More like fishing than chess...
That was a great article. I would only add that the analogy of checkers and chess is a bit off the mark. Those are games played in which one participant tries to defeat the other. We have so many common interests with the Iraqi tribes and the people in general. The trick is to identify them and figure out a way to work with the tribes to achieve them.
Sheik, sheik, sheik ... your booty
Thanks for pointing out this article. Great stuff for educating soldiers on the complexities they'll face downrange.
Salon.com's Anna Badkhen's seems to be doing some good reporting from Iraq this month. The second page of her 12 MAY 08 entry ("Buying security in Baghdad") describes a U.S. Army captain's poker-faced response to a neighborhood council dust-up. The scene suggested to me an added level of complexity to the "chess not checkers" analogy--that the COIN/nation-building chess game is actually one in which one is not a player directly, but rather an advisor/mentor to one or more players.
That, and I was reminded of tantrum-throwing as a calculated technique for mental- and political-gamesmanship--think John McEnroe (in tennis) or Bobby Fischer (in chess).
Here's an excerpt:
Quote:
His long dishdasha robe flowing, his kuffiyeh folded perfectly around his bearded face, al-Athawi rises from his chair, points a long, manicured finger in the general direction of American Army Capt. Andrew Betson, Iraqi police Gen. Baha al-Azzawi and council secretary Faras al-Qabi, and says in a clear, loud voice, "Why are you accusing me of being a member of al-Qaida?"
Suddenly, everyone is up on their feet, shouting.
"Please!" al-Azzawi bellows, rolling his eyes. "Let us put these differences behind us. It's over. Let's forgive. It's forgotten. Get over it."
"We never said any such thing about you," yells al-Qabi. "Why do you accuse us of accusing you?"
"Al-Qaida!" al-Athawi roars. "I am told that you spread rumors that I am al-Qaida!"
"Enough, enough!" shout fellow council members, grabbing each other's hands.
"Stop! Please!" implores al-Azzawi.
"No one is accusing you of anything!" screams al-Qabi.
Betson remains in his seat, watching the meeting of a council created to foster reconciliation in the war-torn neighborhood descend into a 10-minute shouting match.
Then everyone gets up and goes to a burger joint to lunch together.
True. It's the people, not the process.
There are provisions for it and we say we do the right things (not just on handoffs / RIP...) but the actors don't follow the script all too often.
We need to be able to go into the brain and tune egos -- and ambition...
Lacking that, design a failsafe system that forces cooperation -- and I do NOT mean a bureaucratic effort or regulation. It's up to the Commanders to make it happen; the good ones do, too many do not, not being done their way.
Egos...
Not just a military problem
In my 20 years in the Foreign Service, I had never had an overlap with my predecessor until I came out to my Iraq PRT assignment. The outgoing officer is usually desperate to get back to the US for a few weeks of summer leave while fending off his next boss who thinks any arrival later than late June is too late, while the incoming officer's previous boss is holding on to her with a grip of iron until late August, at least (in part to cover the gap because the guy replacing her isn't coming until September). State just doesn't have the bodies to cover all the bases, especially when you throw in training needs (which usually are addressed during the summer transition).
Baghdad is different, in this as in so many ways. The directive was established that all Baghdad assignments would ensure at least a two-week overlap, whether inside the Embassy or at PRTs. My sense is that this is in fact held to MOSTLY. I had a solid two-week overlap with my predecessor and really benefited from it. It's so important to "hand off" relationships properly, to have the time to go over longstanding problems for which solutions are only just developing and which must be carried to completion by the new team. This is especially critical in a place like Iraq, where nearly everybody turns over ever year. If you can't have continuity, you at least have to have a good hand-off.
I suspect this will be the last time I have that overlap, however Maybe someday, when State is properly staffed...but that's another thread.
Regards
RIP/TOA inherently flawed...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Schmedlap
There is a dual dynamic. Some units do not care to pass along lessons. Some do not care to learn. It sucks when both occur simultaneously. I have never seen in instance where the incoming unit is ready to learn and the outgoing unit is ready to teach.
On my 2nd tour to Iraq, my counterpart in the outgoing unit seemed more interested in getting the hell out of Iraq than on passing anything along. His commander required him to create a continuity book, but it was lacking and he did not have many answers about those areas where it lacked. On my 3rd tour, it was even worse. My counterpart acted as though I was an inconvenience and a distraction whenever I asked him about something. Had I not hunted him down everyday, I doubt that we even would have spoken. As it turned out, he did not do all that much, so maybe he simply had no lessons to pass along.
After each occasion, having dealt with the BS of not having a good handoff, I decided that my replacement would not have a similarly crappy experience. Unfortunately, in both occasions, I had about 24 hours to do the handoff (so much for the one- to two-week RIP/TOA timeline). The guy at the trail end of my 2nd tour seemed pretty uninterested. The guy at the trail end of my 3rd tour had lots of questions and was geniunely interested, but he got there so late - I caught the last bird out with my battalion commander, so that I could do somewhat of a handoff, and it was clearly not enough. We had to email back and forth for another two weeks after I got back home (and throw in a week-long delay between leaving there and getting here).
The idea that a unit or its leaders could pass all the knowledge they've acquired in the last 12-15 months during a two-week RIP is a flawed concept from the get-go. I've been a part of two of them during my time in Iraq. The first in 2004 was an absolute debacle; the second in 2006 did allow much more time, but still not enough to relay all of the information I needed too, nor foster the relationships with the indigenous we should have. There are many ways to mitigate this, but as Schmedlap stated, getting everyone to participate whole-heartedly maybe critical. Here are a few ideas:
1. Big Army needs to identify what BCTs and BNs are going where in IZ MONTHS in advance, as much as possible, anyway. I understand the battlefield changes.
2. The incoming unit needs to send at least one ops staff (asst. S-3) guy and one LOG dude to IZ at least three months early. This will allow them to see what the current unit is doing and maintain some sort of continuity for the incoming unit (or change it). These guys can keep SIPR contact with their units back home to deliver briefs and share INTEL. They can also meet and greet local players that the BNs and BDEs are involved with on a daily basis. The incoming commander has the option of sending these guys home early from the tour, because their primary function will be to capture historical data from the outgoing unit.
3. Try to keep units habitually assigned to the same AO. We are not good at this. My old BCT has gone to three different AOs during their rotations. Why not at least try and keep some continuity, if possible? In general the Iraqi players don't change and they get to see a familiar face...as opposed to "divorcing" from Americans every year.
4. PDSS is a good program, but should probably happen a few times, not once. I realize this can be detrimental to the unit losing leaders for two weeks a time back home, but the payoff is worth it. It doesn't have to be the battalion commander or XO.
Just some ideas. RIP/TOA will never be a perfect system. It can't.
