More bad news: decision making
JMA,
I too have read the story and am slightly puzzled at the timing of the media reports. The report (link below) was ordered to be printed on the 6th July 2011 and a Press Statement is on Parliament's website today - which is not a working day. Methinks a Sunday "filler" item after the media focus elsewhere.
Parliamentary Press release:http://www.parliament.uk/business/co...n-afghanistan/
Full Report:http://www.publications.parliament.u...4/55405.htm#a7
On a quick read of a few sections there are some "howlers" and whilst not unexpected why were those responsible for decision-making not identified?
There is a section about the 2006 deployment to Helmand and the follow-on decision to man section bases in northern settlements, e.g. Sangin,
Quote:
General Fry said that the key question about the events of 2006 was how did UK Forces get from the original plan to provide security in a small area to "fighting for their lives no less than two months later in a series of Alamos in the north of the province....
...to win what the MoD described as the totemic battle of the flagpoles—preventing Government flags from being replaced by those of the Taliban.
John Reid, Defence Secretary, at the time of the initial deployment and five weeks later elsewhere:
Quote:
I understand from inquiries that I made then and subsequently that the matter was not referred to the Secretary of State for Defence who succeeded me. It was never brought to his attention, except in retrospect. Undoubtedly, in my view, it was an operational decision which may or may not have been right. Let us assume that the commanders on the spot got it right; but it was an operational decision that changed the strategic nature of the mission..
Two generals:
Quote:
General Richards said that the move to the north of Helmand was not a change of mission but a change of tactics.[58] But General Wall said that UK Forces had ended up in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different from the one that was anticipated.
The in place Defence Secretary at the time, Lord Browne:
Quote:
..a tactical decision was made to deploy forces beyond the lozenge. He told us that he was briefed about this retrospectively and informed by those in command that, in military terms, this was an operational decision.
We are often told we are in the era of the 'Strategic Corporal', well this is evidence of something very different. The Committee's Press Release says:
Quote:
The Committee considers it unlikely that this fundamental change was put to Ministers.
Decisions made created more enemies?
TDB,
Partial citation:
Quote:
..Further more when we set off for Helmand, we were, were we not? On a counter-narcotics mission..
What is remarkable is that the counter-narcotics (heroin) segment of the renewed 'Great Game' in Helmand played an understandably small a role. The UK was not on a counter-narcotics mission in 2006 and IMHO to this day is not. There is another thread on Afghan counter-narcotics, where we have debated the issues, greatly aided by 120mm who has been there:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234
The Defence Select Committee hearings include:
Quote:
General Peter Wall told us that the UK taking on Helmand was consistent with the UK's role in counter-narcotics (held since July 2005).[25]
Earlier in the why did NATO expand it's role in Afghanistan:
Quote:
General Houghton told us....(southern Afghanistan) being an unsafe place that was host to international terrorism and for which the delivery of good government and governance was essential.[22]
Plus some strategic arguments for UK / NATO and the USA.
Quote:
The initial objective in 2006 was to establish a central "lozenge of security" around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion and then move out from there as conditions permitted. The intent was that UK Forces would gain intelligence and a cultural understanding of the environment and, by developing a local envelope of security, would be able to help create the right environment for governance, build Afghan capacity and create a capacity for economic growth.[31]
Note counter-narcotics does not appear. There are anecdotes that the UK Army took no action when opiates were found and on some of the film footage recently poppy fields formed the backdrop to patrolling.
Nor has the pre-2006 US presence been let's say robust:
Quote:
..the US Forces acted in what General Fry described as "a profoundly live and let live" way.[34] Intelligence from such an operation was limited...There were something like 100 members of the US special forces, for example.
Brigadier Butler, the first UK commander in Helmand:
Quote:
As soon as we arrived in those conditions—and as I have said the Province was already in some form of crisis; they were certainly ready and waiting—of course they wanted to engage us. We used to say that there would be a reaction to our size 12 Boots going into Helmand Province, whether from the Taliban, from the opiate dealers or from the warlords, because we were threatening their very existence. We were trying to turn a failed state into a steady and successful one, which was contrary to all their aims and objectives. We knew full well, as reasonably experienced military men, that we were going to have a reaction.[38]
What undermines the official explanation IMHO is that pre-2006 Helmand Province was a functioning, working and presumably peaceful province where power was split between the Taliban, warlords and opiate dealers. A province where the provincial government was only a token presence. Maybe with rare national i.e. US-funded counter-narcotic visits (another SWC may know if that happened).
Timing is another factor:
Quote:
43. General Houghton pointed out that a number of factors came together to make the situation particularly difficult in the early months:
Poppy eradication—the fear of locals that their livelihoods would be taken away, which was fuelled by Taliban propaganda;
Some of the (my emphasis as never seen before) 200,000 casual labourers who migrated from Pakistan for the poppy harvest had stayed behind as guns for hire;
In preparation for the arrival of UK Forces, the Americans had conducted a number of kinetic operations culminating in Operation Mountain Thrust which had stirred up the local population; and
The removal of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as Governor and his replacement by Governor Daoud had destabilised the tribal balance and the balance of power within northern Helmand.[49]
There was 'no balance of power within Northern Helmand', the new Governor appointed by Karzai wanted to win the 'battle of the flags'.
Governance is not flag waving and the UK is not in Helmand for counter-narcotics. I have argued before that such a role is in our national interest, a role that would resonate back home, especially in the cities where heroin is freely available (including Muslim areas) and as for the methods look at the linked thread.