U.S. Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least ’09

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07-24-2007
SWJED

U.S. Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least ’09

24 July NY Times - U.S. Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least ’09 by Michael Gordon.

Quote:

While Washington is mired in political debate over the future of Iraq, the American command here has prepared a detailed plan that foresees a significant American role for the next two years.

The classified plan, which represents the coordinated strategy of the top American commander and the American ambassador, calls for restoring security in local areas, including Baghdad, by the summer of 2008. “Sustainable security” is to be established on a nationwide basis by the summer of 2009, according to American officials familiar with the document.

The detailed document, known as the Joint Campaign Plan, is an elaboration of the new strategy President Bush signaled in January when he decided to send five additional American combat brigades and other units to Iraq. That signaled a shift from the previous strategy, which emphasized transferring to Iraqis the responsibility for safeguarding their security.

That new approach put a premium on protecting the Iraqi population in Baghdad, on the theory that improved security would provide Iraqi political leaders with the breathing space they needed to try political reconciliation...
08-07-2007
Graycap

The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq: A Trip Report

From Anthony Cordesman a new report at CSIS

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...icpatience.pdf

Quote:

Everyone sees Iraq differently, and my perceptions of a recent trip to Iraq are different from that of two of my traveling companions and those of several other think tank travelers to the country. From my perspective, the US does not have good options in Iraq and cannot dictate its future, only influence it. It is Iraqis that will shape Iraq's ability orinability to rise above its current sectarian and ethnic conflicts, to redefine Iraq's politics and methods of governance, establish some level of stability and security, and move towards a path of economic recovery and development.

The US can influence this process, and can still do a great deal of good. It may be able to push the Iraqis in the right direction and at a pace where the odds of success are significantly higher than they would be without a sustained US presence and intervention. The US cannot, however, prevent the pace of Iraqi progress from having major delays and reversals. US troop levels almost certainly can be reduced sharply over time on an Iraqi capabilities-based level, but many aspects will play out over a period that may well take a decade.
08-07-2007
Tom Odom

The last paragraphs of the piece--which is balanced and clear-sighted--appears to me to be pure Dave Kilcullen:

Quote:

most of the issues that need to be solved are distinctly Iraqi. It is up to them to rise above their sectarian and ethnic conflicts and move forward. We can only empower them and support them in their endeavor. This could be unsettling for an organization that is used to solving or “fixing” problems, but we understand that our success depends on how we influence and support the Iraqis in this process. We agree that strategic patience is
required to give the Iraqis a chance for success. As you point out, there is not universal solution for Iraq. We cannot and should not decide how to partition Iraq - for any of these solutions to work, they must be Iraqi solutions. We can only help them find their own best solution. The US will not define “victory” in Iraq, but our continued support and empowerment is critical to providing the best conditions for the Iraqis to succeed on their own. Any “all-in” or “all-out” strategy immediately demonstrates a lack of understanding of the problem. As you learned during your visit, different areas are and will continue to advance at different rates. We must adapt to these changes and have the patience to let some (not all) problems be solved on the “Iraqi clock.”

We fully expect that the mixed sectarian areas and fault lines will be the last to settle. We’ve maintained a higher troop concentration in these areas for that very reason. I do believe that it is necessary to slowly hand over responsibility to the Iraqis. I believe that it is necessary to increase capability at the local provincial level and hand over a province at time vice thinning the lines everywhere. We cannot do this too quickly, but it’s important that we allow for gradual GOI empowerment. The GOI is a nascent government and a democratic government is arguably the most difficult government structure to build and consolidate power at the national level. Our most difficult challenge at the moment is getting the central GOI to understand that the “grass roots” movements throughout Iraq could work in their favor if they capitalize on them in time.

The surge was designed to create political time and space. I think it has proven effective in doing that, even though the last of the surge BCTs just arrived last month. We didn’t create the “awakening” but we did recognize it and capitalize on it. The additional BCTs gave us the opportunity to take advantage of the awakening. We recognized that increasing security in the mixed sectarian areas in and around Baghdad would also help to bolster a weak central GOI - give it a chance to move politically. What we’ve done over the past several months is the adaptation that you say is required here in Iraq. We were willing to take risks to keep this moving and we didn’t expect that all that ails Iraq would be solved within 6 months. We would like more movement towards accommodation from the central government and we will all continue to do all that we can to bring these outside groups and the GOI together. We understand that our recent tactical successes will not add up unless the Iraqis take advantage of them.
08-08-2007
Mark O'Neill

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tom Odom

The last paragraphs of the piece--which is balanced and clear-sighted--appears to me to be pure Dave Kilcullen:

Hi Tom,

Two observations for my five cents worth:

1. Effectively saying that ' we are doing our bit, now if only those Iraqis would get their act together" is as futile and unhelpful an insight as 'the ocean is wet'. In the situation that has been created, it was always going to be about the Iraqis.

2. From my experience of the USA and Americans, it is going to be a very difficult (perhaps impossible) task, for anyone, to sell the idea of 'strategic patience' contingent upon the required, but possibly glacial in speed, developments within the Iraqi polity and society. That is not to say that I disagree with the requirement, just that I think that you cannot sell it to Americans.

I realise that this post is negative in tone, and I am not sure what the alternative is.

I have the sense that, as in 2003 when the word was that democracy and peace would break out after Saddam fell, 'Hope' is still not a plan. 'Hoping' for Iraqi reconciliation or political unification, appears on the face of their record to date as, at best, naivety running rampant, and at worst duplicitous.

I beleive that the time is here for some 'harder' negotiations, like those that occurred from time to time with various States in 'realpolitik 101' during the Cold War. It will not be perfect, nor easy and clean, but at least it will be a deliberate and proactive. It probably cannot be much worse than 'hoping', and might be a whole lot better.

It might also assuage the growing impression of American impotence that the world (and the US domestic audience) is seeing daily on their televisions and reading on the OPED pages of their newspapers. We should not underestimate the importance, and longer term ramifications, of this.
08-08-2007
Tom Odom

Quote:

Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill

Hi Tom,

Two observations for my five cents worth:

1. Effectively saying that ' we are doing our bit, now if only those Iraqis would get their act together" is as futile and unhelpful an insight as 'the ocean is wet'. In the situation that has been created, it was always going to be about the Iraqis.

2. From my experience of the USA and Americans, it is going to be a very difficult (perhaps impossible) task, for anyone, to sell the idea of 'strategic patience' contingent upon the required, but possibly glacial in speed, developments within the Iraqi polity and society. That is not to say that I disagree with the requirement, just that I think that you cannot sell it to Americans.

I realise that this post is negative in tone, and I am not sure what the alternative is.

I have the sense that, as in 2003 when the word was that democracy and peace would break out after Saddam fell, 'Hope' is still not a plan. 'Hoping' for Iraqi reconciliation or political unification, appears on the face of their record to date as, at best, naivety running rampant, and at worst duplicitous.

I beleive that the time is here for some 'harder' negotiations, like those that occurred from time to time with various States in 'realpolitik 101' during the Cold War. It will not be perfect, nor easy and clean, but at least it will be a deliberate and proactive. It probably cannot be much worse than 'hoping', and might be a whole lot better.

It might also assuage the growing impression of American impotence that the world (and the US domestic audience) is seeing daily on their televisions and reading on the OPED pages of their newspapers. We should not underestimate the importance, and longer term ramifications, of this.

Mark,

No disagreement.

I put that last part from the study because it came from theater--not because I agree with it. To the contrary, as I have posted elsewhere I see a maojor disconnect between the military push to coopt the Sunni militias (and they are effectively coopting us) and the end state of a democratic Iraq with a central government.

I see phrases like "it is up to the Iraqis" as a strategic cop out at this stage. Either we push them to the limit on the political front or we tell them to plan for life after us, probably with three separate countries/territories. Moreover, I see much wishful assumption in the part I posted, assumptions that we have time to let fault lines "settle." This is year 5 and next month is September, some 14 months before our 08 elections. Napoleon had it right when he warned, "ask for anything but time."

Best

Tom
08-08-2007
Tom Odom

From the Wall Street Journal via ebird

Quote:

How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence In Iraq

By Greg Jaffe

RAMADI, Iraq -- To understand how the U.S. managed to bring relative calm to Iraq's unruly Anbar province, it helps to pay a visit to Sheik Hamid Heiss's private compound.

On a recent morning, a 25-year-old Marine Corps lieutenant from Ohio stacked $97,259 in cash in neat piles on Sheik Heiss's gilded tea table. The money paid for food for the sheik's tribe and for two school renovation projects on which the sheik himself is the lead contractor. Even the marble-floored meeting hall where the cash was handed over reflects recent U.S. largesse: The Marines paid Sheik Heiss and his family $127,175 to build it on his private compound.

Such payments have encouraged local leaders in this vast desert expanse to help the U.S. oust al Qaeda extremists and restore a large measure of stability and security. Today, Anbar is averaging about 100 attacks a week, down from 425 a week last year. On the main street in Ramadi, Anbar's main city, Iraqi laborers are removing three years of accumulated rubble that couldn't be carted off previously because of the threat of sniper fire. They're fixing sewer lines shredded by years of roadside bombs. The work is taking place on the same thoroughfare where al Qaeda in Iraq late last year staged a parade of fighters that was posted on Jihadi Web sites.

"For three years we fought our asses off out here and made very little progress," says Lt. Col. Michael Silverman, who oversees an 800-soldier battalion in Ramadi. "Now we are working with the sheiks, and Ramadi has gone from the most dangerous city in the world to a place where I can sit on Sheik Heiss's front porch without my body armor and not have to worry about getting shot."

The success in Anbar Province, which lies west of Baghdad, hasn't come easily. The key to the U.S. campaign has been recruiting, cultivating, and rewarding tribal leaders. At points, the effort even involved a Marine general making several trips abroad to woo an important exiled tribal sheik to return home. The progress here, which has unfolded as violence elsewhere in Iraq has climbed, has become central to American hopes of success in the deeply divided country. President Bush has repeatedly touted it and U.S. commanders throughout Iraq are looking to export the Marine model.

But as remarkable as the turnaround here has been, it isn't clear how broad or lasting the gains will be. With the threat of al Qaeda now gone from their area, many of the Anbari sheiks have begun to jockey with each other for power and influence. More ominously, some tribal leaders, including Sheik Heiss, complain that their real enemy now isn't al Qaeda, but a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad -- the government the U.S. is trying to build up....

...Today, the sheiks' biggest fear is that the Americans will leave them to the devices of a failing, sectarian government in Baghdad. Recently, the U.S. military flew a small group of national security experts to Anbar province to have dinner with Fallujah sheiks at the Marines' base. The think-tankers, who hailed from the Brookings Institution, listened as the sheiks, who came from the Jumaily and Issa tribes, described their frustrations. "We have gotten rid of al Qaeda but we have other organizations that are worse," said Sheik Mishan, referring to the Iraqi government.

One of the Fallujah sheiks then reached out a hand and placed it on Gen. Allen's knee. "This is my government," he said proudly.

Gen. Allen sighed. "Unfortunately, that is the problem," he said.

I added the bold italics. More at the link worth reading as this article ties to Pollock and the other think tankers who visited the area and talked to the Sheiks in this piece.

Tom