Army Doctrine Reengineering and the Loss of Any Historical Perspective

Within the Army there is a project underway to manage doctrine more effectively by redefining what is doctrine; then producing, maintaining, and making doctrinal material more accessible to the user. This involves both reducing the number of field manuals (to less than one hundred, perhaps fifty), and reducing the size of field manuals to facilitate ease of use, ease of maintenance and clarity.

To help reduce the size of each manual (arbitrary goal of not more than 200 pages) the use of quotes and historical vignettes will likely be discouraged. I think this is a mistake. Doctrinal manuals should not become just a series of checklists.

Doctrinal manuals should establish fundamental principles (as a common frame of reference) and explain their application in current military operations. The use of quotes from key leaders past and present together with a series of historical vignettes should be used to illustrate how these fundamental principles have been applied during military operations in the past -- a point of departure from which the current practitioner can gain some insight into how to deal with situations that may arise in future operations.

The recently published Army counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24) is a case in point -- the quotes and historical vignettes that it contains both reinforce its stated principles and make it come alive (it is a very good read that is not only a valued cornerstone in the library of current military practitioners but one that also remains on the bedside table of many in Congress). Lets not throw this baby out with the bathwater.

am unsure that FM 3-24 is a good example on several counts. It does have a certain appeal to many due to its essentially College 101 Textbook approach to military writing. It did assemble a broad based historical perspective to remediate errors of omission over a 30 year period. I have also heard complaints from the field about undue complexity and trivial information; it is not designed for the "doers."

It simply is too large and unwieldy for the practitioner at Battalion level and below -- and that's the bulk of the force.

Thus we have FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency designed to remedy that error -- and which suffers from the same fault; too much backgrorund information and too lengthy at 307 total pages including extracts of Kilcullen and Lawrence among others. It is no real help to the Bn and below worker bee.

Such volume is possibly helpful in a doctrinal sense but I believe it is very disadvantageous in a Field Manual which should be concise, 100 pages or less, designed for the user in the FIELD to rapidly get to the 'how-to' issues that are of concern to him and of pocket size.

The history that must be an interest of any thinking soldier is easily found in many places -- the aforementioned Kilcullen and Lawrence items are widely available. I'd almost be willing to bet that copies of both authors books which are cited would be available in the average deployed BCT ...

What's need are Doctrinal Manuals, in loose leaf binder and .pdf format (everyone may not always have AKO access) which can and should be limited to less than 100 and of less than 200 pages but including background and historical material -- easily achieved by tighter writing and elimination of redundancy -- and Field Manuals, limited to less than 100 of no more than 100 pages that are the operators manuals for the technical publications that are the Doctrinal Manuals which contain all the amplifying detail and the references.

Doctrine is doctrine, it is what should be done and an explanation of why is beneficial. How-to-do-it is rarely the same thing and generally, the 'why' is not necessary and can, in fact, impede understanding.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

What's need are Doctrinal Manuals, in loose leaf binder and .pdf format (everyone may not always have AKO access) which can and should be limited to less than 100 and of less than 200 pages but including background and historical material -- easily achieved by tighter writing and elimination of redundancy -- and Field Manuals, limited to less than 100 of no more than 100 pages that are the operators manuals for the technical publications that are the Doctrinal Manuals which contain all the amplifying detail and the references.

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Yes...Yes...Yes!!!!busy now but more later......this absolutely should be done.

There have been many great manuals, but I think that the stories and vingettes serve not only to illustrate a manual but to make it readable. However, the previous authors are right that the most important problem to overcome is just poor writing. A good writer can make almost anything interesting. The problem with many manuals is that they read like the army decided to test the infinite monkey theorem.

I have here a book written by Eike Middeldorf in the 50's. He was later responsible for the early FMs of the Bundeswehr in our Ministry of Defence.
The book is quite general - about all relevant facets of land warfare (context Germany 50's).

It has less than 500 pages and could easily replace a dozen manuals of that time. There's not the same degree of detail, but taken together it's the best in military writing that I've ever seen.
Sadly, it's in great part not timeless at all - much was outdated already in the late 60's (the leadership-related parts were outstanding, though).
(An earlier work of him was equally great (Taktik im Russlandfeldzug - tactics in Russian campaign) and claimed to have been translated in three languages (most likely including English), but I never saw any English copy.


I personally see little problem in plenty background info. Officers should sit together with more experienced officers and most senior NCOs at times (no uniform, no rank insignia, casual and civilian atmosphere) and just discuss/interpret manuals as if they were beautiful literature.
It would be worth two afternoons per month.



A good example for great FMs at the vehicle/NCO level were the German Tigerfibel, Pantherfibel and Schiessfibel (fighter shooting guide) of WW2. They're almost fun to read.
http://www.panzerlexikon.de/hinter/Tigerfibel/menu.htm
http://www.panther1944.de/Panther/fibel/fibel.htm
http://www.rafiger.de/Homepage/Pages/Schiessfibel.html

They're way better than the usual weapons-specific FMs.

When I see text length requirements I think that there is either an extensive over-writing problem or a poor reading problem. On the former concision is a skill not wrought by bureaucrats or dinosaurs. On the latter reading in serial is a flaw of the under-understood. The expectation a reader should or will read everything word for word is a passing futility that shouldn't be or expected of the reader. That density of the material should be arbitrarily set is also a failure. Pithy, lengthy, laborious passages give depth.

I would suggest that we need to teach officers how to read at all ranks. It is a skill lost to many. I am not talking about grammar but an innate skill learned specifically to cover vast amounts of information with high conceptual understanding rapidly.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Yes...Yes...Yes!!!!busy now but more later......this absolutely should be done.

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There should be one manual with 10,000 chapters/topics on a computer/online/ CD,etc. and you could download the individual chapters/topics and make/customize the manual you need for the situation instead of writing a whole new manual each time. Have a 3 ring binder with page protectors and slide in the new or relevant pages/chapters needed for the situation and/or remove older ones. Example in A'stan you may need a chapter on mules but you may not need it in.....Estonia:)

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Originally Posted by slapout9

There should be one manual with 10,000 chapters/topics on a computer/online/ CD,etc. and you could download the individual chapters/topics and make/customize the manual you need for the situation instead of writing a whole new manual each time. Have a 3 ring binder with page protectors and slide in the new or relevant pages/chapters needed for the situation and/or remove older ones. Example in A'stan you may need a chapter on mules but you may not need it in.....Estonia:)

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How would you go about creating something like that, with todays tech?

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Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

How would you go about creating something like that, with todays tech?

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Easy load all the current FM's into a data base and edit for duplication.....example how many FM's have the same material on the Troop Leading Procedure? should be a chapter/topic by itself and downloaded as need instead of being repeated in a bunch of manuals over and over.

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Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

How would you go about creating something like that, with todays tech?

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Pretty simple actually. A few companies do exactly this kind of on demand publication for academia. You chose the chapter from a few different books (or many) and they create either a pdf or actual print book for what you need. You can do this all the way down to "book modules" like exercises. Pretty simple once the content is electronic.

Amen. The doctrine efforts are ongoing, but we hope the ATTP will be the useful tool that many in this thread advocate. As someone who was tangentially involved in the writing of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, acts as the current custodian of FM 3-24, and who had a hand in FM 3-24.2, I agree. FM 3-24 is essentially an operational/higher tactical manual, although some of its material is of course widely applicable. FM 3-24.2 did not build from the bottom up and link to FM 3-24 as it was supposed to; it linked to FM 3-24 and built down, but it did not go far enough in my opinion.

Doctrine is what is taught. In that respect the FMs are WHY something needs to be done and the some explicit guidance as to how.
IMO, the "manual" should form the reference work from which the teaching is done and not aim to teach something in and of itself. You cannot throw "Infantry Platoon Tactics" at a 2nd LT and then assume he is good to go.

The biggest problem I have with the current US FM's is the poor history, and some of the worst writing the English Language has ever been subject to, in terms of wordy, complex, high-falutting gobbledegook.
Clarity of writing IS clarity of thought. - anyone with any doubts, look at the drivel that gets written about Operational Design. :mad:

Doctrine is a body of thought, so it certainly can be what is taught. Doctrine consists of fundamentals, TTP, terms, and symbols. TTP provide explicit guidance as to the "how," so it depends on the manual's scope and purpose on how explicit you get. You absolutely right in that you don't throw Infantry Platoon Tactics at 2LT and assume he is good to go. While there is a reason D comes first in DOTMLPF, the other pieces are obviously vital.

What manuals do you feel are based on poor history? I can pass along your concerns to the authors.

The writers of FM 5-0 are wrestling with a difficult problem in crafting design doctrine for the whole Army. It is challenging as there are several views on design, it's a new concept for doctrine, and it's complex.

Klugzilla asked "what manuals do you feel are based on poor history? I can pass along your concerns to the authors."

Answer: Notably absent from recent draft field manuals written by authors at CADD are quotes from key leaders past and present and historical vignettes or other historical reference to illustrate the application of a doctrinal principle. Examples include the initial draft of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 24 July 2009 (shortened to 209 pages); the revised final draft of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, 5 June 2009(shortened to 268 pages) and the DRAG draft of FM 3-92, Corps Operations, 7 August 2009 (shortened to 145 pages). They are short, but lack historical perspective. This worries me.

While I think your point is a valid one, I believe the stripping of vignettes and other historical material is part of the effort to reduce the size of manuals. I will ask the authors. What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.

I've made my point, so I suggest some of the other participants that may be more widely read than I weigh in to try help answer your question about poorly written history.

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Originally Posted by selil

Pretty simple actually. A few companies do exactly this kind of on demand publication for academia. You chose the chapter from a few different books (or many) and they create either a pdf or actual print book for what you need. You can do this all the way down to "book modules" like exercises. Pretty simple once the content is electronic.

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Neil Garra at s2company.com has been advocating this for a decade...


http://www.s2company.com/files/readings/279.htm

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Such volume is possibly helpful in a doctrinal sense but I believe it is very disadvantageous in a Field Manual which should be concise, 100 pages or less, designed for the user in the FIELD to rapidly get to the 'how-to' issues that are of concern to him and of pocket size.

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It's interesting that the Marines have 1 T&R manual (equivalent of an ARTEP) where the Army has about 7. I know it's not exactly the same as the doctrinal manuals, but it's a close comparison.

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Originally Posted by Klugzilla

What I was trying to ask for, however, was examples of poor history as the underpinnings of manuals, which is what I thought was meant by the earlier post. I know the authors did their historical homework for the manuals.

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I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.

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2-46. Irregular warfare differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. First, it is warfare among and within the people. The conflict is waged not for military supremacy but for political power.
Military power can contribute to the resolution of this form of warfare, but it is not decisive. The effective application of military forces can create the conditions for the other instruments of national power to exert
their influence. Secondly, irregular warfare also differs from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the indirect approach.

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FM3 Chap 2

That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.

How many more examples do you wish for?

In one of my posts yesterday I said that the initial draft (15 June 2009) of FM 6-0 had no quotes from key leaders past or present or any historical vignettes. I was wrong (this applies only to the 2009 drafts of FM 5-0 and FM 3-92). In fact the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 contains eight quotes and four historical vignettes. What I should have said is that the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes as compared to the published version, 11 August 2003, (which has some 28 quotes and 12 historical vignettes) is startling. As Klugzilla points out, the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes in the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 may be an artifact of the recent trend toward brevity (the published version has some 333 pages). I submit we should not sacrifice the historical underpinning of the principles contained in these doctrinal manuals (and the wisdom of those who have gone before) on the altar of brevity. That would be a false economy that could get us into trouble in the long run.

While I realize that "write doctrine" is arguably the principle task of the Regular force in peace; we need to ask who has the principle task of "read and employ doctrine," and tailor the doctrinal products to that audiance.

Mostly doctrine is for students and higher level staffs. While, as Ken points out, the bulk of the force is at BN and below; I doubt highly that that is the bulk of the doctrine audance.

What the guys and gals at that level need are usable products that convert doctrine to the environment that they will be expected to operate in. Pocket guides that help Platoon leaders and Squad leaders gain effectiveness through the experiences of others.

Could we use less doctrine? Undoubtedly.

Should we attempt to achieve this by stripping the life out of what is already dry reading to begin with, in some effort to make one size fit all? I think that would be a disaster.

Remember, the historic strength of the American warfighting force has always been that the warfighter himself was a draftee or volunteer brought on specifically to fight the war, and who had probably never been within 10 paces of a doctrinal manual. The regulars up at Division had those books and had taught them at places like Benning and Leavenworth. Doctrine shapes the operational construct, but it does not guide the fight.

Here is an example of what I was talking about. The Combat Leaders Field Guide....comes in big size and pocket size. As a PDF file you can print what you need or all of it, you add or delete as needed.

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/clg.pdf

Might it not be possible to not only as one Ursus H. posts and produce a pocket manual of useful info for Bn and below--perhaps with very short quotes, and separately produce a reading list of relevant books for those with time and interest? Perhaps e-books for some or links to the relevant library?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Could we use less doctrine? Undoubtedly.

Should we attempt to achieve this by stripping the life out of what is already dry reading to begin with, in some effort to make one size fit all? I think that would be a disaster.

Remember, the historic strength of the American warfighting force has always been that the warfighter himself was a draftee or volunteer brought on specifically to fight the war, and who had probably never been within 10 paces of a doctrinal manual. The regulars up at Division had those books and had taught them at places like Benning and Leavenworth. Doctrine shapes the operational construct, but it does not guide the fight.

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Amen. In a speech delivered to the conservative backbench Foreign affairs committee, House of Commons, March 1936, Winston S. Churchill said in part:

"Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking the short views, and indulging their natural implses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day. The first thing is to decide where you want to go."

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I'm sure they did do their homework, and a bright and committed men.

FM3 Chap 2

That is a set of opinions. None of the statements contained therein are historically accurate, or supported by military history. FM3 also fails to use the widely accepted historical definition of Irregular Warfare, "warfare against an irregular opponent." - eg: Small Wars.

How many more examples do you wish for?

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While I might personally agree with you that the U.S. definition of IW may not be the right one, you are comparing your interpretation of military history with another. Any history is interpretation based on fact. Yours differs from DOD policy, joint doctrine, and Army doctrine, as FM 3-0 is built to be consistent with DOD policy and joint doctrine. If you want to attack the way irregular warfare is treated, you'll have to start at the top. Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.

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Originally Posted by Ursus horribilis toklat

In one of my posts yesterday I said that the initial draft (15 June 2009) of FM 6-0 had no quotes from key leaders past or present or any historical vignettes. I was wrong (this applies only to the 2009 drafts of FM 5-0 and FM 3-92). In fact the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 contains eight quotes and four historical vignettes. What I should have said is that the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes as compared to the published version, 11 August 2003, (which has some 28 quotes and 12 historical vignettes) is startling. As Klugzilla points out, the relative paucity of quotes and historical vignettes in the 2009 initial draft of FM 6-0 may be an artifact of the recent trend toward brevity (the published version has some 333 pages). I submit we should not sacrifice the historical underpinning of the principles contained in these doctrinal manuals (and the wisdom of those who have gone before) on the altar of brevity. That would be a false economy that could get us into trouble in the long run.

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As I mentioned before, I too hate to see this happening; however, the actual appearance of quotes, vignettes, etc. does not necessarily mean that history does not underpin doctrine. That train has left the station.

Also, we have yet to settle on a format for the ATTP, which is where vignettes may have the most impact. I think this ties into the Bob's World post.

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Originally Posted by Ursus horribilis toklat

Amen. In a speech delivered to the conservative backbench Foreign affairs committee, House of Commons, March 1936, Winston S. Churchill said in part:

"Those who are possessed of a definitive body of doctrine and of deeply rooted convictions upon it will be in a much better position to deal with the shifts and surprises of daily affairs than those who are merely taking the short views, and indulging their natural implses as they are evoked by what they read from day to day. The first thing is to decide where you want to go."

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I personally like this quotation:

I am tempted to say that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter…What does matter is their ability to get it right quickly, when the moment arrives.
—Sir Michael Howard

Serious question from this:

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from Klugzilla
Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.

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What is your understanding of which you speak - the definition which was rejected ?

The reason for my question is that the distinction between regular and irregular combatants underlies the key issues (in LOAC); about which, I attempt to post with some semblence of professionalism.

This is a basic definition on which both military and legal have to occupy the same page.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by jmm99

Serious question from this:



What is your understanding of which you speak - the definition which was rejected ?

The reason for my question is that the distinction between regular and irregular combatants underlies the key issues (in LOAC); about which, I attempt to post with some semblence of professionalism.

This is a basic definition on which both military and legal have to occupy the same page.

Regards

Mike

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Agreed. However, I was referring to the fact that the doctrinal definition of irregular warfare focuses on the population, not irregular combatants, formations, tactics, etc. This was established in the IW JOC and put into doctrine via JP 1 and FM 3-0.

There is a joint or Army definition of irregular forces, which isn't necessarily tied to irregular warfare (I personally see the disconnect). However, the definition is “Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.” I would like to see that definition refined and expanded upon. As it reads, it essentially says they’re irregular forces because they’re not regular. And there is no definition of regular forces. The definition for paramilitary forces has similar problems. If you have any suggestions, I would love to hear them and potentially get them into doctrine. Do we all basically know the difference between regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces? Yes, but I would like to see the doctrinal definitions improved.

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from Klugzilla
There is a joint or Army definition of irregular forces, which isn't necessarily tied to irregular warfare (I personally see the disconnect). However, the definition is “Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.” I would like to see that definition refined and expanded upon. As it reads, it essentially says they’re irregular forces because they’re not regular. And there is no definition of regular forces. The definition for paramilitary forces has similar problems. If you have any suggestions, I would love to hear them and potentially get them into doctrine. Do we all basically know the difference between regular, paramilitary, and irregular forces? Yes, but I would like to see the doctrinal definitions improved.

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If this hasn't been "threaded" before (need to check), should it go in "Doctrine & TTPs", "Training & Education" or elsewhere. It is not "Law Enforcement", since the primary importance is in things military (and its interfaces with diplomacy and policy).

Mike

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Originally Posted by Klugzilla

While I might personally agree with you that the U.S. definition of IW may not be the right one, you are comparing your interpretation of military history with another.

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I'm not sure I am. I don't view Military history as a buffet bar to be raided selectively in support of doctrine. If it is, then that forgives all the stupidity you see in armies today! Military history does layout clear lessons, and the context of those lessons is critical. The US IW definition is not founded in any historical fact. It is a definition used to support doctrine, when it should be the opposite.

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Next fun question: what is an irregular opponent? I understand it, the group who did the analysis for the first IW JOC considered using this as the basis for IW, but rejected it.

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An irregular opponent is one that is not part of a regular army. Regular armies have a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics, generally lacking in irregulars.
That the JOC rejected it, is not evidence that we should. The JOC came up with "hybrid," which is a clumsy forcing mechanisms to try and short cut real military education.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

What's need are Doctrinal Manuals, in loose leaf binder and .pdf format (everyone may not always have AKO access) which can and should be limited to less than 100 and of less than 200 pages but including background and historical material -- easily achieved by tighter writing and elimination of redundancy -- and Field Manuals, limited to less than 100 of no more than 100 pages that are the operators manuals for the technical publications that are the Doctrinal Manuals which contain all the amplifying detail and the references.

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Ken-

Not sure what the current format is for the Army manuals (I mainly end up looking at them online), but the most commonly used Air Force doctrine (TTPs) are in this format. The AFTTP3-XX series provides the main foundation for AF employment at the "doer" level, and are usually in a binder with page protectors. They also have some pretty good illustrations and usually a summary at then end that brings together the biggest points in an appendix.

Anyway, seems to work pretty good.

V/R,

Cliff

Big Blue didn't lose the bubble. The Army used to do it that way, then the educators got involved... :wry:

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I'm not sure I am. I don't view Military history as a buffet bar to be raided selectively in support of doctrine. If it is, then that forgives all the stupidity you see in armies today! Military history does layout clear lessons, and the context of those lessons is critical. The US IW definition is not founded in any historical fact. It is a definition used to support doctrine, when it should be the opposite.


An irregular opponent is one that is not part of a regular army. Regular armies have a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics, generally lacking in irregulars.
That the JOC rejected it, is not evidence that we should. The JOC came up with "hybrid," which is a clumsy forcing mechanisms to try and short cut real military education.

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I don't view military history as a buffet, but you have to survey all of the appropriate facts and establish a hypothesis. The authors of the IW JOC surveyed the historical facts and established a hypothesis. While you may not agree with their hypothesis, and I’m not sure I’m completely sold either, there is historical fact that supports the current IW definition. And the definition for IW was first established in the JOC and then doctrine was written for that paradigm, not the other way around. From writing several recent doctrinal manuals, I can say that the manuals flow from theory and terminology. For example, how you define insurgency drives COIN doctrine.

Please elaborate on the defined set of legal, social, and organizational characteristics—that is the hard part. Although this material will not appear in the definition itself, it will have to be discussed in some detail in support of the definition. This discussion tends to quickly become mired in mirror imaging and cultural bias. And “generally lacking in irregulars” is circular.

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Originally Posted by Klugzilla

From writing several recent doctrinal manuals, I can say that the manuals flow from theory and terminology. For example, how you define insurgency drives COIN doctrine.

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I beg to differ. I think the doctrine often drives the definitions. The very fact that you wanted to develop a "COIN Doctrine" instead of a broad guide to conduct of Irregular Warfare is symptomatic of that.

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Please elaborate on the defined set of legal, social, and organisational characteristics—that is the hard part.

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Not sure I understand the question. Define an irregular enemy? That depends on your define a regular.
Regular Forces are, trained, paid and organised as declared and defined instruments of state power - all others are irregular.

So for example, regular soldiers have pay books, ID papers etc, and thus even US Special Forces are very regular soldiers.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

An irregular opponent is one that is not part of a regular army. Regular armies have a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics, generally lacking in irregulars.

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Emphasis on "generally". Much of the weakness of your statement is in that single word.

Examples:
* East India Companies
* European 15th-17th century mercs.
* Japanese warrior monks.
* Boers

It's also difficult to use "irregular" in context of mixed opposition (VC/NVA, Mercs among soldiers in Iraq/AFG, Palestina campaign 1917).

By the way; what's a "regular" army and what not? That's another weak spot of your definition.
Some armies of the world include(d) militias and even partisans. The Russians would likely field many para-military, non-regular "army" troops in a future conflict (troops of ministry of interior, KGB successor troops, border patrol).
Germany gives combatant status to its border police (meant for WW3), while much of France's police is (para)military Gendarmerie. About 10% of the German Eastern front army in 1942-1945 were ex-Soviet troops ("Hilfswillige", people willing to help) who were employed with rudimentary markings and unarmed. They weren't officially subject to martial courts and such. Were these men irregulars?
What about Soviet Red Army troops who were overrun and turned to partisan warfare? Regulars or irregulars?

A 95% definition is no useful definition.


edit: I forgot to add Austrian-Hungarian border settlers, Russian Cossacks, letter of marque,

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I beg to differ. I think the doctrine often drives the definitions. The very fact that you wanted to develop a "COIN Doctrine" instead of a broad guide to conduct of Irregular Warfare is symptomatic of that.


Not sure I understand the question. Define an irregular enemy? That depends on your define a regular.
Regular Forces are, trained, paid and organised as declared and defined instruments of state power - all others are irregular.

So for example, regular soldiers have pay books, ID papers etc, and thus even US Special Forces are very regular soldiers.

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I personally wanted to write an IW JP and have advocated writing an Army IW FM, so please don't assume that I personally just leaped to writing a COIN JP. Developing or not developing a joint publication is not one individual author's choice, although they certainly can make recommendations. Irregular warfare is covered in higher JPs, although I personally think it needs more detail and development, and the joint community wanted IW to permeate all joint doctrine rather have reside in one pub, so it was decided not to develop an IW pub.

As far as the COIN manual goes, there was a gap in joint doctrine with respect to COIN and the Army therefore proposed that we develop a COIN JP. This proposal had to be consistent with policy and approved by the voting members (Services, Joint Staff J-7, ALSA, GCCs, and FCCs). In this case, the members voted unanimously to develop a COIN JP. There are similar considerations for FMs.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

A 95% definition is no useful definition.

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Well I strongly disagree. 95% is certainly good enough. No definition in warfare can be perfect. EG:
What is a Tank? CV-120? CVR-T?
Define a mortar, bearing in mind there are breach loading, rifled, direct fire mortar systems.

Some definitions of regular and irregular are going to be very context specific, so yes the context will provide a dimension so....

Examples:
* East India Companies - Regular in the context of whom they are contracted to, and used against
* European 15th-17th century mercs.- same as above
* Japanese warrior monks. - Serving the Emperor and fighting against whom?
* Boers - very definitely irregular.

Native Americans fighting Native Americans, is State v State Warfare or Nation v Nation. - context.

My definition is not to serve a general theory of war, but to provide the basis for teaching/discussion for Western/NATO armies in the early 21st century.

The Japanese warrior monks had "a defined set of legal, social and organisational characteristics".
Yet, they didn't serve a state, army, emperor or whatsoever. They were essentially sects that reached the proficiency and degree of organization of regular armies, albeit differently.

Your 95% definition doesn't tell for sure in any case whether a crowd is a regular or irregular force. Your exception ("generally lacking") is too unspecific.

I'd also take issue with the Native Americans example, but now we're down to splitting hairs....:D

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Originally Posted by Klugzilla

I personally wanted to write an IW JP and have advocated writing an Army IW FM,

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War is war. Participants may be regular or irregular or fall into any number of other catagories; but warfare is not definable in terms of a standard of regularity. For example, what is irregular war; and how is that different from any other form of war.

Major Bill Jakola

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Originally Posted by Bill Jakola

War is war. Participants may be regular or irregular or fall into any number of other catagories; but warfare is not definable in terms of a standard of regularity. For example, what is irregular war; and how is that different from any other form of war.

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War is War. Cannot argue with that. Welcome to the Dark Side of SWC! :wry:

I agree that you cannot have irregular War. - but I do think "Irregular Warfare" is a useful term, especially for training and force development.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

War is War. Cannot argue with that. Welcome to the Dark Side of SWC! :wry:

I agree that you cannot have irregular War. - but I do think "Irregular Warfare" is a useful term, especially for training and force development.

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No argument from me on that one.

One answer to that question can be found in the introduction to Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume I, March 1992----

"Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the Air Force. It is based on experience, our own and that of others. Doctrine is what we have learned about aerospace power and its application since the dawn of powered flight. While history does not provide specific formulas that can be applied without modification to present and future situations, it does provide the broad conceptual basis for our understanding of war, human nature, and aerospace power. Thus doctrine is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment rather than a set of rules to be followed blindly. It is the starting point for solving contemporary problems.

Doctrine is also a standard against which to measure our efforts. It describes our understanding of the best way to do the job---the world as it should be. Many factors can prevent us from acting in the best manner, but doctrine can guide our efforts, gauge our success, and illuminate our problems.

Doctrine should be alive---growing, evolving, and maturing. New experiences, reinterpretations of former experiences, advances in technology, changes in threats, and cultural change can all require alterations to parts of our doctrine even as other parts remain constant. If we allow our thinking about aerospace power to stagnate, our doctrine can become dogma.

This is an airman's doctrine---written by air power scholars for use by air power practitoners."

And there you have the essence of what doctrine can and should be. Tactics, techniques and procedures provide the details.

Why can't all the Services have an upper tier of doctrine manuals (brief not limited to an arbitrary 200 pages, and replete with quotes from leaders past and present, and historical vignettes to provide context for the application of doctrinal principles), and a lower tier of tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals?

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Originally Posted by Ursus horribilis toklat

And there you have the essence of what doctrine can and should be. Tactics, techniques and procedures provide the details.

Why can't all the Services have an upper tier of doctrine manuals (brief not limited to an arbitrary 200 pages, and replete with quotes from leaders past and present, and historical vignettes to provide context for the application of doctrinal principles), and a lower tier of tactics, techniques, and procedures manuals?

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To me, Doctrine is simply "That which is taught" - nothing else. Doctrine should be the teaching of an armed force. What that covers is very debatable, but I am firmly of the belief that a great deal of doctrine fails the primary test of "Why".

IMO, a lot of what some consider doctrine are really evidence free articles of faith, akin to religious teaching and not really based in an empirical reality that gives anyone any confidence as to it's use.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

To me, Doctrine is simply "That which is taught" - nothing else. Doctrine should be the teaching of an armed force. What that covers is very debatable, but I am firmly of the belief that a great deal of doctrine fails the primary test of "Why".

IMO, a lot of what some consider doctrine are really evidence free articles of faith, akin to religious teaching and not really based in an empirical reality that gives anyone any confidence as to it's use.

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William,

I agree with your understanding of doctrine; it is a simple yet useful definition. This Joint definition from JP 1, 20 March 2009, with change 1 is similar in highlighting the teaching aspect of docrine but goes a bit further as well:

"Joint doctrine promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best). Conducting joint operations generally involve 12 broad principles, collectively known as the “principles of joint operations”. These principles guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war."

Also, your opinion of doctrine unconnected to "empirical reality" seems right. Moreover, competing doctrinal sources, like Army, Navy, Air Force, and Joint organizations, tend to exist to support service specific or individual requirements that do not fit neatly into a coherent concept.
Therefore, individuals tend to use only that doctrine which seems to fit their particular mission. But this causes a potential for failure in multi-service missions where each force possesses a different doctrinal concept. Additionally, Joint doctrine is not a complete solution because, like all compromises, it incorporates only the ideas that everyone agrees with, and leaves out those elements that defy resolution.

For example, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning from 26 December 2006, does not align with FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces; and the concept of effects based operations does not align well between Joint, Army, and Air Force doctrine.

Major Bill Jakola

Klugzilla noted earlier

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As I mentioned before, I too hate to see this happening; however, the actual appearance of quotes, vignettes, etc. does not necessarily mean that history does not underpin doctrine. That train has left the station". Also, we have yet to settle on a format for the ATTP, which is where vignettes may have the most impact. I think this ties into the Bob's World post."

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Its not to late. The train hasn't gathered much speed yet. I think that historical underpinnings ought to be part and parcel of each published Service doctrinal manual, and that these underpinnings, whether in-text references or separate quotes and vignettes, should be extensively footnoted and/or source-note referenced. Peer review/audit ought to be an integral part of the coordination process (required not just requested) for draft manuals prior to their publication and public release.

I suggest COMISAF's guidance for COIN is a good example of tight writing and appropriate use of vignettes to drive home a point. Alarmingly the current trend in draft revisions of Army doctrinal manuals is not to include such vignettes (see the posts on Army Doctrine Reengineering on the TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference thread). As you well know by now I think this is a mistake. In writing doctrine we should follow GEN McC's lead rather than sacrificing the inclusion of any historical perspective in doctrinal manuals on the altar of brevity (as we are apparently about to do).

The problem isn't the manuals or what is contained in them.
The problem is an officer corps that sees no reason to read professionally beyond what the immediate problem is.

We have lots of careerists, but professionals are hard to come by.