Hello all,
Check and have a look if BGEN McMaster is going. He is the Concept Dev Cav guy at ACIC, and he is a straight shooter and has a lot to say about operational design and Human COG.
Cheers,
Rach
Printable View
Hello all,
Check and have a look if BGEN McMaster is going. He is the Concept Dev Cav guy at ACIC, and he is a straight shooter and has a lot to say about operational design and Human COG.
Cheers,
Rach
Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
- What is "Operational Design"
- What is "Human COG?"
Thanks.
In this context, operational design is decribed by McMaster to be a "creative approach" to solving challenges in planning for operations. Rather than following a checklist of items to match with the conditions on the ground and targeting tactics to support those criteria, McMaster talks about focusing on a problem statement, one that is centered around a human/population problem, and planning your solution around resolving the human/population problem. It's a very simplistic explanation, but McMaster, if he attends, will probably discuss this in detail, and I'm sure he has written in Parameters or other journals on that topic....
Human COG refers to center of gravity, meaning that the environment and subsequent effects are dependant on the psychology or actions/behaviors of targeted humans (the capacity to execute is dependant on this core). See Nash, Nagl, Gurney, Vego, or Gavrilis for further authorship on this subject.
Cheers,
Rach
(HOOAH)
Let me guess. JP-3.0?Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
I'm not sure I get this. A COG is "The most effective target for a blow," - IMO, the JP-3.0 definition never says this, so basically misses the point.Quote:
Human COG refers to center of gravity, meaning that the environment and subsequent effects are dependant on the psychology or actions/behaviors of targeted humans (the capacity to execute is dependant on this core).
So, if you are saying kill or capture the right people, then I can go along with that.
If it doesn't then I'm getting pretty sceptical.
Hi William,
When working on counterinsurgency definition with the Pentagon, we were looking at various thought leaders in preparing 3.24.2 (December 2006 revision). The idea with Human COG is to redefine the term to understanding the motivators and drivers of humans in the OE, and then understanding that those motivators (and human actors obviously) are what drive battlefield changes, whether of kinetic or non-kinetic effect. This is not a new idea, and has been floating around for some time now, and used in discussion amongst TRADOC, overall force transformation folks.
Please PM me if you want to talk about this further.
Cheers,
Rach
(HOOAH)
Here's how we're defining "design" in the new FM 5-0 draft chapter 3:
"Planning consists of two separate, but closely related components: a conceptual component, represented by the cognitive application of design, and a detailed component, which introduces specificity through a formal planning process, such as the military decision making process. During planning, these components overlap—no clear delineation exists between them. As commanders conceptualize the operation, their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Like planning, design is continuous—it evolves with increased understanding and drives the operations process. It underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing."
"Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex problems and develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. Design is a way of organizing conceptual work within an organization to assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment and to develop approaches to solving complex, ill-structured problems. Design occurs throughout the operations process before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment."
is an interesting term. So, HumanCOGRachel are you using that in the context of the Political Struggle, or in the context of the Military Struggle ?
And, in any event, how are they "targeted" - in your construct ?
I should suppose that "kill, capture or convert" would be three possible end states for the "targeted human" - which in CORDS-Phoenix ran about 1/3, 1/3 and 1/3 (the general term used was "neutralize").
Jack,
I just got off a conference call....have you looked into SAMS's COE project on OD?
JMM,
The targeted humans part simply meant as an identified group of persons, who range from non-involved to highly invested actors. Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) - See Bard O'Neill for further leadership on this issue...
PM me for more details....
Have a great day,
Rach
(Hooah!)
Oh, so that's creative thinking.Quote:
Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas.
I don't mean to be a jerk (though I often am anyway) but does this really need to be said? And if so, is this going to provide some epiphany to an otherwise un-creative thinker, or someone who is unable to recognize it? And even then, how is the institution going to be re-structured to encourage such "creative thinking" without just calling it "insubordinate"?
Check out what SAMS and TRADOC is doing to help push creative design. BGEN McMaster is a good POC on this - I'm sure he has some publications out. Check with NDU Press - I'm pretty sure he published an article recently on this subject.
Cheers,
Rach
(Hooah!)
about what I thought re: this:
1. So, backfilling with your other posted statements: Do a General Area Study with a detailed Operational Area Intelligence Study; followed by a continuing Area Assessment after insertion ?Quote:
from HCR
[1] The targeted humans part simply meant as an identified group of persons, who range from non-involved to highly invested actors. [2] Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) - [3] See Bard O'Neill for further leadership on this issue...
2. Gee, something like the attached - or, as well stated, in Dr. Zhivago:
3. Been there; done that.Quote:
Liberius: I could have you taken out and shot!
Razin, Liberius' Lieutenant: And could you have The Party taken out and shot? Understand this: as the military struggle draws to a close, the political struggle intensifies. In the hour of victory, the military will have served its purpose - and all men will be judged POLITICALLY - regardless of their military record! Meanwhile, there are still White units in this area - the Doctor stays.
[Haooh]
JMM, sounds like they are trying to do a 5 rings analysis. The Human COG's are usually found in Ring 1-Leadership targets, unless they saw some of my LE adaptions.
Rach - roger; much of the great SAMS work provided the foundation for the integration of design into FM 5-0. Working closely with SAMS on the development of the concept...(hooah!)Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
Well – there is a difference between the concepts of “innovation” and “adaptation” that is reinforced in design. Innovation involves taking a new approach to a familiar or known situation, whereas adaptation involves taking a known solution and modifying it to a particular situation. Both concepts are central tenets of design – and the concept of innovation is closely tied (in the doctrinal definitions) to creative thinking.Quote:
Originally Posted by IntelTrooper
This will require close dialog and collaboration – encouraging creative thought for innovative approaches to problems… which will require reinforcing the best practices of great staffs that encourage innovation and adaptation.
delusions of grandeur ....
Seriously, could be a 5-ring analysis; or simply a classification of the population from pro-HN to anti-HN, and everything in between (with whatever variations and branches you have time to make).Quote:
JMM, sounds like they are trying to do a 5 rings analysis. The Human COG's are usually found in Ring 1-Leadership targets, unless they saw some of my LE adaptions.
In any event, to do any of that you need to do something akin to the studies mentioned in my point #1 (General Area Study, etc.). Which, BTW, are 50 years old - from FM 31-21 (Apps III & IV; 1958, rev 1961), Guerrilla Warfare.
Might want to read the two Apps - not much new under the sun, except new buzzwords.
Yea them little blue pills are sumtin man:wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
How and why did the definition change?Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
The COG is something you strike. The JP3 definition is wrong, and less it explicitly makes that point or unless it wants to invent a new term.Quote:
The idea with Human COG is to redefine the term to understanding the motivators and drivers of humans in the OE, and then understanding that those motivators (and human actors obviously) are what drive battlefield changes, whether of kinetic or non-kinetic effect.
What I think you are saying is the HumanCOG is the motivation that cause people to act. Correct?
Does this mean, trying to understand what everyone wants?Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
So an insurgency is exactly the same as any other type of warfare.Quote:
Counterinsurgency assumes that insurgency involves political AND military struggles (two-pronged) -
So planning now takes longer and is a less well defined process? If design is really SOD by the back door, then planning is going to become more complex, less effective, take longer, and allow people not to be held accountable for poor decisions.Quote:
Originally Posted by Dr Jack
Well, let me address each element –
Well, actually the process is more defined – planning has two components: 1) a conceptual thinking component about how to address the problem (design) and 2) a detailed component that goes into the nuts and bolts (MDMP or JOPP). It won’t necessarily take more or less time – but the process is more defined with design.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
There certainly are components of SOD in design, but it’s not SOD (or EBO) sneaking in by the back door. Design actually gets to certain “outcomes” that are not evident in SOD, such as a problem statement, the initial commander’s intent (purpose and end state), the mission narrative, and planning guidance (that includes the operational approach).Quote:
If design is really SOD by the back door...
More complex? Perhaps, because design is normally applied for complex, ill-structured problems – but it’s still a commander-centric process – the commander is assisted by the staff (as always) but still accountable and responsible with design. The commander's decisions should be more effective if design is used properly – because the commander has stepped back, not relied solely on intuition, and considered the essence of his problem using design:Quote:
...planning is going to become more complex, less effective, take longer, and allow people not to be held accountable for poor decisions.
What’s really going on (what’s the problem?)… where do we want to take this situation (what are the desired future conditions?)… how do we bridge the gap between what we have now and what we want (what's the broad operational approach?)… who else needs to be involved in understanding of the problem (dialog and collaboration?)… and a willingness to step back periodically to assess the changes in the problem (reframing).
Design, in this context, is intended to provide a common sense methodology that good commanders have always used - and to provide tools to assist in the process of thinking about a problem before delving into the details.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but you plan the mission given to you. That mission should be expressed in clear simple and unambiguous terms. What's different about campaigns?Quote:
Originally Posted by Dr Jack
If what "Design" is trying to say is "let's give subordinates better missions" then OK, but I've never seen that said - especially in SOD. Does it actually mean, "Mission analysis" applied to the campaign level?
What "ill-structured" problems are the military faced with that are actually new? Does "ill structured" actually mean folks don't understand the problem?
If that's the case, why didn't someone just say "let's get better at planning." If it's someone that is common sense and commanders have always done, then it's a product of training and command experience. Separating the plan from the problem is nonsensical.Quote:
Design, in this context, is intended to provide a common sense methodology that good commanders have always used - and to provide tools to assist in the process of thinking about a problem before delving into the details.
George Orwell once wrote that one of the things a writer must ask is "Have I written anything unnecessarily ugly?"Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
I am not sure if you have, because I understand neither your prose or context.
Could you humour me( and maybe some of the other members) and explain what your point is, and why you are making it.
Thanks
Mark
PS I would prefer in without any postmodern expression.
PPS 'Hooah' means what as an emphasis for whatever point you were trying to make?
Mark,
Dr. Jack and W. Owen did a great job of explaining OD/OPP and human COG, as well as provide some historical context, so have a look above.
With regards to Hooah, I usually use it in an affectionate manner, when showing approval or excitement or gearing up to go do something fun. Hooah can also mean "yes" and a number of other different things. I just love my Army...
Be advised that Hooah in the US Army takes a different meaning than OORAAHH in the Marine Corps - they use it more specifically when given a task/mission and it is more of a response that the task is understood and let's go get 'em!
Cheers,
Rach
Well that's very kind, but I'm not sure I did. (Cannot speak for Dr. Jack)Quote:
Originally Posted by HumanCOGRachel
My extrapolation of what you said was that the "Human COG" was the primary cause or motivation, and that some effort is made to try and understand this. If so, then that is not a COG, as in "Centre of Gravity" unless TRADOC is arbitrarily inventing some new meaning that is different from that which Clausewitz intended.
As concerns "Operational Design," I remain a sceptic. It seems to have no clear and concise definition and like EBO seems to alter and morph when confronted by criticism. Manoeuvre Warfare may have been founded on ignorance, but it stayed consistent.
I think US military doctrine has botched the hell out of COG theory in an effort to over codify it. But I also find it counter intuitive that if the COG is the Enemy's "source of all stregth and power" why I would by necessity "strike" it, when in fact what I want to do is "Defeat", "Neutralize", "Co-opt" or in whatever way is appropriate (acceptable, suitable, feasible) render it ineffective.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Dr. Strange's work helped my think about this, but I could never fully get on board with his analysis either. It just didn't make sense to me to call something the COG's "Critical Capability" and then say it was something that the COG requirred. To me it was something the COG produced.
So to may way of thinking (makes sense to a mind educated in the Myrtle Creek public school system)
- A COG is like a factory that is the producer of the things the enemy must have to prevail
- Critical Capabilities are the things that factory produces. Targeting this output has little effect on the COG, but does reduce effectiveness. The importance of these things are what validates your assessment of what the COG is.
- Critical Requirements are those raw inputs to the COG that it must have to produce the Critical Capabilities. These are what must be disrupted to render the COG ineffective.
- Critical Vulnerabilities. THESE MUST BE A SUBSET OF YOUR CRITICAL CAPABILITIES. CVs are those CCs that are also vulnerable to attack. You can get at them with reasonable risk, and their disruption will produce your desired effect.
Anyway, I always think of attacking the COG like attacking an Enemy Strongpoint. Yes its important, but you don't want to attack it if you can defeat it in other ways. Find the CVs, and attack those.
Strike merely means the action that does harm.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Dr. Jack,
Sir, is your work to incorporate wicked/ill-defined/un-structured problems going to lead to a new version of MDMP, or are y'all simply providing guidelines for commanders on how to rethink or relook problems?
Mark O'neill / Wilf,
Some of this thread is confusing me, and I've spent two years studying this stuff. I'll try to explain it as best that I can. In the most simplest form, all these folks are trying to do is determine better ways of problem solving. That's it. In most circles, the main strategy to devise better answers is more defined and thorough problem definition.
Wicked, ill-defined, unstructured problems are big ones like global warming, terrorism, failed/failing states, etc....None of this is new, but some of the approaches are.
My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.
Out of all the literature, I best enjoyed Dr. James Adams' Conceptual Blockbusting: A Guide to Better Ideas. As Dean of Stanford Engineering back in the early 1970's, he became frustrated b/c his students were book smart but could not think creatively. So he wrote a book on how to think creatively. It's short, and provides cool tricks to entertain with at a pub.
v/r
Mike
Rachel,Quote:
See Nash, Nagl, Gurney, Vego, or Gavrilis for further authorship on this subject.....
I just got off a conference call....have you looked into SAMS's COE project on OD?
See Bard O'Neill for further leadership on this issue...
Check out what SAMS and TRADOC is doing to help push creative design. BGEN McMaster is a good POC on this - I'm sure he has some publications out. Check with NDU Press - I'm pretty sure he published an article recently on this subject....
Instead of just throwing out names and suggestions, please try to post actual links to the sources you are mentioning, or at least try to discuss them in a more substantive manner. People should not have to PM you for details about everything......
Mike, thanks for mentioning the huddle aka collaboration. As an academic, I've seen two ideal types (in the Weberian sense) of this. The first involves collecting people who are "like minded" and will reinforce the "correctness" of what you write, while the second is closer to Red Teaming (I suspect that in academia it derives from the old Advocatus Diaboli position).
Of the two, the first reinforces any perceptual pathologies that are present. In effect, this type of collaboration is worse than useless, it is destructive of creative thinking. The second type, when done properly, identifies holes in one's thinking and may or may not produce creative solutions. Some of the research on organization culture seems to indicate that there is a strong correlation between HR practices (especially rewards and punishments) and styles of collaboration. As a rough rule of thumb, the more clearly laid out HR policies are in terms of ordering (e.g. promotion and pay structures in a linear form), the greater likelihood that "collaboration" will tend towards the first type.
Part of this seems to centre around the organizational culture's formalization of "problems"; i.e. how they are defined, who "owns" them, how the must be approached, what may or may not be considered as a legitimate problem, etc.
Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?
Will this planning process - design - encourage such problem identification and increase the likelihood that such "problems" will be acted on?
Don't take the beating from the "old" guys to hard. They just get kinda tired of things which they have known forever and have assumed should have been common sense having to be approached in doctrine to fix what should have been happening from (training birth). So yes their right there is nothing new under the sun ;except for us(people). Each of us has developed our understanding of the world through the lens of our own experiences and training. For some reason throughout the years it seems that the realization that the primary analyst at any echelon is the CO (or at least should be IMHO) has gone awry. Thus those simple common sense up front requirements in order to facilitate a good analysis of the mission before even trying to apply MDMP has gone by the wayside.
In so far as the COG at least from where I have come to see it is that treating the populous as a Center of Gravity for operations leads one to ask the questions about that particular group which should point out the less apparent what not to do's. Having done that it becomes much easier to define both what the mission is and to gain at least acceptable expectations for how it should be approached by those assigned to it.
An example is that if you have looked at a group through the "targeting" lense of COG then not only have you given yourself more clarity about those with whom you will interact but you have also in the same stroke managed to "red team" the heck out of the enemies probable approaches in that arena that they must survive in.
As Mike noted it really is about how to plan but honestly it is even more about getting the whole orchestra on the same sheet of music and then keeping time. And the pub thing is pretty cool too;)
OK, I understand the idea of wicked problems, but how does that translate into the conduct of Operations?Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
So essentially, this is seeking the advice of others?Quote:
My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively. On the strategic level, a commander brings in regional and specialized experts to advice him on big decisions. GEN Patraeus's "Council of Colonels" is a great example of this.
On the strategic level I can think of many, many times this fails. People seeking advice are often merely seeking approval for their plan, so I'm not sure this is a step forward, or that this is part of the Planning or Estimate process.
Mike - design will complement formal / detailed planning processes, such as MDMP and JOPP - it certainly won't replace these systems. It also won't just look at "re-thinking" or reframing problems, but be the conceptual component that a commander does for detailed planning - that can take place before initiating MDMP/JOPP, during MDMP/JOPP, or doing execution of a mission.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
That is exactly why EBO was invented....you want to affect(cause) a target to change to something (effect). And how you do that may be kinetic or non-kinetic,lethal or non-lethal.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Attached is the 1944 version of the "Huddle" - 1/117-30ID. Mid-Nov 1944 planning session for Bn's attack on the "Paper Village" near Warden, Germany - after the Siegfried Breakthrough was successful. Guy with pointer is LTC Bob Frankland (retired as a MG), with his 5 company commanders.Quote:
from MikeF
My favorite is what I call the "Huddle." The Academics will call it "collaberation." On the tactical level, a leader simply brings all his team together and allows everyone to give their assesments and recommendations before he makes a decision. The huddle allows the leader to avoid forgetting something. Many leaders do this intuitively.
Looking at the apparent age of the captains, I'd have to agree with Ron that the people are some of the new things under the sun - and that a lot of lessons learned have to be relearned by future generations.
PS: I'd also add army hair styling to the list of differences - then and now. :D
Hello All,
Curious as to why the thread was renamed. I say that because I am the Fires Center of Excellence STRATCOM Knowledge Management Advisor, and earlier this week we received correspondence from Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Strategic Communications to announce the upcoming TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference (TSLC). I have posted the announcement to our Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence website (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/130700)
See TRADOC message below:
All,
From 18 - 20 August, TRADOC invites every member of your organization to
follow the semiannual TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference (TSLC) via computer by reading and posting comments on the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) discussion board.
New for this TSLC, reporters and bloggers at the conference will provide
significant public transparency and feedback using a near real time
interactive discussion board as TRADOC's senior leaders discuss the
requirements, capabilities, and topics that support the execution of
TRADOC’s mission.
Also, please ensure your leadership is aware of this media presence and that
your offices are synchronizing engagements to outcomes and cross promoting
the event in all traditional and social networking mediums.
Please post this invitation on your websites and link to the TRADOC and
small wars journal websites as well.
Thank you,
v/r,
Major Bill Jakola
Deputy Strategic Communication Director
Noted Jedburgh, will do... Sometimes only insiders would be able to access information, so I point people to the location. But only that's only the case sometimes. My apologies.
diverted into a discussion of Design and a moderator pulled it an started a new thread to prevent disruption of the TSLC Thread.Quote:
Originally Posted by GMLRS
That thread still exists, it's here: LINK
Quote:
Originally Posted by Dr Jack
Dr. Jack,
Sir, I'm all for innovation and y'alls way ahead, but as I tried to express in my earlier comment, we must keep it KISS (Keep it simple stupid). I always deferred to my PSG test...If after briefing something, my PSG's found what I was saying incomprehensible, then I tried to reexplain it...
In context, and I'm not trying to marginalize what you're doing, if the boys cannot comprehend it b/c your using post-modern buzzwords from acadamie, then your efforts will be as fruitless as Effects Based Operations (EBO).
I hope this is helpful in your planning...I suppose the bottom line is that someone should not need a post-graduate degree to understand the planning.
I only stated this b/c I believe what you and TRADOC are trying to accomplish is important.
v/r
Mike
The caption of this photo probably would more accurately read:Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
"Alright, which one of you A**clowns took a crap on my map board??"
(But your right, with time on our hands we can complicate the heck out of what is often very intuitive to the good commander, and then in turn penalize intuitive commanders for "Not using the process to standard" and promote far less capable men over them who dogmatically churn through the process like the unimaginative clerks that they are.)
In Patton's book he talked how he would go forward to his commander's location for a huddle over the Jeep hood; one page document, basic task/purpose/intent on one side, sketch on the other. I highly doubt he relied on 40 guys grinding through a 4-5 hour process to produce it either.
Excellent example. If you have a sound planning process, which aims at issuing orders and not just creating plans (something all too often forgotten), then this is an implicit part of the orders process. Orders require plans. Plans do not require orders.Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
If anyone can explain how separating the problem from the plan can lead to simpler plans resulting in faster and more useful sets of orders, then I'm all ears.
Spot on! - but today, we have a collection of officers who blindly assert that Patton would have failed in today's conflicts, because today, it would all be too complicated for Patton to understand.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
In the UK, the size of HQs now occupy a far greater percentage of manpower versus the formation they serve than ever before, for no better ability to support the commander.
has to be right on:
as evidenced by the smiling faces of the first four captains, and the pokerface of Morrie Stoffer (on the far right of the photo - the best combat soldier in the lot), whose gaze is directed at the "pile" in question. :)Quote:
"Alright, which one of you A**clowns took a crap on my map board??"
The language suggested would not have been appropriate to Bob Frankland, who was a Tennessee gentleman (like Walt Johnson, the regimental commander, he was a NG officer). Bill Lyman, in his Bn history ("Curlew History", long out of print and not on line that I could find), noted that Frankland was "much more than a superior tactician and battle director ... He was innately considerate and gentlemanly in his dealings with all those under his command. ... Under his guidance, the battalion was noticeably free of the petty jealousies and bickerings that plagued so many units."
Bob Frankland also was a decent pistol shot under stress. 7 Aug 1944, St.-Barthelemy, France (from Lyman) "As he entered [the front door of his HQ FOP], he saw two of his HQ men, hands up, walking out the rear door in front of two Germans. The Bn CO pulled out his pistol, ran to the door and promptly shot the two Jerries dead." LTC was awarded the DSC for his role in resolving the very fluid situation at St.-Barthelemy (the .45 bit was only a small part), where 1/117 and the 117th's Cannon Coy stacked up Liebstandarte (1SSPz) in front of the regimental HQ. And, had their bacon saved by Wilf's RAF Typhoons, I should add (with a sincere hat tip to your dad's tactical counterparts).
More to the point involved (planning and the "Huddle"), two folks aren't shown in the photo, but who entered into the planning process for 1/117. One was the Bn XO, Hank Koczowka (MAJ), and Able Coy CO, when the Bn landed at Omaha a week after the invasion. The other was the S-3, Dave Easlick (CPT), and Dog Coy CO when the Bn landed - a Michigan boy from Ann Arbor. As to his rapport with LTC Frankland (from Lyman): "The two officers complemented each other perfectly. The LTC was thorough, sound, dependable; the CPT quick, clever, brilliant. ... The First Battalion was a good team."
By mid-Nov 1944, that planning team consisted of 7 then or former combat company commanders - and Bob Frankland, who like the others hadn't seen combat before Normandy. As Ken has said elsewhere, the good ones learn quick in heavy combat.
PS: Bob Frankland's very brief "bio", by his grand-daughter Laila, is here - complete with the "pile" photo (from Bill Lyman's book). She wasn't quite on about the decorations: 4 BS; 2 SS and the DSC (from Lyman).
At bottom of page, AAR for Mortain (St Bart) engagement & 3 maps. A snip with my added text is attached so that Wilf will know whereof I speak re: RAF.
Marc,Quote:
Originally Posted by marct
Here's how I understand it.
On the tactical level, when forces are attempting to secure terrain, decision making is pretty straightfoward and a commander just has to remind himself to seek advise, feedback, and recommendations from his subordinates (i.e. "huddle" method).
Once the area is secure, one starts working on the really complex problems (legitimacy of gov't, good governance, property rights, reconciliation, etc...) At this point, I believe the introduction of academics, NGOs, and other smart people into the planning process can assist the commander in finding better or least bad solutions outside of his/her expertise.
This type of design and decision making process is extremely helpful on the policy making level. One of the best examples that I've seen is the distribution of water rights in California. There are many stakeholders, every has a legitimate request, but there is simply a limited supply of water. Finding fair or appropriate solutions in this type of scenario requires something a bit broader than the Military Decision Making Process.
I think it is a good thing that we're relooking how we define and solve problems. I just hope that the final product is something junior leaders can easily absorb and use.
As for your example, my solution would be to have the governor removed; however, that COA is typically outside the boundaries of our operations. Additionally, I would add the it is the governments responsibility to provide legitimacy, not ours. My personal thought is that we can assist at security, but we can only provide limited assistance in the other factors of governance (at least in Iraq/Afghanistan). In the future, I think that the governments desire to be legitimate to it's people should be a criteria when we decide to conduct FID/SFA.
v/r
Mike
Hi Mike,
Thanks for the response. Just a couple of comments / questions.
On its face, the makes perfect sense - I can't think of any better way to mess up a ground op than to have academics "helping" to devise it ;)! At the same time, sometimes, I would suggest, the long term tactical solution is not the immediately optimal one. For example, setting up a long term "siege", complete with biometric ID stations and interface with local tribal elders, may prove better than moving into an area. Other times, leaving an area under OPFOR control may prove to be in your long term interests especially if the OPFOR has a nasty habit of beheading people.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Now, I would hope that most current commanders would recognize these options, but I'm not sure.
Agreed ;)! Personally, I would suggest that two things would help that in junior officer training. First, encourage all junior officers to develop a friendship network outside of the military that they can call on. Second, reward in the HR system innovations that work.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
That's why I used that example - it is a truly wicked problem :p! As to it being outside of your COAs, hmmm, not in all cases. Even if you cannot get them removed, and you don't have the direct authority to remove them, it is still grist for the IO mill that can be bumped up to the appropriate level.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Oh, I agree it should be a consideration of future FID / SFA operations. The problem with both Iraq and Afghjanistan is that you (the US) created those governments by overthrowing the previous ones. This is an especially tricky situation as far as legitimacy is concerned and, I would argue, that the legitimacy of that new government is a co-creation of both it and the US. A special case maybe, but still there.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Anyway, I have to run off and sing a concert :wry:.
Cheers,
Marc
In some ways this strikes to heart of my issues with the idea of Operational Design. As far as I can tell, (from the badly written FM) OD essentially attempts to predict outcome in a deterministic and even casual way.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
"We do this, so the situation created is this...." - It then basically seeks a set of opinions to predict the second and even third order effects of actions. - cannot be done.
So question. Would the US have invaded IRAQ if opinions suggested that it would lead to a six year insurgency and X-thousand dead? - If no one ventured that opinion, then the process is useless. Now the OD guys say "if we had used OD, it wouldn't have been like that." - but OD does not avoid the entirely human desire to pick the information that fits the desired version of events.
Exactly like EBO and MW, the "enduring wisdom" of OD takes credit for success, and denies involvement in failure.