Déjà Vu in Iraq

14 June The American Prospect commentary - Déjà Vu in Iraq - What the Israelis Can Teach Us About the Death of al-Zarqawi by Matthew Yglesias.

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... The Israelis know a lot about the tactical and operational aspects of counterterrorism. They’re quite good at it. This stuff has been a matter of life and death for Israeli citizens for decades and their security and intelligence forces are very expert at it.

They’ve gotten so expert at it because, as Jean-Lopez implies, they’ve had the opportunity to try different things out “time and time again” over the years to see what works. The clear moral of that story, however, is that nothing works especially well. Better tactics, better operational counterterrorism, doesn’t alter the strategic situation -- the attacks keep on coming. What’s needed to end the war isn’t better tactics, but an end to the war, a political settlement of the issues in dispute.

The fly in the ointment, of course, is that a political settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is hard to find, which is a big part of the reason the Israelis have had occasion to learn lessons in operational counterterrorism. Time and again. And again.

Iraq is much the same. Zarqawi’s a bad man, a very bad man, and in an abstract sense his death surely serves the cause of justice. But an inability to kill or capture insurgents and their leaders has never been the problem in Iraq. We killed Uday and Qusay Hussein. We captured Saddam Hussein. We've killed Zarqawi’s lieutenants. We've killed his foot soldiers. Our military is good -- very good -- at killing the guys it’s supposed to kill. We’ve proven that we can do it. Time and again. And we can keep proving it for as long as America’s political leaders insist on proving it. Time and again. But it won’t produce better results than anything we’ve seen so far. Victory will always be six months away as operational successes fail to secure tactical gains...

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False analogy. Deposing Saddam Hussein, and then working hand in hand with the Iraqis to set up a functioning new government with effective security and law enforcement entities, not to mention the massive expenditure on rebuilding the country, has absolutely no relation to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory and the vast and complex issues that have ensued since '67.

They may not seem comparable in reality but the appearance is similar and they may be enough. The Palestinians see the Israelis as occupying land that belongs to them, further complicated by matters of religious differences, therefore the Palestinians fight against them for reasons of nationalistic/religious identity. In Iraq the insurgency is fed by nationalistic/religious reasons. While the reality in Iraq maybe different the appearance to many of the insurgents is that it is the same; they see the US as occupiers (like Israel) and the government we are working to stand up as being a puppet with no legitimacy.

Reality is nice but it is no match for appearance

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Originally Posted by Stu-6

They may not seem comparable in reality but the appearance is similar and they may be enough. The Palestinians see the Israelis as occupying land that belongs to them, further complicated by matters of religious differences, therefore the Palestinians fight against them for reasons of nationalistic/religious identity. In Iraq the insurgency is fed by nationalistic/religious reasons. While the reality in Iraq maybe different the appearance to many of the insurgents is that it is the same; they see the US as occupiers (like Israel) and the government we are working to stand up as being a puppet with no legitimacy.

Reality is nice but it is no match for appearance

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Unfortunately, that (mis)perception is commonly held throughout much of the world. Your statement is a reflection of that, and of the failure of the strategic IO campaign (what little there is of such a thing). However, and most importantly, that is not the perception of the vast majority of Iraqis - where the battle is actually being fought.

That is the significant difference between Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 100% of the Palestinians see the Israelis as occupiers of their land - varying in degrees from willing to accept a two-state solution to the extremists who refuse to accept the continued existence of Israel. In Iraq, the view of the US as a hostile foreign occupier is limited to a sectarian minority of the population.

We are not fighting a broad-based nationalist insurgency in Iraq. It is limited in area (although incidents do occur outside that area, they are infrequent) and the enemy we face is primarily a disparate variety of Sunni Arab militant organizations. Of course, they do like to characterize themselves as fighting a nationalist battle against the foreign occupier. However, that characterization also includes themes of the Sunni Arabs being the only legitimate rulers of Iraq and heirs to all of Iraq's former glories. Needless to say, the Shi'a, Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians do not take kindly to this. The latter, although they certainly would like to end the coalition presence as soon as feasible (with the exception of the Kurds) recognize and accept that they need our assistance in order to keep their country from the Abyss.

It is the exclusionary message of the Sunni Arab insurgency, coupled with targeted attacks upon the Shi'a, that has significantly exacerbated sectarian violence over the past year. This has also made it more difficult to bring sectarian militias under control, and to effectively integrate the nascent Iraqi armed forces, among a host of other stabilization issues that require the various groups to work together for effective implementation.

Effective methods of addressing the insurgency in its proper context, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, differ significantly from the Israeli-Palestinian case. There are no useful lessons to be learned from the Israelis in their dealings with the Palestinians, except along the lines of "this is what we should not do"...

Agree, Jed. The Iraq problem is much more complex that that faced by the Israelis, if for no other reason than the huge number of "players" in Iraq.

While the Iraqis may not be unified in overall goal this does not mean that there isn’t a wide based nationalist opposition to coalition forces. While there may appear to be support of foreign troops by large segments of the Shiite population this is at best an alliance of convenience; as long their community leaders see the coalition as useful for their goals they will limited the attacks that occur in their areas, this of course doesn’t mean they don’t attack coalition troops elsewhere. When/If these supposedly supportive elements begin to see foreign troops as a hindrance they will quickly turn on them. . .and they too will characterize themselves as fighting a nationalist battle against the foreign occupier

How do we analyze Shiite violence vis a vis the British troops in Southern Iraq? Are they merely criminals and power seeking warlords or is there a strong element of nationalism involved.

It's telling that the Shiite and Kurdish elements aren't one hundred percent united. Look at the difficulty in keeping the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigades under control - and the level of violence they can bring down.

While the Iraqis may not be unified in overall goal this does not mean that there isn’t a wide based nationalist opposition to coalition forces.
There isn't. Go and travel around the country and see for yourself.

While there may appear to be support of foreign troops by large segments of the Shiite population this is at best an alliance of convenience; as long their community leaders see the coalition as useful for their goals they will limited the attacks that occur in their areas, this of course doesn’t mean they don’t attack coalition troops elsewhere.
Of course the Shi'a see us as coveniently preventing a slide into anarchy and as a continued support to their rise to power in relation to their numbers. "Useful for their goals" means just about the same as it does to us - until Iraq stabilizes enough that the Iraqi government, military and security forces can be effectively self-sustaining. Do not mistake the actions of the militias to reflect the attitudes of the majority.

When/If these supposedly supportive elements begin to see foreign troops as a hindrance they will quickly turn on them. . .and they too will characterize themselves as fighting a nationalist battle against the foreign occupier.
My, my aren't we gloom and doom. Of course, you're just referring again to the Shi'a here. Ultimately, I don't believe the Iraqis (with the exception of the Kurds) will accept an American presence once the insurgency has been put down to a point where the security situation is stable, effective governance is in place and the people, in general feel secure.

You can be sure that there will be open and loud official demands for our withdrawal if we seem to be hanging on. But, given the political climate in the US, that scenario seems unlikely. It is more probable that we will begin our final withdrawal before we've truly acheived our objectives, and before the Iraqi government feels really comfortable in their new shoes.

Well I never said I wasn’t all gloom and doom . . . but maybe there is a reason for my pessimism.

No I am talk exclusively of the Shiites, the Kurds are the most nationalist population in Iraq and they will look for a way to show us the door (albeit possibly more gently) as soon as we are in their way.

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Originally Posted by Stu-6

No I am talk exclusively of the Shiites, the Kurds are the most nationalist population in Iraq and they will look for a way to show us the door (albeit possibly more gently) as soon as we are in their way.

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The Kurds would love to have us establish a permanent base up in the North. They look at that option as a security guarantee against their aggressive neighbor to the north, and, to a lesser extent, Iran - both of whom are not very happy about the Kurds' near-independence. Kurdish leaders, although they are enjoying a great degree of both autonomy and prosperity right now, are concerned about the impact upon both once the coalition calls it quits and the US departs.

As long as we are guarantying their autonomy the Kurds will be supportive of our presence there, if we are seen as being supportive of a more unified Iraq then that support will start to evaporate.

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Originally Posted by Stu-6

As long as we are guarantying their autonomy the Kurds will be supportive of our presence there, if we are seen as being supportive of a more unified Iraq then that support will start to evaporate.

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We have thus far supported most of the Kurds efforts towards autonomy within the new Iraqi government. It is the Shi'a who have felt the brunt of U.S. political pressure. A bit to accept a greater degree of Kurdish autonomy, but a lot more to accept a real Sunni voice in government. The one real political issue we've had with the Kurds is the matter of Kirkuk.

Anyway, it is highly unlikely that we would establish a permanent presence in the north and then follow up by dropping support for Kurdish autonomy. The opposite is true - if we do establish a permanent presence in the Kurdish north, that is de-facto support of their autonomy. I've already stated that I do not believe the Shi'a or the Sunni Arab population of Iraq will want us in-country longer than necessary to develop an acceptable degree of stability.

Establishing a permanent presence in the north at the invitation of the Kurds, when the rest of Iraq has decided they want us to head home would not exactly help strengthen the unity of Iraq. And it would also have a significant negative impact upon our relations with Turkey.

If you mind me making my first post around here a mild rip at good ol' Matt, I'd recommend you stop reading. :)

I tend to contextualize things a bit. I put articles like this into the authors larger message, I look at whatever agenda he or his affiliated movements might have, and I try to answer what's really going on. In other words, I don't have Stu or Jed's ability to look at those nuances of the conflict, but I can present an angle on where this is coming from.

Look, I've been hanging around the blogging world long enough to tell you one thing: Left leaning elite bloggers are so heavily invested in defeat at this point, it doesn't surprise me that Yglesias would draw a comparison between an unwinnable perma-conflict such Israel V. Palestine and Iraq.

In fact, it's their only option at this point. Time and time again, we hear from individuals such as Yglesias or Moutisas (over at DailyKOS) and they're going to tell you that Iraq is Vietnam. That is there message. Vietnam is wildely considered to be a complete loss, a 'quagmire', a war that should never have been. They make the comparison between Iraq and Vietnam to swing the opinion that Iraq is already a complete loss, a 'quagmire', and a war that should never have been.

They're even trying the same old playbook. What was once My Lai is now called Haditha. But with the Haditha story quickly falling apart and looking less and less likely to be what the Yglesias crowd wants it to be, a new angle is required. A new conflict of futility to compare Iraq to.

What Yglesias (and several other left leaning bloggers) have found is that a historic comparison to other conflicts is an ineffective way of delivering a message about a current conflict. Sure it works as a great one liner and makes a great Tshirt slogan, but it couldn't possibly stand up to scrutiny by an individual who either lived through the war, participated in the war, and/or has reasonable historic understanding of the war. Hell I don't even think somebody who watches the history channel twice a week is going to seriously call 'positive' on the Iraq/Vietnam analogy.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Agree, Jed. The Iraq problem is much more complex that that faced by the Israelis, if for no other reason than the huge number of "players" in Iraq.

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More complicated than a situation that includes: the PLFP, PIJ, Hamas, Hizbollah, Al-Aqsa Brigades, conservative Jewish settlers, Kahanists, the Syrians, Iranians, Egyptians, Jordanians, the UN, and a powerful American Jewish lobby?

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Originally Posted by Jedburgh

We have thus far supported most of the Kurds efforts towards autonomy within the new Iraqi government. It is the Shi'a who have felt the brunt of U.S. political pressure. A bit to accept a greater degree of Kurdish autonomy, but a lot more to accept a real Sunni voice in government. The one real political issue we've had with the Kurds is the matter of Kirkuk.

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According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Kirkuk issue is to be settled by Dec 31, 2007. Which means the Kurds have plenty of time to "ethnical cleanse" the area to ensure electoral victory. AH - democracy in action!

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Originally Posted by Strickland

More complicated than a situation that includes: the PLFP, PIJ, Hamas, Hizbollah, Al-Aqsa Brigades, conservative Jewish settlers, Kahanists, the Syrians, Iranians, Egyptians, Jordanians, the UN, and a powerful American Jewish lobby?

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I don't believe that I stated that Iraq was "more complex" than the Israeli-Palestinian issue. I was trying to make the point that it is very different, and that workable solutions to either cannot be transplanted to the other.

The only element in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is less complex than Iraq is the basic viewpoint of the Palestinians of the Israeli occupation. As I stated, 100% of them view Israel as an illegal occupier of Palestinian lands. The manner in which the numerous factions act on that point of view, and attempts to resolve it, is incredibly complex.

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Originally Posted by Strickland

According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Kirkuk issue is to be settled by Dec 31, 2007. Which means the Kurds have plenty of time to "ethnical cleanse" the area to ensure electoral victory. AH - democracy in action!

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Kirkuk is the primary problem in that regard. Saddam exerted a great deal of effort to change the demographics of that area. The Kurds, in their eagerness to reverse that in their own future political interests, have not only failed to encourage Turkmen and Assyrian families to return, but have actively worked to discourage those remaining to leave in favor of a greater Kurdish presence. Only pressure from the US and Turkey has succeeded in keeping this process from getting out of hand.

Background:

Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq (HRW - Aug 04)

Iraq: Forcible Expulsion of Ethnic Minorities (HRW - Mar 03)