Something of Apples & oranges
Quote:
Originally Posted by
gute
I'm interested in cost comparisons between AC and RC forces, armor and infantry and wondering if someone might point me in the right direction? Also, the Army has talked about fielding a lighter force and plans to replace two HBCTs with SBCTs. To me it would make sense to replace IBCTs because SBCTs may also function as light infantry. Can the U.S. afford to transfer most of the armor force to the reserves/ARNG and still field a high quality, combat ready force? Or, should the AC Army keep all armor battalions and the reserves/ARNG convert their HBCTs to IBCTs?
Today, the costs for AC versus RC for equipment are essentially the same as they both will generally have the same types and amounts of equipment.
It costs the same for training, both individual and collective, but many RC units will end up costing more for training as their level of proficiency starts low. More reps cost more. Overall, HBCTs are the most expensive to train and IBCTs are the cheapest. The major costs for training are: Ammo, Fuel and repair parts. Tanks = lots, 11Bs not so much :)
For personnel, RC units are a hugh bargain, you only pay us/them when we are in some kind of official status. Generaly, 4 days pay per RC Soldier per month + 14/15 days once each year for Annual Training/Summer Camp.
OEF/OIF changed alot on the amount of training time available/required, but RC still costs less.
Today, the breakdown of AC versus RC by BCT type is something like
HBCT AC = 17, RC (National Guard only) = 8
SBCT AC = 6, RC (National Guard only) = 1
IBCT AC = 23, RC (National Guard only) = 20
To answer the question a different way, how many BCTs of which type does the Army project it will need in the future? If you can get that one 100% right, let me know. I want stock tips next. :wry:
I think the conversion plan was for one AC HBCT to SBCT and the 3rd ACR (once back from deployment) is supposed to be the other. With only one "True" ACR remaining, the last part makes sense.
If based simply off Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) the AC numbers should/could be divisible by 3 (one deployed for two at home) and the RC/NG by 5 (one deployed for four at home).
Apples and Oranges Revisited
I am coming to this discussion a little late in the game. About six months late by the looks of the last post. But I see the last question is still out there hanging so I thought I would apply my two pence worth.
My basic heartburn is with the construct of all of the non-Stryker Brigades, both heavy and light. I feel that it is a fundamental error to have only two maneuver battalions in these brigades, rather than three. Three that is, along with the cavalry squadron.
I am also not sure about the combined arms battalions in the heavy brigades. On paper they look great, and certainly would seem better, again on paper, than the task organization nut roll we did for sixty plus years. We did all of this in the midst of deployments, and I don't think the concept has been throughly vetted. It should be. I would never advocate a backward step, and I am not doing that here. I just want to be sure that the balance is right before we go any further forward.
Now back to the main point. The changes in structure that I propose would mean that the numbers of brigades in both components be reduced. That is a given based upon authorized end strength. I feel though that that would be acceptable, if the resulting brigades were more robust and could dominate more battlespace per brigade.
Reducing each division down to three brigades, with MTO&E strengths at about the 4500-5000 level should fit within the confines of current constraints. That would produce a picture of something like the following:
Active Component:
1st ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
2nd ID------- 1 HBCT
3rd ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
4th ID ------- 2 INCT, 1 HBTC
7th ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT (Activate Hqs at Lewis)
9th ID ------- 3 HBCT (Inactivate 1st AD - Activate 9th ID)
10th MD ----- 3 IBCT
24th ID ------ 2 HBCT (Activate Div Hqs in Germany)
82nd ABD ---- 3 IBCT
101st ABD --- 3 IBCT
1st CD -------3 Stryker Cavalry Brigades
173rd Airborne Brigade
2nd Stryker Cavalry Brigade
3rd Stryker Cavalry Brigade
6th Stryker Cavalry Brigade
11th Cavalry Stryker Brigade
Army National Guard
26th IBCT (New England)
27th IBCT (NY)
28th INCT (PA)
29TH IBCT (MD&VA)
30TH IBCT (NC & TN)
31st IBCT (AL&MS)
32nd IBCT (WI&MI)
33RD IBCT (IL&KY)
34th IBCT (IA&MN)
36TH IBCT (TX)
37th IBCT (OH&WV)
38th IBCT (IN)
39th IBCT (AR&LA)
40TH IBCT (CA)
41st IBCT (OR&WA)
42nd IBCT (NY&NJ)
45th IBCT (OK)
48th IBCT (GA)
53rd IBCT (FL)
56th Stryker Cavalry Brigade (TX)
All National Guard Divisions would be inactivated and their places taken in the force structure by coordinating headquarters co-located with FEMA Regions.
I believe that this would result in a balanced force struture capable across the spectrum. Glad I had a chance to put this on paper. You may fire when ready
CNAS: Hard Choices--Responsible Defense in an Age of Austerity
I would imagine that some have read this report, which really does not get too specific. What I do question is the idea of shifting the majority of heavy forces to the reserves/national guard - what does that mean? If the Army was forced to shift heavy forces to the national guard where do the heavy forces go? Do we re-set the national guard brigades back to armor brigades that were "transformed" into IBCTs? Or do we look to change existing IBCTs west of the Mighty Miss into HBCTs because there is more room to train?
Link to cited report:http://www.cnas.org/hardchoices
The choices are only hard for Rice Bowl Coveters...
They are actually -- logically and militarily -- fairly easy. Unfortunately, they are, politically, a number of varying size Rice Bowls all full of a mass of worms -- or worse.
Hard to say how it'll work out, we'll see -- but your comment about west of the Mississippi is very appropriate. The issue is not training room per se -- the NTC provides more maneuver space than is neccessary -- but range fans. Twenty years ago I tried to point out to folks that after 2020 or so, the likelihood of having adequate ranges for 105mm much less 120mm and above east of that river was quite slim. The antiwar Squirrels have been using and will continue to use environmental, heritage and other pretexts to shut down impact areas and live fire in general on both coasts -- they will not stop. They would totally ban training if they thought they could. Fortunately, the folks in flyover country are more sensible.
I also strongly believe it in the interest of the Nation that the 1980s concept of combat arms units only in the ArNG be revisited. While the Guard slickly co-opted the 'Militia' title as theirs alone, that's a politically beneficial belief and a flaky law, not a Constitutional clause. The Nation can do recruiting, training, location, employment and mission things with the Guard it cannot do with the USAR -- and vice versa. That versa indicates that some USAR combat units would be beneficial so also would some currently USAR peculiar skills be beneficial to the Guard and the States. Laws can be changed...
Round-out battalions instead of brigades
It's my understanding that round-out battalions were used in the 70's, but did suffer from readiness and recruitment issues. In today's fight are round-out battalions practical/feasible? Would it work to place all RC maneuver battalions and attached CS/CSS under operational command of an AC BCT for combat, but RC divisions would have administrative control of the battalions for drills, natural disasters, etc?
Before there was an NTC...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
btheives
I still think a handful of HBCTs should be kept on the AC side though - just for mobile operation. Maybe rotate the funds per quarter or 1/2-year for each AC HBCT to be completely ready and capable to conduct tank-on-tank battle, and allow the others to perform maneuver/tank tables less. This may sound absurd to some AC guys, but ARNG does this all the time.
The AC used force on force training constantly -- produced better units more able to operate flexibly IMO. Canned stuff has its limitations even with a 'world class OPFOR'. Donated training has some advantages; it also has some disadvantages...
One size fits all does not work in fairly intense combat. :eek::rolleyes:
What Reed says above makes sense. If the Army Reserve still had combat units, that would be the ideal place for RC HBCTs and the Guard could have light Inf, MPs aEngineers and Medics for State missions. However, the ArNG didn't want the USAR to have such units and won that battle (another example of "be careful what you want..."). So the ArNG gets stuck with some HBCTs -- since that heavy stuff is a Federal need and since the Feds pay about 90% ± of the total cost of the Guard, I guess it's a fair trade... ;)
Generally, RC units cannot train as thoroughly and have some problems with readiness compared to AC units (though I've seen RC units that could outperform some AC elements...) but that's okay -- an RC HBCT can get trained up and deploy a whole lot faster than the AC could recruit, equip, train and deploy one from scratch. Typically, RC elements cost about 25% of their AC counterparts costs, you get what you pay for and what we get is more than good enough -- far better than a lot folks active units. :cool:
Going Back to "Peactime" Guard/Reserve Training
This thread has gone quiet for a while now so I figure that I would stir the pot. And just for brevity's sake I will be referring to the Reserves because that is what I know, but most of what I am talking about includes the National Guard as well.
I left the regular AC army and went straight into a RC Training Support Battalion (CS/CSS). I have now witnessed this whole issue first hand. During my first year at my unit (2010-2011), it was a ghost town. Half the unit was mob'd to the nearest readiness center (pulling guard duty or some BS) and the other half was sitting on their fourth point of contact with no mission because the Reserves hadn't validated its own units since 2004/5. To make matters worse, our unit was so understrength at our home station that our AC numbers were just about even with the RC. Forget about training. In those circumstances, the culture shock alone is enormous. The officers are usually pretty politic and understanding, but the NCO's....lets just say we had one SFC come straight from Drill Sergeant duty and it was a rough couple of BA weekends. I know as a Captain, I just breathed deeply, kept my opinions to myself, and shifted my “no major changes rule” from 90 days to a year.
Break to 18 months ago. We reflagged under a new brigade and were told that we would be supporting Reserve unit training. We ramped up our basic soldiering skills and then tackled the essential unit non-specific platoon collective tasks along with our OC/T specific tasks (you have to know what to look for before you can evaluate it, and some NCO and Officers needed some refreshing). End result, our unit just helped train a bunch of Reservists for the first time in 8 years. Job well done.
Here some preliminary impressions:
-All Reserve units are eaten alive by “DA Mandatory Annual Training”, its insane. I think we lose the equivalent of two to three Battle Assemblies in a year to these classes. I wish they were biennial for us part-timers.
-Reservists operate at a much faster tempo than the AC, we always try to cram 4 days of events in one weekend (and sometimes we succeed). AC can tend to waste time (make work).
-Maintaining individual and team skills is really all that should be expected from Reservists during the year. The two weeks of annual training are for raising a prioritzed list of collective tasks (METL) from a U to a P. I don't believe in double standards and there is no circumstance where a unit that only works together 38 days a year can be called a “T” on collective tasks when compared to the Active Component or deployed Reservists. A “T” is earned through repetition, repetition, repetition. Realistic expectations shared by all would be appreciated.
-The Active Component is valuable for training Reservists, but holy carumba, they need to remember that weak leadership is not the same as absent leadership. People forget how long it took them to develop leadership skills. It is an organic process that cannot be taught, only trial and error experience works.
My last comment is more general. Except for a few time/resource intensive units (airborne, air assault, special forces, etc.) the Army and the Nation would be well served by keeping a 4:3:3 (Active:Reserve:Guard) ratio of all unit types. Besides ensuring that skills and equipment are spread throughout the force there is a political motive. Too much Active Component and you end up in situations where we are fighting three wars simultaneously with no democratic incentive to stop the fighting. Not enough Active Component and you could lose the next war.
I have many more thoughts on the matter but this is starting to drift into a rant and I will stop right there. For those who thought this was a rant a while ago, my apologies. I am curious to hear any other stories about the AC/RC clash of cultures.
Leviathan and System Administrator after a short aside
As mentioned earlier, the Constitution and politics will ultimately prevent the dissolution of the National Guard. In addition, the Reserves will probably always be around to some degree or another because it is a nice place to store unwanted, but necessary, capabilities when money gets tight (it applies to every branch).
To add some anecdotal evidence to another debate... logistical issues will always necessitate the existence of the Army. I worked for a logistics Major who would tell stories about how the Marines were begging Army log units for support during the initial weeks of the Iraq Invasion. Once the Marines get too far from the Navy, their CSS situation goes down the toilet. That is how they are able to maintain such a large tooth to tail ratio on paper. By the same token, there will always be a force that looks like the Marines and it will occupy that 200 mile strip of land between the ocean and the interior. I am willing to accept that fact and let them do their own thing (but can we please standardize weapons and uniforms between Army and Marines?)
Back to AC/RC structure. I am surprised that nobody in this thread has brought up Tom Barnett and the Leviathan/System Administrator structure. If you agree with his views of globalization and the US's role in the world system, it would seem that the AC/RC structure would be a great place to start tailoring the armed forces to perform those duties. His TED talk is a great summary of his line of thinking and offers a quick and dirty breakdown of AC/RC forces which is pertinent to this thread.http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barn...for_peace.html
If you followed Barnett's plan the AC Army would have the large majority of the Leviathan units (Special Forces, Maneuver BCTs, Fires, Combat Aviation, and Battlefield Surveillance) and the RC/NG would have most of the Sys-Admin units (Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, Sustainment Brigades, etc.) I can see MP and Engineer units being particularly valuable for a Sys-Admin force because of their dual nature (MP's and Combat Engineers relish their secondary “Fight as Infantry” mission.) When paired up with the Marines we have a force that could handle just about anything in a low-intensity conflict zone. The AC Army divisional headquarters' would be spread out by region roughly as TAH described it and paired with a joint-interagency Sys-Admin headquarters (which helps with contingency planning). The RC component and Marines would fall under the Sys-Admin joint headquarters during the mobilization.
I don't see this force mixture occurring anytime soon because the end result would make the AC Army much smaller (same size as AC Marine Corps perhaps?). This would be possible because there would be no need for 12 month deployments. The Leviathan force would crush countries like Iraq in a couple months and come straight back home. The RC/NG and the Marines would be a far larger component, personnel wise, because they would have to sustain long deployments repeatedly.
The more I write about it, the more I have to give Barnett credit. It seems like an elegant solution to many problems. Maintaining the skill sets and collective tasks needed to perform low-intensity warfare at a high level requires far less time and resources than maintaining those needed for high-intensity ops.
If I were Secretary of Defense for a Decade
Bob's World,
I agree. That was the exact response I was going to write. Plus, it lets me take the idea a little further into detail. I would make the assertion that the Iron Triangle of politics which governs our Active and Reserve components, along with their composition, can only truly be influenced by the President, Secretary of Defense (advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and acts of Congress. Economic downturns have the nice effect of forcing consolidation (for better or for worse) but otherwise Congress is useless.
If I were the Secretary of Defense during a decade of stagnant or declining economic prospects, I would do the following:
- Apply the High-Low capability mix to the Navy and Air Force:
- Navy: 6 Large Carriers, 6 “Jeep” Carriers, 12 Boomers, 12 “Blue Water” attack subs, 12 “Brown Water” attack subs, 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers per Carrier, 24 Frigates, start producing as many cheap “Corvette” class patrol ships as all other combat ships combined (6+6+12+12+12+12+24+24=108,) and all necessary support ships...Reserve would have all ships leftover from reorganization (nuclear reactors powered down and under guard).
- Air Force: As many ICBMs as the Navy. Same amount of money spent on UAVs/missles, as piloted combat aircraft. Plenty of aerial support (airlift included) capability. Reserves have 50-50 mix of piloted combat aircraft and aerial support aircraft. No AFNG, only Reserves.
- Special Operations Command (Direct Action): Consists only of a small mission tasking office run from directly under the Joint Chiefs. Personnel and equipment still comes out of each branch.
- Synch the Marine Corps with the Navy: 3 extra-strength MEFs (4 MEU each), and necessary additional personnel (training, embassy guards etc.) Reserves have another extra-strength MEF.
- Army focuses on 1) maintaining a large, well-equipped, well-trained NG, 2) performing on call joint operations with Marines, 3) and on call joint ops with Allies...in that order.
- Army undergoes massive consolidation with all surviving brigades adding personnel and necessary equipment until roughly between 4500-5000 soldiers strong. All companies are between 150-200 strong. Officer and NCO corps purged, increased use of Warrant Officers (Generals retired first, redundant field grades pushed into the IRR or National Guard). Reclass/Rebranch as necessary. Integrate National Guard Installations with AC Div. HQ's for joint training.
- AC: 40 Division HQ's, 8 Training & Support Brigades, 4 Sustainment BDEs, 3 Combat Aviation BDEs, 4 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 3 Special Forces BDEs, 3 IBCTs (Airborne), 3 IBCTs, 3 SBCTs, 3 ABCTs, 3 Fires BDEs, 3 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 40 Brigades and 40 Div HQ's on 40 Bases= ~200,000 (including Pentagon and civilian staff).
- Reserves: Only maintains IRR, 1 Div HQ, 2 Training & Support Brigade, 1 Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 1 Sustainment Brigade...all other TPU units transferred to National Guard based on geography. 4 Brigades= ~20,000
- National Guard: 30 Sustainment BDEs, 22 Combat Aviation BDEs, 30 Maneuver Enhancement BDEs, 22 IBCTs, 22 ABCTs, 15 Fires BDEs, 15 Battlefield Surveillance BDEs. 156 Brigades= ~780,000...No overseas deployments without State approval. Check on Executive Power. Capabilities distributed evenly by region.
- All companies are deployable as modular units under different battalions on an ad hoc basis. (MAGTF concept)
- Set Army recruit intake goals at twice the replacement level for enlisted and officers. Ensure that each rank requires half as many soldiers to staff as the next lower rank. Emplace an aggressive up or out policy for Active component with skills testing before every promotion (you must be proficient in the skills of the rank you will be promoted into...team leaders can run squads, lieutenants can run companies.) Soldiers who don't get promoted quickly enough are forced into the Reserves or National Guard (contingent on MOS shortages.) The end result is a Reserve force with a large supply of junior enlisted ready to become an NCO, and many excellent platoon leaders, ready to become Captain.
It saves money (assuming NG costs 1/4th active), reduces the President's capacity for unlimited warfare, and makes the AC more proficient. It is also career suicide, but I wouldn't care.
A More Flexibile Army and A More Stable World
I typed a big long post about a recent article in Military Rview with the same above title, but it went poof in the cyber universe. What the author proposes is interesting and I recommend reading it: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...831_art012.pdf
I have a question for the more knowledgeable posters at SWJ - could the HBCT (now ABCT) and IBCT brigades serve in both heavy and light assignments? I believe some HBCTs did shed the heavy equipment and serve as light forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but is it possible to train all armor, mechanized infantry and light infantry as just armor and infantry?
The HBCT combined arms battalion has 2xM1 and 2xM2. The IBCT maneuver battalion consists of 3xinfantry and 1xweapons. I propose changing the IBCT maneuver battalion design to 2 by 2. Armor companies when not assigned the heavy mission would serve as motorized weapons companies and the Bradley infantry would be light infantry. Should the Bradley crews be separate from the rifle platoon or utilize the weapons squad as crew members?
For example in the recent announcement from the Army the force structure will be cut by nine brigades - 4xHBCT, 1xSBCT and 4xIBCT. The 25ID will keep all four brigades. 4ID will have 2xHBCT and 1xIBCT. With my proposal, which I'm sure has been brought up before, all three brigades of the 4D would be capable of either the heavy or light mission. The Army would have combat arms troops trained primarily as M1 crew members, Bradleys and infantry. The 4D brigade assigned the light mission would still be able to train on heavy equipment at station to maintain a level of profficiency.
I would also propose keeping all the teeth in the AC and increasing the numbers of CS and sustainment in the RC. The RC combat brigades would consist of cadre forces that could be brought to full strength in a time of major war. Would this work or would it be detrimental to the RC?