stengthen the connections between MiTT and MREs. As you say you are not convinced Polk is the answer, exactly where do you think that answer might lie?
Tom:
Thanks for your kind reply. Please don't get me wrong--I'm in no way singling out Polk for criticism. My point about training suffering immediately before, during, and after a hand-off would apply regardless of the installations involved. And, admittedly, that's a concern that's decidedly short-term.
We're already feeling some of the effects, for example, as we hear from attendees that instructors at Riley are not being replaced, as that installation draws down its advisor-training role. That (fact? rumor? does it matter?) naturally causes concerns from those who are still scheduled to go through Riley, and not Polk.
As a potential customer, so to speak, I personally like all the resources and capabilities that you and others have described as being available at JRTC. In fact, it sounds like a Tactical Disneyland. So I'm hoping that Polk does prove to be the long-term fix.
Given the realities of the OEF mission, however, I'm specifically looking forward to seeing if/how Fort Polk manages to create Afghantomorrowland (maybe EPCOT Center would've been a better analogy?) as well as Iraqadventureland. Although outside of my personal experience, it seems to me that some of the dynamics present in the former are not necessarily present in the latter.
I guess the larger question--one with which we're wrestling daily as we send more guys into the pipeline--is: How do you create a training scheme and environment that adequately prepares citizen-soldiers to mentor ANA/ANP/other counterparts while working in a combined, joint, and AC vs. RC operation (in other words, whose branch, country and/or task force is in charge?). And, while they'll train as teams, they'll mostly be deployed as individuals once they hit country, often in functional areas completely disassociated with their military/civilian expertise.
One former ETT member described the best-possible training as: Put everyone's job description in a hat, and draw for mentor assignments randomly, regardless of rank or MOS. Now, go mentor that person, who doesn't necessarily speak English, in an area that's 60 percent likely to be controlled/administered by a NATO ally.
Sorry if all this sounds defeatist or negative. Rather, my objective is just the opposite: The guys who have gone before want to make it better for the guys who are about to go. Any insights you or others might offer on how Polk can meet their needs would be appreciated; and, to flip that question around, any insights you might offer on how soldiers can show up to Polk better prepared for ETT training would also be appreciated.
Thanks for your attention ...
Real Soldiering Versus MiTTs?
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Originally Posted by
patmc
Late night in Fayetteville, so if this is slightly disjointed or rambling, I apologize. Good discussion despite my efforts.
All good points and all tied to the very first question I posted:
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a. What is the future of SFA and advisory capacity?
All things flow from that issue. Much of what you describe is US Army culture driven based on a decades-old mindset that dictates how one gets ahead. For instance:
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If you locked people in at Fort Polk, as an Advisor lifecycle, with 6 months training, 12 months deploy, 18 months trainer, you would take these officers and senior NCO's out of the force for 3 years at a time, and leave them stuck in Polk. How many people would volunteer for that?
We already lock folks at Fort Polk on a 3 year cycle as OCs. IF advisor success is the key to a strategy of drawdown and turnover, asking for volunteers is not the answer. Your 3 year cycle would be a good way to do it.
The idea that MiTT tours are Korea tours is the same thinking that dogged efforts early on in Iraq; the belief this is not what real soldiers do is at this stage like praising the Maginot Line in 1939. The Army has to put up some of its best and brightest and then reward them for what they are doing. The answer to the issue of captains missing command cycle opportunities is to give priority for command to those who have MiTT tour under their belt as well as using MiTT duties as a discriminator on selection to battalion command. That too goes back to the original question.
Tom