Forgot a couple of things
Selil I'm like C, but it is missing supporting and related capabilities, but that also supports the argument that you task organize as required to accomplish a particular objective. I think most of Marc's and Eden's posts focus heavily, if not strictly on influence/PSYOP, and do not address the broader fusion of all the enabling disciplines (which I think is the intent, whether reasonable or not) to achieve information dominance.
Bruce Lee was not only a great martial artists, he was an accomplished philosopher (in my opinion), and he wrote something about a punch that I think is relevant. Paraphrased, when you first start training a punch is just a punch, but as you become more advanced the punch becomes very complicated, then when you master it a punch is just a punch.
I think we have realized we don't do the IO basics well so we're trying to develop new systems, new terms, new staff positions etc., so now it is very complicated, but in the end the guys on the groun will just do it again.
For the good of the cause ...
Daninfowar posted the following observations on the SWJ Blog 03 July. Because I thought it germaine to the larger theme of this thread--and because I couldn't remember whether he'd also posted here--I thought I'd relay them for the proverbial good of the cause ...
(In doing so, I leave it to the reader to determine whether I'm exercising my Public Affairs or PSYOP muscles.)
Quote:
While the definition of IO in JP 3-13 is IMHO misguided--it's pretty good for Info Warfare, but we've excised that term from the doctrinal lexicon--the pub has the answer to a better one, which coincides with what I've been teaching for over a decade. (See NDU Strategic Forum #115, "Defining Information Power", June 1997, at
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF115/forum115.html ) How do we characterize or define operations in our other environments? Simple: air operations are the use of the aerospace, maritime ops are the water/sea, etc. JP 3-13 does a very nice job out outlining the information environment--again, mirroring my teaching for the past decade--as the integration of three distinct yet interrelated dimensions, which I paraphrase as CONNECTIVITY (the ability to exchange information), CONTENT (what gets exchanged), and COGNITIVE EFFECT (how humans are affected). The biggest problem with the current 3-13 definition--and also the reason it was created--is that it is nothing more than a collection of budget programs and rice bowls: we have defined IO in terms of what we are bureaucratically able to spend DOD $$ on. That is understandable--concepts without resources are merely hallucinations--but also stupid and dysfunctional. A FAR better approach would be to define IO as terms of its operational environment: if what you are doing is connecting/sharing content, or creating content, or using it to achieve cognitive results, you are doing IO.
By the way, I am still enjoying the pretty colors and afterglow of Selil's conical, graphical fireworks show. Keep 'em coming!
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Another Conceptual Illustration
Based on the diagrams presented by "selil", I offer to the group that Diagram A is closest to what the original doctrine intended. Again, Information Operations is truly more of a 'process' rather than a set of clearly definable TTPs. Below is one of several illustartions that I use to show the relationship of IO to various capabilities:
Attachment 502
The easiest way for me to explain it is to say that IO is the critical thinking process (BIG RED circle) use to determine what specific capabilities/resources (little yellow circle) should be coordinated, synchronized, and integrated into operations in order to achieve desired effects. And nearly every operational diagram that I've seen, especially in terms of Lines of Operation for instance, depict IO as being wrapped around or interwoven through everything else. But even though that is the case, there is still a tendency for leaders to ignore that concept and try and employ IO as a separate entity - it can't be done.
Another thing that we should not try to do is categorize IO as a primary form of consequence management. When a regional "EVENT" occurs that has potentially exploitable or negative effects in an area of operations or concern, IO is not the first-responder for media mitigation --- it is Public Affairs or some other governmental communications/broadcast organization. When an event of that kind occurs, that begins a new cycle of IO PLANNING - the purpose of which is to account for changes in the Information Environment that affect our ability to influence target audiences. Parallel IO planning in the MDMP would likely have anticipated negative events, allowing IO practitioners to coordinate/integrate those resources and capabilities that would influence non-support of those adverse actions. IO should not wait for something to happen, it should be used to influence what happens in the first place.
There is no set formula that can define Information Operations. The "art" is understanding what pieces of the puzzle are important, and how to arrange those pieces (media, PSYOP, CNO, lethal actions, other technology, etc) through critical thinking to influence people and events and achieve desired outcomes...so much more than traditional MDMP and staff actions. And this concept is not limited to a certain level(s). It spans the spectrum from strategic through tactical...
I agree with everyone you say, however...
Derrill, in your last paragraph you accurately state that there is no formula that can define Information Operations. Before I left the dreaded corporate world to work IO exclusively, I was in the process of requesting R&D funding to make just that kind of formula a reality. There are quite a few 'formulae' that accurately describe the effects of information on a targeted population; the problem is they are overly simplistic and only one-way. In my opinion it’s all based on gut reactions. This being small wars council and all, it should make sense because the commander would be the one to approve the plan based his or her personal assessment based on experience, knowledge and the omniscient gut feeling.
A secondary problem regards a quantifiable and/or qualifiable feedback mechanism. There are ways to do this but "Measures of Effectiveness" are often subjective, this is an ongoing challenge. Again, before I left the corporate world I was in the process of trying to ‘suck in’ some operations that specialize in producing this feedback, but the effort has since died on the vine. It wasn't because I left; it was a pure business decision.
A third problem is automation. It would be nice to pop in some factors into a planning tool and at the anticipated Time of Effectiveness see certain factors rise or fall as expected. I'm grossly oversimplifying the entire process for illustration. There are massive efforts underway to create a human factors analytic environment, few will come to fruition in my opinion, but eventually they should produce something we can use.