Do the Right Thing vs. The Next Big Thing
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
There NEEDS to be a new infantry tactics generation in use in the next war against competent and well-equipped enemies (the last one ended in 1945) or we'll see disasters as were seen in 1914-1917.
Old treatises on infantry tactics from WW2 and Vietnam don't help much. They can still tell us about the psychology of combat and some ruses, but not much about tactics.
Small war experiences like Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted some shortcomings and added some minor capabilities, but many of the lessons are 180° wrong simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent. A soldier can wear a heavy vest and patrol, day after day, and survive for months. He'd be dead within minutes if he did that in a high intensity conflict against competent enemies. The whole armour protection rally of the past years is probably 180° off.
So, that's the problem that I see. I can only hope that those people who work and think behind confidentiality barriers (that I cannot penetrate well) are working hard and well on the challenge. I hope they are not working on just incrementally advanced WW2 tactics.
I fear that's not the case, as the indicators for this are rare.
I don't disagree with your observations and arguments, but I think there are a couple logic-tripwires somewhere down this trail:
If your premise is that we're in danger of "fighting the last war," what with all of the current focus on Counterinsurgency and Small Wars and the like, and are in danger of intellectually disarming ourselves for any potential High-Intensity Conflict, roger and amen. (Although, as a user, it seems to run philosophically askance of the SWJ website mission. Perhaps it's more of a question for a notional Big Wars Journal?)
To say that Low-Intensity Conflict lessons are 180° wrong, "simply because the enemy is not modern and not competent," seems to invite the same criticism, however. The operational military-political realities faced since the 1960s and for the conceivable future (25 years?), dictate that most theory and practice be focused on LIC, not HIC. To this amateur historian, lessons from the likes of Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq prove that: You can pick your friends, and you can usually pick your fights, but you can't pick your enemies--or how they fight.
That may mean that the infantry now works in a theoretically/tactically topsy-turvy world, but it doesn't mean it's wrong. Consider the following anecdote shared by Schmedlap in a current SWJ thread on defining Information Operations (IO).
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
Someone gave an example H&I fires and asked, "is this PSYOP?" I don't know if it is PSYOP, but purely kinetic operations can and do have effects that many normally assume to be IO. My favorite example occurred in OIF III when residents actually complained that we were too soft and weak because we took well-aimed shots, rather than firing indiscriminately at insurgents. They were truly angry with us, claiming that the insurgents were humiliating us and showing their strength. The support for their argument was that Kent the insurgent was slinging an entire magazine at us, while Stan the rifleman was only firing back with 3 well-aimed shots. We explained that we were trying to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, but this did not resonate with the city-folk.
Soon thereafter, we adopted a slightly different approach: we returned fire with 40mm, AT-4's, and 25mm, as appropriate. Hellfire strikes became more common, as did the occasional visit from an M-1. The effect was that we killed/captured no more insurgents than we were killing/capturing before, but the PERCEPTION was that we were routing them. Suddenly the city-folk were expressing satisfaction with our work. One man said, "thank you for fighting back." We weren't before? Thereafter, IEDs and direct fire attacks began to plummet and we got significantly more intelligence and cooperation from locals. No IO annex required.
Bottom-line: We've gotta keep our collective heads in the current fight, stay intellectually flexible, always do the right thing, generate theory from practice*, vaccinate ourselves against next-war-itis, all while keeping the proverbial Big HIC Stick in our back pockets.
* Yes, got my own intellectual tripwire there. File under "schoolhouse vs. lessons-learned world-views"; cross-reference under "religious conflicts."
References on Infantry Tactics
Fuchs,
My library is light on tactics and heavy on macro issues. I am not aware of a single 'go-to-guy' for the answer that you are looking for.
"Infanterie Greift An" by Rommel was a fun one. Unlike many here I enjoyed Poole's Tactics of the Crescent Moon. Rommel's Greatest Victory by Mitcham (ISBN 9-780891-417309) was bone dry. Makers of Modern Strategy by Paret (ISBN 0-691-02764-1) is a good reference that I return to often. I have not yet finished Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (ISBN 0-521-79431-5) but portions of it are useful. The Savage Wars of Peace by Boot (ISBN 780465-0077219) is informative. I am a huge fan of most anything by Robert D. Kaplan; Imperial Grunts (ISBN 1-4000-6132-6), Balkan Ghosts (ISBN 0-679-74981-0), Soldiers of God (ISBN 1-4000-3025-0), & The Coming Anarchy (ISBN 0-375-70759-X). Merchant of Death by Farah & Braun (978-0-470-26196-5), and Licensed to Kill (ISBN 1-4000-9781-9) are light reading. Battle Ready by Zinni/Koltz (ISBN 0-399-15176-1), Imperial Hubris by Scheurer (1-57488-862-5), and Fiasco by Ricks (ISBN 1-59420-103-X) are worth the read.
The hard lessons I learned from a ranger captain who taught me as a young cadet, long distance running, using MILES gear, reading ARTEP 7-17-10 Drill (Battle Drills for Light Infantry, Infantry, Airborne, & Air Assault Platoon & Squad), negotiation skills, a certain amount of judicious ruthlessness, and a fair amount of luck kept me & my guys alive in Iraq.
Bottom line, I am not sure that a book can capture what you are looking for. IMHO it has to be more of an apprenticeship and a trial by fire experience.
Regards,
Steve
He does good until he gets to the end and
wants to stick with the triangular organization. :(
(in the original, have not read the revised edition)
However, you're right, he's more than a theoretician. That, as Martha Stewart would say, is a good thing...
Sure. IMO four to six is easily
managed at Co / Bn / Bde level. I think the Div should disappear (except for Artillery Divisions for HIC ;)) and Corps should control (lightly) up to 9-10 Bdes plus the spt package, an Avn Bde and that Arty div.
Four of every maneuver element is better than three, enables better bounding overwatch and rotation off line. Also allows for mix of 2 Tk Co and 2 Mech Inf Co at Bn. Allows one element for Assault and three for breakthrough and follow up. Four Firing Batteries allow two to be ready to fire no matter how much you move. All sorts of advantages. The triangular setup was a German invention to force unbalanced formations and defense -- same thing can be achieved by better training.
Span of control as currently defined is engendered more by lack of trust and fear of failure than by practical considerations -- unless you want to count peacetime manning and personnel management problems as practical (which I don't). Better training can overcome that. Not mixing branches is not maintenance or training driven, it's branch parochialism driven (which again is affected by peacetime manning and personnel management practices...).