Contractors Doing Combat Service Support is a Bad, Bad Idea

15 Dec. New York Times editorial - Soldiers Versus Defense Contractors.

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It's what passes for crunch time at the Pentagon. Word has now gone out that $32 billion in savings must be found out of the $2.3 trillion the Defense Department is planning to spend in the next five years. After the Pentagon's spending orgy over the past five years, there is plenty of scope for cutting, without weakening America's defenses - but only if the cuts come out of the most costly and least needed Air Force and Navy weapons programs, not from the money required to replenish and re-equip the Army and Marine ground forces that have been worn down by Iraq.

Alleviating the dangerous strain on America's overstretched, underrested and increasingly taxed land-based forces must be the Pentagon's highest priority for the next five years...

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From "Lost Army Job Tied to Doubts on Contractor," NYT, 17 Jun 08
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/wa...hp&oref=slogin

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Army officials denied that Mr. Smith had been removed because of the dispute, but confirmed that they had reversed his decision, arguing that blocking the payments to KBR would have eroded basic services to troops. They said that KBR had warned that if it was not paid, it would reduce payments to subcontractors, which in turn would cut back on services.

“You have to understand the circumstances at the time,” said Jeffrey P. Parsons, executive director of the Army Contracting Command. “We could not let operational support suffer because of some other things.”

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Whether the rest of the content of the article is correct, what Parsons says in the sixth paragraph is truly scary. Essentially, he admits that even if the contractor is screwing the government it has to be overlooked because the contractor is holding the troops hostage. Nice business ethic on the part of the contractors there. But the important thing is that there's almost certainly a yellow flag magnet on the back of their cars and a flag pin on their lapels.

I find it strange that SecDef would have gotten involved in this personnel issue unless there was something much bigger at stake. I also don't much care for the bonuses -- seems like a backdoor way to pay the contractors more than was contracted.

In my humble estimation this problem is way bigger than anything going on with the AF, and Gates would do well to get a handle on it.

Bottom line, can we please relearn that Rev War lesson about contractors not being the right men for the job of handling logistics at war, especially at the front lines? The sooner the better.

An interesting tangent to this. My husband and I were discussing the article, and he said that one of his Marines noted, with pride, that he'd been on three deployments and had never served on a FOB with a DFAC. My husband either. This point of pride will make for an interesting point in the conclusion of my dissertation (on gastronomy and morale). If my thesis is that civilian socio-cultural influences affect the decisions regarding gastronomy for morale, then it is understandable that conspicuous consumption has become a part of logistics effort. It also makes sense that military personnel will potentially bristle at having conspicuous consumption forced upon them. You don't join the military if conspicuous consumption is your objective or your interest.

Regards,
Jill

Without commenting on the merits of the article, since I haven't read it (I know --doesn't stop some people):D, I ask Jill the same question I have asked on other similar threads -- what's the solution?

I have been on a C-C-C ration cycle and I can tell you that it leaves a lot to be desired.

I have also had my units gutted for "details" back in the day. I know others here have also lived through that era, so feel free to help me here.

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Originally Posted by Old Eagle

Without commenting on the merits of the article, since I haven't read it (I know --doesn't stop some people):D, I ask Jill the same question I have asked on other similar threads -- what's the solution?

I have been on a C-C-C ration cycle and I can tell you that it leaves a lot to be desired.

I have also had my units gutted for "details" back in the day. I know others here have also lived through that era, so feel free to help me here.

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One answer might be the M85 or new MKT, T-Rats, and Unitized Group Ration (UGR).
http://georgia.usembassy.gov/photos/...404Cooks3F.jpg

We used our cooks on convoys and patrols. I lived on a small Iraqi Army FOB in 05-06. Army cooks only cooked dinner chow and spent the rest of the day on missions or guard duty. I think they enjoyed that more than cooking.

The Marine is proud that can't be associated with FOBs or being a FOBBIT...the worst possible name that you could be called in Combat. The current culture in the Army and Marines is such, "if I'm not on a FOB (with KBR) then I am not a FOBBIT. That's why the Army is converting to sexy names like "Patrol Base Smith" or "Combat Outpost Jones". No one, particularly in the combat arms realm wants to be labeled FOBBIT; although it has nothing to do with you mission or performance, rather than being "spoiled" with KBR chow, movie theaters, basketball gyms and "salsa night" at the MWR facility.

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JKM wrote: We used our cooks on convoys and patrols. I lived on a small Iraqi Army FOB in 05-06. Army cooks only cooked dinner chow and spent the rest of the day on missions or guard duty. I think they enjoyed that more than cooking.

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Last year, when they could not settle the food issue for my husband's unit in Fallujah -- they were stationed at the government center downtown, and given the security situation the contractors refused to go there -- they ultimately sent the only Marine messman at Camp Fallujah out there to cook for them. He did one meal a day, and spent the rest of the time cleaning and prepping -- being the only guy on the job, he was kept busy taking care of that. But yes, cooks, etc., assigned to combat units must be prepared to fight. Providing front line logistical support is dangerous.

I will admit that this issue is my bete noir -- see my recent comments on this issue.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...7399#post47399

However, beyond my peculiar interest in the subject, what caught my attention with this article, and what really gets my blood boiling, is the fact that the contractors basically threatened the troops and DoD caved -- and then gave them a bonus.

This last piece is why I think the practice must end. Management has demonstrated that their bottom line -- not the troop needs, not operational capabilities -- is the priority. And with that priority they have demonstrated that they are not at all suited to support the operational needs of deployed forces. Let them handle the cafeteria's stateside, but in war, you need a reliable system, not just a cheap one. Again, it's time to realize the wisdom of a 200+ year old lesson.

Regards,
Jill

You'd probably find it interesting that during my last tour, there were KBR contractors that worked at the BSB, fixing vehicles. Oddly enough, the BSB soldiers that didn't do combat logistics patrols basically worked for the KBR guys...it was strange. I think one issue is that with the FOB concept (a terrible idea, btw) there aren't enough cooks in a BDE to feed everyone. I think that with the evolution of "irregular warfare", contracted services maybe inevidable. You are absolutely right that the government should put the needs of the Soldier first and not the contractor. I do find myself engaged in a lot of conversations in regards to why KBR gets all of the "no-bid" contracts in Iraq. One reason is probably because not many companies are capable of doing what they do, but another is because we don't have the support elements in the military to do it; short of deploying the entire Army to Iraq, which of course, will not happen.

The NY Times hasn't exactly been completely honest in its reporting on the war.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

Whether the rest of the content of the article is correct, what Parsons says in the sixth paragraph is truly scary. Essentially, he admits that even if the contractor is screwing the government it has to be overlooked because the contractor is holding the troops hostage.

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I don't think that's what they were saying. It seemed more like they were saying "If you don't pay us, we can't pay them, and they'll stop working."

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Originally Posted by Sargent

I also don't much care for the bonuses -- seems like a backdoor way to pay the contractors more than was contracted.

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One type of contract vehicle is Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF), which bases a portion of the negotiated fee on performance criteria. That's pretty typical for ID/IQ (Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity) contracts. (And leave it to the NY Times to describe a standard method of government contracting so that it sounds nefarious.)

The part about the DCAA role was one I would have liked to have seen more information on. If there's any substance to the issues raised in the article, it will be established there.

However, I agree completely that combat units should have their own mess sections.

(Just to illustrate that there may be more than meets the eye: Years ago, a subcontractor had completed all terms of his contract. The managing civil servant demanded additional, uncompensated work out of the sub. He directed me to withhold payment until the additional work was complete. (He also raised hell with my boss when I ignored his direction, but that's a different story ...))

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Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso

The Marine is proud that can't be associated with FOBs or being a FOBBIT...the worst possible name that you could be called in Combat. The current culture in the Army and Marines is such, "if I'm not on a FOB (with KBR) then I am not a FOBBIT. That's why the Army is converting to sexy names like "Patrol Base Smith" or "Combat Outpost Jones". No one, particularly in the combat arms realm wants to be labeled FOBBIT; although it has nothing to do with you mission or performance, rather than being "spoiled" with KBR chow, movie theaters, basketball gyms and "salsa night" at the MWR facility.

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Definitely the anti-Fobbit sentiment is part of it. However, given my diss subject this notion that there can be too much is very interesting to me. It's not what one would expect on a superficial level. It's certainly not what the "Support The Troops" mindset would expect.

Furthermore, I think the reaction against the FOBs reflects something of an innate or subconscious recognition that the conspicuous consumption is not serving our war effort. When the Iraqi civilians are pissed that they cannot get reliable electricity, it doesn't help anything that the American forces are eating ice cream. Hell, a military analyst I met told me he thought the food service at Camp Fallujah was over the top.

This all ties into an idea that has emerged in my mind that there must be parity in suffering between troops and civilians in a war zone. American troops mutinied in the Rev War because they were starving in a land of plenty. In WWII, the sharing that went on between the Allied troops and the liberated civilian populations probably went a long way to assisting the war effort. In Iraq, I doubt our effort is helped by the fact that the vast majority of American troops are living high off the hog while the Iraqis can't even get the basics.

However, I do think that there may also be some valid concerns that such indulgences conflict with operational readiness.

There are always a number of factors at work with any given opinion.

Regards,
Jill

Hi Jill,

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Originally Posted by Sargent

This all ties into an idea that has emerged in my mind that there must be parity in suffering between troops and civilians in a war zone. American troops mutinied in the Rev War because they were starving in a land of plenty. In WWII, the sharing that went on between the Allied troops and the liberated civilian populations probably went a long way to assisting the war effort. In Iraq, I doubt our effort is helped by the fact that the vast majority of American troops are living high off the hog while the Iraqis can't even get the basics.

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I think that is a really good point. It is probably even more important in the ME where there is a tradition that conquerors live well at the expense of the populace (happened in other places too, but the memory of it goes back a long way in the ME). This is one of those times when the logic of rhetoric is more important that that of reality :wry:.

With all its flaws -- and it has plenty -- contracting basic services has merit. The troops hate that kind of stuff and the cessation of a lot of grass mowing, rock painting and, yes K.P or Mess Duty plus a lot of other minor annoyances has helped keep folks in all the services. The Navy can't do that on ships and thus, they have a very minor retention problem because of that scut work. Add it back into the Army, Marines and AF and it will cause retention problems. In an era of an aging population and a kinder gentler world where military service is eschewed by many that may not be a good idea.

It's easy for those who don't have to do that kind of make work (which is what some of it is) and necessary but unpleasant work to overlook the inhibiting effect on Joe. Joe doesn't do windows if he can avoid it -- and, if we're going to train him well enough to go risk his life (which we don't do well) then the least we can do id let him skip washing windows.

The the Army and Marines get plenty of enlistees for the combat arms and for both services, the re-up rates in the combat skills are great. Not so in the Combat service support arena. Enlistments are down and reenlistments are far lower than in the combat arms.

I'm not sure that a reversion to the WW II / Korea / Viet Nam era Army (all effectively the same; little changed) is a good idea. Having been a part of it, there was a lot of crookedness and corruption, petty and major theft by people in uniform. There was also a lot of mediocre performance. Even stupidity -- like the 1LT who futilely and rather foolishly told me and about 15 armed, dirty and smelly troops who needed shaves and haircuts we couldn't eat in his Chu Lai Mess Hall... :D

The Revolution was a long time ago, so was the Civil War which had the same 'contractor' problems. In fact, all wars seem to have contractor problems. The mostly Korean and Japaneses contractors in Korea were crooked and bore a lot of watching; the Consortium RMK-BRJ in Viet Nam got wealthy (the BR being then Brown and Root, now part of KBR. BR in the day were friends of Lyndon...). I suspect it's a human frailty problem and there's no fixing it, just a lot of watching.

My belief is that contracting is probably going to be with us absent a return to the draft (to which I am very strongly opposed) and that aside from the services getting a lot smarter about it -- and eliminating a lot of the Congressionally imposed bureaucracy involved in the contracting process as well as continuing Congressional influence in that process (NOTE: Which has a whole lot to do with the apparent DoD willingness to 'overlook' possible chicanery...) -- it seems to me that design of structure and equipment should be undertaken in the future with elimination of as much contract support as possible as an essential goal.

Consider also that the wants and needs of armed forces in peacetime and those in wartime differ considerably. The US has effectively been at peace since 1945 -- parts of the services have been to war many times since and are there now but Congress and the Pentagon have not been at war in a long time...

No easy solutions to this one...

Ken,
Great points; also consider a lot of jobs on military posts (mess hall, range control, MPs, maintenance, etc) used to be manned by the military. Come to any post now and you will see that it's all pretty much been contracted. Mainly because we don't have enough Soldiers to do it. In a 2 million man army, we would see military members guarding the gate, running range control and serving chow. This obviously carries over to theater.

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There was also a lot of mediocre performance. Even stupidity -- like the 1LT who futilely and rather foolishly told me and about 15 armed, dirty and smelly troops who needed shaves and haircuts we couldn't eat in his Chu Lai Mess Hall... :D

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I've heard that now at LSA Anaconda you MUST have your reflective PT belt to get into the chow hall! You can't eat without it!

I'm not sure if it's such a good idea, this reliance on contracting for government services, and if there is a positive effective on retention, I don't think it ultimately makes up for the negative effects in so many other areas.

I remember when the contracting craze got underway in earnest, back in the early 90s. It was supposed to streamline and make more efficient many operations ("let industry do it - they have to make a profit ergo they are more efficient!"), and save the government a lot of money. I think neither goal has been achieved; unfortunately since that time, contracting and outsourcing have grown and grown, giving defense industry great influence and leverage over the formulation and execution of defense policy, and today, I think the department is in a bad shape due to that.

Like Jill, my blood boils hearing that a contractor held the troops hostage to their bottom line, but I am not suprised (just saddened) to see things come to such a pass, out at the front. It already happens here in echelons above reality. I have personally witnessed a dispute between my command and a service that shall remain nameless, where government interest was subverted and a corporate agenda was pushed in the place of legitimate military needs. Said service's training network was actually owned by a major contractor and only leased by the service, and refused to follow proscribed government networking standards and refused to connect their network to ours so that the Joint community could gain access to certain simulation resources there. When we held meetings between the sides to work it out, the service's representatives were actually contractors from the company that owned the network (well the first time; we threw them out and told the service next time to send only military or goverment civilians in the future). A short time later, this company sent its representatives to some installations belonging to another service, and tried to convince them not to use the already-installed Joint network to do Joint training, but to spend government money to buy nodes on their network, if they ever hoped to have access to their host service's training resources in the future. One example of defense contractor shenanigans among many I have witnessed.

I think things started going wrong when contractors shifted from being only providers of equipment to performing services. Performing services makes you a part of the chain of command, full stop; but unlike military/ government members of that chain, companies have a second set of loyalties, that their company's own bottom line. Thus it is impossible to have unity of command, or assurance that your private sector subordinates will do what the boss commands, unless the corporate folks abide by an ethic that the bottom line takes a back seat to the good of the government where those two collide. Example above and from Jill's post demonstrate that is not the case, nor have I ever heard of that happening anywhere else. Conflicts of interest are built in to this.

Over-reliance on contractors to do government business can also lead to a loss of control of government functions, again like the unnamed service no longer really being in control of their training network, and the Army's CSS support cited in the original article. Costs get out of hand - I think that almost goes without saying now, looking at endemic contract cost overruns, and

I haven't really talked about the massive consolidation of defense industry in the 90s but that plays a big role, too. There's really very little domestic competition out there to curb the worst excesses of the few contractors left in the field, often the government has nowhere to turn. This could be mitigated somewhat by using foreign contractors, but then the spectre is raised of the loss of domestic military production capability. The giant contractors are aware of this, and exploit that fact as a license to print money.

Unfortunately I don't see this changing much - too many in politics are beneficiaries of the status quo.

(Of course, I caveat all this with "I have nothing against contractor employees - I used to be one - just some of their corporate masters." Don't want anyone to take this as a slam against the worker bees)

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Originally Posted by Stevely

I'm not sure if it's such a good idea, this reliance on contracting for government services, and if there is a positive effective on retention, I don't think it ultimately makes up for the negative effects in so many other areas.

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Wouldn't that depend on the numbers?

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I remember when the contracting craze got underway in earnest, back in the early 90s.

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Actually, it started in the mid 70s as a result of the cessation of the Draft.

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... giving defense industry great influence and leverage over the formulation and execution of defense policy, and today, I think the department is in a bad shape due to that.

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Interesting. in what way do you see them influencing policy (other than in the retirees who work for contractors or the contractors who get appointed to defense positions, something that's been happening since WW II).

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I have personally witnessed a dispute between my command and a service that shall remain nameless, where government interest was subverted and a corporate agenda was pushed in the place of legitimate military needs. ... One example of defense contractor shenanigans among many I have witnessed.

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Stuff like that happens. I have also seen turf battles between commands (and services..) that got worse than that -- and everyone involved was wearing a war suit.

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I think things started going wrong when contractors shifted from being only providers of equipment to performing services. Performing services makes you a part of the chain of command, full stop; but unlike military/ government members of that chain, companies have a second set of loyalties, that their company's own bottom line. Thus it is impossible to have unity of command, or assurance that your private sector subordinates will do what the boss commands, unless the corporate folks abide by an ethic that the bottom line takes a back seat to the good of the government where those two collide. Example above and from Jill's post demonstrate that is not the case, nor have I ever heard of that happening anywhere else. Conflicts of interest are built in to this.

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The US government is one massive conflict of interest -- look at the FAA or the Department of Agriculture; any of them. Life is a conflict of interest. The Company has no loyalty to the government or to the chain of command; their only loyalty is to their bottom line, period. Any contract written without that thoughy firmly in mind will leave loopholes that corporate lawyers will find and wiggle through. Sorry, but to me, that's human nature at work, to be expected (not desired, not nice but expected) and part of the way things work. Better contracts and fewer changes can stop that.

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Over-reliance on contractors to do government business can also lead to a loss of control of government functions, again like the unnamed service no longer really being in control of their training network, and the Army's CSS support cited in the original article. Costs get out of hand - I think that almost goes without saying now, looking at endemic contract cost overruns, and
money.

Unfortunately I don't see this changing much - too many in politics are beneficiaries of the status quo.

(Of course, I caveat all this with "I have nothing against contractor employees - I used to be one - just some of their corporate masters." Don't want anyone to take this as a slam against the worker bees)

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While I don't dispute that the system is far from perfect and that there's graft and corruption in it; I gotta ask Old Eagle's question; Bearing my subject line in mind, what's your solution?

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Originally Posted by Ken White

With all its flaws -- and it has plenty -- contracting basic services has merit. The troops hate that kind of stuff and the cessation of a lot of grass mowing, rock painting and, yes K.P or Mess Duty plus a lot of other minor annoyances has helped keep folks in all the services. The Navy can't do that on ships and thus, they have a very minor retention problem because of that scut work. Add it back into the Army, Marines and AF and it will cause retention problems. In an era of an aging population and a kinder gentler world where military service is eschewed by many that may not be a good idea.

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This is why I limited the critique to combat service support. Sure, use contractors to do the scut work on bases in the states -- maybe they could send a few over to my house to keep it clean while my husband is deployed, I wouldn't complain. But where the bullets are flying, the only people you are going to get to work amidst them are soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. The contractors won't do it.

On a side note, every time I see a Navy commercial with aviators or SEALS, I chuckle and imagine the commercial that highlights the scut work -- "Join the Navy, scrape barnacles!"

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The the Army and Marines get plenty of enlistees for the combat arms and for both services, the re-up rates in the combat skills are great. Not so in the Combat service support arena. Enlistments are down and reenlistments are far lower than in the combat arms.

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It might be worth looking into whether the system they have for Marine officers might work with enlisted personnel. For the former, even if they are in a combat arms MOS, they alternate between A billets (fleet tours, usually, in their MOS) and B billets (office jobs doing some sort of support work -- at MARCORSYSCOM, MCCDC, recruiting, etc.). The B billets, while not jobs most enjoy, are usually good for down time from deployments, usually have a lighter workload, and are thus pretty good for family time. Sometimes they are a complete waste of time, but again, short days with little to do give a guy or gal a chance to catch up on all of the administrative scut work of their household that they've missed out on while on a strenuous deployment schedule.

Thus, you could increase the number of personnel who can join up in the combat arms MOS's, and get the rest of the work done by cycling them through A and B billets. You could make it nice and organized and efficient by assigning a primary MOS (their combat arms specialty) and a secondary MOS (the type of office work they will be assigned to), that way you'll know that the jobs will get done.

But again, they don't need to be cutting the grass or painting rocks. Unless, of course, they get themselves in trouble -- because that is great work for brig rats.

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I'm not sure that a reversion to the WW II / Korea / Viet Nam era Army (all effectively the same; little changed) is a good idea. Having been a part of it, there was a lot of crookedness and corruption, petty and major theft by people in uniform. There was also a lot of mediocre performance. Even stupidity -- like the 1LT who futilely and rather foolishly told me and about 15 armed, dirty and smelly troops who needed shaves and haircuts we couldn't eat in his Chu Lai Mess Hall... :D

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This is why you make everyone be a combat arms person first. This is why Marines really want Marine aviators to be there for CAS -- [and why they hate that the Air Force wants all air assets under a single control, because this means they might not get their guys flying the really hairy missions] -- because those aviators have gone to TBS and know a bit about what the guy on the ground is going through. If you have an infantryman running a support service, he'll likely do it with gusto and integrity, because it's his buddies up at the front that he's supporting. It's why my husband was so aggressive at SYSCOM -- because the system he was deploying was for the artillery community, and the guys getting it were his colleagues, and one day he'd be using it as well.

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The Revolution was a long time ago, so was the Civil War which had the same 'contractor' problems.

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The Rev War wasn't so long ago that the lesson doesn't bear remembering. And, if my recollection serves, the guys charged with actually delivering the food to the troops were soldiers, not contractors. (Contractors may have provided the food, and that's probably where the problems came in.) That's why there's a memorial to McKinley the soldier at Antietam for delivering a hot meal and coffee to the battle weary soldiers.

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No easy solutions to this one...

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No, but if we don't even bother looking for one, then there are no solutions.

Cheers,
Jill

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Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso

...I've heard that now at LSA Anaconda you MUST have your reflective PT belt to get into the chow hall! You can't eat without it!

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I'm sure there's some logic in that somewhere but I'm certainly having a hard time figuring out what it might be. :wry:

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Originally Posted by Sargent

This is why I limited the critique to combat service support. ... But where the bullets are flying, the only people you are going to get to work amidst them are soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. The contractors won't do it.

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True, to an extent; you'll always find a few but they'll cost big bucks -- that's why I say the key is to design our systems, organizations and equipment to minimize the contractor requirement * .

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..."Join the Navy, scrape barnacles!"

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It was paint that got scraped and the Navy got smart and bought a better quality of paint that needs replacement less often -- so the contractors in the Yards do it when the ship cycle through (as in * above)...

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It might be worth looking into whether the system they have for Marine officers might work with enlisted personnel.

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That's done to an extent but it doesn't answer the CSS dirty work problem. My bet is that if you offer a lot of combat arms NCOs the unrefusable option of alternating between a CA and a CSS job; they'll leave the service. I would have. :D

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This is why you make everyone be a combat arms person first...

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I agree -- unfortunately, the Air Force and Army personnel folks don't; "inefficient" they say. As if there were anything more inefficient than a war. Even bigger problem is my guess would be about half (+ or - 10% or so) the CA enlistees wouldn't go for the CSS rotation. NCOs as a body differ from Officers in a number of respects. Most do not want to be generalists or multi spectral.

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The Rev War wasn't so long ago that the lesson doesn't bear remembering.

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True -- and WW II, Korea and Viet Nam with all their systemic ineffectiveness, logistic cock-ups, outright failures (which got covered up by the brass and didn't make the papers as contractors did and do -- but the Troops affected knew) crookedness and black marketing by folks in uniform were even less long ago. Balancing both lessons and applying them to tomorrow is the problem.

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No, but if we don't even bother looking for one, then there are no solutions.

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Agree. See above *. ;)

There's a picture I have of a Marine, a tub of lard wearing a glo-belt, and a moral somewhere in between. I'll save it though, as most of you all have already seen it. :D

Count me among those who can proudly proclaim that in three deployments to Iraq, I did not partake in the madness that was the FOB lifestyle. For me, being in Iraq did not include Pizza Hut, Subway, Green Bean, a PX, a gigantic DFAC full of overweight Soldiers, salsa night, or paying for sex. That said, I would also point out that I did occasionally travel to FOBs for logistical issues - thankfully I never had to stay more than 8 hours. But I had zero bad experiences with contractors. In fact, they were far better than their Army counterparts, from what I observed.

Here is one example (I could give many more): weapons repair. My supply sergeant brought weapons in need of repair to the nearest FOB during OIF III. For the first half of the deployment, it was run by Army personnel. They were great at making excuses for why they could not fix the weapons or why they would not fix them and they were great at showing up late, leaving early, taking extended lunch breaks, and making excuses for why the work order paperwork was incorrect and precluded any further action until the following week when my supply sergeant would make another futile attempt. As soon as those yahoos were replaced by big, fat contractors with bushy white beards, our weapons got immediately fixed on the spot, almost every time. The longest turn-around was a matter of hours. It was a day and night difference. Their "hours of operation" were longer, their work ethic was better, they were faster, more efficient, more effective, easier to work with - I could go on.

This was representative of my experiences with weapons repair, supply warehouses, 30 level mechanical repairs, and more, both in Iraq and in Kuwait. I loved it when Brown & Root took over more functions of our logistics, because I knew that instead of some slugabed E-4, supervised by a lazy E-6, and commanded by a lackluster O-2 or O-3 (or worse), either I or my supply sergeant was going to be dealing with someone who could be fired if too many Soldiers complained about his performance, someone who was earning $80K per year and thus did not want to lose his job. It made a world of difference.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

This is why I limited the critique to combat service support. Sure, use contractors to do the scut work on bases in the states -- maybe they could send a few over to my house to keep it clean while my husband is deployed, I wouldn't complain. But where the bullets are flying, the only people you are going to get to work amidst them are soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. The contractors won't do it.

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That's not that much of an issue as most of the contractors (unarmed I mean, not Blackwater et all) work on the FOB and actually many of them are specifically forbidden to leave the FOB. That said there are quite a few contract drivers out doing convoys and they are definitely out where the bullets are flying.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

It might be worth looking into whether the system they have for Marine officers might work with enlisted personnel. For the former, even if they are in a combat arms MOS, they alternate between A billets (fleet tours, usually, in their MOS) and B billets (office jobs doing some sort of support work -- at MARCORSYSCOM, MCCDC, recruiting, etc.). The B billets, while not jobs most enjoy, are usually good for down time from deployments, usually have a lighter workload, and are thus pretty good for family time. Sometimes they are a complete waste of time, but again, short days with little to do give a guy or gal a chance to catch up on all of the administrative scut work of their household that they've missed out on while on a strenuous deployment schedule.

Thus, you could increase the number of personnel who can join up in the combat arms MOS's, and get the rest of the work done by cycling them through A and B billets. You could make it nice and organized and efficient by assigning a primary MOS (their combat arms specialty) and a secondary MOS (the type of office work they will be assigned to), that way you'll know that the jobs will get done.

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That will never work for a variety of reasons with the biggest one being that most CA and CSS soldiers joined CA or CSS specifically because they did not want to be the other. Tell the average support guy like a cook, a clerk, a mechanic or a tanker that he has to do a tour in combat arms and he is going tell you to get bent and he will get out and go find a job somewhere else. Tell the average infantryman that he has to do a tour as a support guy and his response will be somewhat more profane but the end result will be the same. This system works for officers because they will spend a great deal of their career in staff jobs anyway.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

This is why you make everyone be a combat arms person first.

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The Army has been trying to do this since Schoomaker and it hasn't worked all that well. The problem is partially cultural, supporters don't really have much interest is being CA first and partially practical, supporters don't really have the time, knowledge or resources to build and maintain those skillsets.

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While I don't dispute that the system is far from perfect and that there's graft and corruption in it; I gotta ask Old Eagle's question; Bearing my subject line in mind, what's your solution?

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I agree with this completely. Lots of people don't like that we use so many contractors, me neither but what is the solution? We don't have enough servicemembers to do everything that contractors do now and we aren't going to anytime soon.

SFC W

First, to Schmedlap, the problem of paperwork rigamarole never should have happened to your unit, as a current loggie, and former infantryman (even if I was a dirty nasty leg), I always hate hearing about the utter laziness of certain Soldiers in my branch, and guaranteed that we never turned down a job (within reason). The only reason loggies have jobs is to make sure the door-kickers have all the ammo, food, and working equipment they need, and any leader who doesn't understand that deserves a relief for cause
--END RANT--
Contractors are a touchy subject, and I think the Army misuses them, both in theater and otherwise. Obviously, the military manpower shortage plays a major role in this, but, as stated in other threads, I think part of this is due to a short-sighted view when writing contracts. I know quite a few peers in my branch who deployed only to find KBR, or a subcontractor, conducting their wartime mission, leaving the unit to perform some other function, sometimes completely wasting resources (MWR support, etc.)
As far as CSS serving in CA roles, it has already happened in multiple BCTs, and will continue to happen. While training time is limited in most CSS units due to workload while state-side, if a unit expects to do something in theater, they will find the time to train. As far as the argument about CSS Soldiers only joining the Army to do their specific MOS, there are quite a few Soldiers in my unit reclassing into MFE MOSs or going to SFAS because of experiences they had while deployed. The Soldiers are willing to do the job, and if they're not willing to be a rifleman (or riflewoman) first, they should leave the Army. I disagree with the Marine A/B Billet idea for the Army, to echo Uboat, if you want to piss off a young Infantryman, tell him to go work in the DFAC.

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Uboat wrote: That's not that much of an issue as most of the contractors (unarmed I mean, not Blackwater et all) work on the FOB and actually many of them are specifically forbidden to leave the FOB.

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And since not everyone lives on a FOB, and since there are not many options on how to support those who don't, then it seems nearly criminal to have put most of the CSS assets in their control. Does it seem right to anyone to send troops into harm's way with no reasonable means to support (feed) them?

We will not always be able to fight based on a FOB concept, where contractors can live and work in nice, safe conditions to support the troops. What happens when troops have to operate in a truly expeditionary manner?

It may require that we have to fight against our natural way of war, per Weigley -- that is, we rely too much on being able to throw money at a problem. It may be that we have to go back to a people solution, specifically a people in uniform solution.

Regards,
Jill

As regards the responses to the concept that one way to get around the contractor issue in CSS is to have personnel assigned primary and secondary MOS's, so that they can serve in A and B billets, such that more of the CSS can be handled by military personnel:

I have to say, I am not impressed with the picture of soldiers that has emerged from those responses. My son is 5, and he's already learned that he can't always expect to get everything he wants -- and he knows better than to complain when he doesn't. He also knows that the correct response in those cases is "Yes mom," full stop, in a tone of voice that doesn't betray any whining or complaint. I don't know whether to be more disappointed with the state of parenting in this country or the state of leadership in the Army. From what you all have said, it seems to me as though "soldier" has become synonymous with "prima donna" or "spoiled brat." What happened to the ethic of selfless service? Did someone put in a codicil that such service is only on the terms of what the individual wants? In any case, I sure hope my impression is incorrect, that you are all just trying to prove how enthusiastic soldiers are to serve in the most difficult circumstances possible.

Look, if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers -- the most ooh-rah, get some, there's nothing better than being at the point of "pull string-go boom," group you could ever wish to find -- to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers. I would expect nothing less.

However, if you are truly correct, and you can't teach these old dogs new tricks, then the simple answer is that the system applies to those who will enter the service in the future.

If you don't believe there is a problem with contractor-provided CSS, then there is no reason to contemplate such a solution. However, if you think that CSS may have to be returned to those in uniform, then something is going to have to give.

Pardon me for being blunt.

Regards,
Jill

I understand the concern that an argument was put forth stating, basically, that if the contract were cancelled then troops would be without food. However, that is an exaggeration of a statement that was false to begin with. There would be a delay in transferring back from contractor-provided logistics to Army-provided, but the troops would not go hungry. They would simply eat MREs in the interim.

Any FOB or other type of base in Iraq always has enough MREs to be a buffer against a stoppage in food flow. I know this because I have seen it occur. Certain FOBs have had their food supply cut short due to certain routes being shut down to logistics convoys. During those times, the FOBbits ate MREs. The issue is not that troops would go hungry. The issue is that they would be eating MREs. And if you do not cringe at the though of troops eating anything less than gourmet food prepared in a 4-star dining facility, 3 to 4 times per day, everyday, then you do not support the troops (that was sarcasm). That's right - there is a political angle.

It is important to remember that FOBs are Division/Brigade types of areas. The most significant change at issue here is not one of outsourcing logistics to contractors, so much as that our small units are co-habitating with the higher echelons. As a result of this change, we are observing the logistics activity at the DIV/BDE areas, seeing the co-habitation with the companies, and assuming that companies are now conducting contractor-driven logistics. That is simply not the case.

Our increasing outsourcing of logistics is borne more of choice than need and it is only occurring in any significant fashion at high echelons. And it is not borne so much of necessity as from a quality of life stance. The FOBs dole out lots of cash for $35 plates of KBR gourmet extravaganza because someone early on in this war made the determination that we were weak, soft, fragile little things that would bend under the pressure of doing what we signed up to do, if we did not eat three belly-busting meals of steak, bacon, pizza, red bull, and doughnuts every day. When necessity rears its ugly head, units are perfectly capable of doing logistics old-school style. And they do.

For example, my battalion was located away from a FOB and my company was located away from the battalion. The food at our company patrol base and the food consumed at the battalion mini-FOB (for lack of a better term) were prepared and cooked by our battalion's cooks. There were no contractors at our company PB or at our battalion's mini-FOB. The battalion mini-FOB's ration cycle was A-M-A. Our weekly ration cycle at the company level was M-M-M, M-M-M, M-M-A, M-M-M, M-M-M, M-M-M, M-M-A, repeat.

Before being picked up at a large FOB by our support platoon, the food was shipped from Kuwait to the large FOBs by contractors (with US Army Military Police escorts). But, so what? This makes sense. The fact that we are outsourcing does not mean that we are incapable of the logistics. It just means that outsourcing makes more sense, given the intent. We could switch back, but why? It would be less efficient. If Iran comes across the border, then maybe reverting back to military logistics will make sense. Until then, have another doughnut.

guy who really respects the Marines (I never met a dumb Field Grade Marine officer - they could all do the dumb Marine act brilliantly however:D) it is well to remember that the USMC is NOT the Army writ small. Neither is the Army the USMC writ large. They are different organizations whose missions sometimes overlap but often do not. So they will and should do many things differently although they can certainly learn from each other.

Break

I'm with all of you who think that we have gone too far in contracting out services - even in the vast majority of the cases where the contractors are honest and competent. There is no easy or short term solution. But the beginning is to clearly identify what is a government function and stop contracting for that function as we build the capacity to perform it back into the government/military. We didn't get to this point overnight - as Ken says, it began in the 70s with the AVF - and we won't reach a new desired equilibrium in a year or two. Hopefully, it won't take us 35 years!:eek:

Cheers

JohnT

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Originally Posted by Sargent

From what you all have said, it seems to me as though "soldier" has become synonymous with "prima donna" or "spoiled brat." What happened to the ethic of selfless service? Did someone put in a codicil that such service is only on the terms of what the individual wants? In any case, I sure hope my impression is incorrect, that you are all just trying to prove how enthusiastic soldiers are to serve in the most difficult circumstances possible.

... if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers... to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers.

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Jill,

That is a very good question and it could be a thread of its own. It is a question that I grappled with when I decided to leave the Army. Had my option been to be a platoon leader or company commander for the next 20 years, then I would have happily continued to sacrifice my social life and risk my mortal life to do it. But I left the Army because I recognized that, as a Captain, the remainder of my career would be about a 5 to 1 ratio, or worse, of staff time to command time. All of that risk and sacrifice, just to do PowerPoint slides, run a TOC, or otherwise do work that a mediocre Soldier with a permanent profile could do. It did not make any sense to me. But then I also thought, "what about selfless service?" My decision making process sounded highly selfish. And maybe it was. Or maybe I am too self-critical. I don't know. My decision boiled down to my recognition that if I hated my job, then I would not have the self-discipline to give it the full attention that it merited. That was how I rationalized it. It is something that I still think about.

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Originally Posted by Ken White

The US government is one massive conflict of interest -- look at the FAA or the Department of Agriculture; any of them. Life is a conflict of interest. The Company has no loyalty to the government or to the chain of command; their only loyalty is to their bottom line, period. Any contract written without that thoughy firmly in mind will leave loopholes that corporate lawyers will find and wiggle through. Sorry, but to me, that's human nature at work, to be expected (not desired, not nice but expected) and part of the way things work. Better contracts and fewer changes can stop that.

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I don't have a problem in principle with the way businesses work in trying for government contracts, but I think it is a problem when contractors are integrated into the government workforce. You get personnel who serve two masters in one organization, and that's trouble.

You could mitigate some problems with more careful contract writing, but there are a lot of problems with that, I think. Contracted workforce is now pretty common throughout the department, so we're going need probably more lawyers than what we have currently, or rely less on them, or allow contracts with very broad statements of work. Where I work, we've got close to 1000 contractors, who have all been unified under one big contract. We (my boss and me and his other minions) spent the better part of a year combing through the task order to ensure that we closed all the little loopholes, but we still get conflicts over "that's not in the task order, so pay us more or go away." We have a big and technically diverse mission, you really just can't cover it all and I don't believe we could write a foolproof contract to cover the mission, if we have specify all the things the contractor must do (and we do). Squabbles with the contract over what is legitimate work are common here, and depressing.

This is not good in a COCOM HQ, would be much worse out in the field. Do we want contractors parsing their statement of work on the battlefield? I think the obvious solution is that we need more troops, then we wouldn't have a need to push contractors out to do jobs that have traditionally been done by soldiers, or reduce our commitments to the level that can be supported by the numbers we have in uniform. Failing that, fill the billets with GS (make that NSPS) personnel.

Past my few suggestions, I don't have any schemes to solve this current impasse. Though if I do find some clever solution to it all, I will start my own consultancy and go hunting contracts to sell my wisdom to Uncle Sam. :D

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Originally Posted by Andrew Steimer

First, to Schmedlap, the problem of paperwork rigamarole never should have happened to your unit, as a current loggie, and former infantryman (even if I was a dirty nasty leg), I always hate hearing about the utter laziness of certain Soldiers in my branch, and guaranteed that we never turned down a job (within reason). The only reason loggies have jobs is to make sure the door-kickers have all the ammo, food, and working equipment they need, and any leader who doesn't understand that deserves a relief for cause
--END RANT--

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I feel your pain :wry:. I am a former QM, dealt with my share of this. A fair few soldiers in CSS join the Army for the wrong reasons, and are perennially surprised (and become surly) when they are required to be soldiers and do their mission. Some of that can be fixed by good leadership example (when I was in Support Squadron, 11th ACR, all the log troops were pretty highly motivated, not so much in the FSBs I was in later). It is grating though, because the bad ones smear everyone else's reputation.

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I know quite a few peers in my branch who deployed only to find KBR, or a subcontractor, conducting their wartime mission, leaving the unit to perform some other function, sometimes completely wasting resources (MWR support, etc.)

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(repeating what Jill said)

This I can't understand. What happens if we have a higher intensity conflict, or are in an environment where we don't have the luxury of sprawling FOB complexes with all the comforts of home? Who will do the logistics then? If CSS soldiers aren't doing their jobs, they won't be ready to do them when there is no alternative to using soldiers.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

Look, if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers -- the most ooh-rah, get some, there's nothing better than being at the point of "pull string-go boom," group you could ever wish to find -- to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers. I would expect nothing less.

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I don't know that we so much accede to it. We're either relieved to escape from an infantry or artillery battalion environment for a few years, or we're drug off kicking and screaming. I would have been in the latter category, but my XO experience shifted me to the former.

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If you have an infantryman running a support service, he'll likely do it with gusto and integrity, because it's his buddies up at the front that he's supporting.

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I think rotating combat arms officers into CSS jobs would be a mistake. I had the (mis)fortune of pulling a collateral duty as team embarkation officer while doing my company XO time on a MEU deployment. My complete lack of knowledge about embarkation, logistics, or even what an M1123 HMMWV is (come to find out, it's the one that I had always been taught to refer to as a "highback") was a major hindrance. A trained logistics officer would have done a much better job (but try telling my battalion XO that - I did, and he didn't care). Ultimately, I am a much smarter MAGTF officer for having suffered through that; but I think if we were to rotate guys between CA and CSS across the board, it would turn out to be a disaster. My saving grace in that job was being surrounded by guys who were trained in that field, and could help me figure it out.

Keep in mind, what you are describing is not a B billet, per se. It is a CSS billet in the operating forces. Yes, there are combat arms officers that do a turn in CSS billets in the opfor as a B billet, but they are few and far between. B billets are typically in the Supporting Establishment, like your husband's job at SYSCOM.

I like the point that Ken and some others are making. Defense contracting is here to stay for some time. A similar thing happened in Europe in the Middle Ages - it was easier to hire trained men to do their fighting than to train and maintain their own armies. The way to maintain some quality control is to word the contracts carefully, and enforce the contractual obligations.

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Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

I never met a dumb Field Grade Marine officer - they could all do the dumb Marine act brilliantly however:D

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That, sir, is premium signature line material. :D

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Originally Posted by VMI_Marine

I like the point that Ken and some others are making. Defense contracting is here to stay for some time. A similar thing happened in Europe in the Middle Ages - it was easier to hire trained men to do their fighting than to train and maintain their own armies. The way to maintain some quality control is to word the contracts carefully, and enforce the contractual obligations.

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Yes, but in those times you are talking about fielding mercenary fighting forces. Arguably we do that now, and it seems to me we are sliding toward that end, but our society is politically much different than Europe in the Middle Ages - we have a citizen army, still, even if not a conscription army any more. It is politically meaningful that the citizenry have a share in the fights that the government of, by and for the people pick. Fighting wars is one of the most serious and profound things a government can do; contracting it out to private industry would, I believe, alter the political character of the country over the long term. I'm not sure that's a road we want to go down.

I am wondering why the majority of this discussion seems to be about the transport of class I as if that is all that these convoys carry. The attitude of some here seems to be that if we just start feeding the FOBBITs MREs then the need for contractors will dry up. That is simply not the case. First of all, all classes of supply are carried on those convoys. Even if you eliminate the hot meals on the FOBs, you will still need those convoys to carry everything else that is needed both on and off the FOB. Second, the military loggies aren't sitting on their hands and letting the contractors carry everything for them. There are plenty of military logistics convoys but there simply are not enough to haul everything that needs to be moved. Our military is not manned or equiped to support this type of long term mission.

SFC W

... is that the transition to contractors was driven by authorized end strength, the Congressional limit on the number of people in the active duty components.

The authorized end strength of the Army is 512,400 (authorized for 2009). The Army wants to get maximum combat power out of that number. The brass has decided (correctly, in my opinion) to identify areas where they can hire civilians to perform certain activities, and free up another troop slot for combat power.

That is the reason every company doesn't have its own mess section. Its the reason so much of the higher echelon maintenance/repair is performed by contractors. It's the reason a lot of the logistics (i.e. transport) is done by contractors. Having contractors do a lot of that work frees authorized slots for combat power.

A second consideration is pay. As an exampole, the Navy's electronics tech schools are (or at least used to be) the best to be found anywhere, military or civilian. They last(ed) about 18 months. Add 36 months for service in a unit, and the sailor is at the end of his enlistment. At which point, he can get a job at SCI Sanmina, Rockwell-Collins, Harris, etc. at two or three times the pay, company paid education to get a BS EE, etc. At this point, the Navy has exactly one avenue to pursue if it wants to retain the expertise: go to the contractor and pay them for the work.

Jill, a lot of your points and ideas are very well taken. But the problem isn't with what the services want. The problem is with the constraints imposed by Congress.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

...I have to say, I am not impressed with the picture of soldiers that has emerged from those responses. My son is 5, and he's already learned that he can't always expect to get everything he wants -- and he knows better than to complain when he doesn't....

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Do not take umbrage but allow me to point out that your son is not a relatively mature 18 or 19 year old who volunteered to do a particular for remuneration. That guy volunteered to do a job that he thought he would like or at least tolerate for some reason. Two generally distinct personality types go into the CSS and CA spectrums and it was my observation during my service in both the Corps and the Army that this was true and pretty non-negotiable in the eyes of most (not all, a few don't care that much). Officers and EM differ in attitudes on a lot of things and as John said, the Army and Marines differ. I'll also note that I have seen a number of both Army and Marine officers who were able to avoid some jobs they didn't like... :D

Even know some of both who got all the way to Colonel while avoiding service in DC...

Both services have at times reclassified EM from CSS to CA to fill shortfalls (none the other way to my knowledge, though a few guys get tired of combat and voluntarily switch to CSS); most accept it and adapt. However, if they have less than ten years, they tend to get out at the first opportunity; more than ten they mostly stick around -- and then tend to retire at 20 and not stick around for 30. Different people are attracted to different things and I'm not at all sure that's indicative of indiscipline or lack of motivation. You'd be surprised by the number of folks offered commissions in wartime and turn them down.

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What happened to the ethic of selfless service? Did someone put in a codicil that such service is only on the terms of what the individual wants?

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Essentially, yes -- the Enlistment contract is pretty specific. Could it be modified? Sure -- but right now it offers the kid what he thinks he wants as a job and that job offer is fairly specific and pretty much by MOSC.

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In any case, I sure hope my impression is incorrect, that you are all just trying to prove how enthusiastic soldiers are to serve in the most difficult circumstances possible.

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That is the case and I think you inadvertently maligned a lot of Marines and Soldiers. Joe can be hard for many to understand...

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Look, if you can get combat arms Marine Corps officers -- the most ooh-rah, get some, there's nothing better than being at the point of "pull string-go boom," group you could ever wish to find -- to accede to a system of rotation between fleet tours in the their MOS's and B-billets in a supporting function, then you ought to be able to do the same with soldiers. I would expect nothing less.

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Having some experience of Marine Officers and other various service types, IMO, your statement is correct with respect to some but not all Marine Officers. I'm not sure but suspect your knowledge of other communities that are every bit as Gung Ho -- some even more inclusively so -- may be limited. They're out there.

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However, if you are truly correct, and you can't teach these old dogs new tricks, then the simple answer is that the system applies to those who will enter the service in the future.

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Could be tried; my belief is that it wouldn't succeed. All the services today are filling combat arms slots with little problem but are having difficulty filling CSS slots. Short a return to the draft, I suspect that will continue because the average enlistee for a CSS job can make more money with less hassle on the outside -- the kid who wants to get in a fight has to go combat arms or be a cop, he cannot do that on the outside -- and the CA Army or Marine route offers more pizazz. As your 5 year old gets older, you'll see what I mean on a couple of levels... ;)

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If you don't believe there is a problem with contractor-provided CSS, then there is no reason to contemplate such a solution. However, if you think that CSS may have to be returned to those in uniform, then something is going to have to give.

Pardon me for being blunt.

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I thought we were supposed to be blunt? Not a problem. However, I don't think anyone disagrees with you that some CSS contracting is problematic or that in some circumstances, contracting isn't going to work. Seems to me we're in agreement on that and that comments offered to you and to Stevely have been in the vein "it's not as bad as you seem to think" and "that's a good idea but..." and we still end up at the same place -- What, really, is the solution? One that will actually work? How do you get people to volunteer for low paying scut work that comes in an environment filled with petty hassles and regimentation. A guy who wants to fight will put up with all that; one who doesn't want to fight will not.

(there's always a "but") Congressional manpower constraints are not the sole source of the problem. Clearly, they are part of it and aleviation will require more people in uniform. Obviously, there is a legitimate role for contractors but there are roles they play that should be government business. Among those, I submit, are training foreign militaries for the USG and educating/training ROTC cadets and midshipmen. When you remove the contracts from functions that are inherently governmental, you still have the problem of making sure the contract is written well and then its terms are enforced. One should never have to go to the contractor for the expertise to write a good contract but it is sad how often that happens. The positive side is that many of those contracts are written properly and protect the public interest because the contractors are often prior service who supervised similar contracts while on active duty. In many cases, their patriotism trumps corporate profit. Unfortunately, sometimes greed does win out. Some functions that are now performed by contract can and should be performed by civil servants - to make this effective requires a reform in the ability to expand civil service positions and making hiring easier. This, too, requires legislation but some things can, in fact, be done administratively.

It is, indeed, a complex problem but not chaotic (entirely).:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

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... is that the transition to contractors was driven by authorized end strength, the Congressional limit on the number of people in the active duty components.

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As we stand today that is correct

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The authorized end strength of the Army is 512,400 (authorized for 2009). The Army wants to get maximum combat power out of that number. The brass has decided (correctly, in my opinion) to identify areas where they can hire civilians to perform certain activities, and free up another troop slot for combat power.

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Yes again

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That is the reason every company doesn't have its own mess section. Its the reason so much of the higher echelon maintenance/repair is performed by contractors. It's the reason a lot of the logistics (i.e. transport) is done by contractors. Having contractors do a lot of that work frees authorized slots for combat power.

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Not exactly. The removal of mess sections, and maintenance sections to create light infantry divisions was all part of AOE as described below:

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Army of Excellence
The centerpiece of the reorganization, the light infantry division was a 3-brigade organization with 9 battalions of straight foot-infantry, with a strength eventually set at 10,800 men. Deployable in approximately 550 C-141 airlift sorties, it was oriented specifically to contingency actions worldwide where response in the first days of a crisis was critical. Lacking armor and heavy howitzers, the division was structured on shock tactics rather than sustained firepower. Based on the historical lessons of World War II, force designers incorporated "corps plug" augmentation forces into the scheme to make up for the lack of firepower and logistical capability. By concept, an early-arriving light division could buy time for heavier forces to follow. The light division had a secondary mission of reinforcement of heavy forces in scenarios and terrain where it could be more effective than those forces - in cities, forests, and mountain areas. Many light infantry division capabilities were austere. The division - contingency focused - was conceived and approved as a hard-hitting, highly trained, elite light force, with high esprit and cooperation essential to its success. The design went through a successful certification process in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, supported by the TRADOC test organizations, during 1984-1986.

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There are two trends here: one was to reduce tail by either removing the function and replacing it with a partially technological fix as in MREs with T-rations served via micro waves. Or maintenance with so-called plugs from above; we all wondered what would happen when the supply of said plugs was expended.

This was going on well before then SecDef Cheney put the use of contractors into hyper-drive; see Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies, Deborah C. Kidwell. Paper #12. for a pretty good discussion of that.

The other trend was reduction of the military and removal of those functions in favor of "teeth". As you say, fewer troops means keep the shooters.

A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort.

Tom

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Originally Posted by Tom Odom

...A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort.

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Creighton Abrams as CofSA was the real initiator of that AC to RC move of CS/CSS units in 1973, it was desinged so that future Presidents would have to mobilize the guard and Reserve to got to war. It worked -- and works today.

The moves were well in place by the time Meyer and Weinberger appeared on scene (in 79 and 81, respectively). Abrams plan was the basis of (and in support of) the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984 even though he long preceded Cap. The AOE plan was on the right track but a change of civilian leadership meant that it fell by the wayside before it got fully implemented. That happens a lot.

I'll add that all this proves yet again that the Weinberger and Powell 'doctrines' were idealistic to an extreme and thus flawed...

Probably also proving that concrete structural plans and efforts as opposed to 'doctrine' can work and last. Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.

what you are driving at in your third trend:


"A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort."

Tom[/QUOTE]

One of the consequences of both the Gulf War decision to call up RC personnel using derivative UICs and the subsequent Rumsfeld understaffed Army was to require the call up of all sorts of RC (USAR and NG) units - CA, CS, and CSS for multiple tours well beyond what they thought they were signing up for. Can you clarify?;)

Cheers

JohnT

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Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

what you are driving at in your third trend:


"A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort."

Tom

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One of the consequences of both the Gulf War decision to call up RC personnel using derivative UICs and the subsequent Rumsfeld understaffed Army was to require the call up of all sorts of RC (USAR and NG) units - CA, CS, and CSS for multiple tours well beyond what they thought they were signing up for. Can you clarify?;)

Cheers

JohnT[/QUOTE]


JohnT
Agreed Gulf War I required the call up; per the Powell Doctrine that Ken loves so much :D

Gulf War 2 (OIF) required call ups but Rumsfeld view if a transformational military was built on the theory of short war. That means contractors. You supposedly did not have to disrupt the American life style and you could exercise greater executive control of foreign policy and military force. Remember all the hype about transformation in 2001 pre-9/11? It was all about projecting power quickly without any increase in actual force structure.

Where that "vision" (my use of quotes is plain sacarsm) failed was that there would be a need for repeated call ups of those forces on top of all those contractors. In other words, you paid both ways: you paid for high contract costs because you had stripped capacity to sustain the force from the actiual force and you still needed call ups for the long haul

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From Ken:Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.

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Absolutely!

Tom

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Probably also proving that concrete structural plans and efforts as opposed to 'doctrine' can work and last. Thus my suggestion that we'd be better off trying to change the organizations and equipment to minimize the need for contractor support rather than trying to change human nature by executive diktat.

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Could not agree more that keeping contractor logistics support (CLS) out of fielded systems is a desired end state. However, with the trend these days going to ever more COTS procurement as a way to do rapid fielding to bridge perceived capability shortfalls, we are more and more stuck on the CLS horns with the systems we are currently fielding.

The institutional training base is not geared up to provide the kind of rapid response needed to produce uniformed maintainers to sustain equipment fielded using rapid fielding initiative processes (but I think ken and I have had these discussions about the "issues" in the military, at least TRADOC, training design and development process before :)).

from Viet Nam and as CofSA almost immediately set out to move the bulk of the CS/CSS to the Guard and Reserve for two reason. First, to insure that no future President could go to war without calling up the RC and secondly, to put those kinds of unit -- even then having problems recruiting -- in the RC where they could better recruit and could allow unit members to work in their trade in civilian life as well as in training, thus enhancing their skills if they needed to be called up. To that end, some thought was put into what units went where in an attempt to locate units where there were likely locally required skills that would enhance the effectiveness of the unit.

Unfortunately, in the 80s, politics took over and two things happened. first, the ArNG got agreement to take over all CA units in the RC (bad decision on the part of DA) and the USAR picked up the majority of the CSS (read: all that the ArNG did not want) while both components shared CS elements. There was also some movement of unit locations based on politics and not on what native to the area skill pools might contain. Both of these actions were detrimental (IMO) to the concept, to the Army and to the RC.

Come Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Vouno tried to go to war without calling up the RC CS/CSS pool -- he couldn't do it. He and Benny Peay tried every trick in the book and couldn't make it work so the CS/CSS package had to be called up, thus units tabbed Capstone to VII and XVIII Corps had to be activated. Third Army's down trace was mostly RC, they had to be called up. Congress also insisted on ArNG Brigades being called up and sent (they paid for 'em and they and the Guard wanted to put 'em to work). So three Bdes were activated over loud protests from DA. The DA plan was to stall and not deploy them in order to justify a couple of full up, all AC deployable Corps so they decided the RC refresher training would entail a trip to the NTC. One Bde, the 48th from GA, went through that and completed it just about the time of the ceasefire in Kuwait. It never got certified for deployment by DA (a statutory requirement) on the basis "the war's over..." Fun and games the DA way...

Come this one, Tom's got it right plus the need for for more troops due to a rotation policy drove the deployment of ArNG Bdes -- all of whom have done pretty good. 278th from TN did exceptionally well.

There are a number of lessons in this for many, from Congress to DA to the RC to Defense contractors. Let's see how smart everyone is... :D

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Originally Posted by wm

Could not agree more that keeping contractor logistics support (CLS) out of fielded systems is a desired end state. However, with the trend these days going to ever more COTS procurement as a way to do rapid fielding to bridge perceived capability shortfalls, we are more and more stuck on the CLS horns with the systems we are currently fielding.

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Sadly true, in fact -- but that's the Army's fault for just reacting and not thinking ahead. That and skewed priorities that put big ticket items ahead of must have items of little glamor. Yes, I'm aware that the US Congress is a BIG part of that problem, as is DoD and our civilian 'leadership' (scare quotes advised on that one).

Still, the capability to plan ahead, to rationalize and procure the right things has always existed -- the Army has not been willing to put the energy into doing that. That's a senior leadership failure. They are the Stewards of the Institution in their view and I submit they have not done a particularly good job. I'll fault all of the services for being a tad arrogant and not explaining what they need and why they need it very well -- sadly because I think in many cases, they don't know. However, I also believe they've all been guilty of not really thinking ahead and getting a really good handle on their own roles and missions. I am fully aware that is very easy for me to say when I have no responsibility but there was a time when I did have a little and I think I exercised that better than I see with respect to rational and sensible efforts to prepare for combat -- because that is really what it's all about.

It will come as no surprise to many that I blame a lack of common sense and full training in the basics, the personnel system and DOPMA for much of this...:D

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The institutional training base is not geared up to provide the kind of rapid response needed to produce uniformed maintainers to sustain equipment fielded using rapid fielding initiative processes (but I think ken and I have had these discussions about the "issues" in the military, at least TRADOC, training design and development process before :)).

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True, it is not -- nor do I think it should necessarily be. A better process would be to more carefully select what is bought and buy stuff that is low maintenance; LRUs, swapouts, reliability requirements and so forth. Add to that better and more comprehensive training of new entrants, Officer and Enlisted to include maintenance at above the 'call a mechanic' level and life could be better.

Personally, I'm not giving the Army a bye on any of that -- nor am I holding my breath on any of it....:rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

... That and skewed priorities that put big ticket items ahead of must have items of little glamor. ...

... However, I also believe they've all been guilty of not really thinking ahead and getting a really good handle on their own roles and missions. ...

... A better process would be to more carefully select what is bought and buy stuff that is low maintenance; LRUs, swapouts, reliability requirements and so forth. Add to that better and more comprehensive training of new entrants, Officer and Enlisted to include maintenance at above the 'call a mechanic' level and life could be better.

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When the Army moves to all the wonderful "net-centric" capabilities that are going to completely change the nature of war ...

[/Sarcasm] Sorry. :mad:

Whatever I think of it, and I personally believe it has been dramatically over sold, the Army is becoming increasingly information centric. The technical specialists necessary to keep those systems up and running, and especially to keep the bad guys from knocking them down, won't be in uniform. The sad truth is that once they're trained, they make way more as civilians. Which means they get out, go to the contractor, who puts them back in the same duty station as a civilian at 4 or 5 or more times as much pay. I really don't think that could be solved by making them officers, either.

And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.

My mom told me. I think she was right and I think we've forgotten that...

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Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

Whatever I think of it, and I personally believe it has been dramatically over sold, the Army is becoming increasingly information centric.

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Too true -- and that has one driver. Over centralization. :mad:

That, in turn is driven by the lack of willingness to trust subordinates induced by the experience in the last few years of Viet Nam where Bn Cdrs found out that instant NCOs and 2LTs were wonderfully willing and dedicated but didn't know much and required constant supervision. A partial solution to that is far better training and a better personnel system. Until those very significant problems are fixed, we will over rely on technology and pay the CLS price. Seems dumb to me but what do I know....

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And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.

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IF we keep edging reliability and and simplicity out for sophistication -- which the industry wants to sell, it's got a bigger markup -- and if we keep insisting on trying to solve human problems with mo' better machinery...

OTOH there may be other, less expensive and more reliable ways to do things.

Not to mention that in my experience, reliance on electronic systems is dicey at best. They have the annoying habit of working well for months on end for unimportant things and then failing when you need them most... :rolleyes:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

OTOH there may be other, less expensive and more reliable ways to do things.

Not to mention that in my experience, reliance on electronic systems is dicey at best. They have the annoying habit of working well for months on end for unimportant things and then failing when you need them most... :rolleyes:

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I have this persistent vision of the next highly kinetic war beginning with a three or four day orgy of destruction of multi-million dollar systems ...

... followed by weeks, months and years of old fashioned infantry slug fest. :wry:

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Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

I have this persistent vision of the next highly kinetic war beginning with a three or four day orgy of destruction of multi-million dollar systems ...

... followed by weeks, months and years of old fashioned infantry slug fest. :wry:

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Something to the effect of ( Not sure about wwIII, but WWIV ; sticks and stones):eek:

We can't afford to fight $7M Tanks... :D

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Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

The technical specialists necessary to keep those systems up and running, and especially to keep the bad guys from knocking them down, won't be in uniform. The sad truth is that once they're trained, they make way more as civilians. Which means they get out, go to the contractor, who puts them back in the same duty station as a civilian at 4 or 5 or more times as much pay. I really don't think that could be solved by making them officers, either.

And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.

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Bingo. The Army already had that problem back in the 70's with the troops it spent 12-18 months training to maintain its SIGINT/EW systems. I/EW system maintainers left the schoolhouse for their first assignment with civilian job offers already in hand.

Pardon the delay in responding. I was thinking.

Schmedlap wrote:

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I understand the concern that an argument was put forth stating, basically, that if the contract were cancelled then troops would be without food. However, that is an exaggeration of a statement that was false to begin with. There would be a delay in transferring back from contractor-provided logistics to Army-provided, but the troops would not go hungry. They would simply eat MREs in the interim.

Any FOB or other type of base in Iraq always has enough MREs to be a buffer against a stoppage in food flow. I know this because I have seen it occur. Certain FOBs have had their food supply cut short due to certain routes being shut down to logistics convoys. During those times, the FOBbits ate MREs. The issue is not that troops would go hungry. The issue is that they would be eating MREs. And if you do not cringe at the though of troops eating anything less than gourmet food prepared in a 4-star dining facility, 3 to 4 times per day, everyday, then you do not support the troops (that was sarcasm). That's right - there is a political angle.

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I did not mean to suggest that the contractor refusing to do his job meant that troops would starve. Rather, I do not think that folks with that sort of an attitude ought to be in the government contracting business. Alternately, I'm not sure that the government contracting model works because, at the end of the day, the profit motive is at odds with the needs of national security. There is a fundamental conflict between interests and objectives.

As to the MRE point, it should be remembered that the MRE is not formulated for long-term consumption. It's a stop gap, it's a means to provide interim caloric and basic nutritive needs, but it is not an answer to the subsistence needs. On a less tangible basis, one could be concerned about the cohesion effect of constant MRE feeding -- the nature of the meal is such that it can tend to degrade the group dynamic by pushing people apart during an activity (feeding) that is most enhanced by the group. How we eat is as important as what we eat. (I am a believer in the small intangibles in the military effectiveness equation.)

It would take a lot more explanation than is feasible here, but I think the biggest problem is the lack of balance. FOBs with steak and lobster and five flavors of ice cream contrasted with small units outside the FOB with very little is not a particularly good set up. If I were in charge of logistics, I would start with the pointy end and work my way back -- nobody gets steak and lobster until everyone can get a decent meal. For the guys at the very edge of that pointy end, the best answer is for military personnel to handle the food preparation.

I do like your point about the "political issues." You've basically made the entire point of my dissertation, that the gastronomy for morale calculus is determined to a greater degree by the larger societal-cultural needs than the morale needs of the troops.

Ken White wrote:

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Do not take umbrage but allow me to point out that your son is not a relatively mature 18 or 19 year old who volunteered to do a particular for remuneration. That guy volunteered to do a job that he thought he would like or at least tolerate for some reason.

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If that relatively mature 18 or 19 year old had learned the lesson earlier in life, that might not be the attitude. The point of childhood is to develop the skills and tools that will be necessary and useful for adult life.

And I did not inadvertently -- or otherwise -- "malign" anyone. You all provided a set of facts regarding the average combat arms soldier. I drew a conclusion from those facts -- perhaps a harsh one, but certainly a defensible one. It may not be anything anyone wants to hear or contemplate, but I can't help that. If you want to change the facts that you assert, then I can arrive at a different conclusion. But if you provided that set of descriptors about a generic individual or group, I doubt anyone would come to a different conclusion. Let's not allow our thinking to be clouded by a false loyalty.

For the record, I am just this harsh with my husband whenever he starts complaining when he shouldn't be. I'm blunt. Live with it. Learn to love it. I have no doubt it will prove valuable one day.

===

As to my use of the Marine officer as an example... I am aware that the Marine Corps and the Army are different institutions and comparisons are made at one's peril. I was not comparing the institutions, I was comparing attributes of individuals. As such, I do think that if it's possible to achieve such an end with Marine Corps officers, there is certainly room to consider that it's possible to achieve the same thing with enlisted soldiers.

As to how the A/B billet rotation works, I was not intending my idea to be an exact copy of how the Marine Corps runs it, but rather was suggesting a model from which to build a similar system with different specifics and ends.

Finally, please remember that I did suggest that such a program would best work with new enlistees.

Regards,
Jill

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Originally Posted by Sargent

As to the MRE point, it should be remembered that the MRE is not formulated for long-term consumption. It's a stop gap, it's a means to provide interim caloric and basic nutritive needs, but it is not an answer to the subsistence needs.

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In OIF I, we ate nothing but MREs, T-rations, and occasionally some food from local restaurants in Baghdad. In 12 months, during OIF III, at least 90% of my meals were MREs. The rest were a mix of T-rations (either mystery meat or General Tso's chicken) and an occasional brown-lettuce salad or a piece of rotten fruit. It was completely random in OIF V - MREs, occasional DFAC meal, eating with locals, etc.

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Originally Posted by Sargent

On a less tangible basis, one could be concerned about the cohesion effect of constant MRE feeding -- the nature of the meal is such that it can tend to degrade the group dynamic by pushing people apart during an activity (feeding) that is most enhanced by the group. How we eat is as important as what we eat.

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We lived in pretty tight confines, so eating indoors did not push anyone apart. The same was true of eating in the back of a Bradley in the field - very tight confines. I suspect that the same is true on a FOB. Soldiers are going to eat their MRE in an air-conditioned hut or huddle together to take up refuge from the sun in whatever shade exists. The only time that I recall MRE consumption to be a solitary event was in Ranger School, when you moved toward the center of the patrol base to devour your meal while your buddy pulled security.