Adapting Equipment to the Reality of the Battlefield

In small wars and insurgencies, shock is achieved not through firepower and mass movement, but through surprise and pinpoint accuracy. As mass movement continues to dominate the operational and minor tactical thinking of Western defence staffs, success against insurgents is far from being within our reach.

In my opinion, the requirement for pinpoint accuracy - usually at ranges beyond 700 yards - vs. firepower, casts serious doubt on the value of assault rifles. Although designed to be as accurate as a rifle while providing the firepower of a light machine gun, they are only efficient against an adjacent, relatively fixed enemy; and insurgents are anything but. The assault rifle is ideal for HIC. But weapons have to be adapted to the reality of the battlefield.

The U.S. M21 Sniper System seems perfectly suited as a counter-insurgency, shoot and scoot, weapon. Of course, the generalization of the employment of what has previously been a specialized weapon, requires not only marksmanship, but also radical operational and tactical changes. The M21 is useless as a replacement for the assault rifle unless we gain the initiative against insurgents. And ambushing the ambushers is far from being an easy task.

Trust me, there are times when having that M240 7.62mm belt fed is more then just nice! Not always, but the last thing you want to be here is outgunned, and PKCs are routinely part of AIF kit. As fo rthe M4 and AK, same thing. If I could get a nice package of 7.62 or maybe even something slightly smaller fit into a rifle as good as the M4, I'd be on it like stink on a monkey. Lots of close fights here. Sniper rifles are a good part of the kit that rounds it out, but even our snipers are shooting around the 300 mark allot. Put a 4X32 ACOG on a M4 and you have a nice COIN rifle. A typical OPAL carrying 3-4 AIF will have an AK-47, a PKC (med MG), a RPK (think LMG or SAW), and a RPG launcher w/2-3 rockets. Call it an AIF Fire Team.

Well, both American and Canadian troops are, in increasing numbers, using more compact assault rifles (and you mention the short-barreled - and thus less accurate at longer ranges - M4 (US)/Diemaco C8 (CAN) assault carbine). Although easier to use in confined spaces, and thus ideally suited for urban terrain, the assault carbines are not as accurate as other assault rifles.

In Europe and Israel we see a different trend. The design of new assault rifles recognizes the need for accuracy via the almost universal adoption of the bullpup firearm configuration (see the TAR-21). By placing the mechanism and the magazine behind the trigger, close to the shoulder, trajectory and accuracy are greatly improved. The bullpup system has been pioneered in the 1970s by the Austrian Steyr AUG (arguably the best performing – and the most expensive – assault rifle in the world) and by the French FAMAS.

I couldn't help noticing in Rob Thornton's post that even the insurgents have to use combined arms. If the fundamentals don't change in Iraq, they don't change anywhere. . . .

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Originally Posted by Jones_RE

I couldn't help noticing in Rob Thornton's post that even the insurgents have to use combined arms. If the fundamentals don't change in Iraq, they don't change anywhere. . . .

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See this thread for some discussion along these lines. I'm a CW convert (was all along, but hadn't seen that name before...).

When I was at SOI, all our instructors were Iraq veterans. They mostly were big M4 believers and told us that we would probably never get into a gunfight beyond 100 meters in Iraq, and maybe not even over 50m.

Other bullpup adopting countries include Australia with the AUG, the Brits of course with their troubled L85A1/SA80, the Singaporeans, and even the Iranians and Chinese.

The most exhaustive book I've read on the tactics of Iraqi guerrilla is Militant Tricks, Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent written by John Poole...

Rob, I'm not familiar with some of the acronyms you're using: OPAL (that's either an insurgent vehicle or the Online Programming for All Libraries, AIF (could be the Adult Interactive Fiction Association or a motley crew of insurgents with different religious and ethnic backgrounds?) :confused:

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Originally Posted by tequila

When I was at SOI, all our instructors were Iraq veterans. They mostly were big M4 believers and told us that we would probably never get into a gunfight beyond 100 meters in Iraq, and maybe not even over 50m.

Other bullpup adopting countries include Australia with the AUG, the Brits of course with their troubled L85A1/SA80, the Singaporeans, and even the Iranians and Chinese.

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Why do you think they never got into a gunfight beyond 50-100 meters?

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The most exhaustive book I've read on the tactics of Iraqi guerrilla is Militant Tricks, Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent written by John Poole...

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Poole's book is heavy on Hizballah and extrapolates from there; most of what I have seen does not translate to Iraq but better fits Taliban in Afghanistan, That said, the book is again Hizballah-centric.


You can see my and others review of it on SWJ at http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=Poole

Best
Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

Poole's book is heavy on Hizballah and extrapolates from there; most of what I have seen does not translate to Iraq but better fits Taliban in Afghanistan, That said, the book is again Hizballah-centric.


You can see my and others review of it on SWJ at http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ighlight=Poole

Best
Tom

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Tom, you might be confusing Militant Tricks with Tactics of the Crescent Moon: different books, different content.

My assumption is that the insurgents want to engage as close-in as possible to mitigate our units support from Arty or Air assets. Plus, the closer you are the less the advantage goes to the better trained marksmen. At least in the U.S., our law enforcement gunfight survival stats sky rocket the farther the engagement distance. A lucky shot from a rusty .38 will kill you just as dead as one from well maintained Sig. They are probably trying to get in close for short engagements and then breaking off before any reaction forces can intervene.

"Grabbing the belt" was the term used for this technique in Vietnam (if not sooner). It's very common with just about any adversary facing US firepower.

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Originally Posted by bismark17

My assumption is that the insurgents want to engage as close-in as possible to mitigate our units support from Arty or Air assets. Plus, the closer you are the less the advantage goes to the better trained marksmen. At least in the U.S., our law enforcement gunfight survival stats sky rocket the farther the engagement distance. A lucky shot from a rusty .38 will kill you just as dead as one from well maintained Sig. They are probably trying to get in close for short engagements and then breaking off before any reaction forces can intervene.

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You're bang on, Bismarck. And if I may link your reply to my previous posts, let me just say (or rather write) that by adapting our equipment to their tactics, we're playing right into their hands.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

"Grabbing the belt" was the term used for this technique in Vietnam (if not sooner). It's very common with just about any adversary facing US firepower.

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With the risk of annoying Tom :D, I have to mention Poole again: I believe he wrote extensively about the technique in Phantom Soldier, the Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower...

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

"Grabbing the belt" was the term used for this technique in Vietnam (if not sooner). It's very common with just about any adversary facing US firepower.

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... used "hugging" techniques to negate Russian conventional capabilities.

Tim Thomas - Summer 1999 editon of Parameters:

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Russian forces tried to counter Chechen ambush tactics by using a technique called "baiting," in which they would send out contact teams to find Chechen ambushes. In turn, the Chechens used a technique called "hugging," getting very close to Russian forces. This technique eliminated the Russian use of artillery in many cases, and it exposed baiting tactics.

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Originally Posted by Monte Cristo

With the risk of annoying Tom :D, I have to mention Poole again: I believe he wrote extensively about the technique in Phantom Soldier, the Enemy's Answer to U.S. Firepower...

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And Poole's commentary was nothing new. Infantry magazine, for one, had been writing about it during the mid-1960s, and I've also seen it mentioned in literature concerning both the Pacific Theater in WW2 (although not with that name) and Korea.

It's actually a very old concept that over the decades and centuries has been refined into what you see today.

One of Poole's strengths (and weaknesses) is that he's a great synthesizer and compiler of writing that exists in a wide variety of sources. If you don't know all the background, it's at times easy to mistake some of his compiled stuff for original work. Doesn't lessen his value at all, but it's something to be aware of when looking at his more recent stuff.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

One of Poole's strengths (and weaknesses) is that he's a great synthesizer and compiler of writing that exists in a wide variety of sources.

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I think that's called research...a common practice in the academic world.

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Originally Posted by Monte Cristo

I think that's called research...a common practice in the academic world.

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No, that's not called research. What he does is compile information. There is a difference between the two. Research is used to support, draw, or validate an original conclusion. What Poole tends to do is present the research in raw form, which when published is typically called compiling.

As I said before, there's nothing wrong with what he does. It's just important to understand what it is and what it is not. He provides great training aids and sources of information that might otherwise be missed.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

No, that's not called research. What he does is compile information. There is a difference between the two. Research is used to support, draw, or validate an original conclusion. What Poole tends to do is present the research in raw form, which when published is typically called compiling.

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Steve, are you trying to lure me into the semantic maze of circular logic?:p

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Originally Posted by Monte Cristo

Steve, are you trying to lure me into the semantic maze of circular logic?:p

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Not at all. I just have an odd thing about being precise with terms like that. A bit of an academic hang-up, I'm afraid.:)

MC,

Opal is just a type of car used by AIF allot because its so common here. As for the M4, its good for AT&T long distance calls as well with the right optics, and increasingly US troops are showing up with better optics. Having been a Marine before I became an Army Infanty Officer, I've spent lots of time at the range. You can get out quite a ways with an M4, put an ACOG or some other scope on it and so much the better - I like my ACOG with tritium because I have a thing against batteries and it has a quick reflex back up Iron on the top. 300m with irons is definetly in the doable, with a 4x32 4-500 is pretty easy, some of these units are spending the dough on their SDMs (the right call) and investing in top of the line ACOGs - better then 4x32s, but pricey. Like I said, the only thing I'd put on a Christmas list would be a slightly more serious caliber, but that's personal pref. In reality there are a number of reasons we'll probably keep 5.56 such as the cost of retooling, training, etc,. in the end the 5.56 will do the job just fine.

AIF like ambushes and urban terrain often facillitates that. an Ambush does not require the type of coordination an attack does, and allows for use of IEDs, etc to initiate with. It also keeps AIF from being PID'd until the last possible moment. Its more of a question of them acknowledging their capabilities and limitations then trying to downplay ours I think, although if you want to lump the fact that they know what routes we have to clear (common knowledge by any Iraqi at this point) - you can chalk that up to vulnerabilites.

3 issues I'd like to address, here. First, Monte Cristo, the reason why we are FORCED to engage the enemy in Iraq at close range, is that they use the terrain they have to FORCE us to go in after them at close range. If we "stand off" and snipe them, we become the Air Force, just killing everything that looks suspicious.

Second, none of the semi-auto precision rifle options are good ones. Both the M-21/25 and SR-25 systems have functional issues. While you may find the odd one that works well and accurately on the target line, they are difficult to maintain in the field with stoppages and failure to feed. Bottom line: You can have functionality or you can have accuracy, but you must choose.

Third, bullpups are fatally flawed. Their ergonomics are Not Good(tm). Combat magazine changes are crucial to the CQB fight, and while the top-loading magazine bullpups have good ergo, they require an overly complicated and fragile action. And the bottom-loading ones are hard to change, compared to the M4. Also, the only way left-handed firers can shoot bullpups is to teach right-handed firing, eject through the bottom, which has significant problems, or introduce a fragile and complex system for changing which side they eject from.

There is a certain amount of parallax which is built in to the basic bull pup design over and above the M4 type. The higher you make the sight, and the closer to the muzzle the sight it, the more you have to compensate for parallax, which confines your combat range.

I am continually getting in peeing matches with folks who argue "bullpup uber alles", but generally speaking, they do not understand the role that basic ergonomics plays in infantry combat, nor do they understand parallax.

I don't think small arms are that relevant to the Small Wars issue, anyway. While equipment shortcomings and PERCEIVED shortcomings can become part of the I/O battle (And, obtw, Russia, Iran and China are fighting an I/O battle over military equipment right now against the west) I think it matters not what your soldiers are equipped with, it is how they use it.

It wouldn't take any training to cross over since it is an AR platform

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Originally Posted by 120mm

3 issues I'd like to address, here. First, Monte Cristo, the reason why we are FORCED to engage the enemy in Iraq at close range, is that they use the terrain they have to FORCE us to go in after them at close range. If we "stand off" and snipe them, we become the Air Force, just killing everything that looks suspicious.

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Well, first of all, I would like to formally thank you for the rhetorical spanking. It felt great! Plus, I really needed that! Seriously though, I suggest you save your misplaced aggressiveness for more worthy causes.

The enemy doesn't compel you to do anything. You make your own decisions….bad decisions if you’re unable to control your emotional impulses. When the nature of the mission or the lack of tactical foresight exposes you to hostile fire or ambushes, following your enemy might lead you into a trap. You might want to reflect on that. The best soldiers are those that manage to find a balance between too much and too little aggressiveness.

I feel that the substance of my threat has been lost.

Back to you, Bill.

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Originally Posted by Monte Cristo

Well, first of all, I would like to formally thank you for the rhetorical spanking. It felt great! Plus, I really needed that! Seriously though, I suggest you save your misplaced aggressiveness for more worthy causes.

The enemy doesn't compel you to do anything. You make your own decisions….bad decisions if you’re unable to control your emotional impulses. When the nature of the mission or the lack of tactical foresight exposes you to hostile fire or ambushes, following your enemy might lead you into a trap. You might want to reflect on that. The best soldiers are those that manage to find a balance between too much and too little aggressiveness.

I feel that the substance of my threat has been lost.

Back to you, Bill.

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You do not always have to follow the enemy to be exposed to close-in attacks. The basic mission of population security does that for you. To provide that security, you HAVE to be out there with them. That exposes you to IEDs and ambushes. Nature of the beast, not bad decisions or over-aggressiveness.

Back to 120mm...I agree about the bullpups. Quick reload is a major concern, and too many non-shooters just don't understand parallax or the role that reasonably precise shooting plays in the real world. Just because your bullpup does well in Counterstrike doesn't mean it will work well out in the field.:cool:

Counterstrike? Is that a flick or something?

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Originally Posted by Monte Cristo

Counterstrike? Is that a flick or something?

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First person shooter. You'd be amazed how many people get their ideas about how weapons work from computer games. This of course ain't how they really work.

Rob: The 5.56 versus 7.62 debate has been around for ages. Usually it's been spun as rate of fire and weight of ammo as opposed to penetration ability. 7.62 has greater penetration power, but you can carry more 5.56 and weapons that use it tend to have a higher rate of fire (at least until the 3-round burst feature came into use). I suspect the debate will always be with us.:)

If you wanna debate console games, you should wait for 120 mm to get online.

I'm afraid that my experince with bullpups is limited to live-fire range exercises.

No debate on console games. Just pointing out that perception does not always equal reality when it comes to equipment and the situation in the field. 120mm makes very valid points in his post about the capabilities of weapon systems, and as someone who's using the gear today, Rob's points should be considered carefully as well. Using a weapon in range exercises isn't the same thing as using it when you're under fire in a dirty environment.

This whole thing brings to mind one lesson that every army seems to have to relearn with EVERY conflict: that of combat load for infantry personnel. Back around 1870 or so a group of German medical students determined that the most an infantryman could be expected to carry without degrading his endurance and performance was around 40 pounds. But every conflict we've been in since that time this lesson always surfaces as something new. Sort of like "you need more water when operating in a desert or jungle environment." Who knew?:eek:

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Using a weapon in range exercises isn't the same thing as using it when you're under fire in a dirty environment.

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So, in your opinion, training on range is pretty much useless...And what exactly is a "dirty" environment?:confused:

Now who's trying circular logic?:)

I did not say range training is useless. I'm not sure how you came to that conclusion. What I said is that it is NOT the same thing as using a weapon in a combat environment when someone's shooting back at you, you're under stress, carrying a full combat load, tired, and scared. And combat zones tend to be dirty. Your weapon may have been dropped, rained on, or otherwise rendered less than pristine. It won't behave the same as it does on the range.

I wish we could continue this fascinating conversation, but unfortunately I have to leave, and I probably won't be anywhere near a computer with an Internet connection for a while. I wish you guys all the best. Keep it up and keep it civil!

Best comment I've seen yet is 120's. What ever you have - train with it! A piece of advice that every small unit trainer should live.

Steve, your right about the argument - when it comes down to it the 5.56 is a fine caliber for what its designed for.

M.C. as far as emotions go, everybody goes to work here with a different feel on any given day, sometimes you go a certain route at a certain time becasuse somebody says you have to go that way for one reason or another. Sometimes you are the bug and sometimes your the windshield - being the bug is no fun. What is fun is showing the bad guy one thing, but giving him something else.

I'm pretty sure the usefulness of this thread is exhausted.

Regards, Rob

I once had the chance to take an Estonian Infantry NCO and his boss (an 0-6) to Maryland on an OTT. Maryland is Estonia's Partner State and still is today.

Once at Aberdeen they were offered to try various weapons on the range and at the end of the day, both seemed to favor the M-14 over any other weapon. After several rounds we headed to a local watering hole to discuss the day's events and a little history about long rifles.

Turns out, one of the NCO's distant relatives was part of an Estonia sniper unit trained by the Germans in the early 1900s. The unit then and today is know as the Kuperjanov Single Infantry Battalion. Formed as a partisan troop in 1918 by 1LT Julius Kuperjanov, their enemies (the Russians) referred to them as a death squad, and rightfully so. Kuperjanov's men were responsible for more Russian officer casualties than that of 25 years of war.

Also known as Forest Brothers and lacking sufficient ammo to sustain a long firefight, they would simply wait hiden in a dense growth of trees for an adorn officer and use a single 7mm round (per officer).

On 06 JAN 1919 and so proud of her husband's success, Alice Kuperjanov embroidered the battalion's first sleeve patch. Skull and crossbones with a black background and gold border.

The Kuperjanov battalion still wears this patch today, but now use US-donated M14s and continue to practice the one-round rule.

Regards, Stan