Here is a link to the BAE GCV entry - the vehicle looks like a M2 and M113 made a baby. What imagination they have at BAE:rolleyes: This is enough to make a guy cynical.
http://defensetech.org/2012/03/02/fr...id/#more-16487
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Here is a link to the BAE GCV entry - the vehicle looks like a M2 and M113 made a baby. What imagination they have at BAE:rolleyes: This is enough to make a guy cynical.
http://defensetech.org/2012/03/02/fr...id/#more-16487
I mean really, is this a f***ing joke!
Well I guess I'm the only responding to this so I will continue to have this conversation with myself:)
Now that I took a big boy pill I get the size of GCV - I believe both Ken White and Wilf (as well as others) have posted that vehicles that are designed to operate/complement the MBT needs to be built like a tank and the GCV design by BAE seems to meet that requirement at 140,000 pounds. I do wonder about the gun size, but I have a feeling that the future Armored Brigade Combat Team (formally the HBCT) will be designed like the current SBCTs with three battalions of GVCs with a platoon of M1 tanks attached to each GCV company.
It's NOT built like a tank; as you first noted, it's a cross between a 113 and an M2 / 3. -- which probably means it'll have the worst attributes of all. It's problem is that it'l get used like a tank as were the Bradleys. Bad vehicles all. We ought to buy Namers but won't, not invented here. :rolleyes:Quote:
Originally Posted by gute
Hopefully we'll drop the 'team' bit and just call it an Armored Brigade.Too infantry heavy IMO. Two Tank and two Mech Cos are far more flexible. ;)Quote:
I have a feeling that the future Armored Brigade Combat Team (formally the HBCT) will be designed like the current SBCTs with three battalions of GVCs with a platoon of M1 tanks attached to each GCV company.
That GCV is a bad idea, sounds simplistic but I learned one thing over a lot of years -- if it looks right, it'll work right. If it doesn't, it won't. That thing doesn't even look right, way too much overhang in all directions for one thing. Way too tall for another. It'll be a bear to drive due to all that and that means lengthy and difficult driver training. Overarmed, too. I really doubt it'll keep up with an M1 in tight quarters or cross country... :D
I don't know much about the subject but those overhangs made it look funny. Then when Ken mentioned them it hit me why. It looks like the WWI French St. Chamond tank with a big beanie on top.
140,000# seems very heavy. Do the Army and USMC have the engineering and bridging capacity to handle so many heavy vehicles? I don't know which is why I ask.
"a M-2 and M-113 made a baby"- I laughed like hell at that line.
Designations are supposed to mean something. A 2-2 ratio is typically understood to be a mechanised (infantry) brigade; infantry in protected tracked vehicles and main battle tanks, suitable for a wide variety of terrain.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
An Armored Brigade would receive a different NATO icon on maps and lead coalition staffs to inadvertently think that the formation is rather meant for terrain that's not so nice to infantry AND to think that the entire formation is suitable for demands of fast operational advances.
Besides; I'm a bit flabbergasted why one of the bigger active armies in NATO would turn away from formation specialization and embrace a standard format. Small forces need to standardise, bigger ones can enjoy the benefits of specialisation.
There should be formations with a focus on mounted combat (with infantry strength for the exception from this rule) and mechanised formations with a focus on slower, yet more thorough dismounted combat (where tanks become assault guns and security vehicles, with infantry being the main hand). I suppose the airborne and 'mountain' forces do not satisfy the need for the latter.
(West) Germany had a 1950's discussion about optimal brigades (divisions were ruled out as too cumbersome and only raised because politicians had promised 12 of them to the West). A universal balanced brigade was favoured, but geographic realities forced us to specialise (South and North Germany are very dissimilar).
In the end, we developed an entirely different culture and tactics between armour and mech inf brigades. The armour brigades turned towards a much, much faster and more daring movement style while the armoured mech thought more infantry-like and emphasised security more. I suspect a balanced standard brigade would not develop such a rich repertoire for an army.
And from the look of this beast, they weren't married at the time. :oQuote:
Originally Posted by gute
I see a lot of FCS in it. On the other hand, I'm sure it satisfies every single spec in the RFP/contract and provides every feature the Army asked for.Quote:
Originally Posted by gute
If you ask companies to design to a large set of specifications instead of asking them to develop a design that provides capabilities, this is what you get.
(Of course, getting people to understand the difference between a capability and a design solution that provides it is a whole different challenge.)
:rolleyes:Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
If you look at the ass end it has a little Namer in it. Must have been a 3-way.
The US norm was, for years, two Inf, one Tank = Mech Bde; two Tank, one Inf = Armored Bde. The hybrid 2 and 2 is my idea of a better approach. Not telling yet how the Armored Bde will actually be structured.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
True but that's what happens when one lets the Accountants have too much sway...Quote:
Besides; I'm a bit flabbergasted why one of the bigger active armies in NATO would turn away from formation specialization and embrace a standard format. Small forces need to standardise, bigger ones can enjoy the benefits of specialisation.
Same here and I believe your assessment's correct.Quote:
...The armour brigades turned towards a much, much faster and more daring movement style while the armoured mech thought more infantry-like and emphasised security more. I suspect a balanced standard brigade would not develop such a rich repertoire for an army.
... Crusader (maybe BAe should look into it. Seems like "outlandish" is their motto)
From the Lexington Institute: Is The Army About To Make Another FCS-Size Mistake?
Interesting article by Ralph Peters from 1997. If you noticed from the photos and descriptions of the GCV is the sensors or similar capabilities. Anyways, take a look at his article on the future of armored warfare:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/p...umn/peters.htm
Whenever there's talk about 'future tanks' keep in mind that it's likely only about Western future tank projects or even only about requirements.
Meanwhile East and South Asia is mass-producing the classic MBT and (thinly armoured) IFV categories and judging by the numbers they define the future of tanks.
I really wondered how long it would take GM to put tracks on the Stryker and try to market it as a viable option for the GCV. I don't know this for a fact - total speculation.
http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/
yep, it's true. Here is a short news article on it.
http://blog.thenewstribune.com/milit...-seen-at-jblm/
So it is now very roughly about 42 tons similar to the heavierst German Puma variant which of course has a "turret".
At least the US has some scale to work with, which can't be said of the Italian efforts in this direction.
I wrote a comment here yesterday (deleted prior to submission).
The short version is that I think BAe and the U.S.Army should be kept away from AFV development in general for the next decade. Give other institutions a chance.
Oh, and I'd like to express my great relief that EADS does not merge with BAe.
I'm with Ken and many others here that the IFV or whatever you want to call it should be armored like a tank if it's fighting with tanks. keep the remote weapon station of at least a 50 caliber and and a useful troop load of 9+ and we just might have "weiner" here gents. I don't know if the entire vehicle was up armored or the added weight comes from the double-V hull and tracks. The other thing I like about this as a possible replacement for the M2 - cost (if it keeps our guys safe that is). The cost of the GCV pictured on this thread, but earlier posts was going to be between 9-11 million each - WTF! I would imagine this baby is gonna run 5-6 million. The more knowledeable here will know and can set me straight about its viability as a replacement for the M2.
A question for the more knowledgeable guys out there.
It seems that quite a few here think that infantry organized to fight alongside MBTs need a carrier with MBT-like qualities, especially armor and mobility, minus the firepower. The Merkava - Namer combination has been named as a good example. Considering the low numbers of vehicles purchased, especially in Europe, and the advantages of a mostly shared vehicle does it make sense to go with a standard front engine configuration for new MBT projects?
Thanks.
A major factor in favour of a front-engine and transmission is use of their mass and bulk to increase forward protection up to the top of the glacis. That location and use can be considered as likely to increase the probability of a mobility kill. However, a penetration of the forward hull that causes such damage is anyway likely to injure crew members and otherwise disable the vehicle, or similarly an equivalent rear-engine vehicle. The other major gain with a front-engine is that the rear hull can then include a door and ramp that enables ready and better protected entry and egress for the crew and any passengers, possibly including one or more litter-borne casualties.Quote:
Originally Posted by Firn
Conversely a major factor in favour of a rear-engine and transmission is that they act as a counterweight to armour concentrated at the front end which a crew typically aims at what they perceive to be their main threat. Another factor is that pulling track to a rear sprocket is more efficient in terms of energy lost to friction than pulling to a front sprocket, or to an elevated sprocket on a mid-engined tracked vehicle as used mainly by industry.
Each of those factors is obvious but assessment of their importance has been affected by considerations that are specific to and supposedly mandatory for a well-configured MBT with an enclosed main armament. One is that its gun should be mounted as low as practicable on the vehicle in order to minimise overall height and particularly the weight of armour on the turret front and to some extent its sides. Nothwithstanding that the turret roof must be high enough so the gun can depress below the horizontal for utility and hull-down fire over a berm or other form of cover. Somewhat similarly elevation is restricted to avoid recoil into the turret floor.
However, the Israeli Merkava Mark 1 through Mark 4 tanks each have the engine and transmission below a mildly sloped glacis and have a turret which provides depression and elevation of -8.5 and +20 within a turret roof height of 2.8 m. Corresponding figures for other western MBTS are: Abrams: -9, +20, 2.9m; Challenger: -10, +20, 2.5m; Le Clerc: -8, +15, 2.9m; Leopard-2: -9, +20, 3m. So relative to western rear-engined MBTs, Merkava has a small reduction in its main armament depression.
In regard to elevation the modern MBT can be required to employ its main and especially its co-axial armament in close-range fire against built-up and high-rise targets. To enable that its armament must be mounted higher above the hull floor in either a flat-roofed or contour-roofed turret which encloses the armament, or above the hull in a remotely operated super-elevated and armoured gun mount. That last type of mount brings its own set of problems. For example in order to be fired broadside on it may - to reduce the overturning moment - demand the complication of variable recoil length. The practicable increase in elevation and in depression will be large for an externally mounted main armament, with lesser increases gained for an armament enclosed in a flat-roofed or contoured turret. Notwithstanding such applied considerations, the vital aspect is that a front-engine chassis does not intrinsicly compromise the functioning or use of mounts or turrets.
Back in the late-1960s the Israeli’s decided it made sense to adopt a front-engine configuration for the Merkava MBT. Their rationale was clearcut then and is even more applicable today. For generally similar reasons a front-engine is also preferable for the heavy ARV/recovery and AEV/combat engineer vehicles and also the HAG/assault gun. To assist forward and backward towing and pushing, dozing, excavating, lifting and ripping the ARV (which functions also as an auxiliary AEV) and AEV (which functions as an auxiliary ARV) are often ballasted down. Adopting a front-engine configuration would require different arrangements for ballast. However that might be fully offset against the utility of a rear doorway/ramp for their mechanics and engineers.
The one exception is the heavy AVLB/assault bridge which needs a counterweight to support the launch of a scissor or cantilever bridge. An alternative front-engine configuration would require a reversing manoeuvre toward the gap followed by ‘rearward’ launch of a bridge. For that the crew’s vision could be augmented - as is already common - by means of closed-circuit cameras, and the stern of the vehicle could carry ‘additional’ armour transferred from the bow. Alternate crew positions might even be provided at each end. With bridge(s) offloaded an AVLB is commonly expected to function as an auxiliary ARV or AEV. Providing a dozer blade/stabilizer at each end could result in a double-ended auxiliary ARV/AEV, always provided that a door/ramp was still readily accessible at one or other end.
Enough theorising. The short answer to the question is an unqualified yes it makes sense to go with a front-engine configuration for new MBT projects.
If - however unlikely it seems - more than two new MBT projects are commenced in the future then one of those three or more could be rear-engined or mid-engined.
Thanks for your long and detailed reply, it makes it difficult to come up with a proper answer. ;)
I see the issue mostly from a economic and logistics point of view. There have been over the years quite a number of successfull families of military vehicles, some of them in the combat role. In general the variants of the same family share a good part of the chassis, the power train etc. while differing only when the specific requirements of the specific variant demand it. So far so easy. The key benefit is that the whole is more then just the sum of the variants. It is also a sort of benefit which is difficult to integrate in a trial of a specific vehicle/platform so that sometimes the individual winner is worse for the whole then the second or third-best. Nothing new there, of course.
What I personally find interesting is the fact that historically the heavier combat vehicles like MBTs , SPGs and (heavy) APCs seem to have remained rather isolated members with little share in common. Yes, there are many specialized vehicles bases on MBTs but seemingly hardly one with considerable volume.
---
Anyway from a technological point the hybrid system of the GCV does sound interesting, it sounds like a parallel one.
On the M1 Abrams thread I commented that the GCV projectThat comment was unsupported so here is an expansion. Most of following quotes are from http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/fil...t_Vehicles.pdfQuote:
... will require at least two major changes. One, the proposed scale of issue will have to be reduced and directed to companys (rather than battalions) of assault infantry and combat engineers. Two, the large turret and armament will have to be supplanted by something smaller and less heavy that is still able to deliver intense prophylactic fire. Hence the definitive vehicle will be smaller and probably less weighty.
Quote:
The GCV is supposed to operate across the full range of potential conflict types while providing unprecedented levels of protection for the full squad of soldiers it will carry. To achieve the Army’s goals, the GCV would weigh from 64 to 84 tons, making it the biggest and heaviest infantry fighting vehicle that the Army has ever fielded—as big as the M1 Abrams tank and twice as heavy as the Bradley, the Army’s current infantry fighting vehicle.
By implication the other 60% of Bradleys in each HBCT (24 Army and 9 Guard) will be M3 cavalry fighting vehicles plus mortar, engineer and CS variants. There are also Abrams and Bradleys – mostly M3 CFVs – in the 6 (Army) Armoured Battalion Combat Teams and 3 (Army) Cavalry Battalion Combat teams. Elsewhere, armour on issue to the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (19 Army and 20 Guard) will mainly consist of MRAVs plus HMWWVs and other GS and all terrain vehicles with applique protection. However,Quote:
The Army intends to replace about 40 percent of the Bradleys in its heavy combat brigades with Ground Combat Vehicles (GCVs). The GCV will carry a full squad of infantry soldiers and provide very high levels of protection from all angles against a wide range of weapons. The Army plans to buy a total of 1,874 vehicles.
https://sites.google.com/site/usarmy...de-combat-teamQuote:
An inventory of 2,635 M113A3Es and M113A5Es will be kept up to combat standards at all times and can supply up to 12 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with mechanized transportation and cavalry.
Reading these and other references it seems that the GCV is intended to initially succeed the Bradley M2 infantry fighting vehicle, and that a variant will later succeed the M3 cavalry fighting vehicle. A GCV that weighs as much as an M1 Abrams MBT will be similarly restricted by terrain and whatever road/track and bridge infrastructure exists in an operational zone. Similar trafficability also means that the GCV is likely to be - almost invariably - deployed together with the Abrams as a composite force.
Such a force would be less deployable and less wieldy than a Bradley and Abrams mechanized or cavalry force, especially in regard to logistic support. A vital attribute of infantry is the capability to go early and operate anywhere, sometimes with at most medium or light armoured vehicles and sometimes with none at all. So for armoured infantry carriers one puzzle is to determine a balance between heavy and medium and/or lightweight vehicles.
Currently the US Army has the mediumweight Bradley M2 and M3 carriers plus the M113A3 and A5 carriers that are approaching obsolescence. If the numbers of those carriers on issue were graphed against combat weight the result would resemble a trough or the upper part of a barbell with peaks at 30 to 35 tonnes, and 15 to 18 tonnes.
Army planning is for the M113 to be succeeded by up to 3,800 AMPV carriers and variants. The AMPV will probably be heavier than the M113. But its unladen weight might still be less than 20 tonnes to enable ready transport in C-130 size aircraft. Some sources, however, suggest that the prime AMPV candidates include a turretless Bradley and a tracked Stryker each weighing at least 30 tonnes. So the future distribution of Army infantry - and cavalry - carriers could resemble a wider trough or longer barbell with one peak at 60 to 80 tonnes and the other at about 20 or about 30 tonnes.
Contrastingly the USMC plans to update from its AAV and LAV infantry carriers by procuring about 600 tracked ACVs and about 600 of a similarly weighted 8x8 MPC. The resultant kettle-type weight distribution or dumbbell-type tracked/wheeled distribution could be satisfactory for an ‘over the beach’ component and also for scouting. However, a somewhat heavier and better protected tracked infantry carrier would be useful to accompany Marine MBTs in any subsequent manoeuvre operations.
My presumption is that a wide trough/long barbell of GCV and AMPV vehicles would prove awkward to use and inadequate for purpose. It is more likely that the eventual distribution of the US Army’s tracked infantry-carrying armoured vehicles will have three peaks with the medium-weight Bradley and later its successor in the middle between the GCV and M113 or AMPV. In that context some companies in the HBCTs and more companies in Armoured Battalion Combat Teams and in the Cavalry Battalion Combat Teams would preferably continue to be equipped with mediumweight carriers rather than requip with GCVs.
SecondlyQuote:
Notable requirements in Band A include a primary weapon equal in capability to the current 25 millimeter cannon on the Bradley fighting vehicle, ...
A turret-mounted cannon at least equivalent to the 25mm Bushmaster is too large for prophylaptic fire. Also a cannon of less than 35 or 40mm would be unable to defeat many static targets and contemporary armoured vehicles. Compounded by lack of a LATGW it seems that the GCV is intended to have a neither-nor armament.The nature of an appropriate armament can be refined by considering two scenarios at the extremes of military operations.Quote:
To reduce costs, the Army has allowed the vehicle designers to omit some capabilities in the GCV that are included in the Bradley. For example, the Bradley has a long-range antitank missile launcher and associated long-range sensors mounted on the turret. Those components contribute about $1.3 million, or 35 percent, of the overall Bradley manufacturing cost of $3.9 million. The Army expects to save some money by omitting the missile launcher on the GCV, ......
One: infantry and armour movement and combat within an intensely contested locality. Any need for large calibre close support firepower will be provided almost certainly by MBTs rather than heavy assault guns that are traverse limited. Much of the smaller calibre prophylaptic fire is likely to be delivered by the GCVs that are co-operatively moving and supporting infantry within that locality. Cannon ammunition is much more bulky than ammunition for MGs. Also single - or multiple - cannon of say 50 down to 30mm calibre can be effectively employed and better kept in action when installed as the principal armament of a specialised weapon platform or cannon-equipped tank rather than as the secondary armament of an infantry carrier. Considerations of masking, multi-targeting, intensity, duration, damage and malfunction, and hazard posed to dismounted infantry indicate that a GCV could be usefully armed with (at least) two independently trainable small calibre weapon stations equipped with MGs of 7.62mm to 12.7mm calibre.
The armament officially proposed for the GCV includes a turret-mounted cannon and co-axial MG plus a shielded MG at the commander’s hatch. However, an alternate GCV would dispense with the turreted cannon. It would instead have its trainable weapons limited to single or multiple MGs - possibly complemented by a 40mm AGL - mounted in separate mini-turrets or RCWS. An ATGW container/launcher might be fitted on an as-needed basis to one or other RCWS to allow for instances when fire from a MBT was not available or allowable.
Two: a robust forward presence during anti-guerilla, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The heavily protected GCV is well suited to function as a deployable observation and sentry post and as a bullet magnet. In addition to protecting sentries and sensors it could be armed to provide deliberate small calibre fire to nullify snipers, dominate personnel movement and secure roads and pathways in built-up areas and rural zones. That would involve several crew-members operating an all-aspect sensor package and at least two separated weapon mounts - mini-turrets or RCWS. In this second role, the RCWS would not have to be stabilised. That would improve the prospects for development of a RCWS with an articulated boom supporting a sensor and MG pod operable in extended and compact modes.
Some commentators argue that scenarios can be chosen with bias to favour a particular viewpoint. That is a valid criticism. But scenarios are similar to gaming and can assist in evaluating a concept. The current concept for the GCV seems to be simply aimed at delivering a bulked-up ‘ Bradley on steroids ‘with an underpowered cannon. My underlying viewpoint - or bias - is that such a heavyweight infantry-carrying vehicle would be better employed in a deliberate close combat role rather than for manoeuvre. Hence, a GCV would preferably be armed with MGs in order to complement vehicles such as Abrams and Breacher during assault and spearhead operations, and to function as an anti-guerilla sentry.
If the GCV is intended to serve as a general-purpose infantry carrier then it should be specified and developed as such. Depending on the requirement for a manned or unmanned turret, the result would be a mediumweight AIFV along the lines of the BAE/Haaglunds CV90 or the KMW/RmLS Puma. But that would be a successor for the Bradley IFV. The heavy force would still be without its required super well-protected infantry carrier.
The GCV is quite unimportant anyway. I'm sure it's going to be cancelled as well. The U.S. military hasn't brought a development program for a new tracked AFV to successful conclusion in three decades and every new program just exhibits the "why".
They should set up standards for interfaces, maintenance, data communication, reliability, quickness of repairs first and then go shop for what the industries offer.
Instead they're some corporations with horribly inflated development contracts - and the industries are guaranteed a profit margin by merely developing something which isn't going to be produced.
Besides, the entire concept of mating autocannon combat vehicle and APC tasks is deeply flawed. The concept of a Schützenpanzer / IFV hasn't been valid since hand-held AT weapons' practical range exceeded the practical range of moving mounted infantry (less than 100 m) in the 50's.
Ever since, the IFV perception moved towards autocannon partner to MBTs and neglected the dismount strength.