The article, soon to be published in the May/June 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs is available below.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200805...the-surge.html
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The article, soon to be published in the May/June 2008 issue of Foreign Affairs is available below.
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/200805...the-surge.html
reference in his learned discourse about Iraq's external security.
(For those that say it's not our problem, I'd simply suggest they give that a little thought...)
We can always go back. (I bet if we left the tanks in Kuwait, Cavguy wouldn't even need a map to go back.).Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
would be even worse... ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Rank amateur
The author's entire article hinges on the assertion that we are fostering retribalization and that using tribes to assert control over their lands is a bad thing. While the author cites historical examples of why retribalization is a bad thing, he fails to explain why those apply to the current circumstances. On the contrary, he points out that the examples that he cites are significantly different. And he provides no explanation for why using the tribes is a bad thing. He merely points out that the Sheiks are making money and I guess we are to infer that profit is evil, so the policy is inherently bad because it generates profits.
The author advocates a policy "to subordinate the tribes to the state." He implies that this is not part of our current effort. It is. There are conditions tied to the money that we hand out, specifically measures to integrate security forces into the ISF. There are significant C2 arrangements made between ISF, CF, and the tribal security forces. The impression that one gets from reading this article is that we're just strolling into tribal territory once per month to deliver a suitcase of money. I wonder how the author's opinion would change if he knew what he were talking about.
The author states that "the tribes feeding off the surge must be weaned from U.S. assistance and linked firmly to Baghdad as their source of support." I really don't see how that is any better or worse than tribes getting money from us. If the current policy leads to retribalization, then how would this new policy not?
And this is what really baffles me: "The surge has changed the situation not by itself but only in conjunction with several other developments." So we should assume that our efforts thus far are a failure because the conditions were better? That's like me saying the last two Red Sox World Series championships didn't count because they had home field advantage. Huh?
Could the apparent success of The Surge be partially the result of just the process of Ethnic Cleansing/Sectarian Violence?
As an economist/mathematician, it strikes me that there must be a natural limit to the process of Ethnic Cleansing/Sectarian Violence - - if it works, the participants move to their own enclaves or they are killed or disabled. It seems that it may not take all that long for the players to readjust their circumstances and for things to settle down. Is this a factor in the apparent success of The Suge, which is just not mentioned in the national media? Was our timing of The Surge just coincidental with the end of an Ethnic Cleansing process in various Iraq neighborhoods?
What does the community think of the article's assertion and its implications? It reminds me of a particular theory (I forget its author) which suggested that the peace in Europe is not the consequence of new attitudes and institutions (i.e. the EU), but of the massive population displacements post WW2. Is "peace" really only possible when clear lines of demographics are drawn?
Ralph Peters would argue so, and has in several of his works, although I am not totally sold.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
I've headed down this path on a number of boards (and I'm sure COL Gentile will jump in too ;)), but I'm getting tired of all the singular "credit" certain things take for the Iraqi success, when in reality it was a combination of:
- Additional forces added to Baghdad and key areas (President)
- New operational tactics in the US and Iraqi forces (outposts, pop security)
- Co-option of local tribes and militias to provide security. Sunni tribes ceasing to fight US forces.
- Over-reach of AQIZ, pissing off the populace with car-bombs and thuggery
- Sadr declaring cease-fire, perhaps due to reduction of Iranian support for Sadr
- War fatigue in the population
- Black ops destroying insurgent networks (Woodward)
- Population security measures
- Ethnic Cleansing (this article)
- Much improved Iraqi Army performance
- 400% increase in airstrikes (Andres)
I submit to the council it was a combination of all of the above, and various groups have been jockeying for credit along one or more lines to justify a particular view or to secure funds for their particular initiative.
To be honest, I don't know what the correct mixture was. I think there will be arguments for a long time about what mix of factors reduced tension in 2007-2008.
Finally, the genesis of the Anbar article I co-wrote came from Tom Odom on an old thread discussing what happened to the ASW campaign in the North Atlantic in 1943. At the beginning of 1943, German subs were sinking massive tonnage. By the end of 1943 the threat was essentially gone. Why? There was no one reason - we bombed the sub bases, enigma intercepts, sonar improved, better convoy tactics, long range ASW aircraft patrols, more destroyers, escort carriers, fuel shortages, etc. No one factor could create the change alone, the combination did.
Same for Iraq.
The tendency to deconstruct complex phenomenon to derive a single "root cause" (usually the cause most agreeable to a preexisting bias) seems to be one of those mysterious psychological traits peculiar to our species. There must be literature on the subject, maybe I'll read up on it when I get some free time.
Cavguy, I agree 100%. As much as some people would like to pin the rose on one single event/policy decision, in reality, there is no way you can. As much as I would hate to start a discussion on complexity theory, I cannot help but think of some of its key points whenever we talk about any conflict. There are too many variables with too many unknowns to go back and decide, "This was it...this is where things turned for better or worse". The cumulative effect of a multitude of events, 95% outside of U.S. military control, lead to where we are today.
Now, did the U.S. military shape, cajole, and influence the environment...absolutely. But is there any way to accurately measure the effects the U.S. military actions had intertwined with all of the above factors you mentioned? Tough to say.
I think the ASW campaign is great example of a how a combination of tactics, techniques, procedures, policies and technological breakthroughs tipped the scales in favor of the allies. You cannot point to a single event (convoying, sonar, hedgehogs, Ultra, Leigh-lights, Coastal Command, coastal blackouts, etc) which lead to the turning of the tides. All of those actions and inactions resulted in a shift.
I think it's generally acknowledged on this forum that there's no such thing as a silver bullet. That said, to what extent do you think the ethnic cleansing theory in the article I provided is valid?
Kent's Imperative weigh's in:
Quote:
We have rarely seen such a work of profound analytic fallacy as the now much circulated study “Baghdad nights: evaluating the US military `surge' using nighttime light signatures”, which has been making the rounds throughout the blogsphere as of late. This paper purports to declare the Surge a failure based on the lack of increase of overnight artificial lighting, as measured by the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) sensors.
This sensor data has previously been used to illustrate the profound gaps between the quality of life in North Korea, when compared to the prosperity and wealth of the South. Electrical usage can generally be considered a proxy for economic activity, particularly in areas where public utilities must be augmented by private generation capacity.
The Environment and Planning paper provides night lights data only to December 2007. And while it briefly displays intensity mapping of sectarian deaths in Baghdad area neighborhoods, it largely ignores the decrease in such violence as the final outcome of “a vicious process of interethnic cleansing” rather than the result of the change in US counterinsurgency strategy and force commitments which was the surge. This is an assumption which cannot be supported merely through imagery analysis.