Hizbullah / Hezbollah (just the group)
Moderator's Note
This thread has steadily acquired smaller threads, six today and concerns the group's activities. Hezbollah appears in the title of several threads and in a large number of threads on other subjects (ends).
22 July New York Times - In 1990’s, Shadows Waged War by John Kifner.
Quote:
The Hezbollah guerrilla campaign that ended Israel’s 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000 was in many ways a precursor to the kind of asymmetrical warfare American troops are facing in Iraq — and Israeli troops would face again if they entered Lebanon in large numbers.
Suicide bombers, roadside explosives and ambushes were the weapons the shadowy force that called itself the resistance used to drive out a superior conventional army.
“By limiting the firing, we were able to keep the cards in our hands,” said Sheik Nabil Qaouk, then and now the Hezbollah commander in the south, in a rare interview six years ago, shortly after the Israeli withdrawal.
“We were able to do small, little battles where we had the advantage,” the sheik, a Shiite imam who is also referred to as a general, said at the time in Tyre, Lebanon.
Now, as Israel contemplates the possibility of another land invasion of Lebanon, its commando reconnaissance teams are meeting stiff fighting as they discover that Hezbollah has spent much of the past six years constructing networks of fortified bunkers and tunnels and amassing stores of thousands of rockets.
And while the Palestinians whom Israel is battling in the Gaza Strip have only light weapons and homemade rockets, Hezbollah is equipped with up-to-date weaponry like laser-guided missiles, much of it supplied by Iran.
In the earlier battles in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah used innovations like roadside bombs made of fake plastic rocks, which could be bought in Beirut garden stores for $15.
To confuse Israel’s motion sensors, they would run farm animals across areas monitored by the devices.
A Soviet tank that was hidden in a cave and never driven, and thus did not show up on heat sensors, took the Israelis months to find, the sheik said.
A turning point was the ambush, in the summer of 1997, of a raid by elite Israeli naval commandos — some of Israel’s toughest troops — in which a dozen were killed. Then Hezbollah put out word that it had an informer, deterring further Israeli counterinsurgency operations.
The effect was to drive the Israelis into fixed, fortified positions, conceding land and initiative to Hezbollah...
Hezbollah: A Win For 'The Best Guerrilla Force in the World'?
Commentary by Shibley Telhami of the Brookings Institution:
Hezbollah's Popularity Exposes al-Qaeda's Failure to Win the Hearts
Quote:
...Americans should also be troubled that most Arabs surveyed now see the United States as one of the greatest threats to them (second only to Israel), in large part because of the Iraq war and the deep mistrust of U.S. intentions there, according to my poll with Zogby. In that sense, some have wanted to see the United States fail even more than they have wanted to see Iraq succeed; they worry about Iran, but they will root for it against Washington; and they fear Al-Qaida's world, but hope the group gives America a black eye.
This suggests that the current American challenge in the region is how to help shape outcomes, without making them seem part of an American imperial design. Yet the statements by the Bush administration in the first two weeks of the current crisis have played directly into regional fears. The reluctance to call for a quick cease-fire despite the massive damage and civilian casualties and statements about the suffering as being ``the birth pangs of a new Middle East'' have made many in the region conclude that the Lebanon war is America's war...
Israel's Long-Term Battle: Defining Victory
3 August New York Times - The Long-Term Battle: Defining ‘Victory’ Before the World by Steven Erlanger.
Quote:
As Israeli troops press the ground offensive in southern Lebanon and commandos make an unexpected raid far to the north in Baalbek, Israel is fighting now to win the battle of perceptions.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert wants to ensure that when a cease-fire is finally arranged, Israel is seen as having won a decisive victory over Hezbollah. It is important for him politically, especially after a slow and fumbling start to this war. In part, Israel wants to recover from an image of an unimpressive military venture against a tough, small, but well-trained group of fighters.
Israel also wants to send a message to the Palestinians, and to Hezbollah and its sponsors, Syria and Iran, that attacks on Israel will be met with overwhelming force, and that the cost is not worth the effort. How soon that message is perceived will play a central role in its decision to stop the war.
As with all wars, however, any victory must be consolidated in political and diplomatic arrangements, which remain uncertain, like the insertion of a multinational force along the border.
For Hezbollah, victory means simply avoiding defeat. It will be perceived by many Muslims to have won by keeping the capacity to fire even short-range rockets into Israel.
Gidi Grinstein, a former Israeli negotiator and director of the Reut Institute, a research group, calls it the “90-10 paradox.” Israel can eliminate 90 percent of Hezbollah’s fighting capacity, but Hezbollah can still declare victory and claim that it fought the mighty Israeli Army to a draw...
Hezbollah and the Ghost of Giap
SWC member and all-around good-guy from Chicago posts over on his Zenpundit blog - Hezbollah and the Ghost of Giap.
Quote:
Colonel W. Pat Lang , making an observation about
Israel's war in Lebanon with both immediate as well as historical implications.
"The Lebanese Hizbullah "Arab Guerrilla Army" is something different. What Newsweek describes is a force in transition, a force becoming a real army. Vo Nguyen Giap wrote in "People's War, People's Army" that a national resistance movement's armed force must "evolve" from political agitprop activities to guerrilla war and eventually to the status and capability of regular armed forces if it is to succeed in defeating its enemies and seizing " a place at the table" in its country's future."
The interesting thing about this observation is that, while Giap is a military leader of the first rank, his theory of guerilla warfare has rarely been borne out by history, including that of the Vietnam War. It is exceptionally rare for irregulars or guerillas to " transition" or "evolve" into full-fledged conventional military operations against a modern, first-rate opponent. Generally, guerilla forces beat state opponents by becoming more effective at guerilla warfare and causing a psychological and moral collapse of the state's will to resist; and only after seizing power, do the new rulers transform their guerilla fighters into professional soldiers...
Much more - read the whole thing...
COIN: Learning From Hezbollah
12 August Washington Post commentary - Learning From Hezbollah by Brian Humphreys.
Quote:
From my first day in Iraq as a young infantry officer, I was struck by the huge perceptual gulf that separated us from the Iraqis. My first mission was to escort a civil affairs team assigned to supervise the rebuilding of a local school. After tea, smiles and handshakes, we departed and were promptly struck by a roadside bomb. Our modest efforts to close the perceptual gulf, exemplified in our smile-and-wave tactics and civil affairs missions, seemed to my mind well-intentioned but inadequate.
At a deeper level, the motives of the local populace remained largely invisible to us, as people smiled one minute and attempted to blow us up the next. We knew little or nothing about their grievances and aspirations, or where the political fault lines ran in the cluster of small cities in the Sunni Triangle we were tasked with pacifying
We experienced many periodic spasms of violence that seemed to come out of nowhere before disappearing again. Of course they came from somewhere, but it was a somewhere we didn't understand. In a battalion of more than 800 men, we had one four-man team assigned to interact directly with the local population, and even this team was frequently sidetracked to deal with routine translation duties or interrogations.
Perhaps understandably for a conventional military force trained to focus on the enemy, our primary intelligence focus was on the insurgents. Much less attention was paid to the larger part of the population. Although we were a visible and sometimes forceful presence, I'm not sure we were a truly influential one.
Now, watching the latest news dispatches from Lebanon, I find myself comparing our efforts to introduce a new order in Iraq with Hezbollah's success as an effective practitioner of the art of militarized grass-roots politics. Frankly, it's not a favorable comparison -- for us. Hezbollah's organizational resilience in the face of an all-out conventional assault shows the degree to which it has seamlessly combined the strategic objectives of its sponsors with a localized political and military program.
Using the grass-roots approach, Hezbollah has been able to convert the ignored and dispossessed Shiite underclass of southern Lebanon into a powerful lever in regional politics. It understands that the basic need in any human conflict, whether or not it involves physical violence, is to take care of one's political base before striking out at the opponent...
Whatever the objective truth of Hezbollah's motives, its many supporters in southern Lebanon believe fervently that it is their organization, not an Iranian surrogate. Few if any American units in Iraq have achieved anything close to this level of success in winning the support of the local population. (Of more concern is the fact that few Iraqi security units or political leaders appear to have done so, either.) Commanders have come and gone, elections have been held, Iraqi soldiers trained, all manner of strategies for dealing with the insurgency attempted -- but with only limited and localized successes. Hezbollah's success among civilians in Lebanon, which is only reinforced by a ruthless pummeling from a reviled enemy, contrasts sharply with the continued fragility of the much more modest U.S. gains in Iraq, achieved at a much higher price.
The lessons should be clear. To engage in insurgency or counterinsurgency -- fancy terms for grass-roots politics by other means -- one must be willing and, most of all, able to work in the underbelly of local politics, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. It is the politics of getting people jobs, picking up trash and getting relatives out of jail. Engaging in this politics has the potential to do much more than merely ingratiate an armed force with a local population. It gives that force a mental map of local pressure points and the knowledge of how to press them -- benignly or otherwise -- to get desired results.
Some may say that this is just standard insurgency-counterinsurgency doctrine. True, but one has to ask why Hezbollah has been able to pull it off in Lebanon, while young Americans continue to endure a host of nasty surprises in Iraq.
Writer only addresses one issue
The writer effectively addresses the issue regarding raising a grassroots effort in order to gain greater acceptance among the masses, but the writer completely ignores the greater issues.
I believe the two bigger issues are religion and race. We will never reach the level of acceptance that a Hezbollah can within their own culture because they can play the race and religion card. We are dealing with extremists who hate us and they are taught to hate from the time they are small children - until this changes we will continue to fight.
Hezbollah: A Win For 'The Best Guerrilla Force in the World'?
14 August Washington Post - 'The Best Guerrilla Force in the World' by Edward Cody and Molly Moore.
Quote:
Hezbollah's irregular fighters stood off the modern Israeli army for a month in the hills of southern Lebanon thanks to extraordinary zeal and secrecy, rigorous training, tight controls over the population, and a steady flow of Iranian money to acquire effective weaponry, according to informed assessments in Lebanon and Israel.
"They are the best guerrilla force in the world," said a Lebanese specialist who has sifted through intelligence on Hezbollah for more than two decades and strongly opposes the militant Shiite Muslim movement.
Because Hezbollah was entrenched in friendly Shiite-inhabited villages and underground bunkers constructed in secret over several years, a withering Israeli air campaign and a tank-led ground assault were unable to establish full control over a border strip and sweep it clear of Hezbollah guerrillas -- one of Israel's main declared war aims. Largely as a result, the U.N. Security Council resolution approved unanimously Friday night fell short of the original objectives laid out by Israel and the Bush administration when the conflict began July 12.
With the declared U.N. cease-fire set to take effect Monday morning, many Lebanese -- particularly among the Shiites who make up an estimated 40 percent of the population -- have already assessed Hezbollah's endurance as a military success despite the devastation wrought across Lebanon by Israeli bombing...
Will other Islamic fighters adopt the same tactics?
Will other Islamic fighters adopt the same tactics?
We already know that Terrorist organizations have established their own version of lessons learned database in operations/tactics. The successes by Hizballah over the past month against the IDF are no doubt being fed back to Iran since most Hizballah fighters where trained there. Although I think most of those so called Iranian advisors where probably the ones manning most of those Sagger-2 missiles. Hizballah's stand against the IDF has already been recognized in the Islamic world. Nasrallah is hailed as a Muslim hero others may adopt the same tactics by the use of rockets. Hizballah now has seasoned fighters that can now take that experience against the IDF and apply to future operations, as well as export to other fighters. It would not surprise me if similar tactics showing up elsewhere. Just in the past week rocket attacks have been reported in both A-Stan and Iraq. Iran no doubt has benefited the most from observing their trained and equipped fighters slugging it out against the IDF. Will they refocus their efforts elsewhere?
Iran's Historic and Present Ties with Lebanon, Hezbollah
From the Vital Perspective Blog - Background Briefing: Iran's Historic and Present Ties with Lebanon, Hezbollah.
Quote:
The origins of Iranian involvement in Lebanon:
Iran first became involved militarily in Lebanon when a 2500-strong Iranian expeditionary force drawn from the Revolutionary Guard land army was sent to Syria in 1982 to assist in confronting Israel during the Peace in Galilee campaign.
Although the Syrians prevented actual Iranian participation in fighting, with many of the troops being returned to Iran, the remainder (1000-1500 men) stayed on to camp in the Bekaa Valley in the midst of the Shiite population. The force established a permanent military and logistic infrastructure at Camp Sheikh Abdallah in Baalbek, (which it had captured from the Lebanese Army) and at the Zabadani Camp in Syria, northeast of Damascus. In addition, command posts, field intelligence and operations units were established at Baalbek, Beirut, Zahleh and Mashgara (south Bekaa).
However the most distinctive accomplishment of the Iranians in Lebanon was their ability to cause disparate Shiite groups (which had been operating as local clan militias) to unite under one organizational umbrella called Hezbollah ("the party of Allah"), to indoctrinate their leaders with the extremist concepts of the Islamic revolution, and to train them in the military techniques and methods of the Revolutionary Guards.
Assistance by the Revolutionary Guards to Hezbollah prior to and during the present confrontation:
Iran did all it could during the present confrontation to stress its moral support for Hezbollah, as being part of "the historic struggle against the Zionist cancer and the USA". At the same time Iran strenuously denied any military involvement in the crisis. In fact, Iran was totally involved in these events.
This involvement was led by the Quds (Jerusalem) Force, an elite unit of the Revolutionary Guards. The Quds Force commanded by Qasem Suleimani is in charge of Iranian military operations and terrorist activities world-wide, and Lebanon is one of its main theaters of operations.
The Revolutionary Guard force in Lebanon is the spearhead of Iran in its campaign against Israel. It expresses an Iranian strategy that sees Lebanon as a beach-head, and so cultivates Hezbollah and its strategic abilities as a means of reacting to Israel, to wear Israel down with the ultimate aim of destroying that country, and meanwhile maintaining a balanced deterrent against it.
Over the years the Revolutionary Guards strengthened Hezbollah's military capabilities, granting it over $100 million annually. Iran also supplied the organization with varied weaponry, some of which was used by Hezbollah in the recent conflict. Some of these weapons were used independently and others required Iranian consent before use, such as the C-802 missiles...
Further Iranian assistance to Hezbollah in the recent fighting:
Iran supplied Hezbollah with intelligence about Israel.
Technical assistance in operating weapons: This assistance complemented routine basic training held in Iran at Revolutionary Guards camps and facilities. The two main camps of the Quds Force where non-Iranians are trained are the Imam Ali base in Teheran and Bahunar camp at Kharj north of Teheran. Two Hezbollah terrorists captured by the IDF related that they had been trained by the Revolutionary Guards at the Kharj base. One of them named the commander of an anti-aircraft course in 1999 as Hassan Irelo, a senior Iranian officer in charge of training.
Courses and joint exercises held in Iran for Hezbollah included anti-tank weapons (firing Sagger and Tow missiles), and anti-aircraft missiles. Special efforts were made to train in the use of strategic missiles with ranges of over 75 and 100 km, as well as drones. Revolutionary Guards officers assisted Hezbollah in launching an Iranian drone in November 2004 against Israel.
During recent years the Iranians stepped up supply of weapons to Hezbollah by air. When humanitarian supplies were flown into Iran following the earthquakes in Bam in southeast Iran (Dec 2003-Jan 2004) at least 9 return flights were used to ferry weapons to Hezbollah.
It is estimated that some recent attempts to resupply from Iran were prevented by IDF action. But the huge arsenal amassed over the years gave Hezbollah its "second wind". Iranian leaders have recently admitted publicly to supplying Hezbollah with weapons including long range rockets that threaten Israel...
Hezballah Leadership Profile: Naim Qasim
From the Jamestown Foundation: The Man in Nasrallah's Shadow: A Profile of Sheikh Naim Qasim
Quote:
Sheikh Naim Qasim, the deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, is one of the most interesting politicians in Lebanon. He is also one of the most under-covered by the Western media because he remains overshadowed by the towering influence of his boss, the charismatic 46-year-old Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Yet the life and career of the number two man in Hezbollah is important since he is the leader who would likely lead the controversial party if Nasrallah were to step down or get killed by Israel...
Additional insights into the man and his perspectives on the organization can be gained from his book, "Hizbullah: The Story from Within".
Palestinians Aim to Learn from Hezbollah
1 September Washington Times - Palestinians Aim to Learn from Hezbollah by Joshua Mitnick.
Quote:
Gunmen from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a militant Palestinian group known for its suicide attacks on Israel, say they envy Hezbollah even as they despair of their own inability to defeat Israeli forces.
"Even though we feel our capabilities are depleted, any chance at striking back we'll take. We have men that will eat stones," said Abu Ameed, who used a nickname for fear of arrest by the Israeli military.
"And if our generation feels a little demoralized, the next generations will not stop."
Mr. Ameed was part of a group of gunmen who spoke with a reporter in a grungy courtyard parking lot in Ramallah. Their disappointment was obvious. The Israeli military can reach them at will, and leaders of their own Fatah party want them to lay down their weapons.
But after Hezbollah held firm against an Israeli invasion for 34 days until an Aug. 14 cease-fire, the Palestinian gunmen say they have hope.
Israeli officials and analysts have expressed concern that Palestinian militants will try to replicate Hezbollah's tactics and "Lebanonize" areas such as the Gaza Strip by smuggling advanced weapons and building bunkers.
The militants, who wore black shirts, said they are trying to learn the lessons of Hezbollah's success, which they attributed partly to the militia's cohesion and discipline...
IDF Studies Hezbollah's Resilience
14 September USA Today - Israeli Military Studies Hezbollah's Resilience by Yaakov Katz.
Quote:
Israel's military has ordered a series of investigations to examine why its armed forces were unable to crush Hezbollah militants during a month of fighting in Lebanon.
Hezbollah guerrillas proved a resilient foe for Israel's vaunted military, inflicting casualties and firing missiles into Israel despite a punishing air campaign. Even after Israel sent thousands of troops into Lebanon, Israeli military commanders were still surprised by Hezbollah's capabilities.
“This is by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world,” said Brig. Gen. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162. His division lost 12 soldiers during an effort by Israel to gain ground days before a United Nations-brokered cease-fire went into effect Aug. 14...
Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year occupation in the south. Hezbollah used the past six years to build a complex network of tunnels and other fortifications in southern Lebanon. Some of these bunkers were found a couple hundred yards from the border with Israel.
Israeli troops, Saguy said, walked into traps Hezbollah had been preparing for six years.
Hezbollah is rearming after Israel lifted the sea and air blockade of Lebanon, allowing the group to get smuggled weapons, some experts say.
“Hezbollah is working to recover its arsenal and will be in several months where it was before the war,” Ganor said.
Other important questions
1. Hezbollah lost several foot soldiers in the conflict. Are they effectively able to recruit replacements? There is a big difference between supporters waving Hezbollah flags and volunteering to fight. If their recruiting trend is improving that would be an area of concern.
2. What is the trend of public support for Hezbollah? Understandably there was mass support for Hezbollah during the recent spat between Israel and Lebanon, since Hezbollah was the only effective force countering "perceived" Israeli aggression; however, now that the dust has settled is the Lebonese public reconsidering their position on the Hezbollah?
If anyone can provide answers to these questions it would be most appreciated.
Hizballah Likely to Bounce Back
Bill,
I can provide experienced-based SWAGs:
a. Recruitment will not be a problem among the young Shia in Lebanon. Hiszballah's "victory" may be perceptions-based but that constitutes reality in this matter.
b. Larger support for Hizballah will be greater at least for the near term. Hizballah damage payments to locals and earlier civic minded efforts all work in the organization's favor.
The central questiuon will be how Hizballah, the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Army, and the Israelis react to the expanded UNIFIL, one with a much more aggressive mandate and larger troop list.
Frankly, Zur's comments are somewhat obfuscatory; Hizballah's record against the IDF was not a state secret hidden from IDF leaders. And the open press--especially Poole's book on their tactics--had very accurate portrayals of what could be expected, especially the use of caves and caches.
Best
Tom
Technology likely supplied by Iran allowed guerrillas to stop Israeli tank assaults
Hezbollah cracked the code
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationwo...orldnews-print
Quote:
Hezbollah guerrillas were able to hack into Israeli radio communications during last month's battles in south Lebanon, an intelligence breakthrough that helped them thwart Israeli tank assaults, according to Hezbollah and Lebanese officials.
Using technology most likely supplied by Iran, special Hezbollah teams monitored the constantly changing radio frequencies of Israeli troops on the ground. That gave guerrillas a picture of Israeli movements, casualty reports and supply routes. It also allowed Hezbollah anti-tank units to more effectively target advancing Israeli armor, according to the officials.
"We were able to monitor Israeli communications, and we used this information to adjust our planning," said a Hezbollah commander involved in the battles, speaking on the condition of anonymity. The official refused to detail how Hezbollah was able to intercept and decipher Israeli transmissions. He acknowledged that guerrillas were not able to hack into Israeli communications around the clock.
The Israeli military refused to comment on whether its radio communications were compromised, citing security concerns. But a former Israeli general, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Hezbollah's ability to secretly hack into military transmissions had "disastrous" consequences for the Israeli offensive.
Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment
Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/p...icyFocus60.pdf
Exclusive: Hizbullah Paying Terrorists for Kassam Attacks
Jerusalem Post - Exclusive: Hizbullah paying terrorists for Kassam attacks
Quote:
According to the officials, while Islamic Jihad was behind most recent rocket attacks - including the one on Tuesday night that critically wounded 14-year-old Adir Basad in Sderot - several splinter terrorists groups are also involved and have received direct funding from Hizbullah.
According to security officials, Islamic Jihad gets the money via its headquarters in Damascus while Fatah's Tanzim terror group and the Popular Resistance Committees receive payment from Hizbullah in Lebanon.
All of the money originated in Iran, the officials said.
Government officials said Hamas was not currently involved in firing missiles, but was doing nothing to stop those who were.
A surrogate isn't necessarily a mercenary
The Hezbollah have proven they understand how to implement 4GW strategy effectively. These are guesses, but they are attempting to garner more political power in Lebanon, so they are probably holding their military arm in reserve, and keeping a clean overt appearance, yet covertly they are keeping the pressure on Israel by channeling money to various individuals and groups to conduct harassment attacks against Israel. To what purpose? This creates a wide array of targets for Israel, which means there are few if any identifiable targets that can be "effectively" neutralized. They may be able to find and kill the shooter, but there are hundreds of shooters waiting to step up to the plate. The Israeli government obviously feels compelled to take action, so this could be an attempt to lure Israel into conducting an attack, which will be seen by many as unprovoked, so again Hezbollah wins on the IO stage. Speculation, but don't underestimate them.